



# Leo Strauss

## on the Problem of Sokrates

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The origins of political science are in Greece, and more particularly in Socrates. Therefore we will deal with Socrates in this course.

Socrates did not write, so we must depend on men who wrote about him, as Aristophanes, Xenophon, and Plato. There is a problem of who gives the right account. Aristophanes is not a sober reporter. The same may be true of the others.

We will read the Apology, Crito, Clouds, Birds, and Wasps. We will deal with this group only, because Xenophon's Memorabilia is not available.

The subject is suggested because as political scientists we want to understand political phenomena. Now, political science is generally said to be the empirical study of these phenomena. But the question arises: What is relevant? That Mr. X voted is not itself relevant. We have to see his relevance in another light, as a type of voter. We come to the question: what is the whole to which the political things must be relevant? Political is derived from polis, a form of living together independently of others. The polis no longer exists. So we have to look now for some other whole to find what is politically relevant. Perhaps this is the state. But the polis is not equivalent to the state. Today, by 'state,' we mean something in contradistinction to something else--society. The former whole--the polis--is today split into two things, state and society. The preponderant view is that society is more comprehensive and fundamental than the state. This leads to the conclusion that a true understanding of political phenomena is sociological; that the study of politics should be absorbed by sociology.

But there is a difficulty. What is society? What is meant by it? Doesn't the term owe its reputation to the fact that it is unbelievably vague? For example, are we a society? Are all men living on earth a society? No. Are we in this room a society? No. When we say "our society" what do we mean? We mean American society, drawn by our political boundaries. Polis is precise, society is not.

Another view of determining relevance is one which makes the larger whole the world-historical process. This is Marx. Now the trend is toward a world-state society, hence relevance depends on how an event relates to this trend.

But does this help? The situation in the middle of the 20th century is unique. No political analysis of anything going on can be adequate without an awareness of this uniqueness. But what is the meaning of this uniqueness? In every age, there is something which we can call a basic opinion by which men are united, even in their fights (for religious wars presuppose that religion is worth fighting for.) So, what is the ruling opinion of our age? If we look at western countries, we can say it is democracy. And the other element of the uniqueness of science. The ruling opinion is democracy and science in such a way that the two are in basic harmony. The method of democracy is the method of intelligence. Whereas democracy is the ruling opinion in many states, science is ruling everywhere.

For the first time there is one ruling opinion. This is unique. Strictly speaking, science can't be an authority accepted blindly, and yet modern science takes on this character. Man takes this faith, that man can be united through the quest for or respect for Truth, in and through reason. This hope can be called rationalism. This is the basic stratum of our present opinion.

In the West, what is most characteristic of scientific reason? What does reason mean for us in the West? We might expect it to find out ends, and the means to these ends. What about present-day scientific rationalism? We now have a distinction between facts and values. The ends of human life are, according to this distinction, irrational. Once the values have been posited, science can decide as to the means. This is a crucial difference between the victorious rationalism of today and the original premise of rationalism.

Originally the purpose of science was to discover relations, causes, laws, and not only facts. Science presupposes such a thing as causality. What about the modern status of this principle of causality? It is now regarded as a mere assumption. Modern rationalism bases its whole endeavor on a non-evident assumption. Science has today externally the greatest triumph: no society can resist it (whereas religion was superior to Newtonian cosmology), yet the triumph is hollow because the reason within science declares itself incompetent for the greatest purpose—deciding ends and the basic foundation of causality.

We could try to think of alternatives: either (a) question reason, and find another way, e.g., revelation; or (b) not abandon reason, but question what reason has come to mean. Perhaps the belief that an evaluating social science is impossible must be revised. Perhaps we have to recover this notion. In simple terms, perhaps traditional political philosophy is not as bad as it is seen to be. Traditional political philosophy was an evaluating social science.

But we must consider a fundamental ambiguity about traditional political philosophy. Within the tradition there is a fundamental break at a certain moment; there are two radically different conceptions, the classical view and the modern view. Most of the criticism of traditional political philosophy is based on an understanding of modern political philosophy and a criticism of classical thought in the light of this modern understanding.

We proceed in a simple way setting a criterion to distinguish a tradition. How does it divide human knowledge? How, for example, does Aristotle divide it? If we can understand this, we can see what the quarrel is between the ancients and the moderns. The real quarrel is in the field of philosophy and science. For Aristotle, all the sciences could be fundamentally divided into two parts: the theoretical, which included mathematics, physics, and metaphysics; and the practical, which included ethics, economics, and politics. Today the distinction between theory and practice is abolished. And the idea that philosophy and science are the same is dropped. Up to the 17th century what we call science now didn't exist because what we call science is not philosophic. There was not, prior to the 17th century, any physics as physics; what existed was within a system, as an Aristotelian physics or an Epicurean physics. This was not so with the practical arts—shoemaking and, to some extent, logic were developed according to the inherent qualities of shoemaking and logic. But in the 17th century a metaphysically neutral physics developed. Today a distinction is drawn between philosophy and science. Today some of the divisions of philosophy are epistemology, logic, ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of language, philosophy of history, and philosophy of religion. We wouldn't include metaphysics because that it is not hocus-pocus is not undisputed.

In Aristotle the theoretical is the higher kind of knowledge; and within the theoretical, metaphysics is the highest. If metaphysics were dropped, then physics



would be highest. But in the modern division, what is the highest in actual practice is not stated; but what do all the things listed above have in common? A study of the human soul or human mind, human psychology. Philosophy is no longer cosmology, concern with the whole, but primarily concerned with man. For example, philosophy of religion didn't exist in former times. God, toward whom religion attracts, is not the object of philosophy of religion, but the human attitude toward God is. Another example. In the middle ages the principle of human conduct was called the natural law. In modern times people still talked of it, but later talked of rights of man. The natural was replaced by man. The natural law was also law for man, but the whole was emphasized, whereas "the rights of man" doesn't refer to anything but man. Kant, a contemporary of Tom Paine, explicitly abolished the old terminology. He called the new phenomena the law of freedom. Also law was replaced by right. In the older view, order came first, secondarily giving rise to rights. But in the new view, man's rights became primary and order became secondary: the primacy of man against the primacy of order.

Another example. Regarding aesthetics, in the ancient teaching the equivalent of what we call aesthetics was poetics. According to this older view, poetry was an imitation, not a creation or making. In the modern view, the fine arts are created. In the older view, the artist was dependent, now he is autonomous; he creates.

In the ancient view, things belonged to a whole from which they took meaning. But if meaning originated in man, then we have to have logic, because the mind gives all meaning. The notion of conquest of nature means there is something in man which allows him to stay outside and conquer the whole. The distinction between theoretical and practical is abolished. (The difference between theoretical and practical is not the same as that between theoretical and applied. Practical science does not presuppose the theoretical as does the applied.)

Abolition of the distinction between theoretical and practical means we no longer believe in a fundamental difference between a man devoting himself to theory (contemplation, not construction as theory means today; theory originally meant a looking at something, a procession) and one who devoted himself to practical, non-philosophic things. This distinction between the philosophic and the non-philosophic man was more basic than the distinction between slaves and masters. The ancients believed that the non-philosophic man had a different object in life than the philosophic man. In modern life we think the object of all men is or can be the same, so the philosopher or scientist can serve all men. Science is for the sake of power. In modern times the view prevails that intellectual progress and social progress are identical. With improvement of the mind, social progress will come inevitably.

In the older view, man can't be united by reason; the modern view implies that they can be.

Before we can consider the suggestion that social science is possible, we must understand the cleavage in the meaning of social science which corresponds to the difference between the ancients and the moderns.

The distinction between the philosophic and non-philosophic man is more fundamental than that between the gentleman and his opposite. The gentleman bows to respectable authority. He likes the graces above all. He doesn't think and question, he dislikes pettiness; but in a way and because of this dislike, is petty.

In the early 17th century, Bacon, Descartes, and Hobbes held that science is no longer to be cultivated for its own sake, but for its fruits, which fruits are available to all men. All the enormous efforts of technology are means to fruits, which are accessible to all. But if the efforts were the end, then they would be available only to those who are qualified by training and nature.

The immediate subject of this seminar is classical political philosophy. The modern tradition is derivative. This is true even if modern social science is the end of all wisdom.

The proposal of practical political philosophy is the natural one to seek, that we should have an evaluating reason. That we should cut this out is based on a complicated experiment which allegedly shows that an evaluating political philosophy is impossible. Even if the present-day notion were the last word, it would still need justification, and this justification is available only with reference to what preceded.

In any modern social science we have a polemical reference to the ancients. There is a heritage of rejection of the ancients, no longer based on ancient texts.

There is a practical difficulty in studying the original form of social science. Socratic political philosophy presents itself as a quest for the best regime. (Socrates doesn't admit the possibility of society without regime.) The character of the best regime is determined by the character of association. It is determined ultimately by the nature of man. (Plato's Laws and Republic and Aristotle's Politics are all determined by this.)

This best regime is an ideal, distinguished from everything real. It could become real, but it is not of its essence to be real. The ideal is derived from idea. What did idea mean for Socrates? Idea is that which is truly. Everything else is a poor imitation of that which alone truly is. Ideas are separate, eternal, unchangeable. This is in contradistinction to what is mixed, which comes into being, and passes away.

But in Plato's works, the theme is not the idea, but Socrates in the flesh, the mortal Socrates.

Socratic political philosophy is the quest for the best regime, i.e., which is best for man as man. It is a universal theme, yet is not presented to us in treatises, but in the form of dialogues, with individual characters and proper names. The individual Socrates becomes the theme. Why? Because the best regime of the polis is somehow the same as the best order of the individual himself. In order to understand the best regime, we have also to look at the best human individual. We could say that Socrates is merely the best man whom Plato happened to meet. Is this sufficient?

Socratic political philosophy is accessible to us only from Plato and Xenophon, because Socrates did not write. Yet Plato doesn't write in his own name. Plato's doctrine is indistinguishable from Socrates'. All efforts to distinguish are purely hypothetical. Plato's writing is as unique as Socrates' not writing because Plato appears only in his Socrates. This is the only such case in thought. Socrates had to be characterized properly because he was a contemporary, not like Homer's Achilles.



Socrates' public activity was talk. He was a citizen, and never left home, except to fight. He is always in the center, always begins with the obvious. Plato was a private man, wrote, traveled; he was not so much a citizen—he was detached.

Other non-Socratic dialogues always begin from above. But Socrates always begins in the middle. His thinking has the character of an ascent from the here and now. Ascent is always followed by a descent. This is not a peculiarity of Socrates' thinking, but is characteristic of all right thought. It cannot begin from above. The fundamental question is never solved, and therefore Socrates' knowledge is inseparable from a kind of ignorance. Socrates raises questions rather than gives answers.

We live not in the highest principles, but only in the element of the derivative. Socrates became the theme because the best life is the philosophic, questioning life, as actually lived. Therefore Socrates could be chosen by Plato.



...You have prepared your paper, but we still need some more introductory remarks. A few points I mentioned last time -- I'll state them in a very general way again.

If we start from our situation today which affects all political matters as well as all thinking about political matters, we can say that we are the contemporaries of the greatest triumph of rationalism, and at the same time we are more aware, more obviously aware, of the hollowness of that triumph. The original project of that rationalism was this: man's universal and lasting happiness should be brought about by the conquest of nature -- by the production of abundance and all its implications. That is still around and by no means insignificant, but, to speak only of the most obvious level, the awareness is today more common that abundance and its implications, and freedom, and all the other things are not sufficient to solve the problem of the individual. But here we have -- modern man has developed a supplement to the political and social arrangements, and that is psychology, especially in the form of psychoanalysis. ~~adapts~~ The dissatisfaction with society, however satisfactory society may be, ~~is~~ is a lack of adjustment, and therefore one ~~has~~ to bring about adjustment by psychological, psychopathological means.

I mention a few other points which illustrate the situation. For example, there is the project of a science of public administration which claims to bring about a degree of efficiency which pre-scientific public administration is incapable to achieve. In the words of Herbert Simon, who is especially responsible for this development, the older view and the older thought of public administration is based on a kind of popular wisdom, proverbs. That has to be replaced by a scientific study of public administration. If we look a bit behind this formula, we see this. A human activity, which was traditionally thought to be a sphere of common sense, of practical wisdom, of prudence, is now taken over by science, and that is of general application. The distinction between practical wisdom or prudence and science has lost its elegance. That has something to do with what I said last time about the abolition of the difference between theory and practice, between theoretical science and practical science. Practical sciences were meant to be forms of practical wisdom or prudence. This distinction has lost its significance.

Another example is the substitution of prediction -- scientific prediction -- for guesses. Guesses -- informed guesses of experienced men -- are regarded as inferior to genuine predictions, and they would be inferior if predictions were possible. Behind -- the basis of this whole project, as it is still very powerful today, is this: there is no essential difference between man and the brutes, between life and non-life. This is -- at first glance there are some very striking differences, <sup>we all know</sup> ~~these~~, but the more science progresses, the more these differences will prove to be purely provisional, and the project of which you surely have heard -- you probably have read it in one of the daily papers -- of thinking machines which "think" as well as man or better than man is a necessary consequence of it. If there is no essential difference between man and brutes, between life and non-life, then there cannot be an essential difference between sufficiently clever machines and clever men. I read, on the occasion of this meeting here at Christmas time of the scientists, a statement made by Norbert Weiner, who is well-known as the representative of this view, and I think this statement is very revealing, although I must make this remark with a qualification -- I have not read the paper by Professor Weiner; I have read only the newspaper report which may be wrong. But he seems to have said that one of the major dangers to which we are now exposed is that these clever thinking machines may take over, may crush us. Now if he really says that, one would say: Why did he build them in the first place? And why does he continue building them? Why does he not stop immediately with such a danger? And secondly, if they are really thinking machines, thinking beings -- if they really think, -- why does he not try to negotiate with them a settlement by virtue of which we might survive? If they are very clever, one could show them that as servants of these machines, as slaves, the humans could still fulfill an important function.

Now... you laugh about it, but you must admit that this is <sup>now</sup> the reaction of ordinary common sense to this proposal. This common sense is excluded from any consideration by definition by this kind of people. So this surely is ridiculous, but it is at the same time also a weeping matter, not only a laughing matter.

Now, the hollowness of this proposal, of this hope, appears from a number of considerations. The most obvious one is not so much the thinking machines as the undeniable fact that man, who has developed this tremendous technological apparatus, is by virtue of this apparatus enabled to destroy himself. No such possibility existed in former times. Individuals could destroy themselves, but it was not that some individuals could destroy the whole human race.



On a more theoretical level, this science, this modern science, on which our well-being depends, is by its very nature incomplete. It lives in a horizon of infinite progress. The very idea that at a ~~certain~~<sup>certain</sup> moment all scientific problems could have been solved is incompatible with this notion of science. But, if this is so, that means that the whole which is studied by this science will always remain mysterious, because all progress is taking place in time. There is not infinite time at our disposal, and science by its nature would become complete only in infinite progress. The fundamental mysteriousness is in fact admitted by that science. It concedes the fact ~~that~~ what is in the foreground is the promise of ever-greater progress, of ever-greater rationality. This does not, however, avail with the permanent, persistent, fundamental nonrationality. The fundamental situation of man, that is to say, can never be changed because the mystery would always remain.

Another point to which I referred last time is that the principle of all scientific investigation -- causality -- now appears to be a mere assumption and not an evident principle.

The fourth and last point is the one with which we are immediately concerned as social scientists -- the distinction between facts and values. And that means, practically, that reason is incompetent in the decisive respect, for all questions, all practical questions at any rate, have to do with means for ends; the means are meaningful only in the light of the ends; and if the ends cannot be shown to be sound or unsound by reason, the whole enterprise -- the rationality of the whole enterprise -- remains -- undecided. An implication of that fact-value distinction is that science or reason cannot establish the goodness of science itself. It cannot answer the question: Why science? It can, of course, say science is good for what, for example, medicine is good for health. But, why health? This question is a question which can no longer be raised, which can no longer be taken up. The answer which was formerly available in a more unsophisticated age: -- Science is evidently used for human life, for human survival -- is today an assertion which cannot make any impression on anyone because science is not necessary for human survival; on the contrary, science creates a danger to human survival which did not exist before.

It is a question: Is reason, as it has been cultivated throughout the ages, a delusion? Or, does not the error lie in a certain understanding of reason? And it is this understanding which came into the fore in the last centuries.

LECTURE 2

In application to political matters: Is it absurd to try to understand political things? Or, is it only absurd to try to understand political things without evaluating them? A proper discussion would have to go, of course, into the details. I did this, for example, in the second chapter of my book on natural rights, where I examined the position taken by Max Weber. Now the view of Max Weber is by no means identical with that prevailing at the moment in the social sciences. Max Weber's idea is somewhat older. But one must also say that Max Weber's whole understanding of the problem was much more profound and reflected than that which is prevalent today. Today we use the so-called relativism in the social sciences. It is a very simplistic view which is manifestly absurd, namely, all value judgments express nothing but like or dislike -- like ~~and~~ preference, for example, someone likes peaches more than apples, or vice versa, and that is said to be the statement of all value judgments, at least predominantly. And that is simply not true, as you can see if you look at any assertions you and someone else make about right and wrong; you mean more than you just like it better that way. And this is not even faced by these people. Max Weber did face it.

Now, can I say a word about a recent attempt to defend Max Weber's position that was done in a French translation of some works of Weber, some collections by Weber by Raymond Arons in the French translation which came out with I mention only a few points for those who -- as a kind of supplement to the earlier remarks I made. Arons grants that it is impossible to speak relevantly about social phenomena without making value judgments. It is a very simple thing; you cannot speak about a given politician or statesman without forming an opinion as to the quality of that politician or statesman; whether he is public-spirited, whether he has a broad perspective or a narrow perspective, and other qualities which are relevant. The values belong to the subject matter. Once you abstract from the values, you are no longer speaking about the phenomenon which you claim to analyze. This Arons grants, but what's the difficulty which he maintains? I read to you:

Max Weber (Arons says) might have admitted that -- what I have objected against. He would have raised objections only in a later phase of the argument. He would have accepted, for example, that one must distinguish between Leonardo da Vinci and his imitators. (What this means is a value judgment; that the mere imitator does not have the originality, the power of Leonardo da Vinci. It is obvious that you cannot have history of art, sociology of art, or whatever you call it, without making this distinction. Nor can you have the sociology of knowledge without



LECTURE <sup>2</sup>

making the distinction between scientific geniuses and people who are not scientific geniuses. That should be clear. Whether a scientific work was epoch-making or merely a kind of textbook formulation of what really original men found is obviously a factual question of the utmost importance for this kind of thing, a factual question which includes essentially a value judgment.) But (he goes on to say) can the historian ~~accept~~ establish such a hierarchy between Persian miniatures and Italian painting, between the statues of and the work of Pheidias? Within a universe which possesses its proper criteria of appreciation the historian cannot but evaluate without fortifying his comprehension of reality. But when the criteria are fundamentally different, when the universes are essentially different, the historian could not appreciate except by taking sides and by this very fact he would cease to be a scholar.

Do you understand this objection?

Then let us take another example. I have never heard a speech by Billy Graham, but I believe that most people would say, most Christians, certainly, would say, that however great he may be, Paul, or Pascal even, are men of a much greater stature. And they would say this not because they like Paul or Pascal better than Billy Graham, but they would show it by reasoning, by argument. But what if you have to compare Jesus with Buddha? That's obviously a question of a different order. He means to say if you have a certain, what shall I say, Western art, where certain basic essentials remain the same throughout the ages, as he has shown, then you have <sup>an</sup>inherent and immanent criterion by which to judge anything occurring within it. But if you have an entirely different kind of art, an entirely different kind of religion,, an entirely different kind of society perhaps, then you cannot judge, say, Western phenomena by Hindu standards, nor Hindu phenomena by Western standards.

What do you say about this point?

Well, permit me to read to you something which I have stated in print somewhere and I couldn't ~~say~~ <sup>state</sup> it better now.

If we cannot decide which of two mountains whose peaks are hidden by clouds is higher than the other, cannot we decide that a mountain is higher than a molehill?



For all practical purposes, there are value questions which the social scientist cannot settle. We can grant that. It is -- I think it is prudent to say that it is beyond the competence of the social scientist, for example, of the sociologist of religion, of the historian of religion, to decide the question as to the respective rank of Christianity and Buddhism. It is prudent to say that. But what follows from that? That he cannot judge at all? That he is not capable to appreciate, for example, Billy Graham, in contradistinction to Calvin? Surely not. What follows -- there are questions, value questions, just as there are factual questions, which are extremely difficult to solve, so much so that one can say for practical purposes they are insoluble. But what follows from that? That the social sciences as such must abstain from evaluating? Not at all. And the reason is this. There is no clear, universally valid line which can be drawn between the sphere in which we can evaluate and in which we cannot evaluate. There are certain very simple things where every human being, if he is not insane, if he has a minimum of experience, is perfectly competent to judge. Others require a very special competence and a very special training. And there may be finally a sphere where hardly any human being can judge. But there is no hard and fast line. And to build the notion of the scope of social science would require either; the other way requires that value judgments are impossible on all levels. This is simply not only not true but fatal to the idea of social science. There is no difficulty in admitting that there are quite a few value problems which are practically insoluble and insisting on the necessity of judging in terms of values where one is competent to judge.

I remember when I began my teaching in Chicago I had a long drawn-out fight with one student -- he's now a member of the political science profession -- who absolutely refused to admit that the distinction between art and trash can be used by a social scientist. Now, if that is so, I contend then that such a notion as sociology of art or history of art doesn't make any sense. With what right -- or for that matter, history of literature. If anyone writes a poem in the Sun Times of Chicago, then he's a poet. But I think quite a few of us are in a position to say, with all due respect to this gentleman, that this is perhaps rhyme, not a poem. And that is not merely an impression, but we could quote chapter and verse for proving it.

So the second point which comes out in this connection is this -- Weber's argument can be stated as follows: The objectivity of the social sciences requires the exclusion of value judgments. I contend that there is no objective science possible if there is no possibility of objective value judgment. Now, how did Weber try to solve the problem

in particular? Weber admitted that any social science requires criteria of relevance. A social scientist doesn't study all facts, but relevant facts. What is relevant and what is not is established only by reference to values. These values were, according to him, fundamentally subjective values. But, he says, this does not affect the objectivity of social science for the following reason. Science is a body of true propositions, of the answers to questions that can be established by ordinary rules -- whether the answer is true or not can be established by reference to the rules of evidence or of truth. Weber admitted that the questions which the social scientist addresses to the phenomena are not objective. They are due to his direction of interest, and therefore, ultimately, to the value system which he adopts. So you have, then -- the enterprise as a whole consists of an inevitably subjective part -- the questions -- and an objective part -- the answers.

But, there is this difficulty. The questions, and especially the broad questions, supply the theoretical framework, the fundamental concepts; the answers, however separated they may be from certain specific questions, are not separate from the concepts because the answers are necessarily couched in terms of the concepts. In other words, if Weber is right, that there are no objective values, then there cannot be an objective social science. The consequence is that, as I said in my criticism, the social science as Weber conceives of it is necessarily a parochial affair. The values of a given social scientist, and that means, in practice, of his society, of his age, determine the conceptual framework of the science, and a universally valid social science is impossible in his point of view.

I mentioned one example. Weber's social or political doctrine is interested, is concerned with what he calls the three forms of legitimacy, three principles of legitimacy: traditional, rational, and charismatic. The traditional, as Weber would tell you, would be the situation, say, in a medieval society or in a central African tribe or what have you. Rational -- that is what is characteristic of the modern constitutional, liberal state. Charismatic would be something where -- like Hitler -- where the personal gifts of the ruler are the legitimation of the rule. I contended in my criticism that this is a purely -- is a distinction which cannot possibly lay claim to any universality because it is simply borrowed from the situation in the western European countries in the nineteenth century. In so far as there was this great struggle between the relics of the ancient regime and



the modern revolutionary movements stemming from the French Revolution. In this context, the opposition of tradition and reason made some sense because the ancient regime claimed -- based its authority, in a way, ~~on~~, on age-old tradition, on prescription. The modern regime which emerged in opposition to the French Revolution, claimed to be based on reason. With a view to experiences like that of Napoleon I, Weber added a third one, with the charismatic, a kind of rulership which was neither that of the ancient regime nor that of the modern constitutional state.

Now, Arons makes this remark on the subject. I will leave it at that. "The three terms--tradition, reason, charisma -- correspond to two principles of obedience. Man obeys chiefs whom tradition consecrates, whom reason designates, whom enthusiasm elevates above the others." That's his justification. In other words, he claims that this distinction is one which is really based on the nature of man, on the nature of the ruler-ruled relationship. But I ask you -- what does that mean? He obeys chiefs whom reason designates. Is President Eisenhower or Adenauer, Chancellor Adenauer of Germany, or whoever may be, or Macmillan -- are they designated by reason? What does it mean? What does it mean? They've been elected in a legal manner. But what has this to do with reason? Well, if you make all kinds of unclear assumptions, you can, perhaps, justify, in a roundabout way--that ~~the~~ word, reason, could make sense after all. But primarily, it doesn't make any sense. It makes sense if you take into consideration this conflict between tradition and reason from the nineteenth century. It is not in itself a meaningful distinction.

The main point which I make Arons does not even discuss, namely, that the Weberian distinction between tradition, reason, and charisma is ultimately based on the view that people's most human, most profound, is Charismatic truth. Without this value judgment, ~~concealed~~ *concealed* but discoverable, the whole distinction would not make sense. And I think that every attempt -- I know this word "Charismatic" is constantly used in a certain kind of popular sociological literature -- these terms do not stand up under any analysis. Especially the Weberian form where it does not make any difference whether the so-called Charismatic ruler is a fellow like Hitler or an inspired statesman like Churchill. They're both Charismatic; what's the difference? And there's obviously a difference. That the one works in a constitutional framework and the other does not is true, but not so simply, because whether Hitler's government, at least in the first stage, was not perfectly legal according to the prescriptions of the Weimar

Constitution, is, you know, a very complicated question. Or, if you take the other case of Lincoln, who surely was an inspired ruler, but whose rule was not in every respect constitutional, according to the then understanding of the American constitution, then you see the difficulty. It is wholly -- it has a certain plausibility for the western world in the nineteenth century. Arons seems to admit everything I said, I say, at the end. The Weberian scheme helps for seizing the core of the political problem of our civilization, but Weber wanted to use it for the understanding of all civilizations. Therefore, he in fact admits my suggestion that this is a merely parochial scheme.

There is, perhaps, one more point which I could mention. Well, let's look first at my main point which I made, that the Weberian position strictly leads to nihilism which Arons, with some hemming and hawing, grants. It would take us too long to discuss that.

Now, I will come back to the point from which I started. Perhaps what is wrong is not the belief in reason, but a certain understanding of reason, the modern understanding. But, even if this is not so, we must try, at any rate, to understand our dilemma, and our dilemma is surely due to the failure of modern or rationalism. Modern rationalism is, in itself, a transformation of classical rationalism. Modern rationalism is necessarily a derivative phenomenon which we cannot understand except by going back to the original. Let me illustrate this by one example. When Hobbes, who, in a way, is the originator of modern social science, of modern rationalism, began his argument; he says the following thing: "When I turned my thoughts to the inquiry of natural justice, I was admonished by the very name, justice, according to which, by which, one understands a constant will to attribute to everyone his right. I was admonished by this very name that one must seek first how it comes that someone can call something his rather than another's. Now, since it is an established fact that this distinction is not by nature" -- meaning that I own this cigaret not by nature -- "but through the agreement of men, for nature has given everything to all and men have divided it afterward, I was therefore led to another question, namely, for whose benefit, or by virtue of which necessity, men wished rather to divide up things so that there would be property, than to leave them in composition."



Now, what does this mean? Hobbes begins his inquiry by starting from the definition of justice. Justice is the constant will to give, to assign to everyone what belongs to him. How does he know that this is justice? What do Plato and Aristotle -- in regard to this question? Well, we have the Republic, Plato's Republic, and Aristotle's Ethics. There justice is treated. What do they do? They seek a definition of justice. They seek, they start in a much more elementary way and arrive at a certain definition of justice which is much more rich, much more articulate than what Hobbes says. Hobbes does no longer see any question. Everyone knows what justice is. Someone has to find it, that's clear. And on this basis, then, he raises the question which could not possibly take on the basic importance it has for Hobbes if it were so -- if what justice is were a problem. ~~But~~ this is only one example. But I think it is a typical example -- That modern thought somehow assumes that certain basic and therefore inconspicuous questions have been settled by the tradition and they can then begin, therefore, on a higher level.

To take the most simple example, but then they are the most profound, these people who revolted against Aristotle and Plato and so on in the seventeenth century, in the sixteenth century, they said, "So that's all wrong. Their results are wrong. They did not have the right method, etc." But one thing was no longer a question for them -- the possibility and the necessity of a political science or social science. This was taken for granted. The question was only in what way to proceed. But, is there not a grave assumption implied in the very belief in the possibility and necessity of social science, or of science in general, ~~that~~ the truly fundamental questions was the primary scene of the classical thinkers. In this respect, as well as in others, modern thought is derivative, it transforms the preceding science; it transforms it, but in the act of transformation it presupposes it. Therefore, one cannot understand this modern stratum without having understood that through transformation of which it originally emerged.

Therefore, it is necessary if we want to understand the problem with which we are confronted, which is primarily created by modern science, both natural and social, we have to go back to the origins, and these origins are to be found in Greece. Especially as far as social problems are concerned, the problem is -- we have to go back to Socrates, and that we wish to do.

Before we turn to the text, I would like to make one remark with which I began last time but I will limit myself to one aspect of this only. Quite externally, Socrates never wrote. What Socratic political philosophy is we know only from pupils of Socrates, Plato and Xenophon. But, to speak here now only of Plato, who was the much greater



man, Plato, on the other hand, disappears behind his Socrates. Socrates never wrote. Plato, we may say, with a slight reservation, never wrote except in the name of Socrates. That creates a certain difficulty in itself. What is behind that? What does this mean? The problem of political philosophy as the classics understood it is that of the best social order, the best political order, the best regime. And this is fundamentally the problem of the best life, the best way of life. This best way of life -- we can say the best way of life of the individual is the core of the best regime as Plato and Aristotle understood that. This teaching regarding the best regime or the best way of life is transmitted by Plato, not in the form of a treatise, as Aristotle did it in his Ethics,<sup>and Politics</sup> but in the form of dialogues. That is a very great -- in a way the problem of Plato's political philosophy is identical with the question of why Plato wrote in dialogues about it. Apparently, we cannot understand what the best regime or the best way of life is if we do not understand it through dialogues, whatever that may mean.

I would like to bring up only one point. The best way of life -- the best way of life, that is something which is meant to apply, if in somewhat different ways, to all men. It is a universal. Any ~~way of life~~ way of life, of good life, presented in a dialogue, as Socrates' life is presented in Plato's dialogue, is not the best way of life, but the best way of life as lived by an individual, Socrates, with these accidental qualities. The best way of life as stated by Aristotle would be stated only with a view to what is essentially necessary. No accidents, like born in Athens, snub-nosed, and can drink more than anyone else, and the other things we learn about Socrates, would enter here. Whenever an individual is represented, as is Socrates, as leading the perfect life, accident and chance necessarily enter. And that seems to be, in other words, an inferior <sup>form of</sup> representation.

But, there is another way of looking at it. The best way of life as described, say, in Aristotle's Ethics, presents an "ought"; this is the way in which men ought to live, in which men should live. The representation in a Platonic dialogue, of Socrates, in the Platonic dialogues, shows the best way as actually lived, the best way of life as actually lived; not merely the ought, but the act, the deed, the compliance; not the mere prescription, but the execution. This excess of the execution, of the act, beyond the prescription, seems to convey a lesson which the prescription does not convey. One thing is clear.

The prescription can never say that any man actually lived up to that. The description shows an example. ~~Now~~, that surely does not go to the root of the matter. ~~But~~

One point can be stated generally, if not clearly, but that must be said. The best way of life is surely a life that is actually lived. If it is merely prescribed, and ~~demanded~~ -- it is not actually lived, there is something beyond the prescription, beyond the ~~law~~ <sup>logos</sup> which is, in a way, the most important thing. The mere prescription, the mere ~~law~~ <sup>logos</sup> is up in the air; it must be executed, it must be fulfilled. I appeal to an experience which you all must have made. We hear all kinds of universal statements, prescriptions, demands, come-ons. In a way, these universal statements become intelligible only by application. What we understand before we have tried to apply them is not yet an understanding. For example, if someone recommends a self-control in a certain situation which we have never been in, and that is, in a way, a very empty thing. But once we have been in that situation, have seen how difficult it is to exercise self-control there, then we understand what it means. Theoretically, we are, perhaps, we can, perhaps, not say more than we said before, but there is something there, very important, very powerful, which we understand now and which we did not understand before. The question is whether that excess, stemming from lived experience, can find its full expression in speech, in ~~words~~ <sup>logos</sup>, unless one uses such devices as, for example, a dialogue, or, for that matter, poetry. In a way, it is a very common thing when you read a book dealing with human conduct, and the man never uses an example, never an illustration, then, strictly speaking, it is unintelligible. I mentioned this, for instance, once with John Dewey's Human Nature and Conduct, which is not disfigured by a single example, and ~~though~~ you hear all these nice things about the relation of impulse and custom and how to strike a balance between the two in the proper act and, as you say, you cannot be sure whether you understood Dewey because he never gives an example. If you want to try to understand it, you must find examples for yourself, but you can never be sure whether they would be the examples which Dewey would have in mind.

Universal rules become intelligible only by being seen in particular cases. The individual case, says Socrates, concedes the universal in a way, because there is always -- Socrates may be someone else, or in another situation would act entirely differently, would understand entirely differently, perhaps. That is true. To turn to the principle, accident always enters whenever you present an individual case. But it is equally important to realize that the individual case also reveals the universal, that as universal, it is never revealed in its meaning. That is one of the reasons why Plato, in presenting the best life,



regime  
dialogues

presents it in the form of what we can call a description and not in the form of mere prescription. Plato's work as a whole is nothing but a presentation of the wise man. The theoretical discussions, for example, about the best ~~man~~, the best life, virtue, justice, etc., are all parts of that description or presentation. Or, to use terms somewhat closer to Plato's own usage, Plato imitates in his ~~work~~ the life of a wise man. Of course, he imitates the wise man in action as a wise man. He does not tell us how Socrates behaved when he was dressing or undressing because there is nothing wise about that. ~~But~~, the chief activity of the wise man being speaking, he presents him, of course, almost exclusively in the act of speaking. I say almost exclusively because there is also Socrates is also presented as dying, as you know, which seems to be a more appropriate way of showing wisdom in action than Socrates getting married, for example, which Plato never presented.

Now, this constitutes the uniqueness of Plato's work. There is no other describer or imitator who did nothing but imitate the wise life, the life of the wise man, in the action of wisdom. A few ~~good~~ examples: Homer's Odysseus is not the wise man. Odysseus lacks Homer's wisdom. In Hesiod's Works and Days, we do find the self-presentation of a wise man, that is, Hesiod, the poet, himself. Side by side with this work, there is Hesiod's Theogony, which has no connection, no important connector with the self-representation of the wise man. Parmenides, in his poem, presents a wise man, himself, mythically, namely, in the act of receiving the truth from the goddess. His life is not presented at all. And I think if you will look at modern presentations, or medieval presentations, for that matter, you -- the examples will, to say the least, be very rare of a man who devoted his whole life to the presentation of the act of the life of wisdom. Do you know any examples? Don't say Shakespeare because I think of Shakespeare in this connection. Tempest is such a presentation, possibly, but that is one of many plays, not the sole theme. So, I wonder if you know of a single man, at any time, apart from Plato, whose whole theme was the presentation, the imitation of the good life -- because that means for Plato the life of the wise man, the good life, indeed. Still, although Plato's work is without precedent, he could use early representations of wise men, and surely did. He could, even, had the good fortune of having a presentation of his wise man at his disposal. And what is that presentation of his wise man which Plato could use?

A. Socrates.

No, no, not a presentation. It slipped. <sup>There</sup> ~~was~~ was already a presentation of Socrates before him that he could use.

A. The Clouds.

I think we turn now to the Clouds.

Well, you told me Monday, so my report is not done yet.

I said Monday?

A. Monday.

I'm almost sure -- of one thing I'm sure, that I meant to say Wednesday.

A. You said Wednesday, and then you said that's not enough time.

I said -- oh, I am -- you are right. I have here the eleventh of -- yes. But, you see how much we can be deceived. Good. So then we have simply to help you a bit in writing your paper by beginning with the Clouds directly.

But, before I turn to that, I would like to know whether any of these very broad points which-- to which I have referred call for further clarification. I know that they call for them, but I must make this dependent upon your desires, for reasons which you will understand, if you don't understand them now, as soon as you have begun to teach.

What I tried to make clear to you was this -- that we are confronted with very serious difficulties which make it advisable, if not necessary, to return to the origins of our way of thinking and that means, for all practical purposes, to Socrates. Once this is admitted, we are confronted immediately with the great difficulty that Socrates did not write, and therefore, we have to go on to the question as to why Socrates did not write, or, in different ways, why Plato wrote only in the form of a presentation of the life of a wise man as distinguished from such presentation as you have in Aristotle and in all later philosophers.

Mr. \_\_\_\_\_?



- Q. You spoke of the possibility that reason would be considered to be a delusion, and I can perhaps understand what that means in modern terms, let us say in Kant, for example --

B., why go to Kant?

- A. Yes, you go very high. ~~Q.~~ I can give you a much simpler example taken from our problems here, from our I should say. Did you ever hear of ideology? What is ideology except an irrational speech, highly esteemed by the people affected by it. For example, the view which is very common, of course, that exists, and you must have heard it ~~on~~ times -- there cannot be a rational doctrine of the purpose of civil society. On the other hand, people cannot live without having opinions of the purpose of ~~the~~ society. You know? These opinions are now called ideologies. That means -- this implies, of course, reason, namely, that there could be a true, rational view of the purpose of civil society, is impossible. We have to be satisfied with irrationalities of social value. Where -- the question, of course, arises, how can you -- ~~is~~ is not reason which establishes the social value -- in which there is a certain difficulty.

But let us --

- Q. Does ideology, in this view, imply that a rational account of the purpose of society is impossible?
- A. Yes, sure. Because otherwise you would say that, for example -- if you take the Marxist view, because it is Marx who made the notion, the ideology, as popular as it is today. You know, it was not coined by Marx, it was coined by Napoleon, the term "ideology."

(Garbled.)

- Q. The people who hold the Marxist view don't think the Marxist view is really ideology.
- A. Of course not. They are still old-fashioned. Therefore, a Marxist wrote a book a few years ago -- a German Marxist, the only Marxist, the only educated Marxist in the western world -- George Lukacs. He is a Hungarian. His books are not translated into English. He really is the last lamented worth reading -- a much deeper thinker than Stalin, to say nothing of Khrushchev. So, if you want to know what Marxism could mean theoretically, ~~one~~ one wants to read ~~the~~ ~~Marxist~~ -- I don't believe it establishes the truth of Marxism in any way, but one should know that.



Now, Lukacs wrote a book a few years ago in German called the Destruction of Reason, by which he meant the destruction of reasoning generally believed to be occurring in the western world ...

(End of first side of reel)

... They would say they had a scientific account. Sure, that's what materialism means and therefore anything we think is ideology. What happened then was that a certain half-Marxist called Mannheim, partly following Lukacs, said all social thought, including Marxism, is ideology. In other words, in the form of Lukacs himself, which shows his cleverness but at the same time something else, Lukacs said, 40 years ago, Marxism must be applied to itself. But surely if you apply Marxism to itself in this way then I predict it will garbled ideology and that is today the common view. garbled and they have an ideology, the Marxists have an ideology, some tribe in Central Africa has an ideology and man is an ideological animal. Every man. That is today the very common view. So, I mean, there are some people who use slightly different expressions. For example, they say every society must have a myth but that amounts to the same thing, as the very word indicates.

Q. When I read Plato, I don't find this possibility entertained at all, the possibility that reason is a delusion.

S. That reason is a delusion? No. Forgive me. You misunderstand. I said there is a modern possibility that reason is a delusion. Then we must try to live with positivism. Or if this is really, truly impossible, we must find our way somehow with existentialism or something of this kind. But if reason is not a delusion, then we have to go back to those men who stood for reason, to put it very simply. And the greatest name as far as the study of human things are concerned is Socrates or if you wish, Plato. That is what I said.

Q. I've heard it expressed that this is a Socratic or Platonic phase in Greece. Is it?

S. If it is a mere phase, then it would be also some ideology. That is, of course, what these people say: That the Platonic philosophy is one particular expression of the Greek way of looking at things. That means, of course, it is not intrinsically true. It only has a certain evidence for the Greeks. For us, other things are evident but not because they're intrinsically evident but because we are modern men for whom certain modern notions have evidence. What is at the bottom of your difficulty?

Q. At the bottom is the question whether the possibility of knowledge is something that you have to begin with.

S. Yes. It's a question. But whether it is such a deep question, such a difficult question, is another matter.

Q. But it's only at a certain point it seems that people come to question if not the possibility, certainly the (?), of knowledge.

S. You see, the problem is this. So that the question is serious, there must be grounds for the question. For example, if I question that this is a shawl or a

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scarf, that is a silly question. I believe my example is bad. I believe it is really a scarf. So it is a silly question. But under certain conditions, it can very well be a legitimate question because when it's dark and I touch something, I don't know what it is. So the question "Is knowledge possible?" needs some grounds. (that does not mean that)

After all, when I say "I know you, Mr. X," I must have a complete understanding of your "personality" but ~~simply this~~ I cannot distinguish you ~~from any other~~ students here or recognize you in a crowd of a hundred thousand men, then if someone says, "I can't," I simply say, "You apparently have a very poor memory that you can't remember people after you've seen them for some time." There must be some grounds for that. As a matter of fact, that was the way in which it came about. For example, if you read Descartes' First Meditation, one must doubt of everything, Descartes gives some reasons why one should doubt. Whether the reasons are good or not, that is another matter. But he at least fulfilled the minimum requirement of trying to give some reasons. Of course the question of whether knowledge, in a very general way, is possible is not sufficient because the question concerns not knowledge of good and bad. First of all, it's a silly question. We have to face that, by all means, when we come to Socrates.

There was another point in your remark which may give me an occasion to restate what I was trying to say. There is a ~~view~~ <sup>view</sup> in the social sciences. There are ~~many~~ <sup>only</sup> ideologies; there is the democratic ideology, and there is a communist ideology, fascist, the Nazi regime, and of any tribe in the world. What does social science do? Social science recognizes the need for such ideologies. And that could probably be given in the form of "rationalizations". People live in a certain manner for the economic, or climatic, or whatever reasons, but men are such strange creatures that they need to believe that there are reasons for that. Good reasons! And that's a rationalization. We don't believe in any of these ideologies as social sciences. We describe them and we understand them in their relation to the actions <sup>life</sup> of these people. Is this not what the social scientist, as ordinarily understood, does? The question is whether that is possible; whether this so-called impartial and objective stratagem of ideologies in their relations to institutions is not ultimately best on some commitment, on some values, as we could say. That is the problem. For example, even if you leave it at the word ideology, can you study ideologies without making a distinction between crude and sophisticated, narrow and broad and so on?

Q. In your discussion of Max Weber, I got the impression you were suggesting that even these values which the social scientist must distinguish, of themselves can be shown to be ~~unimpaired~~ <sup>only parochial</sup> under the same principles.

S. These ~~values~~ <sup>unreflected values</sup>. That is obvious. If someone denies the possibility of value judgment ~~he~~ cannot help letting them in by a back door, then he surely hasn't thought about them. And then almost certainly there is something wrong about them. Let us take again the most crude and simple example. Our social science has a kind of, partly a basis and partly an <sup>which</sup> is psychopathology. The social scientist cannot help speaking of adjusted or maladjusted people or some such thing. And then when he says these are not value judgments or not, these are merely descriptive things without any value judgment, <sup>that</sup> does not make any impression because in fact they are value judgments. But if you leave it at the distinction between adjusted and maladjusted, you take an extremely narrow view of man, as if--I can only repeat myself--a sick operator may be adjusted, well-adjusted in terms of this distinction and a very nice and thoughtful man may be maladjusted in the psychological sense. A man who was at odds with the Nazi regime, or is at odds with the Communist regime, is in a sense surely maladjusted. One can say that is it necessary like Pasternak,



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to be maladjusted to a bad society, and being adjusted at all costs is a very silly and narrow notion of what is really important. So you have here in fact a value scheme, but a particularly narrow and poor value scheme. Without it you cannot do anything.

Q. Then, jumping to the distinction between Jesus and Buddha, when you say there is no basis, at least from ...

A. Yes. You see, I must now, for <sup>convenience sake</sup> ~~the same reason~~, I must use the language of our times, the common language. In both cases, what is called religious experience; a place, a culture. We doubt religious experience, the many deeds of religious experience. The student is completely incompetent to say anything. And who could claim to such deep experiences here? I think it is simply prudent and practical to say that it's impossible to make a judgment. Of course there are connections. There are connections between what ~~was~~ said on the basis of religious experience with other things, with things that one can see even without religious experience and understand without them. I don't say that there is no possibility of criticism but surely an extremely irresponsible and difficult thing and for practical purposes, if a student would come to me and say, "I want to write a critical evaluation of Buddhism," I would say, "I don't think that's a good idea." And I would say also there are quite a few professors who think the same thing. That is what I meant by practical. Now is there any other point? You. You are Mr. Haett, yes?

A. That's right. I'd like to raise a sort of practical question about value judgments in the social sciences. You said that while we can't, say, compare Jesus and Buddha, it is still possible to compare Calvin and Billy Graham, for example, and this kind of value judgment we can certainly use. There's a problem, it seems to me, about the point at which you decide that you want to leave the comparison alone because you're not good enough to handle it because the more major the comparison you want to make is, the more important the things are that you're trying to compare, the more serious your mistake will be if you make a mistake. If you're writing the sociological history of religion and you make a mistake comparing Calvin and Billy Graham, this will confuse a relatively minor area of your book, but if you make a mistake comparing Jesus and Buddha, this will confuse a great deal and ruin your whole book probably. How do you decide at what point you'd better stop making value judgments?

S. Again, I think, that's a hard question because the things it represents ... because of its generality.

A. It's a general question, yes.

S. All interesting questions of this kind, they must be brought down, must be said in ~~concrete~~ terms, you see? I said in my exposition that I do not believe that in any practical, useful way, you can draw a line. Leaving it on the level on which it was stated, I would say that as far as I know, and this is ~~for a qualification~~, there is no man who is competent to judge, in terms of evaluating, of everything. There will always be a limit. At least all human beings I have ever seen, however gifted, had their limits. If they were men of levity, they would judge regardless. You know that. I think that Lord Bertrand Russell, whom I have never seen, would be a well-known example of someone who judges regardless. But if they are sensible, they usually don't go beyond that. They don't go beyond their limitations. And they have likes and conversationally and jocularly one may say all kinds of things

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which one cannot support, surely. But when one speaks seriously, and I believe to speak in print should mean to speak seriously, one should not go beyond that point of what one can support. The easy relativism which prevails which, for example, says since all new fashions in paintings were greeted with derision and hundreds of years later, people paid a hundred thousand dollars for a painting which was worth fifty cents at the time doesn't prove anything at all. It merely proves that it takes some time until a really original thought, an original conception, finds a hearing. That doesn't mean that all original thoughts--you say how original, which are much rarer than you think--are good. That is not the question. Perhaps one cannot decide. There is a very simple example apart from this fact of so-called historical change. There are quite a few things which we experience in our lives where a long ~~family~~ <sup>long</sup> ~~origin~~ was required before one could appreciate them. There are things which impress immediately, but there are other things which may not impress immediately and only by some back doors we enter by some accident and then we gradually begin to appreciate the unpromising <sup>façade</sup>. That could be. It's very complicated. Very complicated. And frequently we hear one must be careful in judging, but instead of plunging you must assemble facts. For example, look at a sphere in which the distinction between fact and value judgment simply does not come up. When we read a passage in Plato, we are concerned with the fact; what did this speaker mean here? And we are not concerned with what he says as true or not or truthfully expressed or not. But is it not as difficult to get the truth about the fact; what did he mean? I mean, certain factual statements are extremely simple to make. For example, how many people are in this room. A simple counting will do. But there are also value judgments which are extremely simple to make. For example, it would be thinkable that a human being, male or female, of quite outstanding beauty were among us--maybe there is one; I don't want to go into this--where all would somehow say, "Of course." Also very simple. Or that someone is particularly quick or clever or particularly nice and so on, ~~that can~~ <sup>that can</sup> be as simple as counting. But a mere counting is a very simple mental operation although not all human beings have this persistence. Your question is a numerical question but it is unanswerable because of its generality. It's not sufficiently defined. It permits therefore only a universal answer just as if someone would say, "How should one live?" One can only say, "Decently." It becomes meaningful only in application. In generality, you cannot say more but you can perhaps tell a bit more than "decently". You can say decently <sup>can show</sup> itself in relation to others in the way in which he treats himself and so on. That can be done. But still it is not as illuminating as someone knowing this individual with his problems, <sup>or perhaps this</sup> ~~because someone~~ individual ~~can~~ himself tries to spell out for himself, "What does it mean for me?" Circumstances are handled in this way. Yes?

Q. Two things. First, a short defense of my question in that it's a general question because it was directed to your statement which was a general statement. And secondly, the example you gave--you quoted from your book on distinguishing between a mountain and a molehill?--I think I understand this, but it's a little bit confusing. It's possible to make distinctions between a mountain and a molehill or Jesus and Billy Graham, but does this mean that value judgments are possible so long as you're not dealing with extremely large or important subjects, or does it mean that you have to be careful to make only gross distinctions; that is, a possible inference from your example I think, that it would be possible to distinguish between Billy Graham and Billy Sunday or between two molehills. Did you mean that? I don't think you did?

S. I know much too little about Billy Sunday to say anything about the man so



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otherwise I might seem to be unfair  
forget about this example ~~of the mountain and the molehill~~ to anyone. But taking my simple one, where there are two molehills, whether one is higher than the other could of course be sometimes ~~very difficult to~~ say, if they are almost the same height, surely. But the practical point is if you consider the meaning of the comparison is whether we are capable to distinguish between mountains and molehills, morally speaking in terms of evaluating the things which count. And relativism as practiced today induces one to forget this big book for all the print.

Q. Need you go so far as to say anything about the comparative greatness of, say, Billy Graham and Jesus or to achieve considerable understanding of them; can't you compare them in certain respects and try to understand their particular approaches ...

S. Sure you can. The question is, why do you want to do that? Do you simply keep back for yourself something which occurred to you while going over the evidence? That can be done for various reasons, for reasons of very gross prudence. You don't want to hurt another human being. Or it can be done for other reasons of propriety, but that is another matter. Propriety may pose on us all kinds of reticence. But the main point is I do not believe that you can go into such a subject matter with understanding without forming a judgment which is necessarily a value judgment.

Q. If you don't compare them, say, and just want to try to understand Jesus or whoever you wish to take and try to relive the experience perhaps of whatever is involved, then can't you describe ...

S. Yes, sure, you can, but then, for certain reasons, you keep back what you couldn't have observed. But it is there. After all, value judgments are not identical with written statements or publicly made statements. I think that's impossible to go into any such matter with some depth without forming at least ... You see, you must also not forget this which is particularly important in the context of distinction: you compare two human men, say two very important individuals. ~~if you~~ Both are very great. ~~these are very grave ones, yes?~~ Say a tragedy by Sophocles and a comedy by Shakespeare. If you are asked which do you prefer, I mean ~~from the~~ point of view ~~of the~~ <sup>And you can up with the view</sup> personally your personal likes of each, and you will ~~say~~ you can't do that. Shakespeare's comedy has these and these high qualities. Sophocles' tragedy has these and these high qualities. And there is no possibility of weighing the strength of qualities AB and the qualities CD. I don't see any difficulty in that. I mean, value judgments does not mean that we must always say A is superior to B. It can very well be that A is equal to B but for different reasons. But the value judgment consists in the fact that ~~you've said~~ they are both great works of art. That's a value judgment. <sup>you say</sup>

Also in more narrowly moral matters, matters which concern human conduct, it may very well be the case that two ~~condens of fictions~~ which are mutually exclusive can each be recommended as strongly as the other on serious grounds and so that you can ~~then~~ ultimately do something which is an equivalent to tossing a coin. Why could this be impossible? There's a beautiful statement of this problem by Hume both in his History of England and his Treatise of Human Nature about the War of Roses--two parties in North Lancashire--and he states with great rhetorical skill the case for both parties. ~~He must be pretty good.~~ It could exist. Why not? And so the ~~position~~ <sup>that decision</sup> that men took at that time depended on which family he belonged to or on other accidental things, but a legal or even ~~modern~~ moral superiority could not be. Why should this not exist? Why should this not be possible? But this does not mean that value judgments are ~~not~~ impossible because the whole argument is based on value judgments.

is to blisshed.

In every point, I mean, these are the good sides of York. These are the good sides of Lancashires. These are the bad sides of York and the bad sides of the Lancashires. But the overall picture is ~~both a picture~~ <sup>so regarded as a mixture</sup> good and evil, is so that you cannot say one is ~~that terrible~~. I mean, those who, like me, deny the possibility of getting along in the social sciences without value judgments do not mean that one possesses a kind of handbook of prescriptions in which he can look up perfectly demonstrative solutions to all human problems. That surely doesn't exist. The question is only whether there ~~are relative values~~ <sup>is an absurd</sup> one which says we cannot make any preference anywhere which is not merely subjective. That seems to me completely. But <sup>what</sup> there are questions which cannot be settled, does not refute the position exactly, and I would say even confirms it, because the difficulty arises on the basis of evaluating. Hume's statement I recommend to you. You will find it in the History of England at <sup>the</sup> proper place, the Treatise of Human Nature in the discussion of justice.

To come back now to Mr. Metzler on Aristophanes' Clouds and we will have here an interesting example from the beginning even if we look only at the surface. A scientist who denies morality, who denies that morality is true, and he comes in conflict with the citizens who know from experience--from experience which the scientist lacks--that this is not so, that to teach people to beat up their parents if the parents don't behave, that this is very bad. Very bad, because it destroys all of the household, it destroys the possibility of bringing up children and that is bad because man is a being which has first to be a child before it can be grown up and there is therefore the necessity of paternal authority. You can develop without this but that is merely a rational reaction. And I think we should, before we go into the deeper stratum of the problem, pay some attention to this very simple and superficial point of view. There is a certain similarity--not ~~identity~~, but a certain similarity--between the problem posed by the Socrates of Aristophanes and the problem we have today; a science which is, to say the least, no support for morality. I think <sup>some</sup> of our members would say Aristophanes presents a kind of McCarthy reaction to this extremely academic man. He goes even beyond anything Senator McCarthy ever proposed. He burns down the academy--not only books, but everything. So that is not, even on its surface, not a subject which has not a meaning to many of us today.

So, Mr. Metzler, next time. That is understood. And to avoid any ambiguity for the future, Mr. Haett, you are ready next Wednesday. And Miss Mills, you are ready a week from Monday next, on the 18th. And the other papers will ~~be received later~~ next time. If some one of you is interested in reading a paper and this interest may very well have merely legal reasons, then it would be a good idea if you would contact me.

we will  
see about



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.... We did not go into the details of that argument. But from it, you have the great merit of having restated the accepted view and I think that is very good at the beginning of our discussion to have it presented to us. This is, with minor variations, an accepted view. That this is a slanderous attack on Socrates without any foundation in fact justified to some extent--as you put it better than some other people do on this point--by Socrates' strangeness. So it is a justifiable error to that extent, (7) thing, but above all by the medium in which Aristophanes uses; namely comedy. No comic poet is supposed to be a reporter of nothing but demonstrated fact. And you emphasize very strongly the contrast between this avaricious, filthy, immoral fellow, Socrates, and the Socrates whom we revere. That is surely true. But can we leave it at that? If Aristophanes had been such an unqualified slanderer--which he would be in spite of all mitigating circumstances--how could Plato have presented him as being together with Socrates, in a perfectly nice and gentlemanly way, as he did in his Banquet? The climatic date of the Banquet is about seven years after the Clouds so that is a first indication.

The second point: Was Socrates always the revered Socrates? I mean, this wonderful character is presented... He referred especially to the Apology and Crito, it was, of course, that Socrates was an old man. But Socrates was born, not as a revered Socrates, but just as any other human baby. And what did he do when he was young? Was he really at that time the revered Socrates? Now again we have simple Platonic evidence. In the Phaedo Socrates himself, on the day of his death, said he was not always the revered Socrates. Originally he was engaged in that kind of natural science which he later on rejected as wrong, subversive, immoral, what have you. So, Socrates admits that he was originally led astray as quite a few other people were. And perhaps Aristophanes--that is the minimum one would have to say--Aristophanes knows that early Socrates, the young Socrates, and had not seen that complete change that Socrates had undergone in the meantime. But, again, Aristophanes was not so familiar with Socrates that he knew that change which took place in Socrates himself and was known only to the people most familiar to us. And then later it was not only Plato who says that--Xenophon, too, although that is less well known.

In Xenophon's exciting Oeconomicus--which I would have loved to read with you but which we can't read because of the idiocies of the printers or publishers--in this Oeconomicus, that is also dated after the Clouds by some references, Socrates is presented as a man who does not know what a perfect gentleman is. He just doesn't know. He is presented there as a fellow who is interested in all kinds of high things, but he doesn't know what a gentleman is. And he has to go out of his way, literally, to find out what a gentleman is. And he does this in the most naive way. He has heard that a certain individual is known to everyone as a perfect gentleman--he's a prototype--and he asks him point blank, "What do you do so that everyone calls you a gentleman?" And that is the source of Socrates' knowledge of gentlemanship. Again it shows that there was a time when Socrates did not know, was not concerned, and was even in a way ignorant, of the moral political things and concerned with other things.

And now this applies also to one special point. Socrates had no school. How do you know that? From Plato and Xenophon. But Plato and Xenophon present to us the revered Socrates--not the young Socrates. I do not say that Socrates, the young Socrates, had a school. I don't know that. But nor can I say the contrary because I don't know that. In other words, that Aristophanes should have made a caricature in which every element was a mere invention is an unsupportable assertion and I believe even not a plausible assertion.

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Now there is another point which one must consider if one speaks of the position, ~~or~~ or the enmity of Aristophanes to Socrates, because your interpretation really implies that there is an enmity there. Now enmities ordinarily arise among people who are not quite self-centered, on political grounds rather than on philosophical. Now you've stated very clearly to us that Aristophanes was what is now called a conservative. You've even referred to Burke, not entirely wrongly, and it is sure that the standard for Aristophanes at first glance is the good old times--the old Athens--not this terrible new-dealish Athens of this time, because there are powers to that. And please don't misconstrue what I say as revealing any political opinion of my own. I only try to use simple, contemporary parlance to make it a bit clearer. Now, where did the revered Socrates stand politically? And the revered Plato? And the revered Xenophon?

A. He desires to get rid of most tradition ...

S. No, that is not what you ...

A. In that it ...

S. I meant politically. Now there was a very simple case. At a certain time in this country, perhaps it is still today, you could identify politically an individual by raising the question, "What do you think of Roosevelt?" I mean F.D.R., F.D. Roosevelt. There was a certain individual in Athens who had a certain, really a ~~comfortable~~ position. Also, a traitor to his class. Pericles. Now the simple thing is, the practical question: How did you stand to Pericles? How did Plato stand to Pericles? Absolutely negative. Like any radical, country-club member in this country to Roosevelt. Clear. In brief, politically--I mean, really now, on the level of day-to-day politics--there is no difference between Plato and Xenophon on the one and Aristophanes on the other. This reason for enmity did not exist. I would go further and say the fact of enmity is still to be proven, but there is surely a criticism of Aristophanes against Socrates. And we have to discover the meaning of this criticism. And that has very much to do with our question, ~~namely~~ the origins of social science or political science with which we are concerned.

Before I turn now to study the practical question, Mr. Haett, your paper is due next Wednesday, which duty does not imply a right that you will necessarily read it next time. That depends on how far we come today.

Mr. H. I'm quite prepared to put it off until next week.

S. I know, but you cannot bank on that. That is what I'm saying.

Now let us first begin with the first impressions. What have the Clouds possibly... what can the Clouds possibly have to do with our problem today? Well, very loosely expressed--to use a phrase which Mr. Metzler used--Socrates is a sophist. And what does that mean? Again, very simply, a man who denies morality; that is to say, traditional, ancestral morality. And this suggests to us immediately, on the basis of our knowledge of Plato and Xenophon; the true Socrates, in contradistinction to Aristophanes, was a man who discovered rational morality in contradistinction to merely traditional morality.

What, then, is the relation between rational morality and traditional morality? Well, how would you say what it is? I mean, again, starting from the revered



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Socrates as we must start, because that is the first stratum of our knowledge in these matters, you see, traditional morality, defended by Aristophanes, attacked by Aristophanes' Socrates, but the true Socrates, the Platonic Socrates, does not simply defend traditional morality as such. He's concerned with rational morality. What is the relation of the true rational morality to traditional morality from this point of view?

A. The traditional morality is based upon experience. Well, I still equate <sup>him</sup> ~~me~~ here with Burke ...

S. Yes, that is dangerous, you see, because Burke's reflections belong to a much later age where so many things which are here still in the process of emerging, in the process of being established, had already become a tradition of many centuries. I mean it is not bad, in a very initial statement, to refer to Burke, but it is also not very ~~helpful~~ <sup>helpful</sup> we try to understand better.

What I have in mind is this. The rational morality is surely based on reason. The traditional morality is based on tradition. Nevertheless, they might have the same content. For example, traditional morality says you should not beat your father--an example which plays a major role in the comedy--and rational morality might say the same thing. But prior to investigation, we cannot know whether they fully agree, <sup>x discovered</sup> whether the new morality--the rational morality ~~as it is~~ <sup>as it is</sup> by Socrates--will back up the traditional morality on every point. That is a ~~truth~~ <sup>great</sup> question. We owe it especially to Hegel, whose influence for the understanding of classical philosophy is overpowering, that we are inclined to believe that the content was not changed, but only the mode was changed. That is a very ~~truth~~ <sup>great</sup> question and I will, later on, give some reasons, but I mention here only the fact.

The second question which arises at this stage and which is most important to us: Is Socrates the founder of rational morality? Socrates is the founder of the view that value judgments can be validated in a perfectly unobjectionable way. And we must see, later on, to what extent what this means in Socrates and what the basis of that is.

Now, of these two things, what the true, revered Socrates did, we hear, of course, nothing in the Clouds because there, the old Socrates, the pre-Socratic Socrates, if I may say so, is the only one who occurs. Still what we learn from the Clouds is by no means negligible. In the Clouds, we are presented, we are shown a Socrates who is very far from establishing a rational morality; who, in fact, attacks the traditional morality radically without suggesting any new morality we could respect. He suggests a new morality--that's exactly the point. But this morality seems to be altogether subversive. It includes, for example, the principle that a son may beat his father, to say nothing of other examples which occur. Now this position then which Socrates appears to defend in the Clouds has something in common with a view which is prevalent today in the social sciences--with what is loosely called ~~relativism~~ <sup>relativism</sup>. And just as in the case of present day social science relativism, there ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> power behind that is "science". Socrates is presented primarily as a natural scientist and this natural science ~~is~~ <sup>issues</sup> in a subversive moral teaching.

Now in the Clouds, Socrates is presented as a scientist and that means--to mention only one point which is, in fact, the most important point--there are no gods. Hence, there are no sanctions for morality. You see, that is the crucial point in the Clouds. The traditional morality is a morality sanctioned by the gods and therefore if the belief in the gods fails, morality fails.

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But more specifically, and that you can say is a difficulty which cannot possibly happen in our world, in the biblical world, the difficulty here is that the gods--the guardians of traditional morality--behave themselves immorally. So whenever you are told something--this is what you ought to do and what your fathers and grandfathers and ancestors have done before you--a naughty young man can say, "Well, the greatest <sup>autho- rity</sup> ~~of~~ of all, Zeus, did all these terrible things, so ...". So that is the weakness of that morality and you see also the connection here with Plato immediately. ~~That's his~~ <sup>Plato</sup> critique of the poet, as it is called, in the second book of the Republic is necessary in order to find a solid base of morality. The gods as ~~understood by~~ the Greeks ~~have~~ <sup>are</sup> no such basis.

At any rate, Socrates ~~As~~ <sup>has discovered that</sup> a scientist who ~~discovers~~ these gods are nothing and discovers by this very fact that traditional morality has no sanction. And being a consistent man, he preaches immorality. That's the first act. But what happens? That is what's going on in the latter part of the comedy, but it doesn't end on that strain. What happens? You didn't tell us that.

A. I didn't ... I was ...

S. What happens? I mean, Socrates preaches immorality on these grounds. All right. And what happens after he has preached it? After he has taught it?

A. After he has taught it, the child is not the tool of his father, as his father had hoped.

S. I beg your pardon?

A. The son is not the tool of his father, is not the ...

S. But very simply, what happens? Does it end with Socrates sitting on the throne as a tyrant?

A. Socrates' school is burned.

S. In other words, the citizens who ~~have~~ <sup>has</sup> come under the influence of this immoral teaching revolt--revolts and takes revenge. The dialogue presents, at first glance, a revolt of the honest citizens who know the need for morality, who experience that need against that academic abomination presented by Socrates. You can say it very simply: one part of the teaching--why this is a necessary part, we shall see later--is a son may beat his father. That's what the new teaching says. A son may beat his father with the same right with which a father beats his son. Now, what is the reaction of the father? Let us forget now about the dialogue. It is a preposterous teaching, because it destroys domestic discipline and it leads to corruption of the young, naturally. Well, again, we don't have to go so far away to understand that. We have today a phenomenon which is of great concern to many citizens and social scientists called juvenile delinquency. ~~So let us think about~~ juvenile delinquency and if that is not an evil, I don't know what an evil is. That's the simple reaction of the citizen. Our social sciences admits it as a matter of course, though it doesn't say, ~~allow a~~ <sup>allow a</sup> value judgment. Now, incidentally, why does not our social scientist who is confronted with the phenomenon of juvenile delinquency go on as Aristophanes did, say? If juvenile delinquency is a consequence of this kind of teaching, must this teaching not be wrong? Must it not be radically revised? Must we not restore the old moral teaching? What I have in mind is this: What is the difference--I mean, on the

Socrates  
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most superficial, descriptive level--between the present-day social science student of juvenile delinquency and Aristophanes? Or his hero, Strepsiades? How would he ... Yes?

A. The present-day on-looker would perhaps say that the direction is correct but the application is wrong and this has to be modified and changed and perfected.

S. That is true, but very general. Where does the difference between the typical present-day social scientist and Aristophanes' Strepsiades come in?

A. The social scientist today is not primarily interested in changing.

S. Oh, no. I mean, there are innumerable studies and suggestive analyses of juvenile delinquency by social scientists. I'm sorry that I'm not in the Department of Sociology, but if you had known that, I would have called up one of my colleagues there and told me how many articles have appeared in the last year of the American Journal of Sociology. I don't know it from my own knowledge but ...

A. It's presented though in this true role we can justify as social science?

S. I mean, let us not be too subtle in this very elementary stage. But what is the difference ... To repeat, the comedy of Aristophanes suggests to us a teaching which leads up to juvenile delinquency must be wrong. In a way, the present-day social scientist would admit that, too, but what's the difference in the diagnosis? What is the wrong teaching according to ... I mean, what is the basic error? The basic error, according to Aristophanes, is the destruction of domestic authority, of paternal authority. Here's where the difference comes. The social scientist would be less impressed by the need for paternal authority. The term which occurs, not only in social science literature, which I haven't read, but which I know, but also in law courts when juvenile delinquents are arraigned is: lack of love, lack of comprehension --the nagging mother, the drunken father and on and on. But no emphasis on paternal authority as such is mentioned. In other words, the social scientist would be afraid of that because he thinks paternal authority, as all authority, if too much stressed leads to authoritarianism. And that is a thought which is wholly absent, of course, from Aristophanes. I wish to show you the complexity.

There is another point that is a clear sign. There is one institution of which we find an indication in the dialogue, in the comedy, which Aristophanes absolutely takes for granted and everyone else takes for granted. <sup>At least</sup> no one contests. And that is the institution of slavery. Strepsiades has a slave whom he owns, takes for granted. So there is some difference here, surely. We can say what distinguishes the social scientist from Aristophanes is not only the value traits, alleged freedom from values, it is also a certain notion of freedom which the social scientist in fact has, in spite of his claim to accept his social sciences value free, and which in this sense does not exist in Aristophanes. But what distinguishes the social scientist from Socrates? I mean, also the broad difference. Don't say the difference is that the social scientist is an empirical student and Socrates is not, because Socrates is presented in the comedy as an empirical student of certain phenomena. But which phenomena does Socrates not study empirically which the social scientist does? Well, what are the empirical phenomena which Socrates studied there, or some of them? One example would suffice, because they are all of the same kind.

A. Astronomy.

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S. Astronomy. Or how far can a flea jump.

A. They're not human, they're relevant.

S. In other words, he studies only natural phenomena. He does not engage in the empirical study of human phenomena, of social phenomena. Why does he not do that? Why does Socrates, this empirical student of nature as he is presented here, not dream for one moment of the empirical study of human, social phenomena, political phenomena? What do natural phenomena have that social phenomena do not have?

A. Objectivity.

S. That is a modern expression which points in the right direction, but the Greeks used somewhat different expressions which are more helpful. What is the status of social phenomena? For example, as such a thing as not beating one's father? What is that?

A. Values.

S. A term which doesn't exist. What is it? I mean, how else would it be called also today by a not sophisticated or not corrupted man?

A. Theory?

S. <sup>No</sup> ~~Law~~. A law, a law. It doesn't have to be a written law, but it is a law which you cannot transgress. A law. So what covers the social phenomena is that they are either laws or based on laws. And what is wrong with that? Natural phenomena, ~~as~~ even such humble things as how far a flea can jump are a serious object of study. Social phenomena are not, and that is connected with the fact that social phenomena are laws, have the status of laws, are dependent on laws. I mean, what is the basic defect of laws from this point of view? The cognitive defect of laws.

A. Man is governed by laws which he makes himself?

S. Yes. That is true, but that is not in itself ~~the~~ decisive. He could make them <sup>they</sup> differently. The laws, all laws, are arbitrary, however good reason ~~there~~ <sup>may seem to have them</sup> ~~there~~. That's the basis ~~for~~ <sup>is</sup> the principle. And therefore, it has no solidity. It depends on mere <sup>fact</sup> ~~fact~~. The flea jumps this way, not that way. That is not arbitrary. That is of the nature of things. In other words, laws--and everything depending on laws--have to exaggerate this status of stamp-collecting. You see, we know there are many people who collect stamps, but other people collect butterflies. But the collection of butterflies ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> a higher status, because that is really a natural phenomenon and where we can learn something about the ~~whole~~ <sup>whole</sup> ~~world~~. But stamps are arbitrarily made and there are certain rules which you can perhaps observe which are curious. I think one can say the variety and beauty of stamps is a sign of bankruptcy --at least in former times. And the solid countries had always the same, dreary stamps. Think of Queen Victoria's England. Today things have changed because of the influence of stamp collecting on stamp production. But this is not a serious thing. That is the point. So, in other words, Socrates despises the social phenomena because they are based on law, on human arbitrariness. That is the obvious difference between Socrates and the present-day social scientist.

Behind the present-day social scientist--that is no longer <sup>immediately</sup> ~~merely~~ <sup>visible</sup> -- is the



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7 notion that social phenomena are as natural as natural phenomena in the narrow sense. For example, when you speak of such a law, as it is called, of supply and demand, it is meant to be a law as independent of human arbitrariness as <sup>any</sup> Newtonian law. This notion is wholly absent from this first phase.

Now, one must also mention, if only in passing, the following point because it may come in later on. A certain parallelism between Aristophanes' Socrates and social science exists. The true Socrates, the revered Socrates, the Platonic Socrates, opposes this Aristophanean Socrates, surely. And to the very extent ... True, the Platonic Socrates agrees with Aristophanes. What is the difference between Plato, let me say, and Aristophanes? Did Plato, or Plato's Socrates, express scientifically, rationally what Aristophanes expressed poetically? I mean, Aristophanes in a comedy shows the preposterous character of this teaching. Plato shows the preposterous character of this teaching by argument, by an allegedly demonstrative argument. In other words, we must not forget this question that Aristophanes' argument against his Socrates is poetical. By telling a tale, he refutes it. Plato refutes that position, not by telling a tale, so it seems, universally. Now what does the difference between these two forms of expression mean--between the poetic expression and the scientific expression? The dramatic poet, of course, has one tremendous advantage, it would seem. He demonstrates it ~~a convert~~. We see with our own eyes where this leads to. No scientific argument can do that because we would have to make the transformation from the universal statement into some ~~discovered~~ <sup>visible</sup> fact by our own efforts. The dramatic poet does this for us. But it is of course also true that <sup>weakness</sup> there ~~is~~ also ~~regions~~ of the poetic argument. Here we have Socrates and Strepsiades, the two chief characters. These are two individuals and what is true of these two individuals with their individual characteristics in an individual situation, may not be true of other two individuals. Whether Socrates and the revolt of the citizens, which is here beautifully demonstrated, may not take place if the scientist were somewhat different from Socrates and if the citizen were somewhat different from Strepsiades. That is the limitation of the poetic argument whereas the scientific argument would be of universal validity.

There is another point I mentioned in this context. <sup>It's a</sup> ~~In the~~ comedy; Socrates is ridiculed. We laughed. Is this laughing not also a form of convincing? I mean, is making men laugh not a form of convincing them? You know, in a scientific argument, laughing or making people laugh is not permitted to be legitimate. In a comedy that is surely done. What is it? What makes us laugh? And is that which makes us laugh not something connected with evidence? We laugh about all kinds of things. But we laugh also--and that seems to be the case here--about massive absurdities. If we are suddenly confronted with a massive absurdity, are we not compelled to laugh, and is this laughing not an essential concomitant of the realization of the massive absurdity? That also is a point we must keep in mind.

<sup>revision</sup> But now let us go into the details after these very general remarks, some of which are in need of ~~tradition~~. Strepsiades is the antagonist of Socrates. I have assumed, up till now, that he is the citizen who revolts against this immoral teaching. I have assumed, in other words, that Strepsiades is the normal citizen. Is he a normal citizen? Is his action against Socrates the action of a normal citizen? What do you say to that?

A. No.

S. He is not a normal citizen. Now, if Strepsiades' action is not, if he is not, the

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normal citizen, and his action is not that of the normal citizen, what does the comedy prove? What do we have to think of Socrates if he comes to grief only by virtue of the action of an abnormal citizen? Yes? Do you see? So we must open the question by going into the details. We are in need of patience. Not everything of importance reveals itself, reveals its meaning, immediately. So we are in need of patient observation as we are also when we do other things. So we must wait and not force any scheme on to things until a pattern emerges. Not everything is fit to be digested into a Readers Digest. In other words, we have to read with some care. It goes without saying that we cannot read this work with the necessary care. There are limits. I mean, the absolute limit, to speak practically, is the end of the Wednesday meeting. Otherwise, we will never read something else and it is also important that we get a notion of some other Aristophanean comedy and of the revered Socrates from the model Plato if this course is to fulfill its function.

Now let us then turn to the Clouds and begin at the beginning. Strepsiades is in the night. Strepsiades is awake and he is ill-tempered as most people are when they are sleepless and he thinks of the good old times, of peace, and now of war--it was the Peloponnesian War. Here, at the beginning, he presents himself indeed as a normal citizen who is annoyed by the hardships of war and especially of a war which doesn't seem to be so necessary and, more particularly, also appears a rustic. And the rustics, ~~or rustics~~, were regarded by the reactionaries, by the conservatives, as the most respectable part of the democracy. That's one part of the background still intelligible as is proven by all gerrymanderings, provisions of the Constitution regarding the Senate as distinguished from the House of Representatives, and so on. It's still the same story for the next part. And Aristophanes' sympathy is generally with the rural population against the rabble of the city to ~~read~~ a Jeffersonian expression. So he is a normal character. But he has a peculiarity which appears immediately. And what is that, at first glance, this peculiarity that distinguishes him from the thousands like him? He has a son, a peculiar son. And he has a peculiar indulgence towards that son. And this indulgence has ruined him. Yet, beneath that indulgence, which shows itself throughout the play, he curses his son because of the trouble he has created for him. He wishes, though he doesn't say it in so many words, that his son had never been born. But he is too delicate to say it. He regrets not the birth of his son, but that which made possible the birth of his son; namely, his marriage. What was wrong with his marriage? What keeps him awake is his debts and he tries to go over his accounts and to find out some way he can pay them. But even this he cannot do because his son dreams--he sleeps in the same room. He dreams. And what does he dream of? The same thing which is, of course, of the father's debts; namely, horses. Horses. His worries which keep him sleepless are due to his son and his son is responsible for his not being able to handle his worries by his dream speeches. Now what was wrong with the marriage? We come to that which is the cause of causes. He was a fellow of rustic simplicity, a simple peasant, and then through a matchmaker he was induced to marry a fine lady from the Athenian upper crust. I suppose she must have had some bluish. Perhaps she belonged to a poorer branch, perhaps she was not the most beautiful of these ladies. However this may be, he was persuaded by a matchmaker to marry her and so two wholly unmatchable people--a fellow of rustic simplicity and contentedness, an easy-going fellow married to a lady fine accustomed to pomp and to an over-indulgence in the pleasures of the body. And this shows in the son, simply in the name of the son. The son is called Pheidippides, nobility, you know; the knight from part of the name--ippos is horse. There comes from the word pheidesthai which means to save, to be parsimonious

and that is a paternal heritage; and his son is meant to combine



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the virtues of the simple rustic people and the upper class. But, unfortunately, the maternal heritage is so much more powerful than what he has learned from his father. Strepsiades, in his great troubles ... You see, he's not a normal citizen. Such *mésalliances* were obviously not common; that belongs to the very definition of a *mésalliance*; it ~~is~~ is not something which takes place all the time. You cannot draw conclusions from present-day America. Strepsiades finds a way out of his difficulty. But whether that is feasible depends entirely on his son. He cannot give his son orders. That is precluded by this situation. That's crucial. Let us turn to--if you have the translation--page 155, bottom, verses 88, 89. What does he say--Strepsiades to Pheidippides? Do you have that? Page, what did I say?

A. What did he say to whom?

S. At the bottom of 155--what did he say to his son? Strip off ...

A. Strip off your present habits.

S. As quickly as possible.

A. And go and learn what I advise you to.

S. Yes. Strip off these things. Now the son swears by Dionysus that he will do whatever his father will ask him to do. Now what does the father ask him to do? To go to Socrates to learn there the art of winning any law suits; ~~which is~~ <sup>one way of</sup> getting rid of your debts which is, of course, to defraud your creditors. And that depends to some extent on your facility before the law court. And that is a very simple device. Here then a slight and not uninteresting difference appears. Strepsiades has heard of 'them guys.' He does not know the name of Socrates. He knows only that 'they' speak of heaven and that they teach for ~~knowledge~~ <sup>money</sup> how one can win any cause, just or unjust. Pheidippides, the son, knows the name. That's the first ~~indication~~ <sup>in reading sense and that</sup> ~~which~~ <sup>throws light on</sup> throws light on Socrates and which ~~shows~~ <sup>shows</sup> the whole situation. To indicate the significance of this for the whole work, I mention only this. Socrates comes to grief through Strepsiades and Strepsiades is an abnormal citizen. He does not belong to the upper class. He does not belong to the lower class. He belongs to a very small intermediate group. The lower class simply wouldn't take cognizance of Socrates. They are busy. The upper class do take cognizance of Socrates. Pheidippides, who is moving in the most elegant society, knows the name of Socrates; because, having more time, they take cognizance of all "cultural" events in Athens, one of them being here. But what is the attitude of Pheidippides to Socrates? Utter contempt. These are filthy starvelings who know no elegant graces of horsemanship, of sport, and so on. So Socrates is not threatened by the upper class people either. That's important. Although they know of his existence, ~~whereas~~ <sup>(?)</sup> the lower class will doubt it.

As soon as Pheidippides hears that he is supposed to go to Socrates to learn there the art of speaking so that he can talk himself out of his debts, he swears that he will not do that. He will not do that. Originally he had sworn by Dionysus that he will do everything his father says and he now swears by the same Dionysus that he will not keep the original oath. He perjures himself right at the beginning. The outcome of all this is that old Strepsiades, this small crook, I think we can call him in fairness, although he has some excuses--he did not live <sup>above</sup> ~~about~~ his condition, it was only his over-indulgence to his son, but still a crook--decides to go to Socrates. But, as you will see in verse 127, first he will pray to the gods before he goes to Socrates. If he is a crook, he is at least pious. He goes to Socrates after having

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prayed to the gods. He has a perfectly sober judgment about himself: he is an ordinary man in an extraordinary situation. As such--as an ordinary man in an extraordinary situation--he comes in contact with the extraordinary man, Socrates. Now he goes to the house of Socrates. To repeat, he didn't even know his name. That's very important. Socrates was not <sup>very</sup> known. I mean, Athens was not a small town. The utmost you could say about Athens is that in Athens everyone knew an acquaintance of everyone else. Not everyone knew everyone else. I mean, a small town is one where everyone knows everyone. But if everyone knows only an acquaintance of everyone else, that's a larger town. And that was Athens. So now he enters the house of Socrates. But, not knowing the number of course, he knocks at the door and not Socrates opens it. Nor for that matter a slave, but a pupil. And there is the scene with the pupil which we must briefly discuss. Look it up in your book in case we have to read the modern passage.

*appears from the beginning*  
The pupil complains about the rudeness with which Strepsiades had knocked at the door because by this noise he had damaged a tender thought which was just about to be born. And then he finds out what this was and although the pupil speaks all the time of the great secrecy of the matter, he blabs out everything. So, I mean, if Socrates had made certain security arrangements, they were very poorly enforced and poorly contrived. Socrates is not a very practical man as ~~his pupils~~. Now the pupil tells Strepsiades of Socrates concerns. What did he do? For example, he measured the jump of fleas--how far can a flea jump; in itself, of course, for a sensible man, a perfectly reasonable biologist, a perfectly reasonable question, but from the point of view of someone who is suddenly confronted with adult people doing such things, an absurd activity. To be exact, regarding contemptibly unimportant things. Does he not have anything better to do than measure the jump of a flea? Strepsiades is impressed by the cleverness with which Socrates did that. We don't have to go into that. The second question with which Socrates is concerned: Do gnats hum through the mouth or through the behind. Strepsiades is again impressed by the cleverness, but this time ~~it is due~~ to the consequence; namely, that men who are so clever that they can find out that can win every law suit. And the third point is that Socrates, or his pupils, observe the ways and revolutions of the moon. In this case, Strepsiades is only ~~amused~~--amused by the ridiculous incident which prevented the observation in which some lizard did something, dropped a dropping so he couldn't continue observing. That doesn't ~~impress~~ <sup>interest</sup> him, as you will see.

*necessarily*  
These are the three theoretical objects of Socrates which are mentioned and then we come to a practical one. What we call Socrates'--if I understand the passage correctly and I understood it in the way in which the commentaries understood it and that doesn't mean that it is the correct understanding--that Socrates stole. They didn't have anything to eat. He stole a coat which he then sold. He stole it by means of <sup>Socrates is</sup> geometry. Let us call it Socrates' geometric theft. So, in other words, ~~it was~~ not absolutely decent <sup>of him</sup>. He did steal, it seems. But of course it's also clear that there is a strange disproportion between this cleverness and the result. They are starving fellows. And after all a really clever unjust man doesn't have to steal a coat from a gymnasium and sell it so that they have dinner.

*personally*  
Now at this moment the door is opened, and Strepsiades sees first the students, the pupils of Socrates. And ~~they are five~~ <sup>there are five</sup> different things. Some seek what is beneath the earth--say the rudiments of geology. But Strepsiades, the farmer, thinks they are looking for onions which is of course not true. Then the others go to a much deeper depths so that their mind looks at the stars. The third is astronomy, the fourth is geometry and the fifth is geography. The only subject in which Strepsiades



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is not interested at all in <sup>astronomy</sup> astronomy. Who cares for the heavenly bodies? We live on earth. He's also not impressed by the search beneath the earth, nor by geography. He is impressed to some extent by geometry, because geometry means measuring the earth, literally, <sup>measuring</sup> measuring land. And the prospect of distributing land—you know, of the rich—is of some attraction to a practical rustic.

At this moment, Socrates comes into sight and Socrates is suspended in a basket high above everyone else and his very first word—verse 218—is characteristic (218). Strepsiades calls, "Socrates, Little Socrates." How would a mother have called a young Socrates as a baby? Little Socrates, I don't know... Soky, Soky, perhaps. And then Socrates says, "What do you call me, you ephemeral being, you creature who lives only a day?" His contempt for man is the first sign of Socrates. He lives on high, not on the earth. The earth which Strepsiades cultivates. And the thought behind it is that subtle thoughts can thrive only in subtle air. Thin thoughts require thin air. The "materialism" implied in this doctrine is very important position and we know from Plato, Plato's Phaedo, that the view from which Socrates started was a materialistic philosophy of nature. Socrates comes down and Strepsiades tells Socrates why he has come—in order to learn from him. And he offers payment. And now we get a very great surprise. And this is one point which I must hold against Mr. Metzler, as well as against common interpretation. Socrates is absolutely uninterested in the money. He doesn't even listen to him. He's absolutely uninterested. And there are some later references to money or rather to gifts, but they are never requests of Socrates. Strepsiades, out of gratitude, brings him some flour or whatever it is, but he just isn't interested in them. Not at all. But Socrates is interested in something else which is much more important to him and which is ~~more~~ more grave and which is much more strange. To use a very harsh word to convey the shock, Socrates is not interested at all in his money, but in his atheism. In his denying of the gods whom everyone worships. And you can say Socrates is a kind of fanatic—that would be a ~~just measurement~~—who wants to sell these new gods. He initiates Strepsiades for ~~this~~. And that is very important. This Socrates who rejects the gods whom everyone knows and worships has gods of his own. And he has a cult of his own. He has new gods, strange gods, and who are the strange gods? In the first place, the Clouds. The Clouds, the play is called the Clouds, and in a way, the Clouds, rather than Socrates, are the hero of the play. Of the Clouds it is said that they inspire the Sophists and poets. Now Sophists doesn't necessarily have here the pejorative meaning; it means simply the wise men who speak or write prose. The poets are wise men who speak in meter. The Clouds are ~~at the~~ thing ~~of the~~ first. What is the relation between Sophistry and poetry on the one hand, between wisdom on the one hand, and the Clouds on the other?

A. The Clouds are transitory in shape and appearance. They come and go. There's no absolute basis or concrete foundation to lay anything on to the Clouds.

S. Yes, but there is something more specific ...

A. They appear this to one man, and to another something else.

S. Yes, but one must say this more precisely as it is said: They imitate everything. A cloud looks like a horse, like an old man with a beard, you know, all kinds of figures. The Clouds imitate everything and therefore they are the original ~~imitator~~. That is ~~certain~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ They make visible, by imitating, they make visible the nature of things. That is the meaning of the Clouds. Anticipating some later ~~someone~~ would say this: Socrates is engaged in two activities. The first is what we can call natural

First impression

which appears

the action

of all

point I

SEMINAR 3

science, in the widest sense of the word--what was called physiology--the speaking about nature--not merely what we now understand ~~about~~ physiology. The other activity <sup>by</sup>

(End of first side of reel.)

*lying!*  
*great phrase*  
 .... worshipped only by Socrates. Socrates says they're the only gods. Zeus doesn't exist. And on the other hand, the Clouds help or serve only Socrates. That is an alliance which is underlined in the whole play. And therefore it is crucial for the understanding of the play: Do the Clouds also suffer from Socrates' misfortune as Socrates obviously suffers? We shall see the Clouds are much cleverer than Socrates. They don't suffer. So the Clouds are the only gods. Zeus does not even exist, let alone that he has any power to harm or hurt. That's the first ~~thing~~ <sup>thing</sup> between Socrates and Strepsiades. Everyone thought Zeus was responsible for raining. Zeus is raining. Zeus drenches (?) the earth. Socrates says, "Nonsense. The Clouds make rain." And he gives proof. He says, "Did you ever see rain without clouds?" You must not underestimate this very funny presentation. The argument shows that. The Clouds, therefore, take the place of Zeus, because they are responsible for rain. But then Strepsiades still is not quite satisfied. It is not so simple. Granting that Zeus doesn't rain, but the Clouds are responsible for rain, is not Zeus still higher than the Clouds? Is there not some compelling force, some necessity, which makes the Clouds do what they do, behind them? Socrates knows; he admits there is something which is the cause of what the Clouds do. But that's not Zeus. That is whirls. Is this intelligible in my pronunciation? W-h-i-r-l. Whirl? Good.

Now let us read on page 167 in the translation, say in about the middle of the page where Socrates begins to speak. Do you have it, Mr. Metzler?

A. For when to the brim, filled with water they swim, by necessity, <sup>carried along,</sup> ~~carry the logs;~~ They are hung up on high, in the vault of the sky, and so ~~they~~ <sup>by necessity strong!</sup> In the midst of their course, they clash with great force, and thunder ~~away~~ without end; But is it not he, who compels ~~us~~ <sup>these</sup> to be? Does not Zeus this necessity send?

S. Well, you see, that is the question, that is the point. Is there not some cause which causes the Clouds to act, and is that not Zeus? To which Socrates says ...

A. No Zeus have we there, but a vortex of air.

S. Yes, A vortex and being in the ether--ethereal waters. Yes?

A. Vortex? That's something, I own.

I knew not before that Zeus was no more, but Vortex was placed on his throne. But I have not yet heard to what cause you referred the thunder's majestic roar.

Oh, yes, 'tis they; when on high, full of water they fly, And then as I told you before. By compression impelled as they clash are compelled, a terrible crash is made.

Come. How can that be? I really don't see.

Yourself as my proof I will take.

Have you never eaten the broth puddings you get when Panathenaea comes around?

S. A festival, yes.



## SEMINAR 3

M. And felt with what might, Your bowels all night, In turbulent tumult resound?

By Apollo, 'tis true; It is a mighty-to-do; And my belly keeps rumbling about  
When the puddings begin to clatter within And kick up a wonderful rout.  
Quite gently at first, papappax, papappax; But soon papapappax away;  
Till at last, I'll be bound, They can thunder as loud, papapappax say they.

And shall thy<sup>st</sup> then, of a sound so loud and propound, From thy belly diminutive ~~and~~<sup>and</sup>  
And shall not the high and the infinite sky Go thundering on without end?

S. Literally, the air. In other words, he brings a very homely experience and says  
"look what happens on a cosmic scale in the case of thunder and here we discover air  
as that which is above the Clouds; I mean, not only locally, but as causing what the  
Clouds do. Still, Strepsiades is not completely convinced because there is one fact  
which the air doesn't do and the Clouds do not do; namely, Zeus is the ~~god~~ of Justice. *Guardian*  
And he uses his lightening for striking the perjurers. That is a fact. And how does  
Socrates reply to that? That's the last straw for Strepsiades. Zeus is the avenger  
of perjury. And he says, well, are not ~~these~~ of these guys notorious perjurers and  
never struck by lightening and, on the other hand, is not Zeus' own temple struck by  
his lightening? So what you regard as a fact--that Zeus uses lightening for striking  
perjurers--is not a fact. Strepsiades is completely convinced of the truth of  
Socrates' teaching. And that is enormous! Imagine, a simple rustic completely  
corrupted in less than an hour! Don't underestimate that.

So, we know now the truth about the earth. There is the highest principle--you can  
call it vortex, sometimes you can also call it air, you can also call it ether. That's  
not so very clearly distinguished; it's not so very important. And then we have this  
subordinate principle called the Clouds. And the highest principle corresponds to  
physics or physiology, which seeks the nature of things in their highest principle,  
and then the other is rhetoric represented by the Clouds as we shall see later.

Now at this point, the Clouds encourage Strepsiades to become clever. That is to say,  
to become victorious in action, in deliberation, and in speech. The Clouds help  
Socrates in getting a pupil. They are his publicity agents at this point. Socrates,  
however, demands that Strepsiades must not respect or recognize any other gods except  
Chaos, Clouds, and the Tongue. That is only another formulation of the same thing,  
because the highest principle--call it ether--being completely sense-less, mind-less,  
can very well be called Chaos. There is, <sup>the absence of</sup> absence of order; there is no meaningful order  
and why not call it Chaos. And the Clouds, of course, <sup>the</sup> that which inspires the Tongue  
and the Tongue ~~as~~ the greatest human instrument.

Strepsiades promises to do that. The Clouds listen to this, but they are silent about  
it, just as they were silent when Socrates was setting forth his rejection of the old  
gods. They don't say anything. They are very shrewd. They think of their advantage.  
But they are shrewd, they are the gods. I mean, one must see how the whole thing  
will run and then they wait. They repeat their promise even after they have heard  
that what Strepsiades desires is to learn only to win law suits by tricky means and to  
get rid of his debtors. They are not concerned with Strepsiades' ~~the~~ <sup>becoming</sup> a  
sage, a student of nature. What they're concerned with ~~is~~ Strepsiades' ~~the~~ <sup>becoming</sup>  
~~as~~ their worshipper. And he will become their worshipper, of course, if through them  
he will get rid of his debts. And they promise him that, "You will lead the most  
livable life of human beings, together with us if you undergo the training by  
Socrates." The Clouds also encourage Socrates to begin Socrates' instruction and

first, naturally, to test Strepsiades' mind. In other words, what we do here by looking for the reports from college, written reports, records from college which didn't exist, or for that matter by I.Q.s, is here done by a simple examination. That is the next step. Socrates investigates Strepsiades' nature. This account is incomplete because Socrates and Strepsiades enter the house and we don't know what is going on in the house. What happened there? The Chorus, speaking for the poet, addresses the audience. You see, that is one of the most obvious differences between tragedy and comedy in the olden times. In the tragedy, the tragic poet never addresses the audience. In the comedy, at least in the Aristophanean comedy, an important part is so-called parabasis in which the poet, the Chorus, and especially the leader of the Chorus, addressed the audience in the name of the poet. That is also important.

Aristophanes lays the claim that the Clouds are his cleverest comedy. Now that is a difficult question, because, of the comedies we have, it is the third earliest, and we do not know whether this judgment would extend to the later comedies, but that is a difficult question on which I have no judgment because there is a tradition that Aristophanes rewrote it. You know, he rather failed in that contest and that he rewrote it and that we have now the second version which, of course, in that case would have been written later. I regard it as possible that Aristophanes meant this judgment, even at the end of his career, but this is a mere guess.

And what does he say in praise of that comedy, especially its lack of grossness. Although you have read a passage that is really crude and there are some others of the same kind, but they are much more decent, the Clouds is much more decent, than almost all other comedies. The most shocking words which in English, I understand, would now be called four-letter words, are extremely rare here and, if I am correct, Socrates himself never uses one of them. It is the lack of grossness.

He speaks of another point—the novelty of the conceits. Underline it, novelty. That is important. The poet doesn't say anything here of his moral or political motivation. And that is perfectly intelligent. And that leads us to believe the (inaudible) of Aristophanes and not any others. Politically speaking, he has a simple standard. The good old times. And that can be historically defined, Athens of the Persian War, two or three generations before. The old times. The ancestral polity, as the Athenians called that order of things prior to the democracy. Where the upper classes, the rural (?) populations, still were in control. But, as a poet, his holding an audience depends on his inventiveness, on his having novel concepts. Do you see that? I mean, merely the political interpretation of Aristophanes which is today predominant is obviously at odds with the simple fact that the comic poet, or any poet, is as such concerned with novelty. Such things didn't exist before Aristophanes. You can say that is a remedy for later corruption. The victors of Marathon did not need comedy. Only these corrupted Athenians of the time of the Peloponnesian War needed that as a correction. But you cannot help wondering: is not a corruption which requires such a remedy as Aristophanean comedy not also something good? In other words, if you have rustic simplicity without that blight of the mind developing, that's fine. But if you have a certain amount of rottenness which is the inevitable condition for the mind taking the highest flight, what are you going to do? That's a nice value question. Can you simply decide in favor of rustic simplicity if you see—on the basis of this experience, for example—that a certain dissolution, a certain disintegration compels the mind to rise to heights to which it otherwise never would have risen? That is the great theme of all the classical literature and the simple symbol of it is Sparta-Athens. For example, in Thucydides' history, where he



## SEMINAR 3

*inability*  
*respects*  
*inability* wisely simplifies in order to bring out the problem. Here you have a political model—~~solidity~~, public spirit, and so on—Sparta. And here you have this extremely fragile Athens where the civic spirit, the public spirit, is *weakened* in many of the states and where old simple honesty is no longer in control as it was said to be in Sparta. On the other hand, the understanding of all these things was possible only in Athens where Aristophanes wrote, <sup>and Socrates</sup>, and all the others. That is the problem. And one can say that the problem of Aristophanes as stated immediately is this: The direct contrast ~~upon the~~ political objective—the old, respectable order—and the means which he uses—the comedy, these novel means—that indicates probably that Aristophanes enjoyed doing what he did. I think that goes without saying. He enjoyed something which was dependent on corruption, and which could not help, to some extent, increasing the corruption. Because all of the listeners to Aristophanes' comedies would have gone home with the firm resolve to be now Marathon fighters and not more impressed by his magnificent jokes, some gross, the best, of course, not gross. But, anyway, that's anybody's guess. And let us beware of the simplicity which would perhaps do honor to our character but certainly not do honor to our understanding. So this conflict between the essential novelty of comedy, of all poetry, and the ~~praise~~ <sup>praise</sup> of antiquity we must naturally keep in mind. *between his appo*

*prudent* Now from this speech in the Clouds, it appears that the Clouds are much more reasonable than Socrates. They respect Zeus and Poseidon and the other gods. Naturally. But very interestingly, ~~Even these~~ <sup>breeding</sup> Clouds praise ether most highly. They complain that while they help the city more than any other gods, they are not worshipped at all. In other words, the Clouds themselves pursue a policy in that play. They are involved. Also, the Moon, capitalized, complains about the insufficient worship which it receives on the part of the Athenians and the allies of the Athenians. I cannot develop this as it should be developed. In other words, the Ether and the Moon are in contradistinction to the other gods. Now we need a formula for that distinction. Some of you will have it ready, I'm sure. Yes?

A. Cosmic gods.

S. Very good. And ...

A. And the Olympian gods.

*invariable* S. And the Olympian gods. You know that in the Banquet, Plato's Banquet. Surely, even in this speech of the Clouds, you know the Clouds are much more prudent than Socrates, this antagonism between the Cosmic gods, the gods ~~as~~ <sup>as</sup> to man as man and therefore recognized everywhere, and the Olympian gods—~~these are~~ <sup>these are</sup> specifically Greek gods—also appears. Yes. To repeat, there was nothing of any—how should I say it—crusade of Aristophanes to improve ~~antiquity~~ <sup>Athenian</sup> morality, but it was only a playmate for his comedy as comedy.

While this was going on, in the house, Strepsiades underwent his I.Q. test on the part of Socrates. What was the result?

A. He was not allowed to continue any further.

S. No, I mean first of all, the factual statement about the intelligence of Strepsiades.

A. Never by Chaos, air and respiration, never, no never have I seen a clown so helpless and forgetful and absurd. Why, ~~if he has~~ <sup>he forgets</sup> a quirk or two, he clean forgets





di. i. c. -  
between  
to nature so that the names given to female beings as distinguished from male beings should ... I mean, that the names of males and females should correspond to the distinction between climatical males and climatical females. In other words, it has something to do with the distinction between nature and convention of which I spoke before. Strepsiades also doesn't prove to be very bright here and when he's asked to invent something regarding his own affairs--in other words, Socrates tries to stimulate his creativity in pressing the language--to do regarding his affairs what Socrates had been doing regarding the sun. To move around and to distinguish.

Now Strepsiades has only one problem, as we know; to get rid of his debts. What are his bright ideas to get rid of these debts? The first is to stop the moon because the interest is due with the new moon. Now if the moon could be stopped, the day of payment would never arrive. The other point is to use the sun in some way--it is not necessary for us to go into the details. And Socrates thinks these are not bad ideas. But the last suggestion is the simplest way of getting rid of his worries, is to commit suicide. This is too much for Socrates. He gives up. Why he regarded the other possibilities to stop the moon and to move the sun is not absurd it doesn't appear, but there is a simple contradiction between ... After all, he wants to be happy and only because he wants to be happy is he now unhappy. By destroying himself, he destroys of course all possibilities of happiness because that's real.

The Clouds act again at this point, because they are interested in Socrates' making some headway. Why are they interested in making Socrates some headway, by the way? They are very practical beings, you see. They are gods, goddesses, and no one worships them. No one in the whole world. And then they come to Athens and here they find this sole man who worships them. Socrates. Socrates is the first customer, we can say. If Socrates' business becomes flourishing, they have an interest. So, really concerned with Socrates' success, they advise Strepsiades to send his son instead. They are not fools, because Strepsiades is absolutely hopeless. Let us not forget this. Strepsiades is not, and has never been, a pupil of Socrates. He has listened to a conversation of Socrates in which Socrates expounded to him his unbelief in Zeus and the other gods. That's all. The only one who has learned something is Pheidippides, the son, and Pheidippides does not even dream of taking revenge on Socrates. So what Aristophanes says to Socrates is: Your downfall will not be your pupils, even those who have been pupils only of your rhetoric. Your downfall will be the people who have heard you talking in general, your expressing to them your heterodox views. In this situation, and that confirms only what I have said before, the Clouds advise Socrates to please Strepsiades as long as his state of mind lasts. You see, they are practical beings. Socrates doesn't think of him, the Clouds think of him. If Strepsiades had been cleverer than he is, the whole thing would have worked well to the benefit of the Clouds and at least without damage to Socrates.

So Strepsiades' main problem now is to get his son, Pheidippides, to enter the school; ~~scandalized~~ and therefore, is a kind of transition. The schooling of Strepsiades is over. And, as a matter of fact, he has not received any schooling. That's clear. The schooling will be given to Pheidippides and the trouble to Socrates comes indeed through Pheidippides' action to what his father left.

But we must stop here because there are limits to everything. We will try to conclude our discussion of the Clouds next time. We will hear, perhaps, Mr. Haett's paper.

SEMINAR 4

.... distribute some further papers. I have given a paper to Mr. Strickner, the first half of Plato's Apology. And Mr. Steinfrager and Mr. ~~Green~~ are still waiting for their papers. Now one of them must take the second half of the Apology and one of them must take the Crito. First come, first served. (Next sentence inaudible.)

Now let us turn to Aristophanes and the Clouds. I'll remind you of a few points we discussed last time. At first glance, the Clouds present a conflict between what we would call science and the polis and this is identical in the contents with the conflict between immorality and morality. That science of Socrates is not political; it does not include political or social science because the theme of science is nature and all political and social arrangements are conventional and therefore not the subject of science. But the Socratic science is connected with rhetoric and why that is so we will see later. And the Socratic position is presented symbolically by the two gods whom Socrates worships: Ether, also called Vortex ~~due~~ to its function, and the Clouds. The Ether or Vortex stands for natural science, especially astronomy, and the Clouds stand for rhetoric for the reasons we gave last time. The highest part of Socrates' science is astronomy and it is characteristic of Strepsiades that he is absolutely uninterested in astronomy whereas for the other fields he has some slight understanding. For geometry he has a considerable interest because it is so important for dividing up the land. with a view

This much about the overall position of Socrates: The occasion of the conflict is the predicament of Strepsiades. He is not a normal Athenian citizen; he is an inbetween being, between the upper and the lower class by virtue of his coming, you remember, from the lower class--he's a rustic--and he married, foolishly, into the upper class and therefore he's caught between the devil and the deep sea. But there is a more specific reason, apart from this marriage, and that is his indulgence towards his son, because if he had been a ~~top~~ father, he could have ~~been~~. His love for his son brings him into debts and tempts him therefore to become unjust; namely, to try to deny his debts and this can only be done by becoming a completely unjust man via Socrates. precluded

Strepsiades, we have seen, is too dumb, not only for natural science, but for rhetoric as well. The Clouds advise Strepsiades to send his son, Pheidippides, to Socrates' school. The Clouds, the new gods, encourage an enterprise which is somehow directed against the old gods. You know, Zeus doesn't exist, says Socrates.

Let us turn to verse 833 following, in the translation on page 184, middle, where Pheidippides speaks to his father. Do you have that?

A. Do you want me to read?

S. Yes.

A. In the middle here? Now he comes and says: Which of madness is to put faith in brainstruck men. Oh, hush and don't blaspheme such very ~~extra~~ men and delicious  
Men ~~are~~ such brutal habits they never shave nor use your precious ointments nor go to baths to clean themselves. But you have taken me for a corpse and cleaned me out. Come, come, make haste. ~~For~~ go and learn for me.

S. Enough. Stop here one moment. You see, there is a link between Strepsiades and Socrates and that consists of the fact that they're both thrifty, parsimonious. This parsimony is, of course, of very different origins. Why is Strepsiades parsimonious



SEMINAR 4

and why is Socrates parsimonious? That we must see. This parsimony is the only thing which Strepsiades and Socrates have in common. But all the more important, all the more revealing of the basic difference. Now what is the cause of Strepsiades' parsimony and what is the cause of Socrates' parsimony? This is a question that we must answer.

A. Socrates doesn't care for such things. They are of no worth to him. And they have too much worth for Strepsiades.

S. Yes. In other words, in one case indifference, in the other case, greed. Really opposite motivations. And that is, of course, connected with the fact that Socrates is absolutely disinterested in the payment for his teaching. This we must always keep in mind. And therefore the ~~idea~~ notion of the Clouds, that Socrates is here presented as a sophist in the ~~same~~ sense of the word, that is simply not true because the sophists were famous for greed for money and also for a reputation and prestige. Socrates is completely indifferent to these matters.

So Strepsiades then, as is indicated by the passage we have begun to read, is trying to persuade his son Pheidippides to become the pupil of Socrates because he, Strepsiades himself, is not intelligent enough for the purpose. In the conversation between Strepsiades and his son, Strepsiades teaches his son without any preparation that Zeus is not. Immediately. Like that. And Pheidippides, as a sensible young man, regards this as madness. He's willing to go to Socrates' school, but only to obey his father. The first time in his life that Strepsiades has put his foot down. And he got obeyed, which shows how terribly indulgent he has been hitherto. That brings it out still more. And the action is already indicated in this very fact: Strepsiades has been up till now a little crook. He only had the intention of defrauding his debtors. And then he goes to Socrates and there the net result is that he becomes completely corrupted. He wants to become completely corrupted. But he does not imagine what he is letting himself in for. He has already accepted the abolition of Zeus as a minor thing. But he has no inkling of what is going to happen if his son is exposed to this influence. Pheidippides seems to have a premonition that the end would be very bad for his father just as Strepsiades' indulgence to his son was bad for Strepsiades. In other words, he makes the same mistake in a different way. The father makes the same mistake all over again.

Then they go both to Socrates and Strepsiades urges Socrates to teach Strepsiades (sic) ~~the two~~ the two speeches--how does he call them? Arguments, or logic, which is an impossible translation, logic. Right and wrong logic. It has nothing to do with logic. They are two speeches, two contentions, two assertions, two arguments we could perhaps say. Just arguments. Just, not logically correct; an assertion in favor of justice--that is called the Just Logos. An assertion in favor of injustice--that is called the Unjust Logos. Strepsiades urges Socrates to teach his son the two Logoi, the two assertions, but above all the Unjust Logos. Naturally, because he wants to win the lawsuits, by fair means or foul. Socrates says that Pheidippides will learn from the two Logoi, from the two assertions, themselves. Socrates will be absent. Socrates does not teach injustice. Please note this. He only exposes these young men to these logoi, to these arguments themselves. If the Unjust argument is stronger, it is not Socrates' fault. That is so. The appearance of these two Logoi is very interesting. The Unjust teaching is not the teaching of Socrates. These teachings have a life of their own. They speak themselves. They act themselves. Now this is very common in the Platonic dialogues that the logos is presented as having a life of its own. One of the extreme cases, in the Phaedo, Socrates is afraid the

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logos might die. The logos might die. A logos moves as it sees fit and we follow it. The logos is the leader and must move around. This is not a Platonic invention as you can see. If it has been invented by anyone, one could say it has been invented by Aristophanes who presents this movement of the two logoi.

Now then we come to what is, in a sense, a central scene of the Clouds; namely, the argument between the two logoi--you can say between the two theses if you want to--between the Just thesis and the Unjust thesis. You cannot say the right and wrong logic as Rogers ~~does~~. Where does this begin?

translates

A. 186.

S. Yes. We cannot possibly read the whole thing. A few points which must be mentioned. The Unjust Logos is the weaker logos and the Just Logos is the stronger logos and therefore the claim of Socrates is that he can make the weaker logos the stronger one. Why is the Unjust Logos, the Unjust thesis, called weak if he's so strong? And why is the Just Logos called strong if it is so weak? There must be a reason for that. Yes?

A. The Just is based upon emotional ties to tradition. It takes its strength from its listeners' predilections and vices.

S. In other words, let us say it is strong with the people and the other is weak with the people. Perhaps that is sufficient. We must see. The argument begins, is started by the Unjust Logos and its assertion is very straightforward and clear. Right, or justice is not, just as Socrates had said, Zeus is not. Why does right not exist according to the first argument? Part of the argument is suppressed. Right obviously doesn't exist with men -- read the daily papers. So if it exists anywhere, it will exist with the gods. But does it exist with the gods? No. The highest god is Zeus. And what is the ground of Zeus' rule? By virtue of what does Zeus, the guardian of right, rule? Do you remember? It's important for the whole following argument. What makes Zeus rule?

A. Patricide.

S. Pardon? Parricide?

A. Patricide.

S. Oh, yes. He bound his own father and he committed a most unjust action, so justice has no basis. You must not take these as mere jokes. You know how important it is in Plato's Republic that the new argument for justice, and an atrociously new argument, is necessary because the traditional notions of justice are based on the traditional views of the gods and these traditional notions contradict the very justice which they claim to support. So that is very serious. This in a way settles it. The highest authority for traditional morality contradicts traditional morality. What can you do? That the argument is very powerful is shown by the reaction of the Just Logos. The only reply of which it is capable are insults. But then the Just Logos goes on to say that the moral decay of the city is a consequence of the Unjust Logos. People's faith in right is destroyed by some naughty man pointing out the contradiction between traditional morality and the basis of traditional morality--the actions of Zeus. And that leads to the decay of the city. So the issue is not settled with that. And now it goes on.



## SEMINAR #4

Up till now we had hardly more than scolding between the two Logos and we owe it to the Clouds, these powerful goddesses, that they bring about a debate as distinguished from mere exchange of insults. In a sense, the Clouds are more sensible than the two Logoi. They seem to be impartial and concerned with the true argument. And the Clouds want to find out which of the two Logoi will be the best speaker. That's interesting. The question is: Can justice defend itself by speech? Justice might have a stronger case than injustice, but perhaps not in the element of speech. Is this thinkable, that something might be higher, truer, and yet not be able to defend itself in the element of speech? That is the question with which we are confronted here.

So the debate begins and each of the two Logos states its case. The Just Logos proves its case by praising the austere system of education of olden times. That system of education which led to the victory of Marathon. A parallel from this country would be the American Legion. I say this without any criticism of it, but something standing for the recollection of the greatest achievements of the nation. Now what were the characteristic features of this old education? Physical training, Gymnasium. Not prattling on the market place. Connected with that sense of shame in every respect the young are seen but not heard and this kind of thing. The new education makes what is base noble and makes what is noble base. A certain kind of impudence which was regarded as base by the old school is regarded now as a sign of courage and so on, and therefore regarded as noble. You see, the case is not between an evaluating teaching and a value-free teaching but, in this modern lingo, two opposite systems of values confronted ~~here~~ <sup>each other</sup>.

Part of this modern and wicked system is, as appears from the indications, homosexuality. Now the Clouds, who are super human beings, and therefore can be assumed to be more intelligent than we are and therefore we must listen to how they react, the Clouds are impressed by what the Just <sup>speech</sup> says. Up to now, things are fine, but then the Unjust Speech comes up and contradicts everything the Just Speech has said. He explicitly contradicts the "laws and right", meaning laws are, as such, bad; right is, as such, bad. Nothing short of that. And he boasts that he will win with the weak, in spite of its weakness.

There is, however, one common ground--and that is important--between the two Speeches. There is one thing which they praise equally, although the meaning is somewhat different, and that is manliness. And that is part of the argument in 1045 following where the Unjust Logos shows that manliness is achieved precisely by the means condemned by the Just Speech. This is not very important for our purpose; the means happen to be warm baths. They were despised by the old-fashioned people and used by the new-fashioned people. But the power of the argument comes from the fact that the end is the same. Manliness. And the argument is given by a Heraclitean who used warm baths and no one was as manly as Heracles. Throughout his speech, Unjust <sup>speech</sup> needs to <sup>appeals</sup> precedent, Homeric and otherwise, which favors the new form of education and this is of course of a certain general interest and that is one of the weaknesses of what is called conservatism, if I may mention this complicated thing in passing. Conservatism always refers to tradition but traditions are never unambiguous. That's the trouble. They are complicated and you can find in every tradition some arguments against the overwhelming sense of the tradition. That's the difficulty. And that is where the Just Logos is ~~discomfited~~. The Unjust Logos can find precedents in the traditions which favor the new-fangled proposals.

But to come now to the main point and where the opposition becomes very clear, the

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Unjust Logos rejects moderation or temperance. That is the key point. They agree as to the fact that manliness or courage is a virtue. But they disagree as to the status of moderation or temperance. Moderation is akin to a sense of shame. Moderation, temperance, sense of shame. This is regarded as a most important virtue by the old education and it's regarded as a vice by the new education. There you are. Contemporary parallels abound. In the same breath in which he rejects moderation, he praises rhetoric. That goes together. These go together--this cleverness in speech, this smartness, this flexibility over against the dignified inflexibility, adherence to principle, and so on, in the old education. We can perhaps state it as follows also, and those of you who have studied Plato will know *Plato* better than we can do that. The virtues which are admired by the new type, by the Unjust Logos, are manliness and cleverness. The common Greek word for cleverness is the same as that for wisdom: sophia, because ~~they understand~~ the more subtle distinction between wisdom in the strictest sense and cleverness. So let us say manliness and wisdom. For example, in the characters in Plato's *Gorgias* what are the virtues which he recognizes or ~~similarity~~ in the first book of the *Republic*? Manliness and wisdom combined. Justice and moderation are no virtues. The Just Logos puts a much greater store by moderation plus justice than on manliness and wisdom. But we must go ~~going~~ into the deeper positions. What is at the bottom of the rejection of moderation? Turn to page 193 of the translation. That is after the Just Logos has said that Peleus married Thetis because he was moderate or sensible. Do you have that? Go on there.

A. Read that part where he says that ...

S. No, the immediate following speech.

A. And then she cut and ran away for nothing so engages a woman's heart as forward warmth, O shroud of those dark ages, for take this chastity, young man. Sift it inside and out. Count all the pleasures, all the joys. It bids you live without. No kinds of dames. No kinds of games. No laughing, feasting, drinking. Why, life itself has little worth without these joys, I'm thinking.

S. Notice that the old morality is austere, is aesthetic.

A. But I must notice now the wants by nature's self implanted.

S. Yes. Leave it. The necessities of nature. Literal translation.

A. We love, seduce, we can't help that. You're caught, convicted, granted. You're done for. You can't say one word while you follow me, indulge your genius.

S. <sup>if</sup> Conversing, or being together with me, you use or employ nature where it says "indulge your genius."

A. Laugh and clap. Hold nothing base to be. Why, if you're in adultery caught, your pleas will still be ample. You've done no wrong you'll say and then bring Zeus in your example. He fell before the wondrous powers by love and beauty wielded. And how can you, the mortal, stand where he, the immortal, yielded.

S. In other words, the principle to which he refers is nature. The new morality is in accordance with nature, the old morality is against nature and is based only on convention; all ~~things~~ <sup>themes</sup> which we come ~~upon~~ <sup>time and</sup> again in Plato. You see also the appeal



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to the model of Zeus himself. The old morality ~~condemns~~ condemns adultery and adultery is a great crime and the guardian of right is Zeus, but Zeus does accept these things which he condemns. But the argument is not quite sufficient. Granted then that one should follow nature without regard to law or convention. Still the law exists. And as appears from this sequel, there is human punishment for adultery in spite of the very strong case for adultery implied in Zeus' behavior. What about that? What about that great difficulty? Someone who raises the act of the Unjust Logos is caught and punished. What's the argument? How can the Unjust Logos maintain his thesis on this basis? What would you say? The unnatural morality rules the law courts and that is something. So the Just Logos wins. But how can the Unjust Logos get around the law courts? Partly of rhetoric, but still rhetoric is not the only ~~important~~ important thing. There is something else which we have to consider.

A. Law courts are unjust.

S. Yes, but they exist. And no one cares for justice here particularly. You know, justice loses face. But laws can be changed. As long as the citizen body believes in these conventions, of course, it is powerful. But the citizen body may change its mind, it may become enlightened, and the laws will be changed. That's the end of it. Since these practices are based only on convention, i.e., only on opinion, a change of opinion destroys it. A change of opinion cannot destroy the fact that we must have food for example. We may opine about it what we wish; we still need it. But things which depend entirely on opinion are changeable. At this point, the Just Logos itself admits its defeat and goes over to the opposite camp. That is in a way the high point of this comedy. Not Socrates. Socrates does nothing. Justice itself, we can say, presents its case and is unable to defend it. Justice is there, of course, overthrown. Well. What do you say to that? To that argument up to this point? What was the meaning of this debate? What was to be established by this debate according to the Clouds who were in charge of the debate and who brought it about in a way? Was it to establish who is right or who is wrong?

A. Who can make his speech ...

S. Who is the best speaker. So the Unjust Logos has proved to be the best speaker. That does not prove that he is right. But let us assume, as I hope we all assume, the the Unjust Speech is wrong. Is it then not possible to state it's case in speech? Must it not be possible to state the case for justice in speech? That is, by the way, the great theme of the Republic; the great theme--to state the case for justice in speech. According to Socrates, no one has ever done that before. That's the first time. What is so strong; what is so difficult for speech to establish, so that the Unjust Logo wins? What is that? The subject matter they discuss here is, of course, adultery. Why is the argument in favor of adultery invincible as it seems here? What does any argument against adultery presuppose? Really, that is very simple and we cannot go on before some of you have answered the question.

A. Some kind of a hardship is involved with justice.

S. That would apply also to theft and murder and any other case.

A. Maybe just in terms of adultery.

S. Yes, sure, because that was the subject.

A. The stresses which cause social disharmony.

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S. Yes, but if you look at it purely from a detached point of view you can say it also establishes social harmony. That is too general.

A. The sanctity of the family.

S. Absolutely. That's the one. The sacredness of the marriage bond. But that is question: Is this not the difficulty for the Logos to establish, that marriage is sacred or, to use the term which is here more urgent because the basis of the argument is not sacredness, but nature: Is marriage a natural institution? Is marriage by nature? That is the question. But we must see. We have not yet all the evidence together to see what the specific difficulty is.

Now the decisive thing has been done. The Unjust Logos has proved to be stronger in a speech than the Just Logos. Strepsiades is not deterred by this terrible event; He is as enthusiastic as he was before about his plan of having his son educated by the Unjust Logos. Imagine such a father. His son, on the other hand, still does not like to stay in school. You see, Pheidippides, the foolish playboy, is more sensible than his father is, his common father. How strange. Mr. Gilbert?

A. I don't understand. Why does the final overthrow of the Just Logos take the form of showing that everybody is an adulterer? Or is the translation misleading here?

S. You mean the verse which we just read?

A. At the very end, yes, where, "Who are they? They're adulterers. Who are they? They're adulterers."

S. I see. Well, surely that is a comic exaggeration, you know, playing to the audience. What kind of skeletons do you have in your closets? But stated non-comically it simply means that if the citizen body does not believe in the wrongness of adultery they will not condemn and that is what I said. So if prohibition against adultery is based merely on opinion, then opinion can be changed by enlightenment. Everyone who takes the trouble of reading the chapter on American mores in de Tocqueville's Democracy in America and looks around sees that an enormous change has taken place in the last hundred years. I believe that people are better informed say in the last thirty years; and that shows what opinions can do. I mean, for example, the spread of *Psychoanalysis* has done to change the old position. At this point, the Clouds express for the first time the suspicion that Strepsiades or Socrates will regret what has happened, before long. Since the Clouds are important characters in this play, why this change of opinion on the part of the Clouds? What has happened since their last approving remarks and encouraging remarks? <sup>Answer:</sup> ~~Against~~ the frank and clear victory of the Unjust Logos. The Clouds divine that the victory of the Unjust Logos is bound to have bad effects on everyone. If you turn to the translation, page 195, the speech of the Chorus there. Read that please.

A. Go. But in us the thought is strong you will repent of this ere long. Now we wish to tell the judges all the blessings they shall gain if, as justice plainly warrants, we the worthy prize attain. First when ever in the season ye would fain your fields renewed, all the world shall wait expectant till we've poured our rain on you. Then of all your crops and vineyards we will take the utmost care so that neither draught nor pestilence, the heavy rain impair. But if any one amongst you dare to treat our claims with scorn, mortal he, the Clouds immortal, better had ye ne'er been born. Even his estate shall gather neither corn nor oil nor ~~wine~~ <sup>wine</sup> for



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blossoms

whenever ~~any~~ sparkle on the olive or the vine they shall at once be blighted we will fly our slings so true. And if ever we behold him building up his mansions new with our tight and ~~many~~ hail stones we will all his tiles destroy. But if he, his friends or kins folk should ~~eat~~ feast and joy, all night long we'll pour in torrents so perchance he'll rather pray to endure the draught of Egypt than decide ~~at~~ today. <sup>Clouds</sup> ~~at~~ <sup>Clouds</sup>

S. The reference to Egypt is not uninteresting because <sup>Clouds</sup> ~~draughts~~ are, of course, powerless in Egypt. Egypt is watered by the Nile. Irrigation. It doesn't need the Clouds. The Clouds are powerless in Egypt, which means, turn around; the opposite of the Clouds is most powerful in Egypt. What is ~~these~~ <sup>the</sup> opposite to the Clouds in the simplest formula?

A. The river.

(?) S. Yes, but that does not correspond <sup>to it</sup> on the more practical level. The old, the ancient; and that is, of course, a theme which goes through ~~here~~ <sup>and in</sup> Plato. The most ancient thing and the <sup>greatest</sup> admiration for antiquity as antiquity is <sup>that</sup> found in Egypt. So you see, ~~there is an enjoining Parsons. that I mention only in passing~~

But to come back to our <sup>point</sup> ~~point~~; the Clouds <sup>divine</sup> ~~find~~ that the victory of Injustice is bound to have bad effects on everyone. The Clouds desire to win. Now that is on two levels. As goddesses, they desire to win recognition in Athens because now they are not recognized. As representatives <sup>of</sup> the play, they desire the poet to win. That is what they speak ~~here~~. But they can win only if the judges are just, as they say at the beginning. But the judges will not be just if they do not derive profit from being just: ~~if~~ the Clouds cannot really give all these benefits which they represent ~~here~~. And ~~if~~ they don't derive profit from being just through honoring the Clouds, and if they do not derive harm from being unjust; i.e., from not honoring, or despising, the Clouds. The Clouds naturally presuppose it is just to honor the Clouds. That's the basis of their argument. But the city of Athens, <sup>the ancient political</sup> ~~intense and social~~ <sup>the ancient political</sup> order, does not honor the Clouds. Old Athens is unjust; therefore the Clouds must sympathize with the ~~Antic~~ <sup>Antic</sup> thesis, with the Unjust Logos, because the Just Logos doesn't recognize the Clouds as goddesses. That shows the difficulty in which the Clouds are. The Clouds cannot wish a simple victory of the old school because that doesn't recognize them. On the other hand, a simple victory of the new school would also not be good for them and therefore they are in an ambiguous position which throws also some light on the problem of justice.

One thing appears which I would emphasize: The Clouds see that it is necessary for anyone, sooner or later, to appeal to justice. Perhaps God knows why, but that is a fact. And therefore, think. Don't believe so easily in those who say justice is a mere word.

So the issue is decided in favor of Injustice, apparently. The consequence is that, in the sequence, Strepsiades treats his creditors with incredible impudence, because he is so absolutely sure that he can talk himself out of any debts. Pheidippides, his son, does nothing of the kind. That's quite interesting. And the argument against the creditors is not uninteresting. Let us turn, in the translation, page 200, bottom. That's verse 1278. Do you have that?

A. Well then tell me. Which theory do you side with? That the rain falls fresh each time or that the sun draws back the same old rain? (Is that it?) Well, I'm very sure I need ...

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S. That's the creditor. Yes? Now what does the creditor say?

A. I'm very sure I neither know nor care.

Not care? Good Heavens. Do you claim your money so unenlightened in the laws of nature?

S. How then do you have the right to claim money if you know nothing of the heavenly things? Yes?

A. If you're hard up then, pay me back the interest at least.

Interest? What kind of beast is that?

S. The Greek word for interest--tokos-- means progeny and has therefore a certain ~~kind of meaning~~ <sup>ambiguity</sup> which it doesn't have in English. Yes.

A. What else then, day by day and month by month, larger and larger, until still the silver grows as time sweeps by.

Finely and nobly said. What then? Think you the sea larger now than 'twas last year?

No, surely. 'Tis no larger. It is not right that it should be.

And do you then, insatiable grasper, when the sea, receiving all these rivers, grows no larger, do you desire your silver to grow larger?

Come now. You prosecute your journey off here. Fetch the whip.

S. And so on. In other words, he is not quite stupid. He uses the rudiments of natural science which he has learned to prove the injustice of interest rates. That something should get bigger and bigger and bigger, there is no natural limit to that whereas every natural being has limits. In this discussion with the creditors, as I said, Strepsiades is incredibly impudent. But it remains unclear, because other things happen now, whether Strepsiades would have gotten away with his impudence with the creditors; in other words, whether he would have won his case before the court.

At this stage, after this incredible conduct of Strepsiades, the Clouds are now absolutely opposed to Strepsiades. They know he can't bring them or anyone else any good, being such a fool. What is then the scene in which the whole thing culminates? To our great regret, we cannot know what would have happened to his debts. Something much graver than any question of debts comes in. Pheidippides beats his own father. Pheidippides, who hadn't taken any interest in winning law suits, in defrauding creditors, beats his own father which, according to all natural notions, is a graver crime than some minor cheating. Strepsiades is obviously shocked by this fact. He tells the story of how he came to the beating. That you find on the top of page 204, in the middle of the speech of Strepsiades. They have a controversy about which poets are good or bad and Strepsiades is in favor of the old classics, being an old-fashioned man, and his son, his sophisticated son, is in favor of the modern--Euripides. That's the context. Now what does it say?

A. When he said this, my heart began to heave extremely fast. Yet still I kept my passion down and said, "Then, prithee, you sing one of those new-fangled songs ~~with~~ which



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modern striplings do." And he began the shameful tale Euripides has told of how a brother and a sister led incestuous lives of old. Then I could no more restrain. But first I must confess with strong abuse I loaded him and so, as you may guess, we stormed and banded threat for threat til out at last he flew and smashed and thrashed and thumped and bumped and bruised me black and blue.

S. That's it. So, in other words, the terrible thing which led to the beating of the father by the son is Pheidippides defending incest. *Incest of brother and sister.* Strepsiades abhors it. Pheidippides defends it. But the question now no longer is incest of brother and sister, but beating one's father. The Clouds encourage Pheidippides to defend why he's beating his father. And then Pheidippides proves that a son may beat his father. He proves it to his father's satisfaction. That we must read. Page 205, verse 1408.

A. How sweet it is these novel arts, these clever words, to know. (Or is that the other one down below?)

S. No, the two-line speech of Pheidippides. Yes?

A. Peace. I will now resume the thread where I broke off. And first I ask when I was young, did you not strike me then?

Yea. For I loved and cherished you.

Well solve me this again. Is it not just that I your son should cherish you alike and strike you since, as you observe, to cherish means to strike? What, must my body need to be gorged and pounded black and blue and your's be scathless? Was not I as much free-born as you? Children are whipped and shall not sires be whipped? Perhaps you urge that children's minds alone are taught by blows. Well, age is second childhood then. That everybody knows. And as by old experience, age should guide its steps more clearly. So when they err, they surely should be punished more severely.

But law goes everywhere for me. Deny it if you can.

S. Strepsiades appeals now to the nomos, to the convention. Whatever may be true or right by nature doesn't count. Conventional law forbids that everywhere. What does Pheidippides say?

A. Well, was not he who made the law a man? A mortal man, as you and I, who, in old times, talked over the problem?

S. You see? Like you and me, the legislator. He's no authority. He may be wrong. And in addition, he lived in the olden times, in the dark ages, in the benighted, so the chances that we know the truth are much better. Yes?

A. And think you that to you or me the same is not allowed? To change it so that sons by blows should keep their fathers steady? Still, we'll be liberal and the blows which we've received already, we'll forget. We'll have no *ex post facto* legislation. Look at the game cocks. Look at all the animal creation. Do not they beat their parents? Aye. I say then that they are as we, except they no special laws enact.

S. In other words, they have no conventions. They have no laws based on decisions.

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But otherwise they are what nature is. Pure nature we see much better in the brutes because they have no conventions. Yes?

A. Why don't you then if always where the game cock leads you follow? Ascend your perch to roost at night and dirt and ordure swallow?

The case is different there, old man, as Socrates could see.

Well then, you'll blame yourself at last if you keep striking me.

How so?

Why, if it's right for me to punish you, my son, you can, if you have got one, yours.

Aye. But suppose I've none. Then, having dealt me, you will die, while I've been flogged in vain.

Good Heavens. Good friends, I really think he has some reason to complain. I must concede he's put the case in quite a novel light. I really think we should be flogged unless we're always right.

*ecclesiastic*  
S. Stop. In other words, just as the Just Logos has admitted its defeat and has gone over to the opposite camp, Strepsiades, in his own case, as a father, admits that his son is right. Let us consider the arguments brought forth by Pheidippides. All men are by nature free. I was born as free as you. Hence, every human being has the same right to beat another human being as anyone else has. Sure, that is true, but what about a father and son? That is not just two chance human beings. Why has a father the right to beat his son? Because he exercises his authority in the interest of the son. It's a form of caring; beating is a part of caring. And this beating and caring is connected with the fact that the son as a child lacks understanding. And the father possesses understanding. But if that is the reason, if the son is of age, has reached the age of discretion, and the father is stupid--perhaps even senile--then the son may beat his father with the same reason. If lack of understanding is the reason for the objection, old men are frequently less wise than their children. And the children should beat them. If the only parental authority is intelligence, then the intelligent men must rule the unintelligent. And ruling is sometimes not separable from compelling, physically compelling, and that is beating. That's it. Then the third argument which Pheidippides brings forth in reply to his father ... [No, no, here we have still to go over that.] Strepsiades has said: Yes, but there is a universal nomos, a universal law, which favors the fathers' beating their children and not the other way around. Pheidippides says: Well, that nomos can be changed. That was made by some human legislator, a fellow like you and me. That doesn't impress me. But if we speak of universal law, let us look at the true universal law, the law which all living beings obey. Let us look at the cocks and at the dogs and what have you. The true universal law is that to which all living beings are subject. And these other living beings beat their fathers without any hesitation.

Then Strepsiades gives a reply which is not too bad. Perhaps the only sensible thing he has said in the play. ~~But~~ <sup>man</sup> man is not a brute. He took the example of the cocks: You don't live like a cock. You differ from them in so many other respects. What does Pheidippides say on this occasion? What does he say? That's crucial because, as I said, the only sensible thing said by Strepsiades hitherto. What does he say?



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A. He appeals to Socrates.

S. In other words, he doesn't give a reply. He differs to the authority of Socrates. So that is a point which we must keep in mind for not only today, but for every discussion of this subject. We must consider in all such cases the specific nature of man. That was really the key point in the teaching of the revered Socrates, if I may use your phrase from last time. I mean from Plato's and Xenophon's Socrates. Yes, but what does this imply, such a reference to the nature of man as distinguished from the nature of brutes. What does this imply?

A. There is a difference, however the difference might be defined.

S. However the difference might be defined, there is a difference, but what kind of a difference? That man is stronger than the brutes, or what? That's also a difference.

A. By reason.

S. Yes, but what kind of a difference <sup>is this,</sup> when you defer to reason in this connection? You see, there are various differences. For example, there is a difference in this book ...

A. Man is capable of changing his actions.

S. Well, it's not a good example. Yes. Well, let me do it very simply. What's the difference between this and this?

A. Quantitative difference.

S. Quantitative difference. A difference of degree. <sup>difference</sup> That's one difference. There is another kind of difference. Let us say essentials. In other words, what Aristophanes implies, but doesn't spell out--that is what the later Socrates spells out--is that the whole case for justice cannot be made if we do not consider the essential difference between man and the brutes. And this more generally presupposes that there are essential differences. That there are essential differences. This is a simple sentence and the decisive step taken by Socrates. No one prior to Socrates spoke of essential differences. I mean, people implied them, but the very term <sup>positive</sup> "essential difference" which everyone uses today, even our ~~Aristophanes~~ friends all the time, doesn't exist before Socrates. The discovery of the fact that there are essential differences presupposes that there are essences, whatever that may mean. And that was what Socrates did. And that is the problem to which Aristophanes, not understanding that properly, leads us.

J. Except in the case where he judges Strepsiades, where has Socrates shown his interest in this man's nature, in his ...

S. Not all. You are perfectly correct. Socrates is presented by Aristophanes ...

(End of first side of reel.)

..... The philosophers don't see the truth. They cannot see the truth. The truth is seen by the poets to which Socrates, or Plato, replies: If the Philosophers go about it in the right way, they and they alone see the truth and they see it better and more clearly than the poets. That is a later story. Here we are still far removed from

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this kind of philosophy.

Then the last argument, the fifth argument is this: Strepsiades says if you accept beatings from your father, you acquire the right to beat your own son--that's a kind of chain going round--to which Pheidippides replies: If I do not have a son, I have accepted the beatings from you and I never have an object which I can beat. That's unfair. I shall never have someone whom I can pay back. This is good as far as it goes, but the really crucial argument is the fourth, which I mentioned before, to which Pheidippides doesn't have a reply. Beating is just ~~another~~ <sup>another</sup> form of caring. Otherwise, it's just brutality. Hence sons must beat their fathers. Beating is an enjoyment of the beater at the expense of someone else. That's the implication of the last argument. The beaten must have the right to beat his son. But if he has no son, then he must pay it back. He can't go on. It's a chain. He must pay back. So that is of course (?)

Now what happens immediately thereafter? Let us read what happens immediately after, where we left off. But keep this in mind; Strepsiades admits that his son was right in beating him and so the Socratic teaching, this immoral teaching, won not only in the fight of the two Logoi, the two theses, but it has won again here. And now we come to the last step. The last straw as you will see.

A. Look to a fresh idea. And he'll be my death I vow. Yet then perhaps you will not grudge even what you suffer now.

Now? Will you make me like the blows which I've received today?

Yes. For I'll beat my mother too.

What? What is that you say? Why this is worse than all.

S. Yes. Now let's stop here. Here that's <sup>out</sup> ~~all~~. Beating the father is all right. Beating the mother is impossible. Now what is that? This is worse than everything else and this is the last straw. And at this moment, that alone brings about the revolt of Strepsiades. Nothing else before. The ~~demise~~ <sup>demise</sup> of the gods; even beating the father, that's okay; but beating the mother, that's unbearable. How come? I read in one commentary a suggestion which flabbergasted me; namely, that this is connected with the fact that the mother, in this particular case, is such a fine lady from the upper crust and I think there is not the slightest reason to suppose that is true because Strepsiades has long been cured of any admiration for his upper-class wife as we have seen. But what is then the reason?

A. But what, if as I proved the other, by the same logic I can prove 'tis right to beat my mother?

Aye, what indeed if this you plead. If this you think to win, why then <sup>for all I care</sup> you may ~~to~~ the cursed pit convey yourself with all your learning new; your master and your logic too.

S. Now let us stop here. Strepsiades absolutely refuses, <sup>even</sup> to listen to the argument supporting the assertion that a son may beat his own mother. Why is he so intransigent for the first time when this subject comes up whereas he has always been open to reason up to this point? What's that? What is so wrong in beating one's mother? What is not wrong in beating one's father?



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A. There's a physical difference in strength usually.

S. Sure, but <sup>considerations</sup> chivalry didn't play any role in that. Much tougher.

A. In the last argument, he proved that he could beat his father because his father was weaker in reason.

S. With all due respect to the fair sex, could not a mother also be inferior in understanding to her wise son, or a wise daughter, for that matter.

A. I think this is the difference which Strepsiades accords to women and he doesn't expect them to be equal.

S. You mean that he believes, generally speaking, that they are inferior intellectually to men, or what?

A. That's what I would think.

S. Well, all the greater reason for beating the mother. But why don't you take a daughter and her mother and that would be simpler.

A. Well, I think he has accepted this and then enshrined the ...

S. Now that won't do. I mean, let us go back. Why did Pheidippides beat his father? Why did he come to that beating?

A. Because he had been beaten.

S. No, no. That was the reasoning later on, but why did he come to that beating? What disagreement between father and son led to the beating?

A. Incest.

S. Incest. That's it. And the incest issue was overled by the beating issue. Now the beating of the mother comes in and the beating of the mother comes up and that reminds somehow and quite rightly of the incest issue before. If a son can beat his mother, where is the limit? May there not also be incest between mother and son? That is the point and we must later on try to interpret it. But let us first continue the external action. At this <sup>moment</sup> ~~point~~, after all communication, all discourse, between father and son has been destroyed, Strepsiades complains to the Clouds that they have misled him. And they simply reject his accusation. They did what they did, they claim, in order to prepare Strepsiades' punishment so that he shall learn to fear the gods. Here they are <sup>rather hypocritical</sup>. He realizes that his original motive, to cheat his creditors, was wicked. He wishes to punish Socrates for having misled him. He can't punish the Clouds. His son Pheidippides, however, is grateful to his teacher Socrates and refuses to join his father Strepsiades in the action of revenge which follows and which consists, as you have seen, in burning down Socrates' 'thinktank.' — a term now applied in vulgar language to the center of behavioral studies in <sup>rel. A/B</sup> ~~rel. A/B~~, but it is really a good literal translation for the term used by Aristophanes.

Now we see what a crook Strepsiades really is. The alleged main reason why Strepsiades burns down the thinktank is that Socrates commits acts of *hybris*.

insolence against the gods, or that he is unjust to the gods, those gods whom he, Strepsiades, had sold down the river a long time ago and for whom he didn't care. He was reminded of the gods only when the peak of criminality—namely, beating one's mother, with its terrible implications—came up. He had no objection to any injustice to the gods till he saw the consequence of that—beating one's own mother. Incest with a mother. The implication: without gods no effective prohibition against incest. What does this mean for the play as a whole? We have seen that the crucial thing in the fight between the two Logoi, the Just Logos and the Unjust Logos, was that the Just Logos could not defend itself by speech, by Logos, by argument. And the example here was adultery. And every argument in favor of adultery presupposes that marriage is natural, a natural institution. We must link up this point with the end of the work. There is no logos, no reasoned argument, which can account for this prohibition of incest and which therefore can account for the sacredness of marriage. There is an essential limitation of the logos, of reason, but that does not settle the issue. Marriage is necessary. Prohibitions against incest are necessary. But how can we account for these necessities? Logos appealing to nature, to physis, cannot account for them.

Let me first try to give a summary of the play; I mean, the points most important for our purposes. First, what is Socrates' position and what light does it throw on the origin of political science, our theme here? Socrates here is not, of course, the Socrates we know from Plato and Xenophon. He is a pre-Socratic, a student of nature. And this implies that he is guided by the distinction between nature and the merely conventional, the merely arbitrary, established by men—nomos. And from this it follows that he has no interest in political things as such because political things are all based on nomos, on human arrangements which could also be different. The only interest which this Socrates can have in political things is to use the political things—such as law courts—for the purpose of what is by nature. The individual human being is a natural being. The use he can make of the political things is rhetoric. Therefore rhetoric is identical with political science. That's a phrase which Aristotle uses towards the end of his Nicomachean Ethics, that the Sophists had practically identified political science with rhetoric. That is the deepest reason for that. If all political things are conventional, if they have the cognitive status of stamps, no serious adult would devote his life to the study of political things. I mean, you can do it as a hobby, as you collect stamps, but no more. But still you can make some use of them for your benefit as a natural being. That's rhetoric. Now this Socratic position is opposed to the old opinion which is characterized by piety, moderation, or sense of shame, and silent deed. The new education, akin to Socrates' teaching, is characterized by hybris; no fear of the gods; obeying nature, which in itself means dishonoring them, following one's inclinations, and cleverness in talk. Nothing is sacred since nothing sacred can withstand logos, examination in the light of nature. The polis, the city, has its base in the family, in the—[Greek term]. And what is the basis of the family? That's the theme here. A taboo, to use the modern term, which cannot be justified, which is just there. But could one not say that man needs the polis even if he does not need the family. Is not man so constituted that he cannot live except in society, even if it were true that he does not need the family? There is one great work which all of you have read which proposes this thesis: Man needs the polis, but not the family. Do you know? The Republic. That's the simple, obvious theme of the Republic. Man, by his nature, is so constituted that he needs the polis, but not the family. You see how close the themes of Plato are to those of Aristophanes. And needless to say that this is not Plato's last word on the family, because when Plato spoke practically on the subject, namely in his Laws, the family takes over. But in the Republic, Plato discusses theoretically the problem of human society and there he busts the case wide open and he is not afraid of very shocking things to



say. But what about the polis, then? Men must cooperate with one another if they are to live well. They are in need of exchange of goods and services as no one can deny. Once you admit such an exchange, the need of such exchange, you must insist on that exchange being fair. People would stop exchanging goods and services if they knew all the time they would always be cheated. Part of that is the law punishing men for defrauding their creditors. That's part of that simple fairness. So that would seem to be a good basis for justice. But what is the difficulty here? You see, they were very apt and did not leave one stone unturned. So why is not Aristophanes' Socrates compelled to admit the necessity of justice? Since he cannot deny the need for humans living together, for human exchange, therefore for justice. What's the difficulty here? It is a very terrible thing, but it must be said. And it is also necessary to say to show the essential deficiencies of all utilitarian argument, because that is a simple utilitarian argument. The fact that man must live in society and exchange goods and services and therefore have a certain form of justice does not imply that everyone be just. Do we not have a wonderful exchange of goods and services though there is a lot of crime going on? We take that in our strides. We can afford it. Even a smaller and poorer society can afford some of this crime. A certain amount of clever injustice, of injustice which is invisible to the law courts and even to everyone else, is not destructive to the polis. Therefore, the practical question is for the individual: Will you be one of those privileged guys who can exploit the polis for his own selfish purposes or will you be one of those average fellows who simply have to be just? The problem is discussed in the Republic you know, in the beginning, especially when Glaucon describes the possibility of a man who is invisible and can do what he wants. That's the point. You see how the problems of Plato and the problems of Aristophanes are the same. So the Socratic position by Aristophanes, which is not the position of Socrates we know from Plato, truly implies a denial of the essential necessity of justice.

Now let us see what Aristophanes' critique means. I mean, there is a message of the play as a whole—a very simple one which everyone, looking at it, or reading it, will see immediately. Well, what is it? I mean, Socrates has a teaching which is irrefutable, which is stronger than any other teaching, any other opposed teaching. Well? What happens? His teaching is so strong, stronger than any other and ...?

A. It isn't strong enough.

S. Yes.

A. The result of his teaching is to destroy the polis. That is, it destroys regulations and doctrines which would forbid Strepsiades from burning down the think-tank.

S. That goes too far. Let us stick only to a part of what you said. The opinion—of Strepsiades in this case—and Socrates' logos. That is all. Socrates is defeated. He's defeated.

This brings up another question and I hope I will take care of the other part of your statement. If not, you remind me. Does this mean that Socrates is a wicked man? And that is, after all, the first impression one gets from reading the play. Does Aristophanes attack Socrates as an enemy of the polis and hence as an enemy of the human race? Socrates is defeated not by the polis, but by Strepsiades. Not a legal action. Strepsiades doesn't have one. The character of Strepsiades shows the limit both of Socrates' effectiveness and of Socrates being a danger and being himself in danger. Socrates has no effect on anyone except these starvelings who look at the

stars together with him. The only non-cognitive man, the non-philosopher, non-science, whatever you call it, whom he affects is Strepsiades. Strepsiades is a fairly innocuous crook. And it is an accident that he comes into connection with Socrates and the accident is due to his inbetween position between the upper and lower class which may partly explain his unusual indulgence to his son. Only people like Strepsiades, this rather abnormal type of citizen, can possibly be corrupted by Socrates. One little implication in passing: not types like Alcibiades. That's very interesting. You know, later in the accusation, much was made of what Socrates did to Alcibiades. Of course Alcibiades was still very young at that time. That's true.

Socrates' doctrine destroys not the polis. The polis is strong and firm. It destroys him, Socrates. Socrates' vice is not injustice, which has to do with greed, but lack of understanding. Socrates is in a way a fool in spite of his very great cleverness in measuring the jumping of fleas and in observing the motions of the stars. You know, sometimes even today you see famous natural scientists who are amazingly clever in their scientific work and then they sometimes step out and make arguments on pronounced political matters and so on and there they are not so impressive, to put it mildly. It is an old story, by no means limited to modern times. Socrates lacks prudence, or practical wisdom. He lacks self-knowledge. He does not know, he's unaware of the context in which he operates his thinktank. He's extremely shortsighted. He's a plaything of forces which he does not comprehend and does not control presented here by the Clouds. The Clouds are not defeated. The Clouds are very clever. They want to enter Athens and to be worshipped by Athens. There is only one little enticement wedge and that is Socrates, the fellow who dares, the innovator, who is willing to worship new gods. So they ~~use~~ on Socrates. But they are prudent. In the moment they see that Socrates' lack of understanding in cooperation with Strepsiades' lack of understanding is going to compromise the case of the Clouds, they switch sides. They come up as defenders of the polis. They are sitting pretty. Socrates is not.

We must also mention the following point. Socrates, Aristophanes' Socrates, does not distinguish between the accidental and local laws, which are really rather arbitrary, and a law obeyed by all men, a universal law. A law which all human beings--that is, all civilized human beings--comply with is somehow natural, is somehow based on man's nature. Man's nature. The essential difference between man and brutes is not considered by Socrates.

I mention one point in conclusion of this statement to understand better the whole thing. Strepsiades and Socrates have something in common. Naturally. Otherwise they could not cooperate. And this was identified at one point in the play as parsimony, but an ambiguous parsimony because it means indifference in the case of Socrates and greed in the case of Strepsiades. Now let us look somewhat more closely at Strepsiades. What is his motive? What is Strepsiades' ultimate motive? That is the whole thing--what causes the whole movement. What is his ultimate motive? Yes?

A. Preservation of his own?

S. That is very good. It is too good for my present purposes. I mean, first, obviously, he's in debt. But what is behind the debts? Love of his son. He does not love his wife. I mean, the silence is very clear, and references to his wife do not show any love. He loves his son and that goes through his whole life. This love is not requited. As you put it, what his motivation is, his love of his own--his son, his love of his own. One can say that the father and the son have nothing in common except that Strepsiades is the father of Pheidippides. Strepsiades doesn't admire Pheidippides because of his horsemanship, because of the elegant company he keeps,



and so on and so on and so on, but what is decisive for him is, "This is my son." His own. Nothing else. This is, one can say, a natural design which all brutes have, too. A tigress fights for her cubs as much as <sup>any</sup> you might. Now this natural love for his son as his own brings him into debts, into injustice, into impiety and so on and so on, and it culminates in this atrocious suggestion of his son that he may beat his own mother, you remember. Confronted with this possibility, Strepsiades' indulgence to his son ceases. Why? He grants his son everything. Everything. Even that he may beat him. But not that he may beat the mother with the implication of incest. The prohibition against incest is the basis of his own, of Strepsiades' and any other man's own, in this sense. Why? The sacredness of the family is indispensable in principle for Strepsiades' knowing that Pheidippides is his son. Strepsiades' natural love for this son as his own presupposes ultimately nomos. The law. And therefore his whole life is based on this self-contradiction. Socrates, who is presented there as without any love of any of his own--I mean, there's no allusion to his having children--that's different. I think that is ultimate, the basis of the difficulty of Strepsiades. The question is--to which we do not have an answer now--is, of course, why does Aristophanes defend the family and the polis? He shows only that the defense by means of ~~the~~ logos is not possible. There must be some other form of defense. That is the reason why we will turn--not now, unfortunately, but next time--to the Birds because the Birds deal with the same problem as we have seen that. Yes? Have you some problem, Mr. ?

Q. There is a great variety of opinion as to what the Birds deal with.

S. Yes. I don't believe there is a great variety of opinion. I think as far as I know in literature there is one absolutely preponderant opinion which tries to say that it is the absolutely certain political situation in Athens.

<sup>connected up with a</sup>  
A. There are at least two variations on that .

S. What would you say? Perhaps you'll present us. We'll go to that. But I can only say what my impression is for some time, that the Birds deals with an interesting proposition: to have a polis erected on the basis of Socrates--I mean, on Socrates' teaching. Let us see. We'll read it together. I mean, don't give in to me in any way, of course. Follow your own understanding. But the theme of incest, beating the father, is written very largely, as you must have seen.

<sup>connection</sup>  
A. Yes, but the difference between the incest theme in the Birds and in the Clouds is a little bit obscure.

S. Yes. We must try to make it clear. Now is there any point you would like to bring up, too, Mr. ?

Q. Are you suggesting that the reason the Clouds didn't put out the fire is because they changed sides?

S. Yes, sure, they have changed, but before. The first sign of the change of sides occurs after the victory of the Unjust Logos and that is connected with, they are practical beings. They know that if justice is simply rejected, that is bad for everyone. That they know. Yes, Mr. Johnson ?

Q. I have a question about the youth of Aristophanes. If the given dates in the book are correct. The youth of Aristophanes at the time the play was written, if the

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date that was given approximately for the birth of Aristophanes is correct, it would seem that he would be only about 22 years old.

S. When was he born?

A. They said 445.

S. I don't think ... No, he must be older than that. The Clouds were written in 421 or 2 or somewhere around there. The Birds were much later, 414. No, he must be older than that.

A. He must, because if this were the case, it would seem kind of a strange criticism from a man so young for Socrates who was ...

S. I don't know now what is supposed to be the date of the birth of Aristophanes, but I would assume there was no greater difference than about 10 years and some people are, how should I say, very mature at a very early age. We have some, for example, in very modern times. There is no difficulty in that. But we cannot become entangled in the question of Aristophanes' own position because we would have to read all the eleven plays and that is absolutely impossible. We read it only with a view to an understanding of what Socrates, the revered Socrates stands for and here the statements of Aristophanes are of a particular value. One could as well read Thucydides' history, for example, for understanding the pre-Socratic thinking about society. But Aristophanes has a great advantage. He speaks of Socrates himself, you know, and so we get an earlier version of Socrates' teaching himself. And in addition, I think that there is no writer of this epoch, of the classical theme epoch, who was used so much by Plato as Aristophanes. One cannot understand the subtleties, and the most important subtleties, of Plato's Republic without having studied Aristophanes. There is one work which we cannot read for the simple reason that it is unavailable, and that's the Assembly of Women, which is quite clearly the model for Plato's Republic. The same theme--communism and equality of the sexes. As a matter of fact, there is a preponderance of the female sex. Abolition of the family. That is all there. There are literal agreements between Plato's Republic and the Assembly of Women. We come to that because we must get some notion of what Socrates and Plato stand for. Now is there any other point you would like, Mr. K. ?

Q. Why, in the beginning, do the Clouds mention Prodicos as also one of whom they approve?

S. Yes, that seems to be so. There are all these famous Sophists--I mean, the most famous of them were Prodicos, Protagoras and Hippas. You see, one must make a distinction between the teachers of rhetoric and the Sophists. That is not the same. For example, Thrasymachus is a rhetorician. Gorgias is a rhetorician. That's not quite the same as Sophist. But the three most famous Sophists in Socrates' time were Protagoras, Prodicos and Hippas. And Hippas was the most stupid of the three. And Prodicos was the one, apparently, whom Socrates respected most highly. That we know also from other sources. There was some connection. He is frequently ridiculed, surely, in Plato, but much less ridiculed than the others. So there must have been some connection between Socrates and Prodicos. There is also some reference to that in one of the dialogues--I've forgotten which--there was some connection between the two. So Prodicos, apparently, was sensible, but Prodicos' special preoccupation was correctness of words and that's also alluded to here in the Clouds.

Q. I wonder if there is any connection between the choice of the Heracles story



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that Prodicos was famous for ...

S. Yes, that is Prodicos.

Q. .... and this speech in here?

S. In which way?

Q. The choice of Pheidippides, as it were, being a comic substitute for the choice of Heracles.

S. I don't get it. For those who do not know as much as Mr. K. knows, I would like to say of choice of Heracles, <sup>with</sup> the story told by Socrates in Xenophon's Memorabilia where Socrates presents a case for virtue in the form of a story of the choice of virtue by Heracles and this goes back to Prodicos. I think there is a reference to Prodicos there. Yes. Prodicos. Heracles chooses virtue against vice, yes. And what does Pheidippides do?

A. He chooses the Unjust Speech.

S. I see. In other words, that would be Xenophon's reply, that Socrates teaches just the opposite as what he's made to teach here. *That makes some sense.*

A. I notice a reference to Heracles, the use of Heracles in the Unjust Speech seems to point up that, too.

S. That's possible. But there is a more obvious connection and that is that in Xenophon's Oeconomicus, the hero, the perfect gentleman, <sup>incarnate</sup> uses literally a verse from the Clouds, something which Pheidippides says in the Clouds, you know: "Roll the horse and bring it home." Yes? Sure, there are some connections. There's no question. Surely, very generally speaking, and that is very general and very simply, is this: Plato and Xenophon turn it around. Socrates, <sup>so</sup> far from being a defender of the Unjust, <sup>speech</sup> was the first to set forth the virtues of the Just Speech. But that is a bit too simple, because, as I indicated last time, the case for rational morality which Socrates makes is not ~~the~~ case simply for traditional morality. Certain things are changed. Not because Socrates was a wicked man, but there is a problem in traditional morality.

So, next time we will hear your paper and Miss Sills, your paper.

.... comes up in our seminar this way. I would have probably not taken it up myself because of lack of time, but for any discussion in our age it would come up sooner or later. It seems to me that in your last remark, beginning with your reference to Gaunt, you retracted what you said in the first part. But that is perfectly intelligible--you simply are doubtful. You are attracted by the reputation, but you are also doubtful whether it works. I do not blame you for that. And it will certainly not dispense me from a brief discussion of this whole issue.

You have said there has always been a tendency to present Aristophanes as a political playwright. Always. What does that mean? Since Aristophanes' time? Or since the early nineteenth century? As far as my knowledge goes, since the early twentieth century. And that immediately gives the whole thing a different complexion. It has something to do with tendencies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries peculiar to these centuries to put this emphasis on the political. Now, on the other hand, if one says instead of political, a playwright, one does not necessarily improve the situation because what is a playwright? A playwright today and a playwright in the fourth or fifth century is an entirely different thing and one would have to ask the question, what is a play? What is a drama? What is a comedy, in particular? I will turn to that later.

In the first part of your speech, you said that political plays--political in the narrow sense, topical affairs of the moment--in all ten plays, with the exception of the Birds. That is, of course, not true. What about the Plutus? What about the Assembly of Women? What about the Clouds? What about the Thesmophoriazousae? That is, of course, not so. Allusions to contemporary events occur everywhere, even in the Birds, as we have seen.

. Yes?

*specifically* A: I was speaking rather fast and possibly I said what I did not mean to say, but I did not mean political in the narrow sense of allusions to contemporary events. I believe I said political or social or political in the sense that it was used in Greece, meaning social, and I think ...

S: Yes, but, excuse me, if that is not contemporary politics--as the Sicilian expedition in 414--I don't know what it is.

A: I'm sorry, I didn't understand ...

S: I mean, you tried to link up the Birds and the Sicilian expedition and that was surely contemporary politics at that time. So that was what I meant. I mean, what does political mean if it is not political as contemporary politics? Then you would have to say, for example, that is an historical event: When Shakespeare writes his history, he presents a political problem in a way which has no immediate--or at least ~~is~~ not immediately visible with the contemporary politics of Elizabeth and James.

A: I would prefer a comparison not to Shakespeare but to, say, Bernard Shaw who does not necessarily refer to immediate ...

S: Yes, but the example ...

A: .... contemporary events, but just the same I think can be called a political playwright.

S: Perhaps, I don't know. But <sup>something</sup> ~~the example~~ is surely true <sup>in the case</sup> of Shaw. But I would like to come to a broader issue. Now when we say the parabasis of the Birds is non-political



and nowhere else, that's not true. The Clouds, for example, as we have seen, is entirely non-political.

A: I did not mean and don't think I said that all the others were political. Not all of them are; I think only about four or five of them are political. All I meant to say is that in this case, this is assuredly not political.

S: Yes, but the Clouds, the Thesmophoriazusae and the Plutus are as surely, in that <sup>simp</sup> sense, not political. One point I would like to mention only immediately: whatever may be difficult regarding the name of that city founded in the Birds, it surely has a <sup>the</sup> connection to clouds and Aristophanes wrote a play called the Clouds which would ~~rather~~ indicate that there might be some connection there to say nothing of other considerations.

But let me put the question of the broader basis. I said there is a general tendency of critics, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, to emphasize the political character of the plays... is connected with the spirit of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The prevalent spirit: a prejudice which we can call a political prejudice <sup>and which finds its most well-known expressions in</sup> ~~Marxism~~; that you have to understand a work of poetry ultimately, ~~along with~~ a true understanding, in terms of the political-social problems of the times. And we have seen traces of that... And this is, of course, not limited to Marxism, but only Marxism <sup>has</sup> the most well-known and extreme form of that. For example, the emphasis which people put in the interpretation of Plato's political works--the Laws and the Republic, on his affairs in Syracuse, there were centuries, <sup>millennia</sup> of Platonic interpretation and no one had paid any attention to Plato's affair in Syracuse. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the Syracusan affair became so famous it overshadowed the <sup>substantive</sup> issues of the Platonic dialogues. I'm sure that one can understand the Republic and the Laws as a whole without any difficulty without even thinking of Plato's adventures or misadventures in Syracuse. When Plato--who after all was interested in politics as we know--presented Aristophanes in one of his dialogues--in the Banquet--there is hardly any allusion to Aristophanes as a man being concerned with politics, much less the other characters he presented there, like Pausanias.

So there is, to begin with ~~anyway~~, no extraneous evidence at any rate in favor of the view that Aristophanes should be emphatically political. Surely politics occurs everywhere, but the question is, why? The safest thing to start from is that Aristophanes' works are all comedies. No one can deny that. Now what is the purpose of the comedy, according to what Aristophanes himself says? Now he says that the poet should make the citizen just, be a teacher of justice. But that would apply, of course, to every dramatic poet. That's not characteristic of the comic poet. What is the comic poet to do in addition to being a teacher of justice? I think everyone ought to know that, but I want some one of you to say it. What is a comic poet supposed to do today, and in all times, and we have Aristophanean evidence to this effect, that he was to bring about this well-known effect of comedy.

A: Make people laugh.

S: Make people laugh. Sure. The ridiculous as ridiculous is the theme of comedy. Now then of course a long question arises: What is the ridiculous? Now let me take a slight round-about way. Ridiculous means very different things for different people. You know that very crude and vulgar people find laughable things which more refined people do not find laughable at all. And vice versa. If we will take now the two extremes--grossly ridiculous and the subtly ridiculous--what is the primary theme of the comedy as Aristophanes meant it? ~~What is~~ <sup>the</sup> grossly ridiculous, ~~what is~~ <sup>the</sup> subtly ridiculous? The primary theme, the most obvious theme? <sup>or the</sup>

A: The grossly ridiculous.

S: Sure. Because it is, after all, a popular presentation where all <sup>males</sup> men at least could be present. Sure. So the grossly comic. The indecently comic. Now 'indecently' in Greece, as well as in our time as at all times, has to do with sex, but not only with sex strictly understood, but also with other affairs of the body which are not mentioned in these societies. It has to do with the digestive process to which many references are made in the Aristophanean comedies. But then there is something else which ... Again, I appeal to a common experience. I <sup>made</sup> ~~made~~ this experience first in another country, but I believe you could make this experience <sup>also</sup> ~~also~~ in this country and the ladies must forgive me for the slight indelicacy of this story, but it is really not unimportant. There is a very vulgar place where people of the male sex express indecencies and these are public toilets. In public toilets you find two forms of indecency most common—at least in another country, but I believe <sup>under</sup> ~~given~~ conditions could also be in this country. First, gross sexual indecencies. But the second, that is much more interesting. Political obscenity. Political obscenity. In Germany, where I had the occasion to observe this, all the inscriptions you found in <sup>Nazi</sup> ~~such~~ places were either ~~Nazi~~ or Communist. ~~Never~~ of the respectable parties. And you know, in our present language, we speak of political obscenity. That is not a bad usage.

What Aristophanes stands for politically was of course a view of the nice people, of the gentleman, there's no question about that. You know, the squires. But this was the unorthodox politics in Athens at that time. All the leading men, the famous men—Pericles, Cleon, whoever they may be—even ~~Nicias~~ — so that the respected men in the foreground, they were all ridiculed and in a way in which they could not well be attacked outside of this privileged sphere of the comic stage. That is still much true now. Bodily obscenity so to extend it beyond sex, the bodily ridiculous, that's one thing; the politically ridiculous, that's another.

But there are at least two other great <sup>themes</sup> ~~things~~ which characterized all Aristophanean comedies, apart from politics and sex. There are two other <sup>themes</sup> ~~things~~ which are treated with an innocent, in a ridiculous manner. Yes?

A: Religion.

S: The gods. Yes, the gods. Blasphemy <sup>goes</sup> ~~comes~~ through the whole play. And blasphemy is another form of obscenity, indecency. And then there is a fourth subject which is treated to some extent improperly, indecently, and we had a good example last time. We will also see some important specimens of that in the Birds.

But there is also another play, a grossly indecent play, by the way—Thesmophoriazusae (I don't know how to translate that title)—in which Euripides is presented in a most ridiculous fashion. Let us call it, using a word used by Aristophanes himself, wisdom. Wisdom. And of course wisdom has various forms. There is this kind of wisdom which is represented by Socrates. There is also the wisdom of the poets. And what Aristophanes presents especially in the Thesmophoriazusae, for example, is the wisdom of Euripides. Now, to mention just one point, externally, and at first glance, Euripides is for the old-fashioned, a fellow of the old-fashioned, and Euripides is a new-fangled poet and the opposite number is Aeschylus. You know the ~~homosocial~~ <sup>venerable</sup> poet of the Persians and so on and so on. And there is a play in which Aristophanes presents a contest between Aeschylus and Euripides, which ends in favor of—externally—~~actually~~ in favor of Aeschylus against Euripides. But on a purely external political ground: Who is willing to accept Alcibiades, Euripides and Aeschylus? And only Aeschylus is willing to accept him and so he gets a prize. Not on the grounds of



the superiority of his poetry. There is one third great tragic poet who does not enter the contest at all and that is the noble Sophocles. And Aeschylus behaves like, talks like, Billingsgate and so does Euripides. In other words, Aeschylus too is presented indecently. The only one who could not be presented indecently was Sophocles. That's a compliment to Sophocles. The word indecent is a bit harsh and I shall retract it.

The theme of Aristophanes is the ridiculous, and the ridiculous <sup>is</sup> the most important and most powerful form, and these are the four things which I have mentioned. One could go, and should go, into that more deeply and see how these four things, which I <sup>themes</sup> mentioned--politics, sex, gods and wisdom--are connected. That would be a true understanding of Aristophanes. But if one would succeed in understanding their intrinsic relation then one would have understood the Aristophanean comedy. You see, the problem of the Aristophanean comedy is quite different from that of the Shakespearean comedy or that of Molière or PIAUS or whoever you might think of. But this is sure: the political plays a part and a very important part because it is as massive and as obvious to everyone as sex. But to say it is more important to the Aristophanean comedy than "sex" would be wrong. One would have to understand this relation and what we have been discussing last time in this question of beating the father which is a relatively decent way of putting the question of the foundation of the family, the foundation of the household, the question of incest, which the polis and its laws needs that institution which has the primary purpose of procreation. The point there is obvious by

Now this much in order to indicate the general approach which I believe is absolutely necessary. Surely one must beware of any generalization. One cannot possibly start from a general notion of comedy of which one does not know as whether it is applicable to Aristophanes. ~~My intention~~ to listen to Aristophanes himself. Aristophanes, in contradistinction to the tragic poets, speaks in the parabasis in his own name and so we have it really straight from the horse's mouth. What does he want to do? And there are two claims, or three claims, which come up all the time. One is the teacher of justice; two, to make people laugh; and three, that he has ~~no~~ <sup>no</sup> ~~alties~~ <sup>alties</sup>--what now would be called creative, that he has conceived a new conjecture which no one had before. That is the basis for the beginning of any possible understanding.

Before we turn to the Birds, I would like to say a few more words about the Clouds which I believe would help a bit for the understanding of the Birds. I remind you of the main point: A man is made aware of the badness of injustice in the Clouds. We have to raise two questions: first, what kind of a man, or what is the motive of his injustice; and b) how is he made aware of the badness of it? Now this man is Strepsiades and his chief concern is the love of his son as his own and this love of his son is stronger than his love of right or justice or his love of the polis, because right and justice and polis are in a way equivalents. There is a difficulty because the polis demands subordination of one's own, of love of one's own, to love of the common, of koronon, which is the common. Even the sacrifice of one's own to the common. The clearest case, of course, is war. This very difficult story in general about Abraham and Isaac, where a man is commanded to sacrifice his only son whom he loves and that's a very difficult and profound story. But, purely humanly speaking, part of the story is the problem of the community, and the individual, which demands that of every father for his son in a war. And only, the battles ~~brought this problem~~ <sup>is brought back</sup> to the most radical formulation. Now this love of one's own taken by itself, taken merely by itself, would lead to unconcern with right or justice. And it leads therefore to a questioning of justice and this is brought out by the discussion between the Just and the Unjust Speech in which the weakness of the Just Speech is ~~revealed~~ <sup>revealed</sup>. The ultimate consequence of this tendency is the acceptance of the son beating his father and his mother and more radically speaking of incest. But this would render impossible

that a man could say of a younger man, he is my son. So Strepsiades' own, and love of his own, is itself somehow based on the polis, on the nomos, on the law which he contradicts. Strepsiades would not contradict himself if he did not respect the prohibition against incest. He would not have got into trouble if he had acted like his own son, Pheidippides, who did not have a son—you remember that—and did not passionately ~~hate~~ his son. Pheidippides remains consistent after his conversion. *love /* Strepsiades cannot remain so. *the crucial question* ~~Strepsiades' question~~: what precisely constitutes the weakness of the case for justice? Answer: in the first place, the contradiction between the rules of justice and the conduct of the guardian of justice—Zeus. You remember, Zeus binds his father, Zeus commits adultery, things which he forbids to men. What do you say to this argument? Some people would perhaps say, "Well, these were Greek myths and therefore Greek morality had the great misfortune of being built on myths which contradicted Greek morality." But what is the reason in the myths? Were these myths mere brutal facts of Greek lives? Was there not some human thought invested in these myths? Now if we assume that, we see immediately what the reason is. The guardian of right, the founder of the order of right, is not subject to the right which he founds; the problem with which you are all familiar in a much more restricted form from the modern doctrine of ~~sovereignty~~ <sup>sovereignty</sup>. The ultimate maker of the law can also unmake the laws. The founder cannot be subject to his nomos, to his law. And therefore, those subject to the law can only obey the legislator. They must not think of imitating the legislator. If we return to the language of myths, men must obey the gods, but must not imitate them. That is one point we ~~must~~ <sup>can</sup> say.

But the whole argument up to this point is based on one presupposition; namely, that the rules in question—let us simply say ~~in~~ <sup>the</sup> prohibition against incest and all its implications—that they are merely by virtue of law, by virtue of establishment, by virtue of say-so. But is the family, the ~~household~~ <sup>household</sup>, which stands and falls by the prohibition against incest, not manifestly natural or rational? That is the question. Now what is implied in the argument of Socrates or his Unjust Logos regarding the natural character of the family? What is implied? If you want to take the simpler example of beating one's father, ~~you would do that~~ <sup>would fear him</sup>. Is it not so, that society stands and falls by paternal, or at least, parental authority? Bringing up the children who are completely unable to take care of themselves, who do not know right and wrong, black and white, left and right? Well, let us again look at the Bible because the fundamental problems are of course always in there. Let us look at incest in the Bible. Do you remember some stories of incest there? How is the procreation of the human race possible in the early age, assuming that all men descend from one and the same couple, except by incest at least between brother and sister, to say nothing of the Lot and his daughters and so on? Think also of the story of Oedipus in Greece. Do you remember this story? What would be our moral judgment about Oedipus if we were suddenly confronted by such a tale in our world? *the story*

A: We would say that he was blameless.

S: Why?

A: Chance.

S: Yes, but more precisely, why is he blameless?

A: That was the rule of Thebes.

S: No, no, I mean why would we say that Oedipus was blameless.

A: He did not know.



S: He did not know. Yes, but the deeper implication of the myth is, of course, incest is a terrible violation of a sacred order regardless of whether you know or not. That is the point. And there is something behind it that this has by itself a terrible sanction? For example, the offspring must be terrible. Now look at the offspring of Oedipus and Jocasta. There is at least one exception to that rule. At least one. I think there are two. Well, if Antigone is not a noble woman, I don't know who is and even her sister, Ismene. So. There is the problem. What is the basis for the prohibition against incest? Is this a rule which is universally valid, universally valid? And the mere fact that it depends on knowledge is a very great point. We cannot say much more because Aristophanes in the Clouds leaves it at a few indications. The foundation of the polis is the household. And the foundation of the household is the prohibition against incest. This is the sacred prohibition. Not a utilitarian rule. And the sacred foundation of all society cannot be defended by the logos. There is a conflict <sup>there</sup> between the polis and the logos. Now this <sup>thing</sup> in itself is today trivial. It is only usually not brought out, but it is implied in what you learn in almost all classes in this building. How would we record today such things as the prohibition against incest or beating one's father and similar things?

A: Conventions.

S: 'Conventions' are rarely <sup>said?</sup> safe today. There has ...

A: Taboo?

S: Taboo is a more ... Yes. But I think the two terms which would invariably occur in such a discussion would be 'myths' or 'values'. Now what does official social science teach about myths or values? That every society stands or falls by a value system or by <sup>a</sup> basic myths and that this value system or myths cannot be defended rationally. Every defense would only be merely ideological. It can only be accepted or rejected, but it is not subject to rational validation. So this premise is really very vulnerable today. I mean, a simple reader--and we all must always return to the stage of a simple reader if we want to understand such a work ... I ~~mean~~ <sup>mean</sup> ~~entirely~~ <sup>entirely</sup> to Strepesides now. Strepesides ought to have loved justice and the polis more than his son. ~~family~~. That is what we would all say, I think, as decent people. But still, why? This question must be permitted in the classroom if not in the market place. Why should he have loved justice and the polis more than his ~~family~~ <sup>son</sup>? All right.

A: The love of his son is ultimately dependent on justice, according to the ~~polis~~ <sup>play</sup>.

S: Yes. Because the polis, we can say, is the condition of his family. He could not have a son, as this son, without the polis. Yes, but that is of course not precise enough because the air also is a condition of his son and one can't say a man should love the air more than his son. So we must be more precise. The polis is a condition and is much more important, is much more than a mere condition. Why?

A: The polis is a condition which would not be present if men didn't somehow or other work to preserve it which is not true of the air as a condition. Therefore, it is more important that men love the polis because if they didn't, it would be destroyed, where this isn't true of the other condition.

S: That is good. But it is a tiny little bit <sup>too</sup> ~~analytic~~ <sup>analytic</sup> for me now, though I'll keep it in mind. What comes first <sup>so</sup> prior to an analysis, is the connection between the polis and right or justice. Strepesides ought to have loved the polis more than his son because the polis is the embodiment of right or justice. That is the higher claim of the polis. All human dignity depends on political society. That is one-

tenth ... That is elementary. The whole argument of Plato, <sup>and Aristotle</sup> presupposes this <sup>at every</sup> elementary point. But here a question arises which we as theoretical men are compelled to raise. Is this true? Is the polis the embodiment of right? In the moment we raise this question, we understand the beginning of the Birds because at the beginning of the Birds, we see two Athenians leaving Athens because Athens is not the embodiment of justice. Provisionally, before going into any details, we can say two Athenians leave Athens in quest for a just city, for a city which is truly an embodiment of right. That is the same problem as in the Republic, as you know. They seek justice and they know that justice has its home in the polis, can be seen more clearly in the polis than in the individual. All right. They are in a polis. Look at Athens. No. Athens has many flaws. Sparta. Even Sparta has many flaws. And any city of which they know has many flaws. So they have to found a just city to see how justice looks like. Something of this kind is implied in the Birds.

And now let us turn to the Birds itself. Two Athenians; one is called Euelpides and the other is called Peisthetaerus. Euelpides--that is derived from the words "men of good hope". And Peisthetaerus--the "reliable comrade," something of this kind. They follow two birds. To follow birds means, of course, in Greek--also the same word--obey two birds. You see, it begins really, the play opens with the rule of birds. Birds were a famous omina.<sup>2</sup> You did what the birds told you to. So it begins with the rule of the birds already. And they are in quest for a human being who has become a bird. They run away from the city of Athens which makes life unbearable <sup>theme /</sup> because of the constant lawsuits, a ~~thing~~ which we will find also in the Wasps from a different point of view. And they seek a place where they can live quietly--a city which is not a city of busybodies. By the way, you see also here a connection with the Republic because in the Republic, the definition of justice given there, justice means minding one's own business. That is only a different formulation for being not a busybody in ordinary language. A man who is minding his own business, he is the opposite of a busybody. So they seek a city which is not a busybody and they don't know whether such a city exists. But they think they can find out the location of it from this man who has become a bird--Tereus. Why such a man, such a creature, now a bird, once a human being? Because being a bird and flying around all countries, he might have seen it from above; a kind of aerial reconnaissance, you see. And since he is of human origin, he will understand these humans so that <sup>he</sup> is chosen with absolute sensibility.

Having almost despaired of finding their way, they discover that they had arrived at the place where Tereus lived. What first comes in sight is a servant bird of Tereus, a slave bird. And that's strange, because we will see there are no slaves there. We hear immediately that this fellow has a slave bird only as a relic from his human life. This was his human slave in his human days. The birds have no slaves. Once they see this strange bird, they get frightened, and they let their birds escape so they can't find their way back. The way back to civilization is closed. They have to find a way to live where they have arrived finally. Let us turn to verse 85 following, which is on page 8 of the translation. Peisthetaerus speaking. Do you have it? In the middle of page 8. Do you have it? Will you read there? Yes? "May you perish ~~if~~ <sup>only</sup> you have turned me through fear." Do you have that? In the middle of page 8, Peisthetaerus speaking.

A: "He frightened me to death."

S: Yes. Go on. Read it.

A: "O dear! O dear! my heart went pit-a-pat, My daw's gone too."



"Gone! O you coward you, You let him go!" Is this the place?

S: Yes. Go on.

A: "Well, didn't you fall down, And let your crow go?

"No, I didn't. No!

"Where is she then?

"She flew away herself.

"You didn't let her go. You're a brave boy!"

S: Now this little interlude is not uninteresting. They did exactly the same thing. Out of fear, they let them fly, but they put different constructions on the same action. Who is the cleverer of the two fellows from a very simple point of view? Peisthetaerus or Euelpides?

A: Peisthetaerus.

S: Yes, sure. Now that is the first indication that he's the hero, you see, at this point of the play. He's clever<sup>er</sup>. The first indication.

Now, Tereus, the Hoopoe, has become completely a bird now. At this place, we should read also page 9, bottom, in the translation, the long speech of Euelpides. They are asked why do they come--they are human beings, of course, the two men from Athens. Now go on.

A: "You were a man at first, as we are now, And had your creditors, as we have now, And loved to shirk your debts, as we do now; And then you changed your nature, and became A bird, and flew round land and sea, and know All that men feel, and all that birds feel too.

That's why we are come as suppliants here, to ask If you can tell us of some city, soft As a thick rug, to lay us down within.

Seek ye a mightier than the Cranaan town?

A mightier, no; a more commodious, yes.

Aristocratic?

Anything but that! I loathe the very name of Scellias' son.

What sort of city would ye like?

Why, one Where my worst trouble would such as this; A friend at daybreak coming to my door

And calling out O by Olympian Zeus, Take your bath early: then come round to me, You and your children, to the wedding banquet I'm going to give. Now pray don't disappoint me,

Else, keep your distance, when my money's--gone.

Upon my word, you are quite in love with troubles! And you?

I love the like.

But tell me what.

To have the father of some handsome lad  
Come up and chide me with complaints like these,  
Fine things I hear of you, Stilbonides, You met my son returning from the baths,  
And never kissed, or hugged, or fondled him, You, his paternal friend! You're a nice  
fellow.

S: Yes. Let us stop here. In this comical and rather gross thing ... The translator was very decent. Now, what do we learn from that? What do we see here about the motivation of the two men? What do we learn? I mean, common as well as the differences. What do they seek? I mean, nothing aristocratic! That's very important and that is one part of the truth that it is a democracy which they seek, but not such a troublesome democracy as Athens. A pleasant democracy. That is clear. A pleasant democracy. But there is a slight difference between the tastes of the two fellows.

A: The first wants an easy material life. He wants to get the necessities of physical existence through no efforts of his own.

S: Yes. He wants to get things from others. Yes? And doesn't want to do anything for them. What some people <sup>say</sup> think the welfare state is. But of course he doesn't think of the welfare state. That is presented more clearly in the Assembly of Women and in another way in the Plutus, you see. A city where men have everything in abundance. That is what the comedian writes. But what is Peisthetaerus interested in.

A: Well, he doesn't want bread and circuses. He wants an existence free from the moral strictures of others.

S: This is very delicate what you say, but we cannot afford an extreme delicacy in a matter of such importance. What is his taste?

A: Well, he's a pederast according ...

S: Sure, sure. So that's important. This is a clever pederast. That is not unimportant because if the question of the household comes up and the family, that includes the prohibition against pederastism itself according to the Greek view, too. That's an irregularity. And here we see a problem. When Plato presents Aristophanes in the Banquet, Aristophanes is presented as giving an edge to the pederast. Yes. To say nothing of other things.

Then Tereus proposes a maritime city ~~and~~ to the question of Euelpides' Greek cities. The proposals are all turned down. No human city will do, of which they know. And then Euelpides asks what about the life with the birds? We don't have to live with humans after all. And then Tereus praises the amenities of birds' life: they need no money and so on. At this point, Peisthetaerus comes to the fore and then he will be at the center for the rest of the play. He comes to the fore with a big scheme: The birds should found a city. Found a city. They do not go on in a non-political life as hitherto. Euelpides did not go higher than that. Peisthetaerus says they must have a polis. And he adds one more thing which is absolutely crucial: they should form a single city. The democracy sketched here is a universal democracy of birds. A universal democracy. So no one should say that the notion of a universal state was wholly unknown prior to the time of the Stoics or anyone else. But what sort of a polis? Now let us read on page 12 of the translation, verses 180 to 193 to which Mr. Hale referred because they are really crucial. That is Peisthetaerus speaking, the long speech of his, the ~~really~~ <sup>relatively</sup> long speech. Yes? Do you have it? It is probably



at the top of page 12, I would think.

A: He first suggests that the Hoopoe look around ...

S: No, begin at the first speech of Peisthetaerus, yes?

A: You mean at the bottom of page 11?

S: "What did you see?"

A: "What did you see?"

"I saw the clouds and sky."

S: You see, the clouds; ~~that~~ which we know already. Yes?

A: "And is not that the Station of the Birds?"

"Station?"

"As one should say, their habitation. Here while the heavens revolve, and yon great dome is moving round, ye keep your Station still. Make this your city, fence it round with walls,

And from your Station is evolved your State. So ye'll be lords of men, as now of locusts, And Melian famine shall destroy the Gods.

"Eh? how?"

"The Air's betwixt the Earth and Sky. And just as we, if we would to to Pytho, Must crave a grant of passage from Boeotia, Even so, when men slay victims to the Gods, Unless the Gods pay tribute, ye in turn Will grant no passage for the savoury steam To rise through Chaos, and a realm not theirs."

S: Yes. Let us stop here and we will comment. Now what kind of a polis? And surely a pun is made but any pun worth being written down must be more than a pun. It is an ~~ideological~~ thing in the first place. Polis <sup>7</sup> . Polis, ~~coming~~ comes from--and this is of course wholly unfounded as ~~the~~ <sup>serious</sup> assertion--polos and polos means an axis, an axis <sup>primary</sup> primarily. Pole, the two poles, is derived from the ~~family~~ <sup>primary</sup> meaning axis. The pivot on which anything turns, and therefore derivatively, the axis of the celestial sphere. And then, finally, the celestial sphere itself. What does this mean, this ~~stroke~~? The polis of the birds is the key polis. It is not a chance <sup>hence also</sup> location which has these or that advantages and ~~these or that~~ disadvantages. It's the key polis. Its site is the bond between heaven and earth, between gods and men. It is the place, the locus, fit for universal rule, for the rule not only ~~of~~ <sup>over</sup> man--that's not universal--but, ~~of~~ <sup>over</sup> the gods as well. The best polis cannot be on earth. Does this ring a bell? Forgive me for bringing up these ~~hypothetical~~ questions, but that saves us time later on. The best polis cannot be on earth. Did you ever hear that? <sup>anticipatory</sup>

A: The end of the Republic.

S: End of the Ninth Book. The model is laid out in heaven. Now here it is not exactly in heaven, it is between heaven and earth, but still it is a reminder. Now. Anticipating a later expression, but lest we miss a point, when we speak today of an ideal city, we don't speak the language of the Greeks; there is no Greek word for ideal. The Greek word is a city according to nature. Now that means also its place

must be by nature most fit for a perfect city and that place is in the air; the bond between heaven and earth. Tereus is enthusiastic about the clever conceit and he is willing to found the polis together with Peisthetaerus provided the other birds agree, naturally. I mean, he's only a constitutional king, you see, and he demands therefore *Scheme* /that Peisthetaerus explains to the birds the new ~~city~~. Now, it is clear, Peisthetaerus is the man, the hero. We learn in passing also that he's an old man. That comes up time and again, an old man, who is an inventive man of novel thoughts, who attempts ~~novelties from the~~ unheard of.  
deeds - something

Now it is not easy to get all the birds together. It is also not easy to convince them that the two human beings are not their enemies. After all, they know them only up to now as bird hunters. The birds wish to render them to pieces. Now let us turn to the translation, page 18, bottom, verses 339-40. They seem to be of some importance. Do you have it? They are in ~~great~~ <sup>real</sup> danger. The birds wish to render them to pieces, both. Yes? And then Euelpides says ... Do you have that? "You alone"... Do you have that?

A: "Wretched man, 'twas you that caused it, you and all your cleverness! Why you brought me I can't see.

"Just that you might follow me.

"Just that I might die of weeping.

"What a foolish thing to say!  
Weeping will be quite beyond you, when your eyes are pecked away."

S: Let us stop here. We learn one point. The real instigator from the very beginning was Peisthetaerus. So, Euelpides is a secondary character. They can be compared to *figure* such couples as Don Quixote and Sancho Panza. Or perhaps also to Sherlock Holmes and Doctor Watson. You know, they are the famous couples; the clever leader, a bit strange--Sherlock Holmes is very strange, you know--and a normal man who has faith in that superior, extra and abnormal man.

Q: In the Frogs also?

S: What?

Q: In the Frogs also? That couple.

S: I don't believe that's ... but I don't know.

Q: Dionysus and ...

S: Yes, Dionysus is a god. I mean, that <sup>superiority is given in</sup> ~~very obviously takes care of~~ that. That's a different point.

The name Peisthetaerus, by the way, what does the name mean? The name indicates reliability--pistos. Perhaps he's so reliable, so unusually reliable, because he's so unusually clever. That could be an explanation; I cannot swear this is the case. Let us turn to the top of page 20, the remark of Euelpides. Do you have it? Where Euelpides says, "You most wise man"...

A: "What a skilful neat contrivance! O you clever fellow you, In your military science Nicias you far outdo."



S: Now, again, only to show the position of the two men; Eualpides recognizes his ascendancy without any hesitation and a bit later on on the same page, Eualpides speaking again. Do you have it?

A: No. I don't see where Eualpides speaks again on that page.

*assembly* S: No, it is Epops. Yes, I'm sorry. "If they are by nature enemies, they are"... He tries to sell the two Athenians to the birds, ~~thereby~~ and says they are by nature enemies because men and birds are enemies, but as regards their minds, they are friends. Do you have that?

A: "Enemies, I grant, by nature, very friends in heart and will; Here they come with kindly purpose, useful lessons to instil."

"What, they come with words of friendship? What, you really then suppose They will teach us useful lessons, they our fathers' fathers' foes?"

"Yet to clever folk a foeman very useful hints may show;  
Thus, that foresight brings us safety, from a friend we ne'er should know,  
But the truth is forced upon us, very quickly, by a foe.  
Hence it is that all the Cities, taught by foe, and not by friend,  
Learn to build them ships of battle, and their lofty walls extend;  
So by this, a foeman's teaching, children, home, and wealth defend."

S: Yes. So in other words, this is a very good political point. Yes. You see that he perfectly imitated a deliberative debate, yes? That's appeasement, the birds say. And then they're given a very good political argument. You can and must learn from enemies. Now we learn in this sequence the birds were barbarians until some time ago, Tereus had said. They still believe in an ancestral enmity to their natural enemies and the birds have to be enlightened. That is the problem. They are ordinary citizens with an ordinary ~~enmity~~ prejudice. They have to be liberated from that. Page 22, top, 418. The Chorus is saying ...

A: "In brief, 'Tis something more than past belief."?

S: No, what profit does he seek. Yes? To stay here.

A: "But wherefore is he come? What is it He seeks to compass by his visit? Think you he's got some cunning plan Whereby, allied with us, he can Assist a friend, or harm a foe? What brings him here, I'd like to know."

S: You see, again, <sup>a perfectly</sup> they naturally distrust. He's a foreigner. An enemy from another polis. He must have some selfish advantage and therefore his selfish advantage cannot be ours. They behave ~~then~~ absolutely like this. Now, after more preparations into which we cannot go, Peisthetaerus makes his speech in verses 465 following, which is in the translation page 123, bottom. Let us read a few of these verses beginning with the relation between the polis and thinking because in modern times men have tried to build up a society which is rational. Yes? A perfectly actual rational society. Of course no one said that any ~~and~~ society is rational, but the end, the goal ~~of~~ <sup>or purpose</sup> ~~of~~ society means is of course differently defined ~~and~~ by different people but that is the objective of all typically modern movements. Yes? A rational ...

(End of first side of reel.)

... in the first place, the youngest god. The youngest god presented now for the first time properly as the youngest poet—the most recent poet, and also a poet who is still young, eternally young—by means of cosmetics. And here, the opposition to Homer becomes clear, the oldest poet, of whom he speaks only with great admiration. He applies to Eros what Homer had said of Attis, the goddess of mischief....

(Girl's voice): "And I never had heard it before!"

"Because you've a blind uninquisitive mind, unaccustomed on Aesop to pore. The lark had her birth, so he says, before Earth; then her father fell sick and he died. She laid out his body with dutiful care, but a grave she could nowhere provide; For the Earth was not yet in existence; at last, by urgent necessity led, When the fifth day arrived, the poor creature contrived to bury her sire in her head.

"So the sire of the lark, give me leave to remark, on the crest of an headland lies dead.

"If therefore, by birth, ye are older than Earth, if before all the Gods ye existed, By the right of the firstborn the sceptre is yours; your claim cannot well be resisted.

"I advise you to nourish and strengthen your beak, and to keep it in trim for a stroke. Zeus won't in a hurry the sceptre restore to the woodpecker tapping the oak.

In times prehistoric 'tis easily proved, by evidence weighty and ample, That Birds, and not Gods, were the Rulers of men, and the Lords of the world; for example, Time was that the Persians were ruled by the Cock,"...

We don't have to read that. The main point is this: how does he convince the birds? By asserting, and in this way proving, that in the oldest times the rule of the universe belonged to the birds, and not to the gods. Again, very politically; he has a novel scheme, a novel something which never existed before. But politically, that can be accepted only if it is proven to be in harmony with tradition, as we would say. But here in old times, if it is really the oldest... The revolutionary must be a restoration of the oldest. That it is not a restoration of the oldest is perfectly clear because the birds never ruled and even in this case we see the birds can't rule. They need a human to rule them. But as a political argument, the birds, having the ordinary citizens' spirit, can only be convinced of their right by being proven that their rule was the oldest.

Originally, birds ruled everything and especially all men. Different birds ruled the Persians, the Greeks, and the Egyptians-Phoenicians ... A division of mankind which you may know from Herodotus. It is however not quite clear whether each bird ruled one province or whether they ruled all men jointly. That is not quite clear. The birds are persuaded that they ought to recover their kingship. One universal polis is established: that's a universal democracy. And of course it has a ruler—that's the difficulty—from a different species. But otherwise a democracy. But how will men be induced to recognize the birds as gods? And how will the birds be able to supply men with riches? And that, of course, must be clear and that must be done to the satisfaction of everyone. Worship of the birds would be much less expensive than worship of the gods: You don't have to bring those expensive sacrifices, and other arguments of this nature.

Peisthetaerus becomes the ruler of the birds. Let us look at page 31, lines 3 to 6 from bottom.

A: You mean the speech of the Chorus?

S: Yes. But we need only lines 3 to 6 from bottom, two verses. "What one must do with strength ..." Yes?

A: "So all that by muscle and strength can be done, we Birds will assuredly do;



But whatever by prudence and skill must be won, we leave altogether to you."

S: Yes. That I think is clear. Peisthetae<sup>g</sup> is the ruler. There are certain <sup>intermezzi</sup> which are by no means uninteresting, but we cannot go into everything.

Now, then, we come to the parabasis, but I see the time is not sufficient to make this clear, therefore I would like to mention only one point. Then there is the parabasis in which the birds are presented as having accepted this story of original rule and presented in a very poetic way.

But then the formal founding of the city takes place and on this occasion five different individuals appear and want to be present. The first is, of course, the priest who is to do the sacrificing; then there is a poet; then there is an oracle fellow; and fourth, Meton; five, an inspector; and sixth, a seller of decrees. The only one who has a proper name is Meton. The others are not identified. Meton was an astronomer. This scene regarding the astronomer is of the utmost importance as we shall see later. I will mention only one point. The city is founded and its fame spreads throughout the world. All human beings wish to become members of this wonderful city. Three come and are shown to us: a man who wants to strike his father, because he has heard that in the City of Birds you can strike your father; then Cinesias, a poet; and finally, a sycophant, a crook. Again, there is only one mentioned who has a proper name. And this time it is a poet.

<sup>the ng</sup> ~~There is~~ The connection between the astronomer, the man with the proper name in the first set, and the poet, the man with the proper name in the second set, is of crucial importance to our understanding ~~in the name~~ of the place. To bring us around to the connection with the Clouds in a few words, the poet is accepted—or is treated best—among the first set. Meton, the astronomer, is thrown out. And he is thrown out with beatings! It is not quite clear who beats him—whether Peisthetaerus beats <sup>do</sup> him or whether the birds beat him—but surely if Peisthetaerus beats him, he would <sup>it</sup> in the spirit of the citizens. He says explicitly, "I love you. I would keep you. But I can't." And there is a nice connection between that and the man who wishes to strike his father. Peisthetaerus contradicts himself there and we have to discuss that. In the first place, he says, "Yes. We birds are permitted to strike our father." And then he speaks of another law, also ~~descending~~ <sup>stemming</sup> from birds, according to which one may not strike one's father.

Peisthetaerus

<sup>WMS</sup> The play ends with the complete victory of the ~~City of Birds~~; the gods are starved, and they have to give up their rule to this clever Athenian because, since he's the ruler of the birds, not the birds rule, but Peisthetaerus rules. So Peisthetaerus takes the place of Zeus and he marries Kingship with a capital K, the daughter of Zeus. He ~~reigns~~ completely. So the gods can be disposed of. They are expendable. But certain things are not expendable. Also the polis in the ordinary sense. We have <sup>well</sup> now a universal polis—no longer a polis limited to a special locality. Yes, the polis as a closed society is expendable. Two things are in<sup>ex</sup>p<sup>en</sup>dable: a) the prohibition against beating one's father and b) the prohibition against the admission of astronomy. These are the absolute limits. You can have a wonderful polis, a most convenient and <sup>strongly</sup> ~~conceptual~~ polis for everyone and it is most pleasant, and enjoyable, and no gods, and wonderful. But two things cannot be tolerated: beating one's father and astronomy. That's the link with the Clouds. Because in the Clouds, among the many things which are ascribed to Socrates, the most peculiar and most ~~emphasized~~ is astronomy. The science of heaven, the heavenly bodies and their motion. And heaven is a ~~total~~ <sup>whole</sup> comprising the whole, therefore it is the whole. This science of the whole is somehow connected with rebellion against the most fundamental authority,

the paternal authority. These are the two things which are incompatible with human society. Peisthetaerus loves the astronomer, Meton, but as the founder of the city he has to throw him out. And therefore there's an important substitution ~~that only~~ in the first set, the only man mentioned by a personal name, a proper name, is the astronomer. In the second set, the only individual mentioned by a proper name is the poet. The poet can be tolerated by the city. He can. The city needs him really. But not the philosopher. Just the opposite in Plato, you remember; the philosophers are the rulers, ought to be the rulers, and the poets are sent away, just as here the astronomer who stands for the philosopher is sent away. The fundamental problem is the same and therefore the name of that city--the Cloud-cuckoo-city, or whatever you might <sup>translate</sup> ~~say~~--shows very clearly the connection with the problem of Socrates. There is a fundamental disproportion between science, philosophy or whatever you call it, <sup>on</sup> and the logos, and the polis. The logos may render questionable the foundation of society and therefore it cannot be tolerated. The poets know what the philosophers know--that's the implication--but they don't say it in a way which destroys the city and therefore they can be tolerated.

Now we have to go into some details of that next time, but still ... You will have prepared your paper next time, yes?



S. These feelings can be changed in the course of events, I'm sorry to say.

A. What is it of Plato that we're going to be reading?

S. The Apology of Socrates and the Crito—these are the two, probably the most popular writings of Plato, I mean popular in the sense most widely read. Now first, let us remind ourselves for a moment before we begin, Mr. Haight and I, in our free-for-all, of our general problem. The course is entitled "The Origins of Political Science." We started from the fact that in our time rational thought is undergoing a crisis, and the question arises, is this crisis due to reason itself, or is it due to a certain interpretation of reason—the modern interpretation? In order to clarify that, we return to the origins of political science. Good.

Now, what are the origins of political science; what is the original conception of political science? I would like to say a word about that, although most of you will know that. But it doesn't do any harm if it is restated. The original conception of political science, in its fully developed form, is accessible in Aristotle's Politics, and, one can say, only there. There, political science is a practical science; that means the perspective of Aristotle at the order of the Politics is identical with the perspective of the perspective of the citizen or statesman. He looks farther afield than the statesman does, even the best statesman, but he looks in the same direction. And political science in the Aristotelian sense is not a theoretical art, is not an attempt to look at political things from the outside.

If this is political life which has a certain direction, there are two ways of looking at it. One is from here; one can view the question following the direction of political things themselves, as the citizen does, the statesman does, and as Aristotle as a political philosopher does. But there is also a way, here, to look at it from the outside, just as we look at the movements of fishes or of leopards, from the outside. We do not participate in that life. That would be a theoretical attitude toward political philosophy; that is characteristic of present-day social science, of course. Although they use the participant-observer in a certain role, that is subordinate to a fundamentally theoretical approach; and if it is practical, it is practical in the sense of an applied science—you remember the distinction between an applied and a practical science of which I spoke on a former occasion. The Aristotelian political science—and by the way, that is true not only of Aristotle, but also of others—but Aristotle develops his in a classic manner, and the model of everyone else who later followed his approach.

By virtue of this practical character, the guiding theme of Aristotle's Politics is the question of what is the best order of society, the best regime. It also deals with the imperfect regimes, and with the question of how this or that kind of imperfect regime can be managed or improved; but this management of the imperfect regimes, and its principles, can only be understood in the light of the best regime, because any improvement presupposes a standard for the improvement, and the fully-developed standard is the best regime. One can also put it this way: the problem of the best regime is the physiology of politics, whereas the doctrine of the various imperfect regimes

is the pathology and therapeutics. That is a permissible comparison. Now, the premises of this whole political doctrine as developed in the Politics is the answer to the question, what is good, what is human good. And the core of the human good is human excellence—virtue; and this is developed in Aristotle's Ethics, which is inseparable from the Politics and vice-versa.

Aristotle's political work, which is the Politics together with the Ethics, gives us the fullest development of the Socratic study of political things as political things; which means that what Aristotle does is not identical with what Socrates did, or with what Plato did. But if Socrates or Plato had been concerned with a relatively independent science of politics, as they were not, they would have said what Aristotle said. Why they were not concerned with such a relatively independent treatment is a long question into which I cannot go. But if we approach the whole problem from our present-day assumptions that there is a possibility of a relatively independent political science, Aristotle's work is the most immediately relevant exponent, or exposition of that. But behind Aristotle's Politics and Ethics there is, somehow, Socrates. Socrates turned to the political things, which means in Socrates, philosophy turned to the political things as such. Prior to Socrates, political philosophy was not concerned with political things as such.

What, then was philosophy originally, prior to Socrates? One way to answer that question is the study of Aristophanes' Clouds, which presents Socrates himself as a representative of the pre-Socratic view of philosophy. Even in the form of a comedy, and that must be viewed very judiciously—that goes without saying—but nevertheless, here in the Clouds, in this pre-Socratic form of Socrates, philosophy is purely theoretical. The spirit of the philosopher is akin or identical to that of the mathematician.

A. Inaudible question.

S. Self-forgetting contemplation of the principles. No self-knowledge. Just as the mathematician is, as a mathematician, not concerned with the question what is mathematics, what am I doing as a human being engaged in mathematics, but is concerned with the mathematical object; the same is true of the philosopher in this presentation. This is, roughly speaking, correct, but it is not literally true, because the disregard of the political things by this philosopher in the Clouds has a reason—the reason being that the political things are essentially conventional, and therefore you cannot learn anything from them about the nature of things. You understand from here why the beginning of Aristotle's Politics is so eminently apt, the beginning being the assertion: the polis is by nature; man is by nature a political animal. Convention comes in only in a very secondary place. If the polis is natural, then the philosophic understanding of man implies, includes, understanding of political things. I said there is a deep harmony between Aristotle's Politics and Socrates; but that is no identity, and that is indicated by this little point, that Socrates never said the polis is natural. He took it very seriously, but he never said the polis is natural. What this means is a question which we will clarify to some extent by our later study of Plato. Before we can begin to understand Socrates, we have to arrive at a better understanding of the position which Socrates attacks, against which political science came into being. And this position which Socrates attacks is presented to us in Aristophanes, among others. But Aristophanes has great advantages, of which I spoke more than once.



Aristophanes' claim can be put as follows: the poets, in contradistinction to the philosophers, are open to the phenomena, to some phenomena, to which the philosophers are blind. The poet understands the political things. By the way, this is also intelligible today, immediately; I think I mentioned this simple observation before; that today you find sometimes a novel which tells you, which gives you a deeper understanding of political things than many volumes of political science: hand-books, textbooks, and periodicals. But it had a particular bearing in this early time. The poets are open to phenomena to which the philosophers are blind. Therefore, Socratic philosophy, as it came with the revered Socrates, with the Socrates we know from Plato and Xenophon, is directed both against an earlier philosophy and against the poets. Socratic philosophy tries to do philosophically what according to Aristophanes could be done only poetically. So that the fight against the philosophers which is so well known from the Republic is an absolutely essential part of the beginning of political science.

Now, in order to understand a bit better what Aristophanes is dealing with, I would like to read to you a passage from Plato's Laws, page 690, that's in the third book somewhere, I read it to you from the simple translation. "What, and how many, are the agreed claims in the matter of ruling and being ruled alike in cities and in houses? Is not the claim of the father and mother one of them, and in general, would not the claim of parents to rule over offspring be a claim universally just? Certainly. And next to this the right of the noble to rule over the ignoble, and then following on these is a third claim: the right of older people to rule and of younger people to be ruled. To be sure. The fourth claim is that slaves ought to be ruled and masters ought to rule. Undoubtedly. And the fifth is, I imagine, that the stronger should rule and the weaker be ruled. A truly compulsory form of rule," says the interlocutor. "Yes, and one that is very prevalent among all kinds of living beings, being according to nature, as Pindar, the poet once said. The most important claim is, it would seem, the sixth, which ordains that the man without understanding should follow, and the wisest man lead and rule. Nevertheless, my most sapient Pindar, this is a thing that I for one would hardly assert to be against nature,"—namely, the rule of the wise—"but rather, according to nature; the natural rule of law without force over willing subjects." In other words, the implication is here meant that law is the embodiment of wisdom and therefore is most correct. "To be favored by the gods and to have good luck marks the seventh form of rule, where we bring a man forward for a casting of lots and declare that if he gains the lot, he will most justly be the ruler, but if he fails he shall take his place among the ruled."

Now these are the seven claims. What Plato implies is that in any actual polis, these seven claims are somehow embodied. And of these the most sensible is the rule of wisdom. But this is not the only one. There is, for example, also the claim of mere strength, and the reason is clear, because the wise cannot compel the unwise if they do not have the support of much strength supplied by arms (?) given. And there is also the claim of the old, merely old, to have a higher right than the young—and in the first place, of course, parents, as you see. That is a sketch of the political problem. The political problem consists precisely in this: that political government is, for all practical purposes, never the rule of wisdom as such, but other, lower, harsher elements are added to it in order to make it political rule. The polis com-

bines these different types which have very different weight. That is the problem of the polis, this mixture of heterogeneous elements which must be accepted if we are to go on to accept the polis. This applies also to the household. The parents have a right over their children, as Plato makes clear by his distinction: The rule of the parents is not the rule of the wise as such. And yet, what is the title of the parents, if not wisdom? That is difficult. In one way, of course, it is. Why do parents have the right to boss around, to guide, to command, or whatever you call it, their children? Because we assume that being older, more experienced, they can take care of the children better than the children themselves can. But two questions arise. Do all parents necessarily care for their children, as birds care for their offspring? You have only to read the daily papers and what is going on in certain social agencies to see that human mothers are not as dependable as swallow mothers. But even granting for one moment that they would care, that would not be of very great help, because caring combined with stupidity is practically as bad as not caring. What do we see here? We see a legal assumption, that very generally and crudely speaking it is better if the young children are brought up by the people who generated them than by strangers. Now that is a crude legal assumption based on very tough things; for example, the unwillingness of other people to take care of other people's "brats," and so the law simply says: "No, you have to take care of them; whether you are fit or not, that's your business, and if you prove to be grossly unfit, you will be sentenced to jail in addition to all other considerations."

This problem was discussed at very great detail, at least at relatively great detail, by the way, by John Locke in the first part of Civil Government, where he discusses the great question: where does paternal power derive, and what is its meaning? And where he, for example, makes a subtle distinction, because his opponent, a fellow called Filmer, had said the mere act of begetting gives the man the right to respect and being obeyed throughout his life be the individual he has begotten. And Locke says that doesn't make much sense, if he is not at the same time the one who brings up that child, and then he goes on into more subtleties of this question. And, needless to say, here also the question arises of whether a given man who is the father according to law is in fact the father. The Napoleonic civil code had this famous prescription: "la recherche de la paternité est interdite"—in the case of an illegitimate child, it is forbidden to make any inquiries as to the identity of the father. Napoleon needed soldiers. This is one side of the matter.

But to come back to the main point: We find here after a very brief inspection a legal assumption on which the whole social order is based. This legal assumption presents itself, however, and for a very deep reason must present itself, as a sacred law. Now the problem with which such people as Aristophanes are concerned is to say, I mean, if they would not overstate it for reasons of comical effect, and some other things: You, the polis, transform a tolerable rule of thumb into a sacred law. The rule of thumb is all right as rule of thumb, because as rule of thumb it admits exceptions and deviations. But a sacred law does not admit exceptions. And you can make the application to the somewhat harsher question of incest by yourself.

Now we have seen some discussion of that in the Clouds, and this is taken up again in the Birds. I remind you only of a few points before we go on.



The action of the Birds: two Athenians leave their city in quest for a perfect city—a city where everyone can live by himself, is left alone, can devote himself to his pleasure. Such a city doesn't exist—neither now, nor ever. They have to found that city, as they have to found a city in Plato's Republic, for somewhat different reasons. But this city, this perfect city, apparently is not possible as a city of human beings. It is possible only as a city of birds. Only a city of birds can have the perfect place which a perfect city must have—the perfect place being the most strategic place imaginable, between heaven and earth, controlling the traffic between gods and men. This perfect city is, as it is hardly necessary to say, a universal city, because if you say particular city you say war, at least the possibility of war, and that means you'll have war. So only a universal city can be really pleasurable, and it is also of course a universal democracy: no harsh distinction between classes, no slavery.

The man who founds the city is the Athonian Peisthetaerus. The name would translate: 'peisthos' means reliable, faithful; and 'hetaerus' means comrade or friend. The name is of course a coinage by Aristophanes, and I have no better explanation than that, in the earliest comedy which has been preserved to us, the Acharnians, the hero is called Dikaiopolis, which is also a very strange name for a man. That means just, and that means city: a man called 'just city'. I believe that Peisthetaerus is somehow modelled on that name. The first part, 'peisthos,' means faithful, reliable, but, as one could prove, this word faithful, reliable, has in a way even a broader meaning than the word just: The thoroughly dependable man in every respect; and polis is replaced by hetaerus, by comrade, by friend. It is not quite a polis which he founds, as we see from the fact that the only humans who are clearly members of it are these two Athenians: all the rest are birds. But this is a mere guess, and I mention it only in passing.

Now let us turn to the point where we left off. Mr. Haight, did your objections to my interpretation reach a point already where you could state them clearly, or should we not rather finish?

A. I would prefer, I think, that we finish.

S. Yes, I think that's sensible. All right. Let us turn to where we left off. Let us turn to the bottom of page 33 in the translation, which is verse 676, where the chorus speaks. Will you read that, whoever has it?

A. O darling! O tawny-throat! Love whom I love the best,  
Dearer than all the rest, Playmate and partner in All my soft lays,  
Thou art come! Thou art come! Thou hast dawned on my gaze,  
I have heard thy sweet note, Nightingale! Nightingale!  
Thou from my flute Softly-sounding canst bring  
Music to suit With our songs of the Spring:  
Begin then I pray Our own anapaestic address to essay.

S. Stop there for the moment. You see, the parabasis of the chorus are here birds, but the birds speak verses. The poet refers to the kinship of birds to the poet. That is one reason why the birds have been selected. Sweet song is what they share. What is the exception in the case of man, sweet song, is the rule in the case of the birds, at least of certain birds, especially the night-

ingale. The question is, is there not also a kinship of the poet with the clouds in the comedy called Clouds? It is surely the imitative character of the clouds, you remember, which connects the clouds with the poet. Now then, let us read the immediate sequel where we left off.

A. Ye men who are dimly existing below, who perish and fade as the leaf,  
Pale, woebegone, shadowlike, spiritless folk, life feeble and wingless and brief,  
Frail castings in clay, who are gone in a day, like a dream full of sorrow and  
sighing,

Come listen with care to the Birds of the air, the ageless, the deathless, who  
flying

In the joy and the freshness of Ether, are wont to muse upon wisdom undying.  
We will tell you of things transcendental; of Springs and of Rivers the mighty  
upheaval;

The nature of Birds; and the birth of the Gods: and of Chaos and Darkness primeval.  
When this ye shall know, let old Prodicus go, and be hanged without hope of  
reprieval.

S. Prodicus is this famous man mentioned in the Clouds with whom young Socrates was connected. The birds are here presented as immortals, as being (?) always, as ethereal beings which teach ephemeral man the truth about the heavenly things. The nature, the coming into being of birds, gods, and rivers. Now this, of course, they have already undergone. They were simple fellows, the birds, before, but our clever Athenians had told them that they were the gods and the origin of everything, and they act on that. You see, they were quick learners, in a way. Go on where you left off.

A. There was Chaos at first, and Darkness and Night, and Tartarus vasty and  
dismal;

But the Earth was not there, not the Sky, not the Air, till at length in the  
bosom abysmal

Of Darkness an egg, from the whirlwind conceived, was laid by the sable-plumed  
Night.

And out of that egg, as the Seasons revolved, sprang Love, the entrancing, the  
bright,

Love brilliant and bold with his pinions of gold, like a whirlwind, refulgent  
and sparkling!

Love hatched us, commingling in Tartarus wide, with Chaos, the murky, the  
darkling,

And brought us above, as the firstlings of love, and first to the light we  
ascended.

S. Let us stop. The birds give now a cosmology. They are the gods. They must be the first beings. Literally, this cannot be true, because in all theogonies (?) there was something before, maybe heaven and earth, or whatever it was. We see here they are preceded by Eros. Those who will remember Plato's Banquet will not be surprised by that. Eros is there first. In a way, love, desire, is the first of all beings. At least he is the first of all bright or shining beings; the first to bring things to light. Does this make sense that Eros is the first because he is the first which brings things to light? Generate—all beings are generated, let's assume, and generation presupposes the act of generating, i.e., Eros. That is the indication of that; to be means to be something, to have a character. There is not a being which merely is, it is always this or that being. There is a character, a limit setting off this from that, a nature. To be means to be limited, and as a limited,



it is distinguished from any possible source of all beings, which as a source of all beings, is unlimited—infinite, that's the same word. And infinite—where you cannot make any distinction. Poetically expressed, night, or something like night, is the origin—chaos. They are mixed—but perhaps one chaos, the unlimited will not do because you cannot understand the difference if there is only one such person. Perhaps you need more, and that was the more common view.

The elements: there are four elements, for example, out of which all else comes. But these elements are not things; they are the sources of things, not things. These elements must be brought together, they must be mixed, they must be united, so that there be things. But that which brings heterogeneous things together is, in the widest sense of the word, the uniting principle, Eros. That is the doctrine behind this birds' cosmology. Now let us read the next two verses where we left off.

A. There was never a race of Immortals at all till Love had the universe  
blended  
Then all things comingling together in love, there arose the fair Earth, and  
the Sky,  
And the limitless Sea; and the race of the Gods, the Blessed, who never shall  
die.

S. Let us stop here. We see the mixture. There is a mixture of heterogeneous elements, and that presupposes a mixing principle, and that is called Eros. And out of that the gods came and, according to this thesis here, the birds. The birds are the firstlings of Eros, and therefore the givers of the greatest things to the mortals. Birds appeal to men for recognition as gods, just as the clouds did in the Clouds, you remember? But there is a difference: the birds try to take the place of the Olympian gods, whereas the clouds only demanded to be recognized in addition to the Olympian gods. The clouds were much more modest than the birds are. Hence, the action of this play is much more daring than the action of the Clouds. Hence, it takes place not in Athens, but in a far-away place. So that makes sense. Now, let us see what we learn about this life of the birds in the sequel. We turn to verse 753 following, which is the third paragraph on page 36 of the translation. Do you have it? Let someone else read. Do you have it, you are, how shall I say it, a notarized reader.

A. Is there any one amongst you, O spectators, who would lead  
With the birds a life of pleasure, let him come to us with speed.  
All that here is reckoned shameful, all that here the laws condemn,  
With the birds is right and proper, you may do it all with them.  
Is it here by law forbidden for a son to beat his sire?  
That a chick should strike his father, strutting up with youthful ire,  
Crowing Raise your spur and fight me, that is what the birds admire.  
Come you runaway deserter, spotted o'er with marks of shame,  
Spotted Francolin we'll call you, that, with us, shall be your name.  
You who style yourself a tribesman, Phrygian pure as Spintharus,  
Come and be a Phrygian linnet, of Philemon's breed, with us.  
Come along, you slave and Carian, Excestides to wit,  
Breed with us your Cuckoo-rearers, they'll be guildsmen apt and fit.  
Son of Peisias, who to outlaws would the city gates betray,

Come to us, and be a partridge (cockerel like the cock, they say),  
We esteem it no dishonor knavish partridge tricks to play.

S. Yes, let us stop here. You see, that is the simple, and I think perfectly clear description of the perfect city as Peisthetaerus sees it. The overall formula: pleasure. The things which are disgraceful by convention are noble with the birds; namely, because they are noble by nature. That is implied: the birds' society is a natural society. Beating the father, of course. You know, you have again examples in the daily papers. The boy is told that he shouldn't do that, his mother nags him; according to the law, he has to obey. According to nature, he can hit back. And even, I think, if he kills her, according to a certain interpretation of American law, he will be regarded as, how do you call it, in need of psychiatric treatment, and not as someone who has done something disgraceful. No slavery. Nothing wrong with cowardice. The harsh students of civic right, there are none. No distinction between citizens and foreigners, which is a hardship for the foreigner. No such distinction. Why? Because it is a universal society. A completely pleasant society must be a universal society. That is said today, and that was already known to Aristophanes, and some earlier men. So we have now, I think, a clear picture of what happens.

At this moment, or shortly after the founding of the city begins, the first question is how it should be called. Perhaps we'll read that. That's in the translation, page 38 bottom, verse 809: first we must give the city a splendid name, and then we must sacrifice to the gods afterwards. That is the plan of what follows.

A. PEI: First we must give the city some grand big name: and then We'll sacrifice to the high Gods. EU: That's my opinion also.

CHOR: Then let's consider what the name shall be.

PEI: What think you of that grand Laconian name, Sparta?

EU: What? Sparta for my city? No. I wouldn't use esparto for my pallet, Not if I'd cords; by Heracles, not I.

PEI: How shall we name it then?

S: You see, just as he rejected aristocracy at an earlier stage, when they wanted a good city, they reject now the very name of Sparta.

A. PEI: How shall we name it then? CHOR: Invent some fine Maniloquent name, drawn from these upper spaces

And clouds. PEI: What think you of Cloudecuckoobury?

CHOR: Good! Good! You have found a good big name, and no mistake.

EU: Is this the great Cloudecuckoobury town Where all the wealth of Aeschines lies hid, and all Theagenes's?

PEI: Best of all, This is the plain of Phlegra, where the Gods Outshot the giants at the game fo Brag.

S. And so on. Then, there is to be found a protecting god in particular, and that's of course a bird, and in this case, a cock. Then after these most urgent questions have been settled, one must sacrifice,—because that is a most sacred action, the founding of the polis—to the gods; but naturally to the new gods. To the birds—of which Peisthetaerus now is the ruler. That is the beautiful inverse, you know, the ruler of the birds sacrifices to his subjects. And a priest has to be called in to sacrifice



to the new gods. This pious man has no trepidations to sacrifice to the heirs to the Olympian gods, but he is sent away; not because of any orthodoxy of his, but because he invites too many birds, i.e., gods, so not sufficient remains for these new gods to feed on.

Then Peisthetaerus himself will bring the sacrifice, but is interrupted by another individual, namely, by a poet. The poet takes the place of the priest. The poet lies, as would appear if you would read it, and as would not surprise you, because that was the common Greek saying, the poets lie much. They tell many stories which are not true. In high Pindaric lyric poetry, he asks for presents, which he receives. They are the garments taken away from the priest's assistants. You see that the poet is in every respect the successor to the priest. He receives these presents because he may bring evil on the polis if he is not satisfied. How could the poor poet bring evil on the polis? I mean, he ain't got no machine guns as a poet, to say nothing of atomic bombs. But what does he have?

A. A poem.

S. Yes, and how does it work to the detriment of the polis? Could it work to the detriment of the polis?

A. By dissuading them. He could dissuade them.

S. The fame. The poets are the most powerful regarding the fame of individuals and cities. Therefore, they have to be respected. Peisthetaerus says visibly, here in verse 947, one must benefit, or help, the poet. That's a principle; but he is also sent away, but not quite the way that poets are sent away in the Republic, but in a much more friendly spirit.

Then there comes the oracle man, and he is thrown out in utter disgrace. He begs for presents as the poet does. But in contradistinction to the poet, the bases of his begging are holy texts. The poet didn't beg, and he had beautiful songs, but there was not a direct connection. He begs on the basis of divine texts, and he doesn't receive anything. He's a boaster. The things which he says are not true.

And then we come to another individual who is most important to us, and that is Meton. In the translation on page 45, Verse 992; read it then.

A. METON: I come amongst you— PEI: Some new misery this!

S. And he says to this fellow Meton...

A. What's your scheme's form and outline? What's your design?  
What buskin's on your foot?

MET: I come to land-survey this Air of yours, and mete it out be acres.

PEI: Heaven and earth! Whoever are you?

MET: Whoever am I? I'm Meton, Known throughout Hellas and Colonus.

PEI: Aye, and what are these? MET: They're rods for Air-surveying.

I'll just explain. The Air's, in outline, like

One vast extinguisher; so then, observe,

Applying here my flexible rod, and fixing

My compass there,—you understand?

PEI: I don't. MET: With the square rod I measure out, that so  
The circle may be squared; and in the center  
A market place; and streets be leading to it  
Straight to the very center; just as from  
A star, though circular, straight rays flash out  
In all directions. PEI: Why, the man's a Thales!

S. That was—as we would say today, the man is an Einstein, or a Newton.  
By the way, Meton actually lived in Athens, himself. We know a little bit  
about him. Go on.

A. Meton! MET: Yes, what? PEI: You know I love you, Meton,  
Take my advice and slip away unnoticed. MET: Why, what's the matter?  
PEI: As in Lacedaemon There's stranger-hunting; and a great disturbance;  
And blows in plenty. MET: What, a Revolution? PEI: No, no, not that.  
MET: What then? PEI: They've all resolved  
With one consent to wallop every quack.

S. Yes, "...all boasters."

A. MET: I'd best be going. PEI: Faith, I'm not quite certain  
If you're in time; see, see the blows are coming!  
MET: O, murder! Help! PEI: I told you how 'twould be.  
Come, measure off your steps some other way.

S. You see, it is by no means certain, as the commentators have often assumed,  
that Peisthetaerus is beating. It could very well be from the city. But even  
of the question is undecidable on the basis of the text, if Peisthetaerus beats  
him, he would not do it on his own accord. He says, I love thee; but if the  
polis doesn't stand for that kind of figure, what do you do? Meton is the  
only one with a proper name, of these five people. Because there also appear  
some other people. Meton, and that is something else which reminds us of—  
we had already met one astronomer in the Clouds—Socrates. Meton does not  
ask for anything; he just wants to do something there. It's some combination  
of astronomy with town-planning. But the polis does not tolerate any of that,  
and he is beaten.

And that is important; the city is, in a way, meant to be followed (?)  
geometric. This regular city—in this country, the best example is, of course,  
Washington. In the 18th century, this kind of cities were rather common; also  
in Europe in the Age of Reason. People built rational cities. And the most  
rational form seemed to be one center. In Paris, you have also an example in  
the Etoile, for those of you who have been there, and there are some cities in  
Germany from the same age and the same time. And the source of that—if one  
can say that—is a remark in Descartes' Discourse on Method, where he opposes  
the old cities, where people just built houses as they saw fit, and later on  
there is a complete mess: the Medieval city, you know, and the old upper-  
storeys obstructing light and all kinds of difficulties; and the other, the  
planned city, perfect order.

That is an interesting example of the age of rationalism, but the same  
thing existed in Greece, and we know this from a passage in Aristotle's  
Politics about such a town-planner called Hippodamus, and Meton is the same  
kind of fellow: an astronomer founder of the city, who tries to establish



the heavenly order on earth. Also the Platonic city. In Plato's Critias, there is a city of this kind described, which is a perfectly ordered one. And Atlantis, which has something to do with Syracuse, however it does. The main point is the only individual coming to that sacrifice who has a proper name is the astronomer. And he plays a very special role, because he is loved by the founder. But the founder cannot tolerate him, for the sake of the polis.

The other fellows who come afterwards are not very interesting. There is one, an inspector, who is also beaten by Enisthetaerus, but there is no reference made that this has anything to do with the sentiment of the citizens. And the same applies to the sixth individual, the seller of Greek degrees, who is also beaten and sent away by Peisthetaerus, and in seventh and last place, the inspector and seller of degrees together. So, if we count in the way in which I suggested, Meton would be the middle, which is, I believe, what the poet means: the central figure. The polis cannot tolerate astronomy. We know that already from the Clouds. Now, some further aspects of the city of the birds come to light in the sequel. If you will turn in the translation to the middle of page 48, which is verse 1071—the basic ordinances of the new city.

A. Listen to the City's notice, specially proclaimed to-day;  
Sirs, Diagoras the Melian whosoever of you slay,  
Shall receive, reward, one talent; and another we'll bestow  
If you slay some ancient tyrant, dead and buried long ago.

S. You see, Diagoras of Melos was a fellow accused of atheism in Athens; and he is, of course, also intolerable for the perfect city. Atheism and tyranny are the two things which are incompatible with the good city. Tyranny, obvious: oppression; and atheism for other reasons. The next two verses.

A. We, the Birds, will give a notice, we proclaim with right good will,  
Sirs, Philocrates, Sparrovian, whosoever of you kill,  
Shall receive, reward, one talent, if alive you bring him, four;  
Him who strings and sells the finches,...

S. ...And so on, that's not important. What does this show, this ordinance? The difference made between alive and dead, bringing him in alive or dead? When you see these Western movies, there is no difference, alive or dead, but they made an enormous difference here. What does that show, to pay much more of brought in alive?

A. More difficult.

S. You think that's a sufficient reason? But why are they so eager, then?

A. Beating.

S. Vindictiveness: that's not unimportant, the theme of the vindictiveness of the polis. I mean, the individual must not be vindictive, that is clear for every decent man. And was clear to every decent man in all times. But the polis needs a certain kind of vindictiveness. That is, as you will see, one of the themes of the Wasps, the comedy to which we shall turn later.

Now, in the sequel, we learn of the progress of the war against the gods; after all, the gods have not yet been defeated, and the new gods have already founded their city. So, we get some information from time to time about the war against the gods. Let us read a characteristic scene at the top of page 54, which is verse 1230. We cannot read everything, unfortunately. Iris, a she-messenger from the gods.

A. IRIS: I? From the Father to mankind I'm flying,  
To bid them on their bullock-slaughtering hearths  
Slay sheep to the Olympian Gods, and steam  
The streets with savour. PEI: What do you say? What Gods?  
IRIS: What Gods? To us, the Gods in Heaven, of course.  
PEI: What, are YOU Gods? IRIS: What other Gods exist?  
PEI: Birds are now Gods to men; and men must slay  
Victims to them; and not, by Zeus, to Zeus.

S. That's very good: "Not, by Zeus, to Zeus." That's very well translated.

A. IRIS: O fool, fool, fool! Stir not the mighty wrath  
Of angry Gods, lest Justice, with the spade  
Of vengeful Zeus, demolish all thy race,  
And fiery vapour, with Licymnian strokes,  
Incinerate thy palace and thyself!  
PEI: Now listen, girl; have done with that bombast.  
(Don't move.) A Lydian or a Phrygian is it,  
You think to terrify with words like those?  
Look here....

S. He is an enlightened man, he cannot be impressed by these old stories.

A. ...If Zeus keep troubling me, I'll soon  
Incinerate his great Amphion's domes  
And halls of state with eagles carrying fire.  
And up against him, to high heaven, I'll send  
More than six hundred stout Porphyrian rails  
All clad in leopard-skins. Yet I remember  
When one Porphyrian gave him toil enough.  
And as for you, his waiting-maid, if you  
Keep troubling me with your outrageous ways,  
I'll outrage you, and you'll be quite surprised  
To find the strength of an old man like me.  
IRIS: O shame upon you, wretch, your words and you.  
PEI: Now then begone; shoo, shoo! Eurax patax!  
IRIS: My father won't stand this; I vow he won't.  
PEI: Now Zeus—a-mercy, maiden; fly you off,  
Incinerate some younger man than I.

S. And so on. In other words, the gods are—they count for nothing. In the sequel, then, the fame of this new perfectly happy city spreads to all men, and all men are filled with eros, longing for the city of the birds, and they wish to immigrate to that happy state. Again, this all precedes the victory over the gods. There are risks which these poor fellows take: after all, if the Olympian gods win, they will be exposed to terrible punishment, but appar-



ently they are not afraid. And now we get a scene in which we see the first immigrants to the new city, the people who take that risk. First is a father-beater. This scene we must read because of its great importance. I don't have the reference here, but you will easily find it. (1337)

A. SIRE-STRIKER: O that I might as an eagle be,  
Flying, flying, flying, flying  
Over the surge of the untilled sea!

PEI: Not false, methinks, the tale our envoy told us.  
For here comes one whose song is all of eagles.

S-S: Fie on it! There's nothing in this world so sweet as flying;  
I've quite a passion for these same bird-laws.

In fact I'm gone bird-mad, and fly, and long  
To dwell with you, and hunger for your laws.

PEI: Which of our laws? for birds have many laws.

S. This one is interesting: you see, it's not quite as simple, this new, happy life, as it seems. There are many laws.

A. S-S: All! All! but most of all that jolly law  
Which lets a youngster throttle and beat his father.

PEI: Aye if a cockeral beat his father here,  
We do indeed account him quite a—Man.

S-S: That's why I moved up hither and would fain  
Throttle my father and get all he has.

PEI: But there's an ancient law among the birds,  
You'll find it in the tablets of the storks;  
When the old stork has brought his storklings up,  
And all are fully fledged for flight, then they  
Must in their turn maintain the stork their father.

S-S: A jolly lot of good I've gained by coming,  
If now I've got to feed my father too!

PEI: Nay, my boy, you come here well-disposed,  
And so I'll rig you like an orphan bird.  
And here's a new suggestion, not a bad one,  
But what I learnt myself when I was young.  
Don't beat your father, lad; but take this wing,  
And grasp this spur of battle in your hand,  
And think this crest a game-cock's martial comb.  
Now march, keep guard, live on your soldier's pay,  
And let your father be. If you want fighting,  
Fly off to Thraceward regions, and fight there.

S-S: By Dionysus, I believe you're right.  
I'll do it too. PEI: You'll show your sense, by Zeus!

S. So that was the first scene. Now there is a great difficulty. Did you notice the difficulty? A very obvious one.

A. They invited him and now they repel him.

S. In other words, it seems up to now we knew that the birds can do with their parents what they like. And now this proves to be wrong. And immediately after this occurs, Peisthetaerus even says, yes, that is our law. Our

Our youngsters may beat their fathers, then he wholly abruptly and illogically says, we forbid that. What does this mean?

A. He says the birds may beat their father, but they must also keep the father. I don't know if this is the translation or—

S. That's a good point you make. In other words you deny the contradiction. The contradiction is only against killing. Good, so there would be no contradiction. I was not aware of that. You are quite right. So he says, you may beat your father, but you cannot do what you want—to throttle him and get his property. You can only beat him, but yet you feed him. That is true.

Let me first try to set forth my interpretation and be corrected then on the basis of your suggestion. He says there are many laws of birds. One could understand this also as follows: Some for the birds, and some for the man ruled by the birds. Here the suggestion is made, some for birds in general, and others for storks, as he says here. Now then, one would have to consider the question what is the special position of the storks, which would lead to a very complicated argument. The storks are there presented as the special guardians—the guardian birds, and so they are under special laws. Evidently, there are not the same laws for every citizen in every respect. The birds may beat their fathers, even kill them. He says that—let me see. No, they may not kill them, that was my error. They may not kill them.

A. But the fellow that comes assumes that—

S. Yes. He assumes that they may kill them, and that's the error. So, you are quite right, there is no contradiction, there is only a qualification. But still, the contradiction is this way: not all birds are obliged to feed their old fathers, only some of them, and that applies to this one. Peisthetærus refers him to that law which commands the children to feed their parents. And the interesting point is this: this very corrupt fellow obeys him immediately, without any contradiction. How come? He is an honest man—he does not break the law. He did not break the law in Athens where it was forbidden, and he only wants to go to a place where he could lawfully do it. When he finds out that he cannot lawfully do it there, he obeys. And he does not complain. That is very important, because later on we will see there is another fellow, a sycophant, who is really a dishonest fellow and who does not obey. So the man who, following a principle, even if a wrong principle—he believes in a wrong principle—but is law-abiding, that's an honest man. That's not quite the—

(End of side 1)



... because we haven't talked for some time. I will write your name down here.

Now let us come to the next set. Here we have only three people among the immigrants. Two are nameless and the central one has a name--a proper name--just as in the first case. In the first case it was the astronomer; now it is a poet. Now what does the poet say?

A: "On the lightest of wings I am soaring on high, Lightly from measure to measure I fly.

"Bless me, this creature wants a pack of wings!

"And ever the new I am flitting to find, With timorless body, and timorless mind.

"We clasp Cinesias, man of linden-wyth.

Why in the world have you whirled your splay foot hither?

"To be a bird, a bird, I long, A nightingale of thrilling song.

"O stop that singing; prithee speak in prose."

S: Yes. More literally, stop singing, but tell me what you mean. In other words, his singing is not telling what ~~he means~~. Yes?  
one thinks

A: "O give me wings, that I may soar on high, And pluck poetic fancies from the clouds, Wild as the whirling winds and driving snows.

"What, do you pluck your fancies from the Clouds?

"Why our whole trade depends upon the clouds; What are our noblest dithyrambs but things Of air, and mist, and purple-gleaming depths, And feathery whirlwinds? You shall hear, and judge.

"No, no, I won't.

"By Heracles you shall. I'll go through all the air, dear friend, for you. (Singing.) Shadowy visions of Wing-spreading, air-treading, Taper-necked birds.

"Steady, there!

"(singing). Bounding along on the path to the seas, Fain would I float on the stream of the breeze.

"O by the Powers, I'll stop your streams and breezes.

(singing). First do I stray on a southerly way; Then to the northward my body I bear, Cutting a harbourless furrow of air.

"A nice trick that, a pleasant trick, old man.

"O, you don't like being feathery-whirl-winged, do you?

"That's how you treat the Cyclian-chorus-trainer For whose possession all the tribes compete!

(Sem. #6)

"Well, will you stop and train a chorus here For Leotrophides, all flying birds, Crane-oppidans?"

"You're jeering me, that's plain. But I won't stop, be sure of that, until I get me wings, and peragate the air."

S: Let us stop here. The last phrase is not uninteresting. Peragate the air. Earlier he used a similar expression. Does it remind you of something? He runs through the air. He walks ... the way he walks on the air. Well?

A: Socrates.

S: Socrates! There is a kinship between Cinesias, the poet, and Socrates. The poet takes the place of the astronomer as is also indicated by the fact of the proper names. He wants to take new songs from the clouds—also Socratic, for the poets' art depends on the clouds. Peisthetærus invites him to stay. He is acceptable. Meton was not acceptable—the astronomer. But the poet doesn't wish to remain. He only came to get wings. He didn't wish to live there. He wants to live in a polis. *simple* And, as I say, his last words remind of Socrates walking on the air, high above *simple* the polis. The polis cannot tolerate astronomy, just as it cannot tolerate beating the father or incest. Connect it. The city of birds and a universal democracy. It is a city of birds. A human society could not be universal. And a human city would need local gods, not these universal gods, the birds. And the Olympian gods are, of course, the Greek example for locals. But even if a human society could be universal and hence get rid of the local gods, it could not get rid of the prohibition against incest, plus beating the parents, and hence it could not get rid of the prohibition against astronomy. They go together. Why? Why do the doubt of the prohibition against incest and astronomy go together? The gods, with all their grandeur and power and importance, are not the most fundamental phenomenon. Father-beating and/or incest is much more fundamental. From that we must start if we want to understand the gods. Now what is the connection between the prohibition against astronomy and the prohibition against father-beating? I think we must answer that question before we can go on. Well, it was implied in almost everything I said. I wish some one of you would help me. What does astronomy do?

A: Well neither of them help the polis.

S: That's too general. What does he positively <sup>do</sup> mean?

A: The astronomer's interested in things which transcend the polis, which are beyond the polis, outside the sphere of the polis.

S: Yes. All right. <sup>by</sup> You have also people who do all kinds of things which are not absolutely necessary for the polis and have to be tolerated nevertheless. I mean, in every society I imagine there are people who do rather useless work. One could find them in all walks of life, I imagine, and they are not regarded as a danger to the city.

A: <sup>You mean the</sup> ~~We wouldn't~~ the astronomer be attempting to <sup>erect the polis on</sup> ~~impose on~~ <sup>some sort of</sup> natural principles? *by laying bare*  
S: That's it. The astronomers pry into the secrets of heaven—the <sup>seeds</sup> secrets of the gods. That is one formula which one can say. But, more fundamental, <sup>they deal with</sup> they deal with the highest, most comprehensive, natural things. And ~~by laying bare~~ nature, they lay bare the distinction between nature and convention. And therefore they show that the foundation of the polis is a convention. Astronomy is the ~~excavator~~ <sup>extension</sup> for that human effort which destroys the sacred. Which destroys the sacred by recognizing the



is tolerated,

conventional character of the sacred. Poetry, which ~~historizes~~<sup>is tolerated</sup>, in contradistinction to astronomy, defends the sacred. Here, Aristophanes does it all the time. Of which it knows that it is not sacred. But it defends it. Poetry defends the sacred, of which it knows that it is weak as far as its logos, its foundation, is concerned. So, you know, in the Clouds, the Unjust Logos was the strong logos; the Just Logos was the weak logos. The poet knows that and yet he takes its side. The poets, very externally, present the gods. Here. You say Zeus is not, but he appears—or at least his brother, Posidon—appears on the scene. Think of the Platonic dialogues. There are never any gods who appear on the scene. The poets present the gods. They make the gods speak. That they make them ~~more~~<sup>more</sup> doubtful is true, but the philosophers never make them ~~more~~<sup>more</sup> speak. The Olympian gods seem to be expendable. But given the ~~lead~~<sup>lead</sup> of the prohibition against incest, some gods are needed, be it only the birds. But there is a terrible secret behind that. The birds are the gods. The birds rule all humans in the whole universe. Who ruled the birds? Who?

A: Peisthetaerus.

S: To what species does he belong?

A: Human.

S: A human being ultimately controls the gods. Yes, ~~by~~<sup>but</sup> a superior fellow, obviously. Not everyone could do that. As ~~some~~<sup>some</sup> said occasionally, not everyone can make the gods speak. Peisthetaerus, in his way, can do that.

In an entirely different context, something of this kind occurs in Plato's Republic. There is the famous simile of the cave. The cave is a ~~same~~<sup>same</sup> ~~thing~~<sup>thing</sup> ~~as~~<sup>as</sup> the polis. That is something ~~in the birds~~<sup>in the birds</sup>—a universe within the universe, with its basic opinions which constitute it. In the language of Plato's Republic, the noble lies, which constitute the polis itself. And then there is a little wall above the cave and statues of beings of superhuman size are carried around. The gods. But they are carried. And who carries them? Not the gods, but some human. The legislator. And therefore the Platonic ~~addition~~<sup>addition</sup> is: one has to seek for the true gods, for the gods which are not gods by convention. 'The cosmic gods' is one expression for that.

The last of these potential immigrants is a ~~sympophant~~<sup>sympophant</sup> who is ~~really~~<sup>simply</sup> a dishonest fellow—a quite vulgar crook. And he's just thrown out, whereas the first one, this very grave fellow who doubts whether one should not beat one's father, is an honest man. An honest man. The ~~sympophant~~<sup>sympophant</sup> is a vulgar crook and no excuse for that. He cannot only be sent away, but he must be sent away with disgrace. Look at page 60, in the middle, verse 1433.

A: "What can I do? I never learnt to dig."

S: In other words, Mr. Luciano also would say ... or is this name not familiar to you? Well, ~~he~~<sup>he</sup> is now the most famous man in this field, which some time ago Mr. Hodge ... But you know there are such people still around only ~~on another~~<sup>on another</sup> ~~they are no longer called sympophants~~<sup>yes? Go on.</sup>

A: "O but, by Zeus, there's many an honest calling Whence men like you can earn a livelihood,  
By means more suitable than hatching suits.

"Come, come, no preaching; wing me, wing me, please.

S: He wants wings in order to exercise his dirty business more efficiently.

(Sem. #6)

A: "I wing you now by talking.

"What, by talk Can you wing men?

"Undoubtedly. By talk All men are winged.

"All!

"Have you never heard The way the fathers in the barbers' shops  
Talk to the children, saying things like these,  
'Ditrephe has winged my youngster so By specious talk, he's all for chariot-driving.'  
'Aye,' says another, 'and that boy of mine Flutters his wings at every Tragic Play.'

"So then by talk they are winged."

S: "By speech<sup>o</sup> would be a proper' ... Men are winged by speeches, yes? Does that make sense? Men are induced to move swiftly by speeches. Yes. Go on.

A: "Exactly so. Through talk the mind flutters and soars aloft,  
And all the man takes wing. And so even now I wish to turn you, winging you by talk,  
To some more honest trade.

"But I don't wish.

"How then?

"I'll not disgrace my bringing up. I'll ply the trade my father's fathers plied.  
So wing me, please, with light quick-darting wings, Falcon's or kestrel's, so I'll serve  
my writs  
Abroad on strangers; then accuse them here; Then dart back there again.

"I understand. So when they come, they'll find the suit decided,  
And payment ordered.

"Right! you understand.

"And while they're sailing hither you'll fly there, And seize their goods for payment.

"That's the trick! Round like a top I'll whizz.

"I understand. A whipping-top; and here by Zeus I've got  
Fine Corcyraean wings to set you whizzing.

"O, it's a whip!"

S: Yes. Let us stop here. There are two things which would make men winged; speeches  
and whipping. The logos and sheer compulsion. That is a trite ~~relative~~, but a very  
~~poor relative~~. That is where the logos is too weak accidentally. Man has a good  
substitute for that which makes men winged. The syncophant, just as the beater of  
his father, is given a lesson in justice. But the syncophant refuses to accept it.  
The father-beater is honest, just as Pheidippides in the Clouds was honest. Never  
forget that. His father was a crook. Pheidippides was not dishonest. The clear and  
simple use of the case ~~for~~ dishonesty or justice. Needing the nomos, because the  
syncophant couldn't exercise his profession without a law making it possible. How can  
you blackmail a man, which makes certain crimes, ~~crimes~~ yes? So this is an  
if there is not law



ordinary criminal man who needs the law and transgresses it. All these ~~gangsters~~ need the law. If not accepting that law which they transgress, another one. That is a simple self-contradiction which has no leg whatever to stand upon and these people, they don't see it. But they must be made to act, they must be winged by whipping. The simple injustice cannot be cured by speech, but only by whippings. Yes! If this is so, what then is justice? ~~Now then~~, it would seem to follow that justice means respect for speeches. They have ~~no~~ consistency. And that is not bad at all, and that is part of Socrates' teaching. The man who respects the logos is a respectable man. And the dishonest man is the one who doesn't listen to the logos at all. But there is here a difficulty. If the logos itself happens to be weak as was suggested in the Clouds, that difficulty arises. Is there not then a need for some ultimate whipping behind the empirical whipping going on all the time by the law courts? Some ultimate force, some ultimate violence, simply laying down the law, although no proper logos for it can be given? That's the question. If the bases of society are conventional, then the ultimate basis of society is some force.

*immediately afterwards*

Now for a few more comments. Perhaps we can read this point--give me the Chorus where we left off. After the sycophant was driven off, yes? The Chorus.

*out*

A: "We've been flying, we've been flying Over sea and land, espying  
Many a wonder strange and new.  
First, a tree of monstrous girth, Tall and stout, yet nothing worth,  
For 'tis rotten through and through;  
It has got no heart, and we Heard it called "Cleonymus-tree."  
In the spring it blooms gigantic, Fig-traducing, sycophantic,  
Yet in falling leaf-time yields Nothing but a fall of shields.

"Next a spot of darkness skirted, Spot, by every light deserted,  
Lone and gloomy, we desoried.  
There the human and divine, Men with heroes, mix and dine  
Freely, save at even-tide.

"Tis not safe for mortal men To encounter heroes then.  
Then the great Orestes, looming Vast and awful through the glooming,  
On their right a stroke delivering, Leaves them palsied, stript, and shivering."

S: This Orestes was a robber who appeared like a hero, like a revenant, in some <sup>things</sup> little out-of-the-way places, also something of which you may know some ~~little~~ from daily papers here in Chicago, and the other point they mentioned first was sycophant, you see? The birds describe what they see flying around the earth, and they see injustice of various kinds. That seems to be very trivial, but we have to think for one moment to see why it is not trivial. The simple thing is they see it, they do not do anything about it. Just like the Olympian gods. Now here is a fine scene where the embassy from the gods appears. No! First Prometheus comes, afraid of Zeus, and he's greeted by Peisthetaerus as a friend. Peisthetaerus takes up the cause of Prometheus against the Olympian gods. There is also a reference to that, by the way, in Plato's Banquet, in Aristophanes' speeches there. ~~It's~~ new and successful Prometheus is Peisthetaerus. What's the difference between Peisthetaerus and Prometheus, apart from the chronological difference?

A: Prometheus is frightened stiff of Zeus; Peisthetaerus isn't.

S: Yes, that's true. But <sup>to what species does Prometheus belong and</sup> what <sup>to what species does Peisthetaerus belong</sup>

A: Prometheus was ~~not~~ a man. Peisthetaerus is a member of the new race that ...

S: Prometheus was not a man. He was frightened. He was a god. So the new and successful Prometheus is a human being and that means, taking into consideration the end of the whole story--namely that the gods have to give in, they have been starved to death, and must give in--that the successor to Zeus is a human being, for Peisthetaerus, via the birds, rules everything.

One point which is of importance not in the play itself, but <sup>in a broader context</sup> ~~is brought upon us~~, in the translation, page 66, bottom. That is verse 1664.

A: Peisthetaerus?

S: Yes.

A: "Aye, say you so? Why, ye'll be mightier far, Ye Gods above, if Birds bear rule below.

Now men go skulking underneath the clouds,  
And swear false oaths, and call the Gods to witness.  
But when ye've got the Birds for your allies,  
If a man swear by the Raven and by Zeus,  
The Raven will come by, and unawares  
Fly up, and swoop, and peck the perjurer's eye out."

S: Yes. Do you remember the discussion of this problem in the Clouds? The crucial argument between Socrates and Strepsiades. After Socrates had disposed of the gods as causes of rain and other things, there still remained one preserve of the gods.

A: Zeus's thunderbolts ....

S: Striking the perjurers. Here it is again. The gods don't do it. But the birds might do it. That's only to confirm my general thesis, there's a very close connection of these two ...

Q: What is the connection with this and that last speech of the Chorus where the birds saw but did nothing about what they saw.

S: Pardon?

Q: When the birds saw ...

S: Yes, but the birds could do it. There is a difference there. In fact, they don't do it. ~~There's a~~ difference. Because the gods are only by convention, they are not. The birds are living beings.

One point I would like to <sup>inserted</sup> mention: this scene where the birds--which seems to be mere ~~and delicate~~ poetry ~~which~~ <sup>which</sup> has of course ~~immediately~~ <sup>immediately</sup> ~~when~~ <sup>the birds had seen</sup> ~~the birds had seen~~ <sup>sing</sup> in this particular case as its meaning. For example, this passage which we read--the ~~delicate~~ passage--where it is shown how they see the injustice on earth, but don't do anything about it. There is a parallel there where they see, not these two crooks--Orestes and the other fellow--but they see Socrates and Chaerephon, who are also ridiculed. But it is very important. Socrates and Chaerephon belong to a different parable than the crooks, which we know anyway, which is a minimal lesson we have been troubled with. Did you want to say something?

A: Yes. The birds seem to have a very good case. The only thing which troubles me was their claim to deathlessness. That seems simply preposterous.



S. Yes, but they have to claim that if they want to be gods. I mean, that follows I mean, the men simply would not accept to worship a mortal being. Similar considerations applied to purely political considerations: If someone wants to be, say the absolute ruler of a society, he must raise certain claims whether they are true or not. By the way, what is invested—the simple political shrewdness in the Aristophanean plays—is absolutely amazing, and that of course can come out only with a closer look. For example, I mention only that example at which I saw it first—that is, in the Assembly of Women. Again, a Utopia. This time Athens submits to the rule of women. And with a certain amount of communism. So it's really very close in many respects to what is going on in the Republic. There are all kinds of difficulties there, you know; seeming contradictions. Now, you have really to think about it. And there is a discussion....As usual, Aristophanes is not free from levity, to put it mildly, and there is one straight rule: the family is abolished. Every man may have intercourse with every woman, and vice versa. That's equality. But nature asserts itself. You have abolished all conventional inequalities. All are now rich and poor. But there is a natural inequality in this respect. Some are attractive and some are unattractive. Some are young and some are old. So here a nomos, a convention, has to come in and to equalize the condition. And therefore, the rule is made: the unattractive ones have priority. What nature denied them, the nomos, the law, gives them, and this leads, of course, to very comic scenes: an old hag who asserts her priority, with great discomfort to everyone. But if you raise the question, who benefits from that law, who really benefits from that law—because this is not a very nice scene for the old hag to go down and have to fight and to make herself entirely ridiculous—and then you reach one conclusion: a young woman who married an old man. She has complied with the law already. It has given priority to the underdog, the by-nature underprivileged, and she doesn't commit adultery by having relations with a man of her age. Such a woman is the heroine. So the whole play is dramatically based on this notion: that in every revolution, you have to raise the question, who benefits from it. And that you have to do especially in the case of the leader of the revolution. Now, that is in no place brought out, this simple reflection, but it is underlying the whole play. And so, in the other plays, too, there is always—I mean, whenever the subject has anything to do with the polis, a political reflection is underlying the play. I don't know how I came to that—some one of you raised a question?

A. Deathlessness.

S. Yes. Political. You have to think of that. By the way, in the Assembly of Women, there is a famous contradiction. She speaks first in the assembly of women.... No! In a private assembly, she speaks of the absolute novelty of this scheme, this leading revolutionary. And then in the assembly of women where they take the vote, she appeals to antiquity; that always the women were really the rulers. The same thing: in a political argument, the appeal to precedent, antiquity, is essential; it goes through. And one must take this into consideration. In this sense, the plays are political, all of them, including the Birds.

A. Who will that convince? I mean, that they can do all kinds of wonderful things for crops and so on, that's fairly plausible. But who will they convince that they will never die. Am I being too (?) early?

S. No. There is a famous American saying from Abraham Lincoln which all of you have heard more than once. Do you know what I mean? Say it.

A. You can fool some of the people all of the time and all of the people some of the time.

S: Yes. All right. Let us forget about the conclusion which Aristophanes would admit. But there is all kinds of fooling. I mean, what is the meaning of propaganda as the word is used today? I mean, I'm sure that if it were not massively incompatible with any form of Marxism in the most extreme ~~interpretation~~ <sup>interpretation</sup> I have no doubt that you could ... What they did with the brain of Lenin in Moscow. You know, the famous exhibition there. And what they did with this Lysenko business--that's a beautiful example. It is sure that the Soviet government can sell the idea that Lysenko's biology is right in the course of years. I mean, Plato, in his wisdom, says, in the Republic, in a discussion with Glaucon when the noble lie is under discussion, Glaucon says, yes, but people won't believe it, won't believe the noble lie. And then he goes on to say, but later generations might. And Socrates very delicately says, I understand more or less what you mean; meaning, well, time has a terrific point. People hear that for generations: Things sound different. And, in addition, I would say in fairness we must grant especially the comic poet's right ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> they exaggerate a bit. After all, let us not forget that birds cannot speak and this preposterous impossibility is of course the basis of that legitimate comedy, a legitimate comedy writer. Now, do we have at least a few minutes to state your problem and I'll see whether we can discuss it. State your objection.

A: First, I have to be sure I understand exactly what you've been doing. As I understand it, you're assuming first that there is a connection between the Birds and the Clouds in that both of them deal with the nature of the polis, of the community, and Aristophanes is making propositions about the nature of the polis. Is that ...

S: Yes. Sure. That was my conclusion. First of all, I say he tells a story about birds being induced by an Athenian to take on the rule of the world. Naturally. But if we think about that and go back to the underlying clue, then we arrive at that. Yes. Sure.

A: Well, first I object to the connection between the Birds and the Clouds. Well, I'll start at the very bottom. I object to the whole idea that Aristophanes is saying something in either of these plays beyond what can be read on the surface.

S: Sure. Absolutely correct, but one must take the whole surface. I mean, you cannot ... You have to take every point. Sure. If you take the whole surface, <sup>and</sup> meaning every speech, then you must account for every speech, and for concept which makes every speech meaningful without having the recourse to fantastic assumptions.

A: Well, let me get at that ~~very~~ <sup>word,</sup> meaningful, <sup>then</sup> ~~thing~~. I, for awhile, the first few days here, couldn't make up my mind whether you were using the plays of Aristophanes as illustrations for your own opinions on the subjects or whether you meant to say that Aristophanes meant the conclusions that you drew from his plays.

S: I can set your mind at rest on this much very easily. It would be criminal of me if I were to impute my opinions to Aristophanes and say they were Aristophanes'. Sure I believe in that. True, <sup>and</sup> I would say that this train of thought, which is not my opinion, but this train of thought I learn from Aristophanes, as one part of the great argument going on in classical times to which Socrates, Plato and Aristophanes <sup>to 12,</sup> is replying.

A: As I started to say, this is just *the first few days I was wandering about this*. I don't believe this. I find it very difficult to believe that Aristophanes deliberately set out to illustrate or to compress the position into his plays. I think the illustrations of various positions or ideas or philosophies may appear in his plays, but they're there almost by accident. I think as a playwright, Aristophanes'



first consideration was to present a picture of contemporary Athens, a mocking, ridiculous picture, but his first consideration was: Is this true of Athens?

S. That is, of course, an assertion which is, I believe, not provable. If you say his first consideration was to make people laugh, I grant you that. I believe I said this last time. That is surely true. But the question is simply....I mean, tragic or comic poets, these are general concepts which cover a very great variety of phenomenon. There may be a man who only likes to make a kind of buffoonery. Undoubtedly, you have seen George Gobel or Groucho Marx, or other individuals of this kind. You have plenty of opportunity to laugh. They do want nothing but that. But there are also comic poets who want more. My starting point of any argument would be that since the comic poet, like Aristophanes, in the conventions of that time, was free to speak in his own name in the parabasis of what he was doing, we have to start from that. In the case of the tragic poet, it's much more difficult, because they never speak in their own name. Now, in there, Aristophanes says he wants to do two things: to make people laugh, and to teach them justice. And any argument which wants to be solid, scholarly and scientifically, has to start from that. And the fact that constant references to contemporary Athens occur must be understood in the light of these two principles: ridiculous and justice. To teach justice by ridiculous. Or to make people laugh by means of presentations of the problem of justice. That is not decided by the general statement. It has to wait. Everyone is free to believe or not to believe, and that is not the point. One must simply....Any argument which is valuable is one which enters into the details. I mean, I don't claim to have understood the whole of Aristophanes. We have today a good example today where Mr. Heberlou had read Aristophanes less than I, I believe, yes?

A. Much less.

S. ...And found something which I overlooked somewhat, and of great importance because it clears great difficulties. But I can only say this: of the interpretations I have read or heard, I think that the overall view I suggest explains more than your alternatives do. What I do not know and what I have to find out by hard work is whether it explains, at least in principle, everything. Because, you see, our belief and non-belief depends to a considerable extent on our earlier opinions, on our preconceived opinions, and that is, of course, as you must admit, not solid. So if you don't show me a given point where I say something, where I interpreted a certain speech wrongly, then I will be delighted and immediately embody it into my interpretation. But this is too vague to make an impression.

A. That's an excellent criticism, I hope I won't bog down the class in a veritable swamp of trivia, but I have a list of things here that I object to. I object to them on the grounds that I gave before, that I think Aristophanes put them in as a playwright from two points of view: either as jokes, or simply because they represented contemporary Athens. That is, there are ideas he attacks in his plays, but I think he put them there not because he was mounting a concentrated attack on a well-meant philosophy, but simply that he was plucking ideas out of Athenian life and attacking them peacefully.

S. Yes, but still they must have some meaning. I mean, when you take the Clouds and you have here, quite externally, Socrates asserting, or at least abetting atrocious things and meeting a terrible end. That can be understood and must be understood at first glance as a critique of Socrates. Something was wrong with Socrates. Otherwise he would not be ridiculous. You know, a simply good and noble action, a simply good and noble way of life, can never be ridiculous. So, I think it is generally

admitted that the Clouds is something like an attack on Socrates. The question only is what are the presented terms for the attack.

Here, in this play, you have an Athenian who has only one quality which would fall into very severe notions of that time; even be regarded as a blemish—namely, his pederasty—but otherwise is presented as an absolutely sensible man. You see, for example, the scene with the father-beater and the scene with the sycophant, a man who has sensible moral principles does something outrageous to the gods and he succeeds. He succeeds. That must be interpreted. I mean, Peisthetaerus is not held up as a wicked destroyer of the paternal order, of the ancestral order. On the contrary. And similar conventions are a part of the peace. They offer as a kind of rebellion against the gods a man, an Athenian, ascends to heaven and brings peace to Hellinas, whereas if Zeus had been right, the war had gone on and on. I mean, to say merely that Aristophanes was in favor of peace and against the continuation of this fratricidal war is true, but it's linked up here with the assertion that Zeus is very inactive and a human being has to be....The human being—that, one can show by the name of it, is really the comic poet himself. And so, the comic poet will do what Zeus himself will not. You have to take these things into consideration. In addition, all the words that you use are really in need of reflection. When you take a man like Bernard Shaw, and there were writings around—say Bergson—and he was influenced by them; then we realize more or less what that means. A playwright, or a novelist, for that matter, happens to be influenced by the theoretical men of his time; and he partly, really partly, believes them and partly also he uses them without believing them because he can use them for characterizing his characters. That is one way of doing it. But whether and to what extent Aristophanes merely used these opinions in the air for characterizing individuals, and to what extent he himself accepted these views is the question. You cannot reach this question openly because the alternatives are limited. I mean, if he believed in the Olympian gods, which means he rejected these new kinds of gods altogether, that would show. These presentations do not make much sense as the work of someone who believed in the Olympian gods.

I disregard here completely another consideration which I do not regard as trivial, but one could object to them on certain sensible grounds. We have a presentation of Aristophanes' work as a whole in four pages in Plato's Banquet. Now, Plato knew everything about the contemporary scene, even more than anyone can know today. I mean, this kind of thing is theory. But I can only say that without having paid any attention to the Platonic analysis regarding these presentations, I came to a view which I was surprised to see is borne out by what Plato has to say in the Banquet about Aristophanes. But the only concrete way is concrete argument, on this or that particular point; and you have to consider both the individual speeches and naturally also the Chorus as well as the action and the meaning of the play as a whole. The plot as a whole.

A. Well, it is the meaning of the play as a whole that I object to. I object....

S. Say the plot, say the plot.

A. In summary, my position is that you're attributing too much consistency to Aristophanes as a (?) fountain or a point of view. Take, on page 48, in the speech of the Chorus:

"Listen to the City's notice, specially proclaimed to-day;  
Sirs, Diagoras the Melian whosoever of you slay,  
Shall receive, reward, one talent; and another we'll bestow  
If you slay some ancient tyrant, dead and buried long ago."

Now, you said that this contained the proposition that heresy and tyranny are now



(Sem. #5)

allowable in the ideal city. And, if I understand the way you're approaching this properly, you mean to say he put that proposition in there purposely. He meant specifically ...

S: Yes. I would say this: such actions were taken by the city of Athens. If he ascribes these actions to the city of birds, it must make some meaning as an act of the city of birds. Of course he could be a silly buffoon who just makes jokes whether they have meaning or not, but to the extent to which I know Aristophanes, I think he was a very thoughtful man. So he did not make ... it was not merely that he could not repress a joke, but it must have some meaning in context. It makes perfect sense in the whole of the play, that however different this new city of the birds may be, it still has certain features in common with all cities of which we know and the prohibition against tyranny, as well as the prohibition against atheism, applies ~~there~~ as well. I mean, it seems to be confirmed by the whole. There are, after all, new gods. There is no atheism. And tyranny goes without saying. A democracy ... Even Aristophanes, he cannot ~~resent~~ <sup>tolerate</sup> tyrants.

A: There are a good many of these points in here that you bring out and some that I object to where I can't say what you draw out of them is wrong. For example, about the father-beater being a law-abiding man. Yes, he is presented as such. I just, still, object to the idea that this is intended. Now, in this speech of the Chorus ...

S: But why should he do that? Why should he present an individual regarded by the normal man as obnoxious just as a sycofant is obnoxious. The sycofant he presented just as everyone would expect it, as a crook, as a dispicable individual whom he treats as a dispicable individual. But here he has another kind of crime--beating the father, or a man who desires to beat his father--and he treats him differently and this fellow ~~is~~ different. I mean, what may he do in the name of poetry, I would say. Is a poet a thoughtless man? Must he be? I don't believe so; no good poet.

A: I don't believe Aristophanes was a thoughtless man. I'm not saying he is.

S: Yes, but he would be ...

A: I'm saying that there are dramatic reasons, reasons why Aristophanes the playwright ...

S: What does dramatic reason in concrete terms mean? In other words, how do you interpret this particular passage? I mean, those are general words. If you say dramatic reason, meaning there is a certain plot, a certain overall idea, and this has in itself consequences which explain a given thing, <sup>and</sup> we don't have to refer to anything else, that may be so, if you call that a dramatic reason. I can't. But you cannot give such a ~~claim~~ <sup>claim</sup> that it was necessary to show the city as an attraction and therefore potential immigrants, you still have to start with the question, what kind of immigrants is he going to choose and how will they be treated and to whom will he give a proper name and to whom he will not give a proper name. These are new decisions, special decisions, which must be ~~decided~~ <sup>examined</sup>.

A: I think in each of these cases, I can think of a dramatic reason why he chose this way of putting it.

S: May I make this suggestion. Of course you must not finish with that, I can see. Can you put them down in writing and hand them to me next time?

A: All right.

end

... you brought up quite a few very important <sup>features.</sup> ~~people.~~ Your interpretation does not quite jibe with the one which I'm going to suggest and therefore implicitly it contains a criticism by anticipation of what I'm going to say. But I must say this kind of criticism is really helpful because it is concrete and we must see whether I can account for everything you said and whether you can account for everything I have to bring out.

Now, to indicate a few points, you say, quite rightly, the attack on Cleon is <sup>data (?)</sup> ~~incidental.~~ I retract my words of praise. You said, "the Cleon phase is incidental." That is not the overall ~~thing~~. That is surely true. But it is not incidental, as is indicated by the names of the two chief characters: lover of Cleon, abhorer of Cleon. Yes? And, you know, at a crucial moment, the lover of Cleon and the dicasts call for Cleon to come, then send boys to fetch him. Yes? And he seems to be the only one who can save the situation for the dicasts. And Cleon never comes. So the absence of Cleon is a very important feature of the play. But one can say it is a play dealing with Cleon but with Cleon's absence. And we must find out what that means. That is one <sup>point</sup>.

The other point--what you say is perfectly correct--the attack on the degenerate <sup>defenders</sup> ~~democracy in the light of the good old times, the old times,~~ and the dicasts as <sup>Athenians</sup> ~~fighters for Athens, the Athens of the past,~~ that is unblameable. Surely. But the question is whether that is the whole story. You know, the praise and what you said about the last scenes indicate there is something else. This business there which is a cure are all novel things. So, in other words, the cure for the present decay is not simply a return to the old <sup>ngs</sup> ~~remedies~~, but new remedies, I mean, and we have to identify these new remedies, yes? That would be our problem.

To mention a few other points, you made very clear, that <sup>is</sup> ~~it's~~ crucial for the understanding, that Philocleon, the hero ~~of~~ dicasts, radically differs from his fellow dicasts. I mean, the word dicast as, let's say, jurymen. The hero jurymen is <sup>Very good</sup> ~~radically different from the other jurymen. You say he is mad. That is good.~~ But the poet is more specific. He identifies that madness. What kind of madness is it from which he suffers?

And the last point which I would like to make now only is this: at the beginning, in the first four or five hundred verses or so, you said Bdelycleon is restraining his father. I believe that was the word. But can you spell this out, this restraining, a little bit? You laugh. You seem to have the answer. Don't hold back. What does he do?

A: Well, this sounds a good deal like the laws of the storks, the storks' laws in the Birds.

S: You mean ... in what way?

A: Well, he's restraining by all kinds of devices, but it includes beating his father.

S: It includes ... ?

A: It includes beating his father.

S: I think so. At least he uses force.

A: O, he does beat him. He kicks him down the chimney at one point, although he's taking care of him, as the story says.



S: Yes. And even if he asks the slaves to beat him, <sup>the father,</sup> it's bad enough. So that was the point which you omitted, but that doesn't detract from the good ~~points~~ <sup>qualities</sup> of your paper. In other words, we have here another case of this problem of beating the father, or may I suggest the simpler formula—he keeps his father a prisoner. He keeps him bound, or fettered. He binds his father. He does to his father what Zeus did to his father, Cronus. So the great problem of beating the father, which we have seen in two Aristophanean plays before, plays a role here, too. And as far as my present recollection goes, these are the three only plays of Aristophanes which deal with this subject and we have to take account of them. But so my criticism of you, of your paper, is this: It was a very good and clear paper and you have seen quite a few important points, but there are other important points for which you did not account and we must integrate what you have found into a larger framework which also will account for the things omitted. Does this make sense as a rule for reading such a work?

A: But how much can you say in <sup>seven pages?</sup> ~~such a paper.~~

S: <sup>Yes, sure.</sup>

S: I repeat, your paper was very satisfactory and especially if I consider that you did it at very short notice. Yes? And in addition, really, it was the first time you read a play of Aristophanes—or this play, at any rate. Is this ~~clear?~~ <sup>fair</sup>

A: Yes.

S: So there is no ... I mean, you will get a very good grade. You don't have to worry about that. I'm not now concerned with this kind of ~~happiness you have made me~~, but only that now I'm planning to turn to our general free-for-all.

A: I would just like to make one comment in the light of this particular way you do it. I plead guilty. I picked out what I thought was the most important ...

S: And it was very good.

A: ... but there are other ... I mean, it would have been <sup>im-</sup>possible to pick <sup>out all the</sup> other things, it's true.

S: Absolutely. Absolutely. You are <sup>perfectly</sup> innocent. I'm not concerned now with guilt. I'm concerned with an invisible adversary, because Mr. Hayett isn't here, but also with other invisible adversaries, other people whom I don't know and who don't know me, but who interpret such works differently; and therefore I use this opportunity which you so graciously gave me for stating one general rule of reading: that if you are confronted with a variety of interpretations, that is preferable which accounts for most—yes?—for more than other interpretations. That is all. And you don't have to worry at all.

Now let me come back and initiate this discussion. Now the first condition for understanding anything—whether it is the American preparation for the coming presidential elections or Plato or Hobbs or whatever have you—is openmindedness. The facts, the data, must be seen in their purity, must be seen and not denied and manipulated. Surely, there are different kinds of data. That is, for example, the observation of how Mr. Miller voted in '56 and '52 and '48, when he voted for the first time perhaps, and how he's going to vote in 1960, but there are also broader things; how a whole area of the country votes or a whole professional group over this country or <sup>to apply it</sup> ~~to our~~ case, the individual speech of a character—here, this one line—or ~~the plot of the work~~. These are both facts, but facts of a different calibre, different importance. So that is clear. The facts.

But then we come to the famous fact that everyone approaches the facts with some previous opinion. He doesn't have to have an opinion about Aristophanes, for example. He may not have any opinion. He may not have heard the name. But he has some opinions which bear on Aristophanes before he even opens the book. Let us take such an opinion--poetry. Everyone who opens up the book has heard the word poetry and assumes this under poetry and that is a very grave act. An inevitable act, but a very grave one. Now, what is poetry? There are certain innocent things which are said. For example, in meter and rhyme--meter and/or rhyme--in other words, poetry is non-colloquial speech, not <sup>precise</sup> speech. That is clear. And it is also clear that <sup>given</sup> in the origin of the word poetry--poesis--making, something made, something invented, something fictitious. Even in the case of the delicate poet. The poet, as individual Mr. Miller, expresses his love for Miss Smith, or his mourning for the death of his grandmother, for example. What makes it a poem is that which transcends it being an expression of Mr. Miller's love for Miss Smith and therefore there is always something fictitious about it. safe 20  
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That is the old meaning of poetry. But today this has rather disappeared and instead we use words like 'creative.' I know that people regard writing a Master's thesis or writing a social science book as creative work--I ~~prefer~~ <sup>have heard</sup> that--but still, the more general use is to apply it to poetry in particular. Or some other art. Or we use the word 'aesthetic,' for example, aesthetic experience. Now these innocent looking facts contain whole <sup>works</sup> ~~worlds~~, a whole <sup>world</sup> ~~work~~ which may <sup>distort</sup> ~~destroy~~ completely what we are trying to understand. The least we must grant--everyone must grant--is this: there may be a disproportion between our previous opinion--for example, regarding poetry--and the opinion of the poet. We cannot assume that Aristophanes understood by poetry what we understand by it. That seems to be elementary, but is not always considered.

Now this, what I call previous opinions, is akin to what is now called hypotheses, but not the same. Let us make clear these differences so that we understand a bit the insidious character of previous opinions. What is a hypothesis? You have in many courses in this building sophisticated expositions of what a hypothesis is; I have never heard such courses, but I can figure out more or less what they must mean. What is a hypothesis? Well. Let me make a stab in the dark. I would say a <sup>number one</sup> ~~hypothesis~~ <sup>second,</sup> hypothesis is an assumption which is known to be an assumption, ~~that is~~ <sup>but</sup> its terms are meant to be perfectly clear and distinct. A hypothesis is completely known as what it is. The question is whether it is true or not and that, there are certain methods by which we validate or invalidate the hypothesis. But the hypothesis itself is lucidity itself. I can imagine that there are sometimes hypotheses which are stated in terms of shocking ambiguity and a lack of lucidity, but that is a bad hypothesis. A hypothesis as such is of perfect lucidity. But hypotheses, and that is also known in the profession, have a <sup>pre-</sup> ~~great~~ history in every case, or a background. For example, why does Mr. X indulge in this particular kind of hypothesis, whereas Mr. Y in that other kind? And the common answer is, well, you have to know the psychology of these men. X underwent <sup>psych.</sup> ~~an~~ analytical treatment and Y did not. I was originally a businessman and therefore ... and this kind of thing. So we have a whole science which tells us something about the only thing which is unclear in our hypothesis; namely, their pre-history. The hypothesis is lucidity itself, but it stems from a vague and unclear medium. <sup>Seems to be</sup> ~~Seems to be~~ a word which is so rejected because of the murkiness to which it seems to allude. But the trouble with this psychological explanation is that psychology itself rests on hypotheses--a scientific term--and then we get again back into this unclear pre-history of the hypothesis. So hypotheses are really very good and satisfactory only in that--and that includes a validation and invalidation of hypotheses. That is wonderful.--But only on the foreground.

There is a dark background in every case. That is the home of the previous opinions.



The previous opinions are deeper, and for the same reason murkier, than any hypothesis can be. That makes it so hard and at the same time so important to reach clarity about them. There are certain social scientists who are under an optimism and naiveté. They think if they write on page one of their preface, "These are my values"—I know such people—and then they have clarified their previous opinions. This is only a very shallow formulation of what they believe they believe. It is not a real understanding of what they believe. So, in fact, every understanding is a constant movement back and forth between the data—for example, the words of the election campaigns—and the presuppositions, the hidden presuppositions. And this movement back and forth leads, is meant to lead, to a clarification of these presuppositions, not only to the validation and invalidation of the hypothesis, and possibly, if we are lucky, to correction of our presuppositions, of our previous opinions.

And we have to do that with poetry, at least to some extent, and very superficially, but only the first few indispensable steps. And let us not be ashamed of being child-like. The older view of poetry was that a poem had two functions: to please—never forget that, to please. I mean, you know, there is a certain kind of art now in existence which may have wonderful qualities, but of which no one could say that it could please. That is a great shame. So, to please, but not only to please; also to be useful. That was the old-fashioned view of old-fashioned people. For example, Horace expressed that, but that goes back much earlier. To please, that is not quite serious—to play. To be useful, that's serious. For example, if we learn something about the virtues of patriotism, that's useful. But that we are amused by the antics of an old drunkard who comes out with a flutegirl in some dubious pre-history, that's funny. But these two elements, to please and to be useful, to be playful and to be serious, are related. They are not just coexistent, they have an inner-unity. There is one kind of human activity which has this quality of being playful and serious, of being of play and useful, together inexplicably. Don't say cocktail party, because they are really separated. Because a fellow goes to a cocktail party to meet there a VIP ... these are two entirely different things which happen to coincide because the VIP happens to drink there and he can meet him and that is one in which they are united.

How does one call these things which are both useful and playful, enjoyable, a boon for the senses? Now this was formerly ... something festive. When you look, for example, at a commencement, there you see the combination of this useful—the conclusion of the academic year, the graduation, you know, that must be formally recognized—and at the same time you don't go there trembling ... are you well prepared, in this kind of thing. It is festive. Festive. Let us say that festive is the natural union of being useful. Festive—that reminds us of festival. Festivals, holidays, if we remember the origin of the meaning of holidays which is in English so very clear—holy days. Days dedicated to the worship of the gods. That is pleasing. I'm speaking now more from a Greek than from a biblical point of view, although from a biblical point of view one can recognize it. This is a holiday. Then, if this is true, the so-called divine apparatus which we find in Homer and Aristophanes and Sophocles, of course, is of the essence of poetry. Poetry without a divine apparatus is a problem, not that poetry isn't. That is a great question, how poetry without a divine apparatus, if I may use that term, could come into being. That required an amazing change which is, of course, partly implied in what such people as Aristophanes and Sophocles did, but is not yet there.

Now let us turn to Aristophanes. That Aristophanes is concerned with divine things is obvious from the plays, but we have in addition Socrates' remark to Aristophanes in Plato's Banquet that Aristophanes deals with nothing but theos Dionysus and

Aphrodite--the god of wine and the goddess of love, wine and love. That is indeed a characteristic of Aristophanes, of a certain kind of poet, not of all, that these two gods, Dionysus and Aphrodite, Wine and Love, both with a capital letter, are his concern. Wine and love have this in common: the joy of life, the throwing off of all burdens, all restraints. 'Carnival' is the closest, best term for approximation to what the comic means. Carnival. Throwing off the burdens not only of work, but even of decency. Decency also can be a burden as you know if you have read books on the education of little children. You have to be told the most elementary rules of decency, which one could not imagine that man was not born with full knowledge of them. <sup>ok</sup>

(?) Now let us here come back to what I said last time. What are these fears of indecency which are so important to Aristophanes? Obscenity proper, politics, blasphemy. But another point which I simply forgot to mention last time which is also important--parody. Parody especially of tragedy, solemn tragedy, solemnity, is also a burden just as a black tie may be a burden. In other words, what we see in Aristophanes throughout is an exhilarating festivity which is connected with Dionysus and Aphrodite--this work of the comic poet that he exhilarates us with festively and not like a mere buffoon--and that this has always to do with recollections of Dionysus and Aphrodite and the ~~heroes~~ <sup>gods</sup>. No women there, as far as we know. Only adult males. Now this work of the comic poet is in itself independent of whether the comic poet believes Dionysus and Aphrodite exist or do not exist. Such a work, without going on into any details but at first glance, such a work could have been produced by someone who thinks Dionysus and Aphrodite are, in the way in which they are believed to be, or <sup>who</sup> he did not believe. He might be a man who does not even care whether they exist or not. Some bright idea occurs to him: How one can produce this aesthetic exhilaration and a wonderful plot, an amusing plot and all this kind of thing. And let others wonder about these kinds of questions. Or, he might not even <sup>do that</sup>. In other words, he might be merely a craftsman in this particular craft of comedy. In that case, he would not be a wise man as the Greeks understood wisdom. The problem I had with Mr. Havel last time turned only around this point. I mean, if it were properly understood, properly phrased, only around that; namely, I seem to assume that Aristophanes had worried whether Dionysus and Aphrodite and of course Zeus and Hera, too, are or are not, whereas he regarded this as a wholly unfounded assumption. I <sup>impress</sup> do not know whether he would agree with my logic, but that is my ~~pleasure~~ <sup>pleasure</sup>. This question cannot be decided by any ~~fact~~ <sup>fact</sup> or preference. We have to investigate. What we can say, on the basis of what we have seen, are two questions: Was Aristophanes aware of this question regarding the existence of the gods, and of the importance of this question? Are we here in a position to answer these questions on the basis of what we have read? And, whatever you say, give your reason. Can we answer the question that Aristophanes was aware that there is a question of whether Dionysus and Aphrodite exist or do not exist and that this is a great question? What would you seem to say? What?

A: Well, I think that he was aware of it in that his constantly talking about the peoples' criticisms of gods; a desire--for instance, as in the Birds--to establish new gods or to be in a society where the gods are not observed in this manner or do not exist in the same way. And also he seems to be aware--he seems to have said that he is--that god is a creation of man. He said this again and again.

S: Yes? Does he say that?

A: He doesn't say it, but it's implied I think ...

S: Yes, you see there ... Because <sup>as we learned from</sup> ~~we must refer to the~~ Wasps, we must here also



the other side. In this case, the invisible Mr. <sup>Hayett</sup> ~~Hale~~, yes? We must take up his position in fairness to him and to ourselves. Now, I would say, can you quote chapter and verse which would settle this question? And, to repeat, was Aristophanes aware regarding the question of the existence or non-existence of the gods and of the importance of this question? Do you have an answer, Mr. Kennedy? You smiled.

A: Well, the Clouds. Zeus is not.

S: Yes. That verse alone would settle it. He presents Socrates as saying, <sup>(greek phrase)</sup> "Zeus does not even exist," would be a correct <sup>translation</sup> ~~pronunciation~~ of the context. In other words, this Zeus of whom you praise so highly, he does not have this <sup>minimum</sup> of virtue which consists in mere existence. Surely. And then that this <sup>great</sup> issue is indicated by the whole play. It ends with the fact that Socrates' thinktank is burned down and because he had been arrogant, insolent towards the gods. So that is clear. This question wasn't new to him and his own work showed it.

But! Now we come to the real question. Did Aristophanes himself answer this question regarding the existence of the gods one way or another? That is a much more difficult question. After all, the poet never speaks in his own name except in the parabasis. The Chorus speaks, at least partly, in the poet's name and there these statements never occur. There are some slight exceptions to what I said, but that's fundamental. Therefore, that is really a question where opinions may very well differ and where the solution can only be found by these broad considerations. In other words, which interpretation can account for everything occurring in the plays and which can account only for half of it? Now this is my statement of the problem. I call now on Mr. Schrock to state his objection, difficulty, or whatever he might call it.

A: I think that I gave the impression that I had a more substantial position than I really did. I talked to Mr. Gilman afterwards and my question was really that of the novelist. It had nothing to do with any specific portion of the play and therefore suffers from the same generality ...

S: Yes, but state it nevertheless because what you said to Mr. Gilman in private is not <sup>knownable</sup> known to us here.

A: Well, it is really, I think, a restatement of the obvious; that is, that you can't know whether a poet or a philosopher was aware of problems or raised questions until you examine the writing. When we started with the Banquet, you gave us a rule of thumb: that there is very little superfluity in Plato ...

A: Very little what?

A: Very little superfluous in Plato. Everything has a purpose and counts ...

S: Yes, as a rule of thumb, I would even say nothing is superfluous.

A: Well, the assumption seems to be about the same with Aristophanes.

<sup>my</sup>  
S: Yes. But you must have seen also from <sup>my</sup> ~~our~~ present exposition that I did not <sup>make this objection</sup> ~~make this objection~~. Very well. Now you bring up the rule of thumb, the real difficulty, which also, I believe, must underline Mr. Hale's objections. We have a certain notion of what notions, what writings of books should be, quite naturally. <sup>Through a number of considerations</sup> I have been led to believe that up to a certain time in the past, partly beyond 1820, there were a number of great writers--not all

crucial point

were, but a considerable number of great writers—who wrote not only with great care, but with what today probably could only be called excessive care. This possibility has been considered; it might have been. Whether a given author—say Aristophanes—has to be subsumed under the group of writers with excessive care or only writers with ordinary care is an empirical question. Absolutely. Now if you say that I approached him with a prejudice that he's one of these writers with excessive care, you are right, as a matter of fact. Yes? But that is an objection to me. But it was not—how should I say?—a thoughtless prejudice. I mean, you know, some people have a notion of applying universals....No, but I can tell you the reason for my prejudice. The reason is that I know Aristophanes from Plato. That was one major point. But surely, to begin, everyone is entitled to say that means nothing, you know, the poet simply followed him. But then you get into certain difficulties. To mention only one which occurs to me at the moment, we have here two scenes which occur at the end of the Birds. First, when they come to the sacrifice, to the founding scene, and then when the immigrants come in; in each case there is only one with a proper name. In the first case, an astronomer, and in the second case, a poet. And there is a question: should this be entirely an accident? Does he not indicate something regarding the specialness of astronomers on the one hand and poets on the other? And then I remembered the following fact, that Aristophanes wrote two plays dealing with the persecution of astronomers on the one hand and poets on the other. Is that clear enough? The persecution of astronomers is, of course, the Clouds. Socrates is presented there as an astronomer. Philosophy and astronomy, that is the same thing. And there is another play called Thesmophoriazussae where the poet is persecuted—Euripides. In the one case, the persecution ends with the destruction, at least of the dwelling, of the astronomer; whereas the Thesmophoriazussae ends with the liberation of the poet. The poet can defeat his adversaries—in this case, the women of Athens. The astronomer cannot.

And there are other things. [We cannot be sure until] we interpret every line. But since, you see, the dangers of error, today, at least, are along the now traditional lines of being very...well, I mean..."Kunst" poetry. For this reason, I believe one should at least give a fair chance to show this approach its virtues and vices. And that we can say.

A. This comes out. This approach is most fruitful, I suppose, when there's an apparent contradiction in the poet or philosopher's writing. If one finds a contradiction and is unable to resolve it, then one does assume from the general reading of the poet that either he was....If you read the poet and find that he commits errors elsewhere, you should then assume that this contradiction is the result of sloppiness, whereas if you find him careful in other instances you should think the contradiction has a meaning. Is that...?

S. Yes, sure, that would be one way. But that would apply also to other things. I mean, contradictions are the most shocking irregularities which a writer can commit. But other irregularities are, for example, lack of order. You know, that he jumps from one thing to the other without any visible reason. That may be due to a lack of craftsmanship or thoughtlessness, but it may, of course, also be due to other reasons. One has to question. You find sometimes in writers a remark about how they wrote. For example, in Plato you have a remark which is not from Plato. Plato never says a word in the dialogues, you remember, although you have certain remarks in the Platonic letters in which he speaks in his own name. But here you are confronted today with the difficulty that almost all these letters are now declared to be spurious, especially the second letter which is a short letter, which is very important. But here you can argue on the basis of the present-day assumption that Plato speaks through



the mouth, for example, of Socrates. Socrates says in the Phaedrus that speech and, in particular, a written speech is subject to the principle of logographic necessity. Logographic means speechwriting; so the necessity governing speechwriting. And what is that rule? That just as in a living being, there is no part which is not important for the living being fulfilling its function. —Plato didn't know of the appendix.— In the same way, in a speech everything must be necessary. Now the living being has a function, to live. What is the function of a speech, in the highest sense? I think one can say to make you to think about the important matters.

Therefore, if we assume that Plato acted in agreement with what his own Socrates so emphatically says about speechwriters, we are entitled to believe that in Plato's dialogues every feature, however seemingly trivial, is meaningful. Now the subtle question is where the limits are because not everything can be meaningful. In ordinary life there is all kinds of chance, all the time, but in a work of the highest order chance is reduced to the minimum. But a minimum of chance remains, and therefore there is the possibility of a misguided subtlety, that you seek something that is a matter of tact which as all forms of tact cannot be transmitted in any rules but depends on experience. If I may give you the simplest example of rules which are possible, there is one which I have seen so frequently in Plato as well as other writers and that is that in any enumeration, what is in the center is the most important. Now that is clearest if you have an odd number. If you have an even number, you have to consider the central pair. Now this is never said by Plato. I came across it about twenty years ago for the first time when I read a certain passage in the first book of the Laws where I was completely misguided by the argument; it suggested, that number one is the most important thing. But then I saw, no! The whole thing becomes clear when I assume that the second or third is the most important thing and then it became clear, and some other observations led me to this rule. And then I found, absolutely independently in writings on common rhetoric, forensic rhetoric, that it was a rule of the rhetoricians—you know, for attorneys for defense—you say that you bring into the middle of your defense the weakest, the seamiest side of the man you defend. The reason is very simple. At the beginning, the audience listens and there you speak of all his virtues; you know, that he has studied at the University of Chicago and got his Ph.D. and was Rockefeller Fund and so on and so on and also was running for Congress and whatever you say. And then the little thing, the embezzlement, which you mention in the middle when the audience's attention is flagging and then when you say, as everyone in the room who has ever made a speech knows, "Now I come to my conclusion," which of course means there will still be twenty or twenty-five minutes and then they begin to listen. And so you will also bring, in these twenty-five concluding minutes, you will again bring the virtues in. Now that is one of the rules of forensic rhetoric which I'm sure is obeyed instinctively by the good defense lawyers, but which was elaborated, for example, in Cicero and other writings and those were the rules of tactics, of military tactics. In the front, the brave guys. In the rear, also brave guys. The cowards in the middle. Now you see, weak, cowardly, indefensible things, the dangerous thing, indefensible things. And it may happen that the most important things, theoretically, are the least defensible things, are the least open to vulgar understanding. That's it. But the statements about this kind of writing with exceeding care ...

I have a correction which is not too small, but is in no proportion to the extent to which it was practiced; and it disappeared, practically, with the ~~emergence~~... with society\* //does not exercise any restraint on opinions, on certain opinions, to the extent which a society permits without any harm whatever, legal or non-legal, to the speaker, to saying the things which he believes, the necessity for such writing disappears. I mean, it isn't quite as simple as I said it, because there are still... Very rarely do you find a hundred

\*becoming evermore liberal ... In proportion, to the extent with which a society is

per cent liberal, but still present societies are ninety per cent liberal, there is no question, and in former times societies were ten per cent liberal and therefore there is an enormous difference in the quality of the work.

There are two things: there is first this possibility--which is a mere possibility--as a mere hypothesis must be understood. And there is the second thing which is absolutely empirical. Has this possibility of such a kind of writing ever existed in actual fact and, more particularly, has Aristophanes ... employed it (?) Now, Mr. Cohn, you have a problem, yes?

A: Do you distinguish between an interpretation and a hypothesis?

S: Well, if I use this somewhat simplistic distinction, I would say that interpretation belongs to the process of validating or invalidating. The hypothesis in this particular case would be, there are such writings. The chances a writer of the nineteenth or twentieth century would be of this kind are practically zero. I would not consider this serious unless it were forced upon me, but I would not ... In earlier times, I don't know, and therefore I'm openminded. I mean, I'm openminded a) he may be a writer without any ~~of this kind of thing~~, but I'm openminded. That is what my hypothesis compels me to do. I know that this could have been and I cannot dogmatically exclude it. That's all. I would say on the contrary, the simpler, the more child-like, the more innocent you read and take the surface as ~~a~~ the whole thing, the more clearly will it appear, there is a deeper strain which does not meet the eye at ~~one glance~~ <sup>whether</sup> or not.

Q: You began to touch on this when you spoke about the possibility of subtlety, excessive subtlety. How do you go about distinguishing what is actually ...

S: For example, let us take a simple thing--names. In the first book of the Republic, there is a fellow who presents a certain point of view who is called Thrasymachos. And Thrasymachos means, literally translated, bold in battle. Fits him nicely, doesn't it? There is a guy who presents a similar point of view in the Gorgias. His name is Polos. Literally translated, colt. Also spirited, not very intellectual. So the names in Plato ... And Plato himself plays with them frequently. For example, in the Apology, the accuser is called Meletos. That was a matter of brute historic fact, but Plato uses it to find meaning in the name because that has something to do with the Greek root for "caring," ... ~~meleae~~ ... ~~ek~~, as if he were called Mr. Carer. And Mr. Carer has accused Socrates because he cares so much for Athens. So there are many obvious things. Does this mean that Plato ... The name Anytos, that's the only character who's not identified historically in any way, yes? There are some ~~hypotheses~~ <sup>hypotheses</sup>, but one really cannot understand. The names ~~are~~ <sup>are</sup> ~~so~~ <sup>are</sup> ~~believable~~. Plato has chosen that name. But whether I should go into the question of names and say I must really find some strain of meaning in every name which occurs, I don't see that. I mean, for example, the name Protagoras, and Protagoras translated ... If you translate the name literally, it means something like the first to speak, the first to speak up. Now it so happens that Protagoras in his speech says of himself, "I am the first who speaks up." But if you look at the Gorgias, I don't think you will find anything of this kind regarding the Gorgias. And though there is occasionally a connection between Gorgias and the gorgon, you may have seen it ~~at the time~~, yes? But if I observed something a while ago, I would ~~not~~ take notice of it, but I would not dig and overlook the wood for the trees. That is what I mean. These things, in all matters--in all matters of this nature--there is something like tact by the sense of the reasonable and plausible which comes from experience and which cannot be transmitted by rules. There are certain rules with which one can formulate and which are helpful, but they are never sufficient.



Here's <sup>from PLATO.</sup> another example in translation. There are Platonic dialogues where the first word—of course not in the translation, but in the Greek original—is manifestly meaningful. The first word of the Republic, literally translated, would be "down a vent." Down a vent. Now later on, going down in opposition to going up plays a key role in describing the relation of the philosopher and the city. Going up out of the cave and going down. Meaningful. The first word of the Gorgias is "of war and battle." War and battle. Well. It gives you already something of the spirit of this dialogues. There are other dialogues in which nothing of this kind is visible. Why should I stop at the first word, and then who knows? Plato did it where it was convenient and did not do it when it wasn't. That was the way I started to read the Banquet first, which begins with very ... pay words ... how shall I say? ... what is the word?

A: A code.

S: Yes, I see, I see. But then later on, exactly by not worrying about it, I came across something which made this beginning intelligible. There was one speech ...

A: The speech of Zeus in ...

S: O, the speech of Zeus, yes, which was the beginning of that work. No other speech of Zeus in Plato anywhere begins that way. That is what I mean. I mean, it is really a rule of thumb and not more. And the main point is, as I always say, be good. I mean, don't sin, yes? Be good. Read carefully and think carefully. That is all. But on the other hand, one must beware of a certain kind of levity which means that if one doesn't see any meaning at one's reading, that there may not be more meaning than has met the eye. That is simple.

I have not spoken of an entirely different kind of complication; namely, there are writers of extreme care who have something entirely different in mind than the old writers and where it is, I believe, impossible to discover this kind of meaning except if they've accidentally spoken about it. I will mention it, lest I whet an appetite and do not satisfy it. I mean, I have only one example ready at hand. In Goethe's Variations Faust, there is a famous scene, the witches. <sup>super</sup>It plays a certain role there in the context of the plot and so that was what I understood. Then I read, in a letter which Vardi wrote, <sup>found</sup> by sheer accident, in which he says that is a description of a decaying society shortly before revolution. I do not quote literally. I must confess this idea would never have occurred to me. And why? Now what Vardi did was Goethe this: Vardi tried to convey the sensible expression, the impression on the senses of two such entirely different things as the witches are on the one hand and a very sophisticated decaying society like the French nobility prior to the French Revolution. In other words, you see, the common thing was an aesthetic impression, strictly speaking, meaning for the senses, whereas in this kind of literature I have in mind it is never merely the sensual especially when there are some clear indications in speech. So one would have had to call the one logical, derived from speech, and the other aesthetic. ~~And it sticks.~~ And I believe, therefore, what the better critics today consider exclusively is this kind of sensual, aesthetic element—you know?—which indeed does not convey a clear meaning.

To mention only one example among thousands which occur to me, when you take an author like Thucydides, everyone who has read Thucydides, even in a translation, knows that this is a deep thinker—very dense and thought out. But what people overlook and which I think obstructs the deeper understanding of Thucydides is a certain kind of playfulness which Thucydides has. One example: the first two speeches which occur in the first book. The first, justice--thikastis; the second, with the word necessary. Well, of course, one must think a bit and then—on the basis of Thucydides—  
 begins with the word begins

and then one will know that these are two very different, possibly conflicting, considerations. Justice and necessity. Now the beauty, as far as I understand it, is this: that the appeal to justice, by beginning the work with justice is made by the less just people and the appeal to necessity—or, if you please, expediency—is made by the people who were less unjust. That is not implausible: We all have seen people who talk more about justice precisely because they care less about it and vice versa. This is only one of many examples.

But the general discussion is not very *helpful* except if to make clear in the most general terms what in itself is a mere possibility. But proof of their quality cannot be given by a discussion of the possibility. What can be created by a discussion is a certain plausibility; namely, if we reflect on the fact that *derivate* our present-day notions of books and reading and writing are naturally derived from a liberal society and the further observation that up to a certain point, but surely not prior to 1640, there never was a liberal society. Athens was of course not liberal. I mean, there was no freedom of opinion as the trial of Socrates shows. Regardless of whether Socrates was condemned justly or unjustly, he was condemned on the basis of opinion. The law was clear: If Socrates had held certain opinions, this alone made him guilty of capital punishment. That is, I think, a simple difference between the liberal and the nonliberal society; whether opinions as *opinions* are regarded as crimes or not. And I think the first example would be the *Civil Restoration* English war under Cromwell, with qualifications even there. And, of course, after the *Restoration* and at more or less the same time, the same development in the low countries. These are the first examples. The law practice could be very liberal and it was so in certain cases like Athens and in certain times in Rome, in certain epochs, but there were never a legal basis for them. And don't underestimate it. I mean, that is one of the follies of the sociological approach, that they underestimate the importance of law. An honest man will always consider what the law says even if the law is not very strictly enforced. And we have to consider that this simple fact, along which is the so-called sociology of knowledge, namely that liberal societies strictly speaking are a very recent phenomenon. Much too liberal. ?

Liberalism in the sense in which I diffused it now—liberalism has <sup>7</sup>many meanings, as you all know—of course is not identical with democracy and often democracy is not necessarily liberal and *monarchy* ~~democracy~~, for example, is not necessarily illiberal. In quite a few respects, the French Republic, the Third Republic, was more liberal than the Anglo Saxon countries and at the same time the Germany of *After Bismarck* was amazingly liberal; in no way democratic, but amazingly liberal. They are long questions.

Is there any point you would like to take up before we turn to the Wasps?

(End of first side of reel.)

... which hardly anyone can claim regarding anyone in order to be sure that this is a man who writes with excessive care. If you have a sufficient number of examples of that, you are bound to have the prejudice as if we do it all the time. It still would need an examination. Surely. But I can only say the danger today is not that of unnecessary subtlety, but that of indefensible unsubtlety. Yes?

A: I mean, this isn't <sup>really</sup> merely a philosophy question. There is a problem regarding Shakespeare when one sometimes finds something of a great magnitude and at other times there seems to be strong evidence of either carelessness or indifference about the published text of the work.



S: Well, that is of course a terrible situation. If you don't have a good text, then you can't be certain that you have Shakespeare. That's a great difficulty. In the case of Plato, we are in a wonderful position because the text is really very good. Very good. I mean, there are certain dark passages, possibly corrupt, but on the whole it's very good. In Aritophanes there's a great difficulty on this ground alone. I never mentioned that. The ascription of individual speeches to different characters is largely hypothetical. I take for granted that the common ascription is sound because otherwise we would come into a difficult question. It makes an impression in many cases where it was important to me. I've considered that and I think, on the whole, it is correct. But that is not clear in the manuscripts. That is a great problem. Surely. That can exist anywhere. Yes?

A: Am I right in thinking that your opinion as to why the reason for this excessive subtlety stems only from the legal prohibitions against holding certain opinions or were you ...

S: That is the most practical and the most, shall we say, unsubtle reason for it, yes? I wrote once some essays with the title, Persecution and the Art of Writing. I indicated that. That's clear. But you see, the thing ... If you go a little bit deeper, it turns around as follows: Let us assume that a writer knows certain opinions cannot be questioned without committing a crime. Yes? It doesn't have to be a legal crime. It doesn't have to be a capital crime. But social ostricizing, to be regarded as a dirty fellow, is not something which a proud man would like to have, yes? I mean, in other words, if there are forbidden opinions or whatever you call it, that comes up for all men, for all thinking ones, who do not agree, who think that these forbidden opinions are wrong (as stated). Yes? Good.

Here is the crossing of the roads. A man may say, well, I'm going to prepare a society in which no opinions will be forbidden. A liberal society. Then this would be a kind of temporary concession to the prejudices of a benighted, illiberal society. A simple example of that would be Thomas Hobbes who practiced a certain amount of concealment but quite clearly with the prospect: a hundred years from now this kingdom of darkness as he called it will have been dissolved. Yes? The alternative, which is more interesting, is this: that the man says you will never have liberal societies. If you destroy these particular opinions—say about Zeus and adorations to Hera and Chronos and so forth—you will get another set of opinions which may be a bit better, which may also be considerably worse for all you know. So there will always be opinions which are not quite reasonable. Now, in such a case, it becomes a matter of responsibility and not of mere fear to be careful. Is this clear? Both exist. I mean, the most simple, of course, is the case of what they called in czarist Russia Aesopic language. I mean, taken from the fables of Aesop, yes? How do you pronounce it? Aesop? You speak—in other words, you tell stories about some nice little animals—rats and squirrels—but you really mean the prime minister and so on. Yes? Good. That's simple.

And they also call it, as I've seen so from a communist writer, very funny when they speak of olden times they call it the language of slaves. Yes? But what they do now that ... By the way, to read such a book as Pasternak's Dr. Zhivago is not uninteresting from this point of view although it is extremely simple. You know, his complete silence about the Stalin era which has a simple explanation that it is too terrible to say, is beyond speech, has of course also the implication that he couldn't dare to write about it. Yes? Good. That's simple. In other words, men merely bow to the bayonets. That's clear. And nothing else. But the much more interesting place is where the bayonets are rather remote and a broader view is behind it. I mean, more exciting. Good. I mean, for example, the question of

Shakespeare's infinite question--that is only the smallest part of it. I mean, the fact that ... Yes.

A: I meant that the scholars often quote his indifference, because other poets produce very excellent texts of their poems (~~something indistinct~~).

*in that century (?)*

S: I don't know. Since one knows so very little about Shakespeare's external life, all kinds of things might be possible. Therefore, I don't believe Shakespeare was careless regarding any verse he wrote from the little bit I understood, but he might have been compelled by things beyond his control ... He might be unable, ~~unhappy~~ to *take care* about the printing. I don't know why. Good.

Well, for a coherent discussion of the Wasps, we don't have the time. I <sup>would</sup> make a few general remarks which we will take up next time when we meet again. Now, as I said at the beginning, fairly and politely taking issue in this play, the point which <sup>you</sup> stated very well, that Philocleon, the father of Bdelycleon, the lover of condemnation. I mean, he is not only a lover of law courts; he loves to condemn. And in the scene with the dog, ~~in support of~~ what the son achieves by treachery, as ~~you~~ <sup>you</sup> called it, an acquittal. He likes to condemn. So what does ~~this mean?~~ *is this kind of man? [?]* That is a ~~trite~~ question. And ~~this~~ is not an unnecessary question or improper question, ~~as~~ indicated by the fact that it is answered in the play more than once. Why does he love to condemn? I mean, that is first a character trait. He's an ill-tempered man, yes? Diskolos. Ill-temper. Sure, an old, ill-tempered fellow. The term is sometimes applied to another dicast, but that is not his special madness. Do you remember what? I mean, what is the special reason, the reason peculiar to Philocleon why he loves to condemn?

A: Delphic oracle.

S: The Delphic oracle. So, strictly speaking, he does not love to condemn; he feels morally obliged to condemn, because of the Delphian oracle. Isn't it interesting that Socrates, too, traces his mission--an entirely different mission--to the Delphic oracle. You see for what different purposes that oracle could be used. So the Delphic oracle. And that means ultimately the gods. The gods. That is one very important consideration. *have such an influence.*

Now, the other point is this, which is connected. We have in a way answered the question, what is the difference between the other jurymen and the hero jurymen. The other fellows are simply fellows. They don't have such kinds of religious obligations. They don't feel that obligation to condemn. There is another difference which is equally important although much more external between the hero jurymen and the mass of the jurymen. I grant that there are passages which obscure it, but the plot of ~~the whole play~~ *envelopes* with perfect clarity. What is the motivation of the poor fellows--these old guys who go to the jury, to the court, and to ...

A: Money?

S: Money. And why do they do that, may I ask? Why are they so interested in money?

A: To eat?

S: They are poor. Poor. And there is a long scene between <sup>a</sup> the father jurymen and his boy which brings it out that whether they have tonight, I don't say a steak but a humble meal, depends on whether there was a sitting of the jury. What about the hero?



A: He has an affluent son, at least.

S: Surely. On the contrary, he has an obviously wealthy son. There are many slaves around. Two come up visibly, but there are others. They are wealthy people and the son says to his father, don't go to the law courts anymore, you can feast at home every day. That is elaborated with considerable obscenities on what kind of pleasures he can get for nothing if he doesn't go. And so they are <sup>not</sup> ~~that~~. And that only underlines the fact that the motivation of the hero is entirely different from that of the poor people and the poor people are the ones who are easily convinced, who are, from a certain moment on, after the son has made his speech, fully on the side of the son. You know? They are nice people. They are only ... You can't blame them. They need that money. I mean, that is so as if you would ... Aristophanes does not ~~wish~~ <sup>suggest</sup> the abolition of social security or the progress <sup>of</sup> income tax, if I may suggest a present day equivalent? No, no. In this sense, the play is not political at all. No, no. Well. Good. Yes?

A: How much of this opinion of the dicasts is because they perhaps held that they held a special place in the polis; they weren't ordinary citizens, they were special citizens getting their military pension in fact.

S: Yes, that is an improvement which this suggests, that only former G.I.s should get, ~~the common maturity~~, you remember?  
*should become jary men.*

Q: ~~What~~ is the point that Weber makes at one point?  
*That*

S: Which Weber?

A: Max Weber.

S: What does he make?

A: About the ... That this, the dicast system, was a system to split up the spoils, the loot, the booty, the land grants and etc. that Athens collected overseas and-at home-~~perhaps~~. *through war accounts.*

S: However important it may be, Aristophanes does not criticize them. On the contrary, he makes even the very demagogic suggestion that much more of that booty should be divided up among the citizen body.

A: They reacted immediately and were immediately won by this argument.

*from the Athenians [?]*  
S: Yes, yes, sure. That is a political trait. But Bdelycleon has no influence, of course, on what will be done with the booty/~~in an~~ empire, but he has influence only on his father and so the action is this: first, that Bdelycleon has to bring the citizen body, or the cream of the citizen body, on his side. And that he does by showing them, you get only these few bucks and the real stuff goes to the demagogues. Yes! That's a simple demagogic trick on his side. But, after the father has been convinced no longer to go to the law courts, then that's the second half of the play. That is as important as what's happened up to this point. Now in other words, what he has to find, after having persuaded his father that he may no longer go to the law courts, he has to find substitutes for that. Yes? You know, William James had what he called a substitutes for war. He had to find a substitute for condemning. Now there are three substitutes altogether, I believe. Three things which one had to consider. The first, which <sup>you</sup> he reported very clearly, the mock law court at home, on the dogs. Yes? But obviously that is not sufficient. Although he has infinite

conveniences at home--again, I cannot say what these conveniences are, because they are not quite decent, but all kinds of things which he can do while sitting in judgment on the dogs which he could not do when sitting in judgment on citizens in the public law courts, but your imagination may very well supply the details. And then that is one. But that is not sufficient, because then the whole thing would be settled. Two more substitutes come up. What's the second substitute? *problem*

A: Eating.

S: Yes, feasting, but more important, in polite society. And that is important because here you raise the question, is Bdelycleon--that's the son--not also in a way blameable, not to say a fool. And that seems to be the case. He tries to make a nice gentlemen out of his father and that ends in complete failure. I mean, he does certain things which I think we all would find exaggerated: that he buys for him the most elegant cashmere coats, in this case I think it was some silk and stuff from Persia. Yes? But the main point, how do you converse in nice society? And here, of course, the father has the crudest notions and the son tells him you have to be present at this--now what would it be?--at this race, horseraces, for example, or other ... I don't know about boxing matches, would belong to a proper theme of ... No. But, for example, Olympia. And what is going on in the Rose Bowl in California would, I'm sure, belong to polite society conversation today. And then also stories of poets, you know? So. But the father is a complete flop and he behaves like a rude rustic and gets completely drunk and drags out a flute-girl and mayhem, you know? And associated with battery. And as you rightly say, this condemn man becomes now the object of criminal charges against him. In this part, there is a clear failure of Bdelycleon, of the son. A clear failure. But you must not forget, it might still be better that this man is fined than that he condemns other people to death. But to some extent, it is still a failure. To transform this fellow into a nice gentleman is hopeless.

But that's not the end. Not the end. There are three such substitutes. What's the third one? This dancing scene. The dancing scene. I must say I didn't know there were ...? I thought that you were kidding, because I must say the general impression is it ends with a failure, but that's not true. The third is a success as is shown by the fact that everyone--for example, the dicasts, the jurymen, the courts, who speak for the <sup>people</sup> courts--are pleased with him. It is not an end like the Clouds, you know, where it is a clear defeat for the hero, Socrates, of course--the other one was Strepsiades. But here it is not so. At the end we have reconciliation. What is a dance? I mean, one would have to understand the dances. Philocleon's bad temper, which leads to a breakdown when he seeks a substitute in polite society, leads to success, ~~because this is~~ the third substitute. Forgive my ~~background on all that to get to~~ my point. What is that? What is ~~that~~? What's it about, meaning the most general terms? It is obviously a parody. The names are mentioned of the people whom he is parodying. What has parody to do with the temper of Philocleon? What is his temper? And what is parody? What is his temper, Miss Hill, you know it? *that dances?*

A: He is bad-tempered.

S: Yes, bad-tempered and malicious. Is there a connection between parody and malice? I would say that a man of perfect, sweet temper would never write a parody. Now let us look at what the poet does. One great part of the comedies are parodies, especially of tragedy, but also of other things... *the dances, and so forth* For example, *here* Here is a use, that is a mitigated use of malice which is universally pleasing and which is a counter-poison to this viciousness which is most hateful in the case of viciousness *poison*



*follow*  
 of citizen against brother citizen although, as you rightly say, it finds good use in war. You know. ~~To use the cities against one's enemies~~, that was okay, but you can't have war all the time. There must be some outlet for that ~~enmity~~. One form which is not negligible is comedy which ~~gives an opportunity~~ *for its use* ~~and that~~ *is* the malicious wit of comedy is in effect, ~~a substitute or cure for~~ waspishness misplaced. Therefore, I think it is really a vindication of the poet himself. You remember, there are quite a few allusions to what happened to him in the previous comedy, in the Clouds, you know, and this kind of thing, and there is also a passage in which—we may read that next time—in which it appears that Bdelycleon, the son who binds his father, is the comic poet. But a comic poet who has lost. Aristophanes is distinguished from that inference as a comic poet who has learned that the polite jokes, the subtle jokes, cannot fulfill the practical function of counter-acting the waspishness. I will try to develop this more fully next time. But the ending is a happy ending here. One must emphasize—especially for me—I have considered that before. Bdelycleon surely makes a mistake, but Bdelycleon has too high expectations from such a waspish man. But what Bdelycleon does not do, Aristophanes does. He shows a way out which is ~~exceptional~~ *helpful*.

*But that was not what you said earlier*

Q: ~~Are you going to say anything~~ about the most important part being in the middle?

*if one sees it mechanically*  
 S: Yes, yes. Well, this was also here, but never ~~to~~ *do* that mechanically. ~~the labor is very great that one doesn't make any...~~ For example, last time, in the Birds, of the three immigrants, the center one was a poet and if you count properly, among those who came to the founding scene I believe you will also find that the astronomer was the middle one although that is not immediately visible. Yes, that is so. But I would say this: the question is not so much to see that something is in the middle, yes? That is a matter of simple counting.

A: No, but I mean, now as opposed to the beginning and the very end.

S: Yes, I mean, but the point is, why is it in the middle? You see, it is the most important, but from what point of view most important? Simple, or is it the most important only in this particular context? That is the question which must be settled afterward, must be decided.

Well, we will leave it at this today. And next time, Miss ~~Shills~~ *Hill*, we will hear your paper and then Mr. Johnson, yes? No, Mr. Strickland.

... and I believe the key remark which you made is this: that the problem of justice as it appears in the Clouds is that Socrates is not, strictly speaking, unjust but impious. Therefore, the question is, what is the relation between justice and piety? Now it is shown that Socrates is not defeated because of his impiety. Strepsiades is not really shocked by Socrates impiety for one moment, as we have seen, but he becomes shocked only when he sees what this means to the family, that beating the father, beating the parents--incest--becomes permitted on the basis of Socrates. In other words, this is the key phenomenon and you interpret this to mean that the family is conventional and acquires its status, its sacredness, only by virtue of these humanly invented gods. Yes, I think there is much to be said for that. You want to bring us up to date. Yes. Would you like to bring up another point?

A: I think this is a crucial point.

S: Yes, sure it is a crucial point, but you really don't ... Now, if we want this class to have any termination--we are obliged to terminate it some time, obliged by law--we must begin next time with our study of Plato and therefore we must discuss the Wasps today which we have not really discussed.

But one thing I would like to do. Can you state now, Mr. Hale, succinctly and clearly, what your criticism is of what Miss ~~Sallie~~ just said?

A: That the scenes in the plays which supposedly support this interpretation may also be explained (as time and again concluded) for other reasons and therefore I don't want to say that her interpretation is wrong, but if there are other reasons for the inclusion of the evidence for this interpretation, it cannot be said definitely and clearly that this must have been what Aristophanes intended.

S: That is an excellent argument, but at the same time an if-y argument, because you would have to show what these alternatives are which account for the phenomenon.

A: This is true. You have to have <sup>very succinct</sup> ~~certain~~ statements and certainly I don't want to involve the class in any long discussion of my reasons, but my reasons ...

S: Yes, all right, all right. We agree. It's a pity last time that we really cleared the ~~board~~ deck entirely <sup>for you</sup>, but maybe you can bring up some of these points later when we turn in connection with the Wasps. Did you want to add another point?

(Miss S.): Well, I think another point that I wanted to make was that just as a choice only between the Just and Unjust Speech, he doesn't seem to suggest that there can be any alternative to this sort of animal-like existence of the Unjust Speech and conventionality. ~~We~~ <sup>Does he see?</sup> no basis anywhere else?

S: That is a very serious and <sup>interesting</sup> ~~interesting~~ question and I would say if we go on from what you said now it would mean that Aristophanes' ~~sex-all-directions~~ <sup>generalize from the Clouds</sup> is a reduction of human life to the life of the brutes. I say brutes because the Greek word zoo, which means animal, includes man. I mean, animal is the gender which can be split into two parts; animals which possess speech and are men, and animals which do not possess speech that are the dumb animals, as we say. And therefore, in other words, Aristophanes suggests a kind of return to brutishness. This interpretation, which is not quite ~~terrible~~, because a man of the intelligence of Aristophanes and of a certain pride of his own craft cannot have

overall suggestion

tenable



meant this so literally, but there is this element in it.

And that is exactly the suggestion which Plato makes in the Banquet. What Plato suggests in the Banquet is this: he knows of course that Aristophanes believed in wisdom and therefore it serves him right if one leaves it at that and that is what Plato consents. For Aristophanes, eros is--as presented by Plato--eros is strictly horizontal, on the same level, not vertical. But the Platonic notion of eros is that it is striving for the highest transcending level. Aristophanes understands it crudely, horizontally. Another way of putting it is that in the Assembly of Women, Aristophanes introduces communism and equality of the sexes. As a matter of fact, there is a preponderance of the female sex, roughly as Plato suggests in the Republic. But one thing is missing which is so crucial in Plato and is completely absent from Aristophanes, which is so crucial in Plato's Republic and completely absent from the Assembly of Women. The third big institution: the rule of philosophy. And that of course is related to whether eros is understood horizontally or vertically. Vertically means denial of noia, of mind, and therefore it's a denial of the rule of philosophy. And on this basis, Plato has built his comical presentation of Aristophanes in the Banquet where the whole effort of eros turns to the pre-mind state, simple union of the two separated parts, say males and females, and complete immersion to that and that, of course, means there is no longer any object of the mind where vis-à-vis: here's this thinking being and there the object of the thinking being. That is the object of Plato. But Plato's objection goes of course much deeper as he indicates in the Banquet by having Aristophanes change his place with the physician Eryximachos, who is a direct pupil of the famous pre-Socratic philosopher Empedocles. The pre-Socratic philosophy--that is what Plato suggests--does not understand mind in its specific character. And therefore, it must reduce mind, in one way or the other, to non-mind. And therefore, in application to human things, it must reduce men to brutes which, of course, is not limited to pre-Socratic philosophy. It comes up again in modern materialistic and positivistic thought where the same occurs again technically perhaps more perfect, but I believe also less clear. That is surely the point. But, as I say, that is not an interpretation of Aristophanes. It is really a criticism of Aristophanes, because Aristophanes surely meant that there is something like wisdom and which is peculiar to men and not to the brutes and this is a distinction, an honor of man to have. Even the polis is, after all, a human thing and not a brutish thing. Yes?

A: How did he indicate this concern for wisdom?

S: Well, read the parabasis, what he says in place of himself. But from this point of view, the fact that the birds, for example, play such a role ... You know, it could be used with a certain malice by Plato as a proof of his interpretation of his caricature of Aristophanes. It could be used in this way, yes? I mean, the mere fact that at the end of the Banquet the only beings who are awake and can talk, the only really thinking beings are Socrates and Agathon and Aristophanes, although he dozed off a little bit earlier in the banquet. This much. Now what other point did you want to make?

A: Exactly what standard is he judging the old Athenian polity by?

S: Well, this question must be answerable on the basis of what we have read. Why does he prefer the old polity to the present ~~actual~~ democracy? Is there anyone among you who has an answer? It's not a difficult question. Well, all the excesses which he presents, yes? For example, this jury system and this preponderance of the rabble of Athens, of the city of Athens, as compared with the healthy rural population. This ~~simple~~ ... I mean, what was common to the conservatives, if we

may use that term. I mean the point of view which you'll find in Plato, in Aristotle, in Thucydides and everywhere. The same people who were afraid of the madness--that was the term which they used--of the democracy where everyone had <sup>in principle</sup> the same say. I mean, the simple thing that the lot can make anyone a jurymen and even can give him one of the highest positions. There were certain restrictions only on generalship and on the treasury. I mean, because these seem to be imprudent, to make a man a general who was a notorious coward or had no other distinction or to make a man a treasurer who was a notorious embezzler. So there... But otherwise the restrictions were very small. You had to prove that you had paid your taxes--or the equivalent of taxes--that you had done your military service if you were called upon to do it and, an interesting other point, whether you took proper care of the graves of your parents. That was also a point used in the dokimathia as they called it, a kind of appraisal preceding electoral vote. The others who fulfilled these minimal conditions, their names were in the urn and could be selected. The good old times ... I mean, the point is this: whether these times were so good is a long question. And there is also a question whether each of these men who speaks about them was utterly convinced of that. The general idea was a brake, you know, to apply a brake, in practical terms it means is there not a body of laws--that was not so clearly defined as it might be today--a body of laws which cannot be overridden by psēphisma, by a mere vote on a measure of today. For example, take the case of Socrates--the only political action of Socrates--the question of the generals at the battle of Arginusai. They had not picked up the corpses. It was <sup>religious</sup> not a matter of the living sailors, but of the corpses. It was a <sup>religious</sup> crime, because they had to be brought home to Ithaca for proper burial. That had something to do with ancestor worship and this kind of thing. There was a trial. And in the trial certain legal safeguards--namely, that the decision must not be made on the same day and I forgot the other points--there was a law and it was simply disregarded. And Socrates protested, of course without success. Now, in other words, while in a way the assembly was sovereign, it was still understood there are certain laws which one cannot change. They don't have the simple distinction which we have between the Constitution and ordinary law, but something like it, is this.

Now the old-fashioned people were very anxious to limit the legislative power of the assembly. In other words, the fundamental distinction between a vote on common measures which had to remain within the limits of the law and simple change--you know what I mean, outright change of the law. That was a practical, very important point, but it went also together with other issues: for example, imperialism and exploitation by the leading city, namely Athens, of her allies or an anti-imperialistic policy and therefore one which would have avoided the prevention of war and would have regarded the cooperation of Athens and Sparta against a foreign enemy as a most important consideration. In that way, I think that the extreme democracy at home which went together with an imperialistic policy--you see, that is very different from what the line-up generally, in modern times, is--the extreme democracy was an extremely imperialistic policy, an irrational policy. That was the view of these men. I mean, Thucydides, who is particularly fair and restrained in his judgment and who admits that Pericles himself, if he had lived long enough, would have <sup>seen</sup> the situation but Pericles was dead at that time. And the successors to Pericles <sup>20 years ago</sup> stood on the moderate policy of Pericles. But the objection to Pericles was this: that Pericles, by destroying, by bringing in the extreme democracy, made moderation entirely dependent on the accident that the key man happened to be a moderate man. The institutional brakes he had abandoned and therefore the objection to Pericles.

parallels.

You have a contemporary? Tell us, for example, the issue which was raised by the Supreme Court packing. ~~Evidently you don't know.~~ Anything altering the brakes on two decades ago.



the ~~will~~ <sup>the practical</sup> of the majority of the moment. That was a powerful issue and I think every sensible man ~~would be~~ <sup>would</sup> be on the same side. There can perhaps be made a case for Pericles in the beginning situation, but that is a difficult thing. The prima facie case was new to these people. I mean, we must not follow present-day inclinations and all kinds of wrong analogies to think that this was mere prejudice. I think one can say that all the great writers whom we have, to the extent ... The word democracy can mean all kinds of things, the word is not decisive, but their general notion of what is sensible and not the over-n<sup>o</sup>tion does not differ so that the practical proposals of a man like Thucydides, men like Plato and Aristotle and Aristophanes would not have differed to any degree. The difference is not there. The difference is in the principles ~~of Pericles and there~~ <sup>as what they agreed</sup> was a crude political term, that was the ancestral polity, something which existed or was thought to have existed. There was politically no great difference prior to the emergence of the extreme democracy. And then they were <sup>all</sup> united. So that does not create a great difficulty. I mean, of course, one has to assemble the material and go to a biographic point, but I think the ~~result~~ <sup>result</sup> is fairly obvious when we begin. And of course there was a connection between this constitutional change and a certain innovation in manners. I mean, say, the old-fashioned respect for older people, respect for parents, respect for tradition, declined, naturally.

Then there was a connection between this loosening of the old morality and ~~feeling~~ <sup>+ theories, of</sup> ~~what is vulgarly called the Sophist~~. But here a difficulty arises because here not all so-called Sophists were <sup>unscrupulous</sup> men. And, secondly, that contained also a possible remedy for the ~~term~~ <sup>term</sup>. Therefore, the ambiguity of people like Aristophanes and also like Plato. Plato also knew a restoration was impossible. He has indicated that as clearly as he could at the beginning of the Republic by the personnel of the Republic. The personnel of the Republic, I mean the characters there apart from Socrates, to the extent that they are not foreigners simply like Thrasymachos and so on. Some of them, at any rate, were victims of the restoration--of the reaction to the restoration which was tried by Critias and the Thirty Tyrants. And Plato himself says in the seventh letter he had to begin <sup>with</sup> as a very young boy of twenty a certain sympathy for this restoration attempt, but after a very short time the old democracy which he loathed appeared to him like the Golden Age--look what an expression--the Golden Age, compared with the beastliness of his own relatives, such people like Critias and Charmides, the tyrants. So Plato ~~didn't know the rules~~ <sup>had no delusions</sup>. The only remedy they could find was that this glibness of tongue could be put to the right use and then it would be even ~~more~~ higher than the ancestral polity.

Q: Then is Aristophanes suggesting ...

S: Something of this kind. The Aristophanean comedy is, of course, novelty. And this pride, this novelty of which I spoke. But this novelty is, at the same time, an attempt to preserve, in a different medium and therefore in an altered form, the old, to defend the polis. Surely. There is no question that he knew. But the simple terms in which the problem is stated frequently does not do justice to what Aristophanes wants. Aristophanes is compelled by the fact that he writes comedies to present everything, and particularly this issue, in gross and crude terms. Do you want to say something at this point, Mr. Hale?

A: I pass.

S: Good. Now, is there any other point you wanted to bring up?

(Miss Sills): I'm still not clear on what justice is, according to Aristophanes. Is it the old morality?

S: Yes, the question is an excellent question, but I think you will seek in vain, as far as I can see, a definition of justice by Aristophanes. But can we not reconstruct such a definition by what we have read in other authors? You see, in authors like Plato and Aristotle, there are letters, letters of the highest refinement, and also a letter of the greatest crudity. Now, one has to look primarily for these crude notions of justice. Now what is the most primitive definition of justice which occurs in Plato or Aristophanes and which, on reflection, proves to be untenable, but which is good enough for many practical purposes.

A: Return to <sup>deposits.</sup> ~~philosophy~~ 3

S: That is already too subtle. There is a much cruder one.

A: Give to each his due.

S: That's still more ... That's the same that Mr. says, only yours is more sophisticated. No.

A: Obeying the law.

S: True, to obey the law. The opposite of justice is violence or maybe fraud. But justice is meant for the man who is law abiding. That's clear. And that he surely means. But then there comes up this little question: Is everything which was passed by, every measure passed by the assembly in a moment of hysteria brought about by hysterical speeches of demagogues, is this a law? No, of course not! A law is a reorientation which has lasted for a long time, the old law. And that, of course, includes all such things as the crude prohibition against theft, robbery, murder, and so on and so on. What we still understand. I mean, in our ordinary speech about these matters, we understand a square versus a crook. That is the first orientation we have in the name of justice. And then, naturally, we know that sometimes a crook is not as crookish as he seems to be and a square is not as square as he seems to be and therefore we have to ascend and there the difficulties arise. That is, of course, what Aristophanes himself does to some extent.

And then if we take this beautiful traditional definition of justice to which we refer, justice is a constant perpetual bill to give everyone what is his due. Surely, but who determines what is a man's due? The law! Absolutely. But the law by nature, not by mere human arbitrariness, and there the difficulties arise. But even there we have certain notions, crude notions. For example, one rule which is not a matter of mere positive law; first come, first served, which has a certain legitimacy without any question, but he who cares sufficiently to get up at six in the morning or five in the morning to be the first in line, whereas the other one is lazing in bed and comes at eleven, the later one cannot complain when the things are distributed, you know? That is one rule. Another rule of this kind which is more important perhaps is that the wiser, the more responsible, and the more public spirited, should have a greater say in the formulating than the foolish and irresponsible and purely selfish. And so, all kinds of things.

But a poet is under no obligation to write a <sup>treatise</sup> ~~thesis~~ on these. Plato and Aristotle were, to different degrees. Aristotle certainly did it very well in the fifth book of the Ethics, where he has <sup>long treatise</sup> ~~long~~ in which all these things which are rooted are cleared up. If they are properly commented, they are really exhaustive, you will see. But a comment would be necessary, indeed. Not that Aristotle omitted anything, but he is very ~~brief~~ and one has to ... And then there are certain things which simply have to be left by their very nature to mere arbitrariness. The most

\* may be (?) an unjust matter, and therefore one would have to go to the question what is due to a man



simple example is, of course, right and left driving. Is it not by nature more just to drive right than to drive left. Yes? But if you take such a question like property which is, I think, really the central problem, because that murder is to be forbidden is, I think, not a controversial issue in any society, you know? I think there is not any movement in this country for the abolition, I don't say of capital punishment, but of punishment for murder. Nor, for that matter, theft and robbery or embezzlement. But the question is, of course, the property; the ways in which property is distributed in society as a whole which depends on our law. You know that there are legal ways of confiscating property, of robbing people, and the old argument was, what's the difference whether a highway-robber takes away your money or the polis in the form of a law? Isn't that also robbery? Great questions. Really great questions, because it is clear that the polis, if it is to be respected, cannot behave like a robber. So they must have a good ground for that. *somehow on*

Now the good ground usually given is, of course, the public good. But is it not a central part of the public good to consider the property rights, the pre-existing property rights, the pre-existing inequalities, or ~~does there exist an inequality~~ *is per- haps this* the root of all injustice as Rousseau, for example, said and the Socialists ~~often~~ *and desirab* ~~have said?~~ That ~~places~~ *is per-* a very important question, a really fundamental question: Is an absolutely egalitarian society in this respect possible ~~on this side of it~~ *and desirab* or is it not? If inequality is necessary, then of course ~~one~~ *is per-* could rightly say, *hops this* why should the injustice that Mr. X has inherited a million and Mr. Y has inherited *all* zero be changed *is per-* in the time that for once Mr. Y gets the million and Mr. X gets *hops this* nothing? It is this turmoil, this upheaval, in any proportion, apart from private greed and envy and should one not leave it at the ordinary traditional ways of inequality and so on? These are of course the fundamental questions regarding justice but that does not mean ... And I'm sure, I have no doubt, that Aristophanes was, on the whole, in favor of a very "conservative" policy. I mean, in other words, that there are certain ways of acquiring property which are regarded as just—by purchasing and so on—must be protected; others, which are unjust, simply taken away by force or fraud, are forbidden and must be punished and these elementary things he accepted without any doubt. That there are difficulties there, deeper difficulties, I'm sure he was aware of, just as Plato was aware of, and he would have admitted, I think, that there is a certain point where a kind of crude convention is the only way out. The alternative would be ~~unstable~~ *activity* destructive of all stability. But one must emphasize whether it is a crude convention or whether it is ~~absolute~~ *is per-* a law of reason because if it is ~~absolute~~ *hops this* law of reason, no exceptions can be permitted under any circumstances. If it is a crude rule of thumb, then it can be modified if circumstances arise where higher considerations demand such a modification. That I think is the issue. *is per-*

So the people who speak so much of the conventional character are not necessarily enemies of civilization, but they may only mean that all rules or actions of which laws are the most important part, whether any rules of action can be strictly speaking universally valid, and whether the nature of human affairs is incompatible with any universally valid rules of action. And the standard was for the ancient thinkers always nature, the nature of man, the nature of human associations. That all gives some broadly ... for broad purposes sufficiently clear directive. Not for any individual case, because every individual case is different from the other and what you can do for the individual case is to have crude decisions. In the majority of cases this is the best thing, but there was always admitted the necessity of a kind of a translegal redress called equity or department powers or what have you if such things existed and also such things as emergency powers. You know, in emergency situations requiring them. This, I think, is the political meaning of that. I mean, *is per-*

\*march;

the pardoning

you have good examples today. For example, the issue regarding birth control where you have on the one hand the proposition, which is over-stated for the sake of clarity, that is simply bad and the others who say that it depends on circumstances and so on. Yes?

Q: Would you say then that Aristophanes suggests that the prohibition against incest, the sacredness of the family, is illicit for a reason, but that it has to be backed up by something sacred or else it will be broken?

S: Yes, sure. I mean, this extreme example and this extremely shocking example of incest is of course ... That is exactly the point. We cannot perhaps easily visualize a situation in which incest can be defensible, but we can only ... the simplest way of arguing is that we take the most sacred thing—the best in the world, the Bible—and we see that according to this account, there were situations where incest was absolutely necessary for the survival of the human race. We cannot know what would happen after a nuclear disaster where human beings might be confronted with this situation. Should the human race perish or should they do this most horrible thing as a way for survival, for the recovery of man. We cannot know that. This is a very harsh thing to contemplate, but let us take an example which is simpler; the famous story of the two men on a raft. The alternative is suicide or murder, both forbidden things, but they have no choice. That is the problem.

The ancient thinkers saw that there is one solution, a crude solution, which of course was taken by some people there and which plays a great role in the beginning of modern public philosophy in men like Machiavelli and Hobbs, and that is simply to say that no solution, no just solution, can be suggested. But then one can of course take the exact opposite point of view and say the extreme cases prove absolutely nothing regarding the normal cases, but one can admit that there are extreme cases in which justice fades into injustice without any possibility of a distinction and still that doesn't say that justice is a merely arbitrary human arrangement. Now let me see, there are some examples of that. I would say that is the simple difference between Socrates, Plato and Aristotle and, say, Machiavelli and Hobbs; that is, the orientation is for the normal case. O, yes. In present-day, example: existentialist literature. This problem comes up again with a deep unawareness of the oldness of the problem. I remember a statement by Sartre on this case in France, 1942, in German Occupation. A French young boy; the only decent member of the family, his mother. The others are all collaborators whom he despises—the father, the brother, and so on—and he wants to fight for France, Free French. And he's in this conflict of duties; will he join de Gaulle, what he thinks is his duty, and then his mother, remaining alone, will perish, or will he stay with his mother? In other words, a conflict of duty between country and the mother. Such things exist and I think it is not "realistic" to deny that there can be such unsolvable conflicts. The conclusion which Sartre draws: this is the normal situation regarding morality. That he doesn't say, but the whole doctrine is based on that, whereas one could draw the other conclusion: Why did the French not fight in 1940 or rather before and then this would not ... In other words, is there not a responsibility there for a situation in which the most elementary human problems become unsolvable problems? Once they have arisen in certain situations, there is no way of acting clearly and with a clear conscience any more, but to say that man can under no circumstances act with a clear conscience is, of course, an absurd conclusion. So existentialism is, in this respect, simply connected with this way of looking at the moral problem from the extremes and not from the normal case. So we see our problems, what we study in Aristophanes, is not very far from us, not merely ancient history. Mr. Burns?

\*"That shows you that there is no justice; because when you go to the tough cases, the extreme cases"

I will  
text in the  
Western

for Plato  
and  
Sartre



A: I'm just curious. If you take those two speeches in the Clouds--the Just Logic and the Unjust Logic ...

S: What logic? Don't forget that logic does not exist prior to Aristotle. It does not even exist in Aristotle, but in a crude way you could say it exists in Aristotle. Yes? Go on, Mr. Burns.

A: One defending the brutish morality and the other defending a traditional morality. Well, Aristophanes certainly is not that brutish and he doesn't present us, in these three plays, with a traditional person if they are the corrupted traditionalists.

S: But what about the dicasts in the Wasps? The jurymen? You mean <sup>individuals</sup> agreeables.

A: Yes, but the point that you ... Even with the dicasts, the point is there has been a break. There is a break in their condition; there is no longer the same social condition, let us say, which allowed them to exist in a type of rural domain which may have existed before. Now, I'm trying to find a common denominator between the three situations in the three plays, the situations of the final scene in all the plays; Strepsiades' burning out of Socrates, Peisthetaerus' final victory, in a sense, and Philocleon's dancing in the streets. If these are perhaps symbolic or actual statements of what Aristophanes considers is a just reconciliation of the situation, I can't figure that out.

S: Yes, that is perfectly correct. I mean, I would state it slightly differently. The fact that the Clouds has an unhappy ending--if an unhappy ending in a comic manner, not a tragic manner, no killing--whereas the two other plays have happy endings, surely they do, there is no question.

A: The second thing is that in two of the plays, in the Wasps and the Birds, there's some kind of creative element in the ending, if you can call it creative.

S: No, you can't.

A: You can't. Well ...

S: You create a concept, but the problem ... You know what that means? You vote or you elect a Congress. Or God created the world. That's also possible. But you cannot call this ... if you want to speak appropriately, you cannot say create. But, say inventions.

A: Inventions. There are two inventive situations and one not inventive, or one which doesn't seem to lead to anything perhaps in the same inventive manner, the Clouds.  
*(lead)*

S: Yes, but in the first place, granted that Socrates was a man who actually lived, whereas it would be safe to say that Philocleon and Bdelycleon were inventions of the poet and Peisthetaerus and Euelpides were invented persons. This is quite true. But otherwise invention, of course, abounds in the Clouds. I mean, did you ever <sup>near</sup> see a cloud speak? Did you ever hear a Just Speech and an Unjust Speech coming up and having a discussion with one another?

A: I was thinking in terms of the final statement of the play, of this suggestion of a category or by the way the situation finally evolved and what it means. Why do the plays end in this way?

S: Because what Socrates does deserves to be punished. What Peisthetaerus <sup>does</sup> and what

Bdelycleon does to his father does not deserve to be punished. Why not take these simple points? I mean, let us not underestimate these things. I mean, our abstract art in every field makes us oblivious to these very elementary things which are so crucial. The visible things. For example, Madame Bovary. That Madame Bovary perishes in a most terrible manner, I mean this absolutely miserable and degrading end, is absolutely essential for understanding the very nobility of this woman. I mean, that is true, I think, of every scientific or scholarly activity. The most important things are the immediately visible things. Not that they give us a why, the cause, the reason, but they are the indispensable starting point for any understanding and these massive ... I think that also applies to the Shakespearean plays, by the way. These massive facts--the happy ending, the unhappy ending and other things of this same crudeness--must never be minimized. They are not sufficient. Otherwise there would be no difference between a Shakespearean tragedy and a western movie. But one must also not forget what Shakespeare has in common with a western movie. There is a kind of false sophistication, which one may very well call snobism, which is as dangerous to the understanding as mere stupidity. You know, by stupidity, I mean unawareness of differences.

A: I think I more care about the reasons. I completely agree with you, but the reasons ...

S: Yes, essentially the reasons. Then you have to see what is it what makes Socrates' fate in the Clouds deserved and what is it what makes Philocleon--a much more abominable man than Socrates--what makes his happy end deserved. If the solution is not in the play, it can be found and it may still be there. It may still be that theoretically you cannot exclude that Aristophanes wrote the play in a state of complete schizophrenia, drunkenness, or what have you, and for some reason the vulgar applauded it because <sup>there were some funny scenes in it</sup> and so it has been preserved. Prior to investigation, anything is possible. And that is of course the burden of Mr. Hale's criticism, that what he says are absolute verities which are true, which precede any empirical investigation. Whether that is a fair criticism of your whole statement I cannot say because I haven't read it, but you tend in this direction.

Now let us turn to the Wasps. You will have seen that the play begins with a long scene where none of the two chief characters appears, whereas in the Clouds and the Birds a chief character, if not the chief character, appears immediately. This also belongs to these externals which we have discussed. In this case <sup>I have no answer,</sup> And it is a conversation between two slaves of Philocleon. They're on guard duty, but sleepy. They dream. Apparently they dream things presaging evil, but the dreams are political dreams. They dream about Athens. Slaves dream about this city. Is this not strange? They dream of the city as theirs. That is some light on Athens. Does it ring a bell? In Plato's description of democracy in the eighth book of the Republic, the distinction between citizens and slaves has lost its power. But these omens prove to be good omens after they have been interpreted and that is perhaps a kind of prelude to the whole thing. Some bad omens, some things which prove to be bad omens, like the jurymen, for example, and the excesses of the jury, prove to be good omens in the end. Now, at this point, the wise interpreter of the dreams <sup>second</sup> speaks to the audience in the name of the poet. That's interesting. You know, not only the Chorus speaks in the name of the poet, but individuals also may do that. And he tells the audience that they should not expect very much of this play. No <sup>emes</sup> such things as Cleon will come out. Yet, in spite of the fact that it is a very small thing, the comedy is wiser, cleverer, and more thoughtful--the Greek word wise implies both, you know, the smart, clever and also the thoughtful--than the vulgar comedy.



Now what is the situation? Bdelycleon has locked up his father because the father suffers from an illness. You may lock up your father. For example, let us assume he has pneumonia and is running a 105 temperature and wants to get up, you can use force to keep him in bed. Everyone will admit that, even those most opposed to any violence applied to the father, but what is the illness? Not pneumonia. Perhaps we'll read that, in the translation, page 221, bottom, verse 81 following. You have it? Do you have it?

A: Where do you want me to start?

S: Page 221 ... "And he conjectures from his own disease." Do you have that? Xanthias after.

A: "Nay, but the word does really end with -lover. Then Sosias here observes to Dercylus, That 'tis a drink-lover."

"Confound it, no: That's the disease of honest gentlemen."

"Then next, Nicostratus of Seabon says, It is a sacrifice- or stranger-lover."

"What, like Philoxenus? No, by the dog, Not quite so lewd, Nicostratus, as that."

"Come, you waste words: you'll never find it out, So all keep silence if you want to know."

I'll tell you the disease old master has. He is a lawcourt-lover, no man like him. Judging is what he dotes on, and he weeps Unless he sit on the front bench of all."

S: Now let us stop here. By the way, in this remark when he brings out what the disease is, he uses the oath which is not brought out in the translation, "by the dog," which played such a great role in the Republic. Now what he says, he's not a lover of strangers. He's not a lover of strangers and the joke is that the word for lover of strangers, philoxenus, is capitalized and used as the proper name of one individual who was a debauched fellow and that is the case that suited. But the real point is this: He is a lover of sacrifices, yes? He is a lover of sacrifices. This is not denied. That he is a lover of strangers is denied and we will see later on that the wasps are not lovers of strangers by nature. I mean, the polis, the fellow-citizens, not the others. But he is a lover of sacrifices; this is stated to begin with. And he's surely not lewd. And he's a man of a bad temper; a hanging judge. His son is opposed to this. After having vainly tried of other means, he keeps his father a prisoner. Then there follows a scene which demonstrates the situation. Philocleon, the father, tries to break out and he's prevented from doing so by his son and the two slaves. You see, it's also important that the slaves force their master, you know? The natural order is destroyed in both respects. Turn to page 224, top, which is verse 156 following. Who is ready to read this? Miss Sills? H///?

A: I'm not sure I know where.

S: Top of page 224.

A: "Let me out, villains! let me out to judge. What, shall Dracontides escape unpunished?"

"What if he should?"

"Why once, when I consulted The Delphian oracle, the God replied,  
That I should wither if a man escaped me.

"Apollo shield us, what a prophecy!"

S: Yes. You see, that's the point. As you see, the lover of oracles, induced originally by a Delphian oracle, to become a hanging judge. That's the great theme going through the play. His motive is a sense of duty imposed upon him by the Delphian oracle.

*there is a funny*

Now then, ~~in the final~~ scene where Philocleon escapes from his prison like Odysseus. Under what kind of a creature was it?

A: An ass.

S: An ass, yes. You know, with Odysseus it was a ram. What does Philocleon have to do with Odysseus? Well, that is something very simple and what is a most <sup>the</sup> superficial characteristic which everyone remembers and which links Odysseus with a hanging judge.

A: *Trojans*

S: No, no. At the end, the slay<sup>ing</sup> of the suitors. A terrific act of revenge and beautifully prepared and he enjoys the revenge, every bit of it. But also in the very scene here with Polythemus, where he escapes, also revenge. The revenge of Odysseus, but it may mean more. And of course Odysseus is a friend of the goddess Athena, the special friend of Athena, which we must not forget.

*scolds*

Now Bielycleon ~~calls~~ his father in very harsh terms and forces him back into the house. He uses violence against his own father. Philocleon, the father, calls for help from Cleon and his fellow jurymen. The fellow jurymen turn out as a matter of course. Cleon never does. Philocleon proves to be the harshest of all judges. Harsh like a stone. We cannot possibly read everything. That is really very bad. This scene ... Now Philocleon comes to the jurymen and he is conscious of having done something evil. In other words, what the god commands him to do is to be harsh to others, to be evil to others. Only one point on page 230 on the second half which we might read. I have in mind verses 340 following. Let me see whether I can find that for you. At the bottom of page 230, where Philocleon explains to his fellow dicasts what the situation is. Yes?

A: "He will let me do no mischief, and no more a lawsuit try.  
True it is he'll feast and pet me, but with that I won't comply."

S: Yes. Now that is a very succinct statement of the situation. The son does not wish his father to do evil anymore. He wants his father to ~~cease~~. What could be more fair and more nice? So right is absolutely on the side of the son here. But in this connection it is made clear that there is a great difference--not emphasized but we have to think for a moment--between Philocleon and the Chorus, the other jurymen. Philocleon does not have the motivation of the others. He is not poor. He's plainly vicious. That's the only reason why he wants to be a judge. And he traces his viciousness, as we have seen, to the Delphian oracle. His son will cure him of his viciousness and therefore justly uses force against his father. Pheidippides in the Clouds and the young man in the Birds who came to the founding did not justly use force. In other words, here in this play Aristophanes answers the question, under what condition can a son legitimately use force against his



father? Here we have it. But the Chorus is shocked by such an atrocious behavior, <sup>respect</sup> and they suspect Bdelycleon of being subversive in everything; a lover of tyranny, anti-democratic. And then there is a discussion between the Chorus and the father as to how he can get out. The only way is to gnaw through the meshes. After, he may be attacked by his son and the two slaves, but the Chorus assures him of protection. Look at page 232, bottom, verse 387, where the Chorus assures Philocleon that he doesn't run any risk. Do you have that?

A: "O nothing, nothing will happen to you: keep up, old comrade, your heart and hope; First breathe a prayer to your father's gods: then let yourself down by the trusty rope.

"O Lycus, neighbour and hero and lord! thou lovest the selfsame pleasures as I; Day after day we both enjoy the suppliant's tears and his wailing cry. Thou earnest here thine abode to fix, on purpose to listen to sounds so sweet, The only hero of all that deigns by the mourner's side to assume his seat:"

S: That is all we need for our purpose. In other words, you see the element of viciousness links up now with a hero, a hero in this sense, a demigod who also enjoys seeing men suffer. Now then, Philocleon still tries to get out, but he is discovered while he lets himself down. He is threatened with blows. And the Chorus now sends for help to Cleon. In the meantime, a dialogue develops between Bdelycleon and the Chorus. The accusations are again repeated very harsh. Bdelycleon is an anti-democrat, subversive, tyrant. Again he makes clear that he wants to lead his father to a life ...

(End of first side of reel)

... is not a natural thing, but due to custom, to ethos. It is an acquired law. No one would do this today. Here the argument between the father and son begins. The son observes that the dicasts are slaves and not the rulers, whereas the father observes that he rules over all. And it is made clear that the argument concerns the whole polity, the whole political order: who is ruling in Athens? You see, the question is not a private question anymore, it concerns the whole affair. If you turn to page 240, line 3 to 4, verse 546 following, where the Chorus speaks. Do you have that? Read it, please.

A: "O friend upon whom it devolves to plead the cause of our Sovereign Power today, Now show us your best; now bring to the test each trick that an eloquent tongue can play."

*then charges*  
S: Yes. So the Chorus ~~implodes~~ <sup>then charges</sup> him, literally translated, on the whole kingship, ~~what he says here, the sovereignty, Sovereign Power. The whole kingship; led this vs~~ <sup>what he says here, the sovereignty, Sovereign Power. The whole kingship; led this vs</sup> wish. (?) Now the father's ~~rule~~ <sup>rule</sup>, our rule, the rule of the jurymen, is not inferior to kingship in any sense. The jurymen is treated like a god; his rule is irresponsible, without appeal. Let us turn to page 243, bottom, verse 620, "Is this not a fine dominion of mine?" Do you have that? Read it.

A: "Is this not a fine dominion of mine? Is it less than the empire of Zeus?"

S: Imagine that a god like this lover of sacrifices, commissioned by the Delphian oracle, exercises himself godly powers. Yes?

A: "Why the very same phrases, so grand and divine, For me, as for Him, are in use. For when we are raging loud and high In stormy, tumultuous din,

O Lord! O Zeus! say the passers-by, How thunders the Court within!

The wealthy and great, when my lightnings glare, Turn pale and sick, and mutter a prayer.

You fear me too: I protest you do: Yes, yes, by Demeter I vow 'tis true. But hang me if I am afraid of you."

S: Yes. So. That is only as a specimen. Then Bdalyoleon's response; line 650, that is on page 244, bottom. The speech of Bdalyoleon on page 244, bottom, yes?

A: "Hard were the task, and shrewd the intent, for a Comedy-poet all too great To attempt to heal an inveterate, old disease engrained in the heart of the state."

S: Now let us stop here. For a comic poet, that is what Bdalyoleon says. Through Bdalyoleon, the comic poet himself speaks. Bdalyoleon is, in a way, the comic poet, just as the slave spoke for him. Bdalyoleon knows that he cannot heal this ancient disease, but it is implied perhaps the comic poet can supply some relief. Now let us go on where we left off immediately. Yes?

A: "Yet, O dread Cronides, Father and Lord."

S: Yes. Who is that, by the way? Who is dread Cronides? Zeus, of course. Or our Father Zeus, yes? And what does the father reply?

A: "Stop, stop, don't talk in that father-me way."

S: Yes. In other words, he identifies himself with Zeus. We are not surprised. Now Bdalyoleon says his proof: only a very small part of the Athenian revenue goes to the alleged rulers of Athens, the jurymen. The bulk goes to the demagogues. If the demagogues wanted, every jurymen could be a rich man which needless to say is campaign oratory at its worst, but not in effect. Now let us turn to page 248, top, verse 792, Bdalyoleon's speech. Yes?

A: "Let a panic possess them, they're ready to give Euboea at once for the State to divide, And engage to supply for every man full fifty bushels of wheat beside. But five poor bushels of barley each is all that you ever obtained in fact, And that doled out by the quart, while first they worry you under the Alien Act. And therefore it was that I locked you away To keep you in ease; unwilling that these With empty mouthings your age should bilk. And now I offer you here to-day Without any reserve whatever you please Save only a draught of--Treasurer's milk.

S: Yes. Well, you see, Bdalyoleon is a super-demagogue. He has to be. You see, that is by the way, the theme of the comedy, the Knights, where the upper-class people, the knights, hire the lowest and most lost demagogue to get rid of the ruling demagogues and this is a similar thing. So he is a super-demagogue. But he speaks only to his father to whom he will give all he wants. He does not promise a change of the law, the division of the whole revenue among the jurymen. The only promise which he makes--and to that extent, he is an honest demagogue--the promise that he makes to his father. If this argument were addressed to the jurymen, it would require a tremendous increase in all forms of social security. But now a surprise. Where we left off immediately. Let me see, the time is a little bit advanced. Could anyone tell me what is the time?

A: Ten minutes of five.





he cannot give up his real inclination, namely to sit in judgement and to condemn. This is the only thing he cannot give up. And therefore the compromise; he's permitted to act as a judge in his house where the activity is anyway more pleasant. Well, a simple thing, an innocent example, I suppose--I never was on a jury--you can't smoke cigarettes while sitting on a jury bench. At home you can smoke cigarettes and he gives some Greek equivalents for that thing. Now then, the very fine scene where the court sitting takes place in the house. There is one verse ... I wonder if I can find it easily. We must now really rush disgracefully. There is a remark by Bdelycleon, verse 834, where he says, what's the matter? How terrible is the addiction to locality, to a place and to what is customary in that place. You see, that would be somewhere ... let me see. I can't find it here. ~~Let's not prolong this session.~~ That comes up later again, this subject. That's why I mention it.

*point* *It is not brought out in the translation.*

You see, that is the ~~problem~~. The father is, in a way, a typical patriarch, but in a somewhat problematic way. And that means attachment to the local for its own sake. Bdelycleon does not have that. There is a beautiful presentation of this same problem in prose in Xenophon's Greek History. There he has given a description of two leading Greek generals of the city--at the beginning of the third book. Two Spartans. One is the famous king, Aleschylaus--who is really a model of a king, I mean a common blimp--and also generals of whom you may know, and so on. But then there is another fellow. He is very military, but he proved to be hopelessly inefficient. He destroys what his predecessor had done without any fuss, in ten days. The name of this predecessor is Dercylides, whom everyone called Sisyphts. It means, not in the sense we know today, but the super-clever and the grandfather of Odysseus was called Sisyphts. And he did a magnificent job without any fuss. Now this man, who was such a perfectly wonderful fellow and also very humane and nice, was however punished, for example, for not being very strict, for ataxia, for some lack of discipline when he was with the Spartan army in Syngam, and he has another quality which Xenophon calls, with an intranslatable word, philopothetia--he likes to be away from the demos, he likes to be away from home. You know that is a similar feature, it seems to be characteristic of Bdelycleon. Yet the son is praised by his father for doing everything according to the manners of the country. Now there is a sacrifice prior to the sitting and Bdelycleon prays. Yes, that we might read, on page 253, verse 875 following ... let me find it for you. Yes, the long speech of Bdelycleon on page 253, second half. Read it please.

A: "Aguieus! my neighbour and hero and lord! who dwellest in front of my vestibule gate,

I pray thee <sup>be</sup> graciously pleased to accept the rite that we new for my father create."

S: Note the emphasis on novelty. He introduces a new rite. A new rite. He made an innovation. Go on.

A: "O bend to a pliant and flexible mood the stubborn and resolute oak of his will, And into his heart, so crusty and tast, a trifle of honey for syrup instil. Endue him with sympathies wide, A sweet and humane disposition, Which leans to the side of the wretch that is tried, And weeps at a culprit's petition. From harshness and anger to turn, May it now be his constant endeavour, And out of his temper the stern Sharp sting of the nettle to sever."

S: Yes. That's all we need. You see. The harshness of Philocleon appears in contrast to the gentleness of the demos as presented, indeed. Now, that is the scene of which Miss Stills reported last time, the trial of the dog. He has to judge somebody and at least a dog, you see. And it shows that Philocleon hasn't changed



at all. He's as eager to condemn as he was before, but his son deceives him into acquitting the poor dog. And he's rather shocked by it and at the end of this, on page 257, middle, as we will see, the motivation becomes clear again. The motivation is piety. He thinks he commits a sin by acquitting. The little joke, by the way, is this: there was a lawsuit against Laches<sup>us</sup>, who is known to you from a Platonic dialogue called Laches, and here there was some affair in Sicily where Cleon persecuted. And the dog is called Labes, you know, in Greek, and Labes comes from the Greek word labano which means take, to take away, to steal, the taker. That's a vulgar joke which links it up with the contemporary situation.

Now, this piety is to be replaced by pleasure and this pleasure is meant to include love of human beings, kindness, philanthropy. Now, in the parabasis, the Chorus speaking for the poet says, admiring the poet's courage in attacking monsters like Cleon--which he does not do in his plays, by the way--and his novel inventions. You see, the two elements, the political action--let us call it the poet's justice--and his inventiveness, his cleverness, these are the two sides, the two claims placed by the poet. The Chorus consists of the jurymen, of true-born Athenian citizens. They are the defenders of Athens against the Persian invasion. That was the greatest moment where their waspishness, their stings, their anger--the word anger is sometimes used, the word thymos which is only translated by spiritedness--the key theme of Plato's Republic; spiritedness, the quality of the guardians. That is characteristic of the citizens. At that time, they did not yet know how to speak well. But they were concerned with who was the best sailor or soldier, ~~real~~ <sup>side</sup> ~~aspirants~~. Thus they became the founders of the Athenian empire. They are proud of having stings, which means, of being harsh spirited and ill-tempered, these terms. They were proud of that, because that are the conditions for winning a war. A war is not won by ~~serpentine~~ <sup>side</sup> ~~serpentine~~. They were distempered to the highest degree, both in war and in peace. Their vindictiveness in law courts is only the reverse ~~of~~ <sup>want</sup> of their prowess in battle. The only political reform which they ~~have~~ <sup>want</sup> is limitation of full citizen rights to those who have served in the army. A defensible position to take. It is not altogether reasonable, because someone might be bodily unable to bear arms and might be good in counsel. We know that famous poem. But that ~~is~~ <sup>side</sup> ~~is~~ simple men would think that way, ~~is~~ <sup>side</sup> ~~is~~ perfectly defensible. There is a praise of waspishness. There is a right kind of waspishness against a foreign element; there is a wrong kind against fellow citizens. And what the poet attacks is only the wrong kind, naturally. That is ~~clear~~ <sup>side</sup> ~~clear~~.

Now the next scene. Bdelycleon tries to change his father. So what is implied? We must not forget that. The first substitute for condemning, public condemning, is domestic condemning. And that worked out well, because of the trickery of Bdelycleon. But no conversion of the father because the father wants to condemn, too. You remember. The son tricked him into it. So the son tries now a more radical cure. He tries to change his father into a fashionable gentleman. Now these are very amusing scenes which we, unfortunately, cannot read. If you would turn to 266, bottom, that is verse 1250, well, we can't read that. He gives ~~some~~ <sup>his</sup> specimens of how people converse in polite society. You see, they talk about special subjects and so on. We mentioned this last time. Drink and laughter of gentlemen. Yes, then, all right:

The father goes into polite society, but that's a complete failure. He doesn't behave like such a fine gentleman at all. A slave gives him a report of the vulgar and vicious conduct of that old fellow at the dinner. Philocleon now becomes the object of judicial proceedings which he now ~~dis~~ <sup>side</sup> ~~dis~~spises, you see, because he's on the receiving end. He promises his inheritance to the flute-girl when his son is dead.

He mistakes his son for his father--you see how drunk he is--and he's prepared to beat his son, which means, of course, his father. You see, he's a completely changed man. But nothing of this kind is happening, because he's too drunk for that and he's brought to his house by force by his son. Then there is another scene where the Chorus approves of the son's conduct. I mean, in other words, what the son did to his father, using force against him, is perfectly decent as these guardians of decency, the jurymen, say. And the Chorus even expresses its admiration for the son. In a way, the son is the comic poet. There is a reconciliation between the demos and the comic poet.

Now, let me see whether we can find that easily. A few more points. Why should you not read this, as I'm sure you did, at home. Let me see. Let us read the speech at the top of page 274, the slave speaking. Do you have that?

A: "O Dionysus! here's a pretty mess  
Into our house some power has whirligigged.  
Soon as the old man heard the pipe, and drank The long untasted wine, he grew so merry  
He won't stop dancing all the whole night through Those strange old dances such as  
Thespis taught;  
And your new bards he'll prove old fools, he says, Dancing against them in the lists  
directly."

S: Yes. In a way, he is the old reactionary, yes? But, on the other hand, he is in a way more fashionable than the reactionaries, because ~~it~~ <sup>he</sup> says ~~he's~~ <sup>he's</sup> a modern tragedian~~s~~, in other words, the meaning was, they are old foggies. You see, there is a kind of coincidence with reactionaryism and extreme modernity. It's a complicated situation. extreme

Well, in the final scene Philocleon parodies, ridicules, the dances of today and that ends with, there is no mayhem anymore. And all these terrible scenes with the flute-girl and with ... what kind of woman was that? What did she sell? I've forgotten.

A: A baker.

S: A baker, yes. And he beat up people and was absolutely terrible, but now he behaves in a legitimate, in a legal manner. ~~Whereas~~ <sup>That is,</sup> the end is peaceful, the end is happy.

Now I would like to make this conclusion about the play. The play proves to us one thing which has been of great interest to us in the two previous plays. A man may use force against his own father; namely, in order to prevent him from evil doing. And in order to turn him to a life of innocent pleasure. Such violence is legitimate if the force is used for the benefit of the father and/or the polis. Look at the beautiful beginning of the Republic where the definition of justice is restoring ~~the polis~~ <sup>the polis</sup>. And then the objection comes: ~~Yes~~ <sup>Yes</sup>, but if the fellow has gotten hold of the knife or the sub-machine gun, has become mad in the meantime? Of course not! How? Then justice is not simply identical with returning the polity. Now apply it to your father, which Plato doesn't do explicitly in this place. Surely the duties to a mad father cannot be the same as the duties to a non-mad father. That's important. So mere paternity doesn't make it. And then, of course, as I said already last time, the particular kind of madness of the father. Harshness. Vindictiveness. Stings. Yes, but the stings are not altogether bad. The stings are needed against the foreign element. The polis needs ill-tempered ~~men~~ <sup>men</sup>. Plato has used a more delicate term than ill-tempered; he has called it spiritedness.



But don't forget what Plato says about the characters of the guardians of the republic. They are to be like dogs; kind to their acquaintances and ill-tempered towards strangers. He says so. Aristotle ~~plays with it~~, but Plato says it. He says ill-tempered. You know, like a vicious dog if he is not a fellow-citizen. This element of Aristotle is very gentlemanly and tries to keep out all harsh things from politics and he succeeds to a very great extent; not completely, because he has to bring in slavery in this funny way, you know, in the first book. Some people know only this of Aristotle, namely slavery, but they don't know how complicated that issue is in Aristophanes. I will take this up on another occasion.

blames him for this

All right. The polis needs a certain amount of ill-temperedness--viciousness I will call it. Harshness. And I think that is empirically true every day and applies to the greatest societies, as well as to the ~~unjustest~~. Only the difference in degrees is very important, in passing. Now the city can avoid war. And perhaps it should avoid war. Surely unnecessary wars. But let us assume it succeeds in avoiding war for an unusually long time. What will happen? Will there be everything honey and milk? Not at all. The stings will become effective against fellow-citizens. And that is what is presented here. You can say that is the dogmatic--For the time being, I am willing to settle for that. It was a dogmatic prejudice of Aristophanes that there is no possibility of eradication of these stings. But I would say, if you ~~read~~ <sup>read</sup> it for an angle, which I ~~feel~~ <sup>think</sup> you might ~~find~~ <sup>find</sup> it, I would defer to a man called Sigmund Freud who said something about the impossibility of eradicating stings in his language. Is that not true? Good. So I have some social science support for Aristophanes. By the way, remember this beautiful story from the Birds: the father-beater--with also this vicious desire to beat someone--is sent off to war in place, against a foreign enemy. Also, the war against the foreigners is less vicious than the war against your nearest and dearest.

Now this stingingness, this waspishness, is true of all wasps. But not quite of the hero of the play. He is a special kind. He is characterized by a special kind of waspishness which is traced to the Delphic oracle. If I can use one of these abominable modern words which the Greek language in the good times didn't know, but which is helpful for simple, colloquial understanding, religious fanaticism. It is this kind of waspishness with which the poet is concerned in our play. Not that of the demos. The waspishness of the demos is partly useful and partly incurable. He's not even concerned with the waspishness of the demagogues. Remember, Cleon is called twice and never comes. The poet wants to emphasize as strongly as possible; it is not Cleon and this kind of evil with which I'm concerned in this play. The waspishness of Philocleon is curable it seems, in a simple way; if he has the right kind of son who will beat him. But is curable only to some extent. Philocleon is prevailed upon to stay away from the law courts where he could do massive mischief, but he needs some more or less vicious substitute for the supreme viciousness of condemning people at all costs which is decided. And there are three such substitutes suggested. First, playing with condemning, pretending to condemn, as the scene with the dog. But that, of course, doesn't cure the disease, it only substitutes harmless objects for the objects where he could do harm. The second substitute is refinement and elegant society. And that is a failure. A complete one, because he's much too crude. And that is the central point. That doesn't work.

That would be the best point, although you must not forget that the poet, with proper poetic license, presents this refinement in a grotesque form; you know, the very funny scene, what kind of coat he wears, what kind of shoes. The old man has never heard that such things exist. And the kind of conversation you make at a cocktail party and so on and so on. That is very funny and that is, naturally, legitimately ~~made out~~. But then there is a third which works and that is parody of the new art. overdone

Aristophanes himself does it all the time, especially in connection with the tragedy of Euripides.

Now these substitutes are supplied, and especially the last, by comedy and therefore Bdelycleon calls himself, in a way, a comic poet in this verse to which I have referred, is perfectly correct. The comedy mitigates the inevitable evils of the polis and the law. Therefore, because it mitigates evils which are felt more or less by every sane human being, the comedy is welcome. But the basis of comedy, precise wisdom, or to use a still harsher term, astronomy, understanding of the basis of everything, is not welcome. You see, Socrates is interested in the crude, and so is not welcome. I mean, only a very special individual like Strepsiades has a momentary interest in it because he misconstrues the meaning of the whole. He thinks he can get out of his debts. But what the poet does, who knows what Socrates does, but puts it to a good human use--mitigating the evils, inevitable evils of society--that is welcome. *precise prosaic to find it out*

The son fails in his attempt to transform his father into a man of elegant society. Only vulgar pleasures would attract this old guy. Perhaps we can say, because there are some allusions to that, that the son made the mistake of Aristophanes, whose Clouds were rejected by the judges, who was deserted by the Athenians, as is indicated in verse 1491. Yet the malicious wit of comedy is effective as a substitute and cure for the waspishness in question. That, I think, is what he means to say in the Wasps. That is clear, I think, that concept. The theme, or a theme, of great importance in the three plays we have discussed is the beating of the father and the status is entirely different in the three plays because here we have, as I say, a legitimate beating where this isn't true in other cases. It's either forbidden or leads to (incest.?) *themes*

Now we have then to turn rather abruptly to Plato, the Apology and the Crito. When we begin to read that, we will not find directly these things, because, as you know, the Apology is a defense of Socrates against the charges and the Crito is a discussion between Socrates and, I don't say his most intimate friend, but his oldest friend, as to whether he should escape from prison or should stick it out. But the connection is there to Aristophanes, to the problem of Aristophanes. Why does Socrates accept the verdict of the city of Athens, which is unjust? You know, when he was condemned, a very sentimental young friend of his, Apollodoros, said, how terrible that they have condemned you to death unjustly. And then Socrates, for once smiling, laughing, would you have preferred it that I had been condemned justly? And so Socrates was condemned unjustly. That is at least the claim. And he nevertheless accepts the punishment. On what grounds? I'm speaking of the most superficial example. One honors the father and mother, but the honor owed to the polis is much greater than the honor owed to the father and mother. So, that is the principle. And we must see how this is related to rational morality in the case of Socrates. I'm sure that this problem is sufficiently articulated in these two works of Plato we're going to read. I know there are others which are very pertinent, but we cannot read too much. We cannot read more than these two relatively short writings. *aid*

Let me only make clear, lest there be any misunderstanding, next time Mr. Strickland will read the paper and Mr. Pockett will hand it in. Yes? I have two or three more minutes if you want to, if there is someone who has a very clear and simple question, I'm willing to discuss it. Mr. Faulkner?

A: Can you tell us what Aristophanes disliked in Euripides? Some of us have seen the performance at Goodman Theatre of the Hippolytus ...



S: Of which?

A: Of the Hippolytus, Euripides' Hippolytus, and there it becomes very clear that Aphroditean love is the target of Euripides. Is this bound up?

S: Yes. That is the accusation made in the Thesmophoriazousae, that Euripides is a women-hater--yes!--a women-hater and the women of Athens persecute him, but he, in contradistinction to Socrates, can save himself. Yes, but that, I think, doesn't go to the root. You find in the Frogs, there you find a clear opposition between Euripidean tragedy, the modern tragedy, and Aeschylus tragedy, the old tragedy, but both regarding content and form. But what Aristophanes thought about it remains ambiguous because the judge there, the god Dionysus, can't decide it, because some things are good in Aeschylus and other things are good in Euripides in both respects. And the decision is made on purely political grounds? Who has the sound view regarding Alcibiades? And that was Aeschylus. So the utmost one could say is this: Aeschylus is given the edge because of his political judgment and perhaps the poet implies, that Aeschylus had better political judgment is not unconnected with the character of his tragedy. That's the utmost one can say. But Euripides belongs to Socrates, yes? And superficially that settles it. He's a newfangled man and Aristophanes is an old ~~man~~, but that is not sufficient, because we have seen Meton, the other Socrates, the astronomer. He's thrown out by Peisthetaerus, but only because the polis cannot stand ~~it~~<sup>him</sup>, not because he himself does not love him as he said. That is difficult to say. I think on the basis of what I know, I would say Aristophanes regarded Sophocles as the greatest, as the greatest of the three, and therefore he is so ... There are two verses on Sophocles in the Frogs of utmost beauty which precisely, in this shocking, parodizing context, stand out as the greatest compliment one could pay to a man. No one praises Aphrodite more than Aristophanes. That cannot be the difference. That means a long study. It cannot be answered in a few minutes.

So, next time, we will hear your paper.

.... you touched on all the important points, but I'm not quite clear whether I understood you. You stated first that the defense was strikingly inadequate. And then you tried to show from what point of view it would not be inadequate. Now let me state my difficulty in the form of an objection. Could one not argue this way: Socrates does not refute the charge of impiety because he regarded it as absurd. Of course he believed in the gods of the city. That is suggested, for example, in the oracle of Apollo. He defers to Apollo. As for the formula of the accusation, at which Socrates pokes fun and which he refutes very easily, but what Meletos probably had in mind was that he knew something of Socrates' reference to the daimonias thing in him--daimonia. And that was the formula he used. He only says Socrates introduces new daimonia, the personal. Well, if there is a daimonia of Socrates, there may be other such things and therefore he's justified in ~~refusing~~ the challenge. But to come back to the main point: could Socrates not have been a simply orthodox Athenian? And he regarded the charge as preposterous and ridiculous and therefore ridiculed it and took it lightly? What would you say to such a consideration?

A: That's plausible, but I don't see how we can infer that from his silence.

S: You referred frequently to Xenophon, to Xenophon's discussion. What did you have in mind in Xenophon?

A: Both the Apology and the Memorabilia.

S: Now let us take the simpler presentation in the first chapter of the Memorabilia. Socrates sacrificed all the time, at the proper times, at home and the public alters. So? Why does Plato's Socrates not refer to that? Is this not a sufficient proof of orthodoxy if someone <sup>fulfills</sup> all the prescribed rites?

A: The argument I was making is that he could have.

S: But why did he not do it? I mean, that would seem to be a very strong argument. By what right can they say of Socrates, he doesn't believe in the gods of the city, when he sacrifices to them?

A: Well, perhaps he didn't want the <sup>JURY</sup> people to believe that he simply believed in proving the city's gods.

S: Yes, but then he becomes guilty of the crime. I think if one reads Xenophon--these four pages, not much more surely--one sees the reason. You see, the Greek word of the charge, Socrates does not believe in the gods, the word is nomizein, nomizein which is derivative from nomos--that is the infinitive, nomizein, and that is the derivative from nomos--and this does not necessarily mean belief. It means also to accept, to cherish. What would be a good word in English indifferent to the distinction between intellectual belief and the practising of proper things connected with it? I do not know.

A: Worship?

S: Yes, let us say worship. Socrates could prove his worshipping the gods very easily, but what is the difficulty of such a proof? If one proves that Socrates worships the gods properly, does it prove that he believes that the gods exist? No. Therefore, Meletos' accusation was that Socrates--at least Socrates' interpretation of the accusation--that Socrates did not believe that the gods exist. And worshipping of the gods is no proof. Xenophon therefore also goes over to other things, to other



arguments, and in conclusion of the arguments he says, well, it is not surprising that these things which I, Xenophon, have mentioned escaped the jury but now I appeal to a fact which everyone knows; that is, that Socrates did not perjure himself in a crucial case, the case of the trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusai. That, according to Xenophon, is the only notorious fact about Socrates' piety. The fact that he worshipped or did not worship was not so commonly known because Socrates did not ... But the only thing which was commonly known was that Socrates fulfilled his sworn duty and to fulfill one's sworn duty means of course to obey the gods. Now that is obviously not proof of piety. It could also be a proof of simple law-abidingness. So Xenophon himself ... shows that there was no notoriety of Socrates' orthodoxy on which he could depend. That had to be the case. And that must be the background of your argument. If we turn therefore to the argument of the Apology, we immediately come to the conclusion that Socrates did not refute the charge, a charge which was not far-fetched. And why did he not do it? There are only two possibilities; he did not wish to refute it--and that means in plain English, he wanted to commit suicide--or he could not refute it. And then this leads to further questions.

Now we will take up these points coherently immediately after a brief reference to Mr. Hale's paper which refers to what we have said on former occasions on Aristophanes, and especially on the Birds. I will turn to certain details you have made and surely the decision, as I have said more than once, depends really on individual passages. We have come down to facts, to details. And Mr. Hale is not convinced in any way by my interpretation. This is of course perfectly all right but I am not quite certain whether there is not a bit more than a simple quiet feeling that my arguments are no good. Whether there is not a certain animosity would be much too strong an expression--but something between perfect indifference and animosity. Perhaps, I said. I do not know.

A: There is not.

S: No? Good. That settles it. According to all rules of psychology, that settles it. Now then, I'll turn to a few points. Now let me make only one crucial point. Your interpretation and your objections are based not only on specific passages--that is impossible. They are also based on a certain premise, hypothesis, whatever you call it, and that is, what is a comedy? You make constant use of that. One example refers to Abbott and Costello, against which I have absolutely nothing, but that is only an indication of the fact that you have a certain broad understanding of comedy which is not altogether derived from Aristophanes. That is exactly the point where we differ, the fundamental point, and that is whether you have given sufficient thought to what a comedy is and especially regarding Aristophanean comedy.

Now I turn to a few formulations of yours. If I understand it correctly, you say the official interpretation of the Birds rests on two major propositions, official in quotes and official is my interpretation. Why I receive this signal honor I do not know because official could be applied to some extent to something which is generally accepted. Yes?

A: I put it in quotes because it didn't seem to fit but I used the word because I couldn't think of another.

S: I see. OK. You mean official as far as this classroom is concerned. OK. Good. That is clear. It would have been simpler if you had said official interpretation as far as Mr. Strauss is concerned. Now, they are: first, that the Birds is a partly deliberate and conscious attempt of Aristophanes to present through his plays a description of the ideal polis. That is not quite correct. I mean that could create

the impression as if I meant that Aristophanes' plays as a whole serves the purpose of describing an ideal polis. The utmost one could say is that there are three plays of Aristophanes which deal in different ways with a polis radically different from any actually known and these are the Birds, the Assembly of Women, and Plutus. But I would never say that this is a formula which applies to all Aristophanean comedies. The possibility of this subject surely belongs to the Aristophanean comedy but it is not its essence.

Second, that Aristophanes therefore inserted several <sup>scenes</sup> statements in the Birds whose purpose is to make statements about the ideal polis, its nature, and the ~~elements~~ <sup>elements</sup> it would or would not contain. Therefore, I would have to delete ... The Birds are a representation of a city which never existed and never will exist and which we may loosely call an ideal polis. Therefore of course he inserted into it many scenes which are to make clear the character of that polis, because no one can deny, I think, that in the Birds a polis is founded which doesn't exist anywhere and which is "ideal" to the extent that it is founded by people dissatisfied with the actual city and looking for a satisfactory city. And they do that. I mean, the descriptions are there. They want to go to a city in which they can live pleasantly, in which there is no busy-bodiness of any kind, and so on and so on. That is true.

And then you give a few points here ... For example, you are displeased and dissatisfied with what I say about the connection between the Birds and the Clouds. And I refer to the point that the perfect polis of the Birds is called Cloud-Cuckooland. And the clouds play a great role in the Clouds, as you know. Now the second point was the character of a father-beater appears in both plays and to which you say the first two of these points strike you as very minor for the rest are nothing more than verbal coincidences. Well, I would say they are more than verbal because the clouds are a massive reality in the Clouds and they also are a very massive reality in the Birds. And that Socrates is aloft at the beginning of the Clouds when he appears and it has very much to do with that and that his realm is somehow also not on earth, but in the air. He is in the clouds, as we see by the name, shows that this is more than verbal. That the father-beater should be verbal I can hardly believe because that is a very definite phenomenon which plays a very great role in the Clouds and plays a certain role at any rate also in the Birds. And this is a very great problem - The father-beater is clear once you think about it because the question of father-beating is identical with the question of the difference between reasonable authority and non-reasonable authority, the implication being that the father as father, especially of a grown-up son, is not necessarily wiser than the son and whereas the only rational authority is that of the wise compared with the unwise.

Then the point at which you are most <sup>explicit</sup> specific: there is a parallel between Socrates of the Clouds and Meton of the Birds since both are astronomers and this you flatly deny. You say Meton is presented as a town-planner. Any reference to Socrates as a town-planner in the Clouds is minor, if it makes <sup>any</sup> sense at all. To my knowledge, it doesn't make this at all. So it turns only around the question, is Meton only a town-planner in the Birds? And I think that can be refuted by a simple reference to a passage, in verse and line 95, I don't have the edition here, when Meton comes up and Peisthetaerus asks him, he says, I wish to geometrize the air. That's the first verse. The Greek word for geometry means to measure the earth and, naturally, derivatively, to geometrize, to be a geometer regarding the air. The comparison is incidental to that, or consequential, but the primary thing is his geometrizing the air which reminds very much with what Socrates is doing when he walks on the air in order all that we studied in the other things. Furthermore, you say there is no explicit reference to Meton the astronomer but in the second speech of Meton he says, replying to Peisthetaerus' question of who he is, he says, "Who am I? Meton, who is known by Greece and by Colonus." So, in other words, he is very well known and therefore there



special

is no need for explicitly speaking of the astronomy. Moreover, a little bit later, <sup>verse in this line</sup> where Meton had spoken of what he can do, Peisthetaerus <sup>brings out into</sup> the words, "the man is a Thales," the same expression as applied to Socrates by Strepsiades. Thales is the figure, as some people <sup>really</sup> say of Einstein and Newton. Everyone knows that. He may not understand a single thing of what it is about but that has something to do with the stars, was well known because there was this famous story about Thales's lack of intelligence. You know it, Mr. Rankin. The stupidity of astronomers. Reinken

A:

S: Yes, that was already his reply. But the original thing for which he was famous, looking at the stars, he fell into a ditch. So that is a perfectly clear popular notion of what an astronomer is. Everyone knew what a Thales is. So, on the contrary, I think one can prove not only that the opposite is true, that Meton is the astronomer in the very verse.

Q: Mr. Strauss?

S: Yes?

A: Further on in my paper I make another reference to Meton in which I make another point about the question of his being an astronomer, the point being that if Aristophanes had directly and clearly wished to present him as an astronomer it would have been questionable. Meton perhaps could have wished to live in Cloud-Cuckoo-land in order to be closer to the stars and so observe them better. I mean, he could have been presented very clearly and very explicitly as an astronomer, yet he was not. Quite Simple

S: But the question is were there not good reasons for not overstressing that because the idea of Meton is he wants to immigrate to that new city and in order to immigrate to that new city he had to prove his usefulness to that city and therefore <sup>the emphasis is</sup> on what he can do regarding town-planning. That, I think, only confirms my argument, that an astronomer, a star-gazer, is as such useless to the city is the accepted view. It requires already some cleverness to say he is useful for the following reasons. There are sometimes in war ... you're going to fight tomorrow, everything is fine. And then there is an eclipse of the moon. And all your soldiers get frightened. That's an ominous day; not tomorrow. And then, what do you do if you are really a good and enlightened general? You call your soldiers together and give them a very simple lecture by drawing figures in the sand and show them that an eclipse of the moon is absolutely nothing terrible and ominous but it happens mechanically under these conditions. That was a long argument on this subject at the beginning of Cicero's book on the Republic and that goes back to the whole story. But this is already a ticklish thing because here you have a definite, let us say a little flaw, to the effect that this is not good to pry into the secrets of the gods. And a great Greek general in Sicily as you know, Nicias, was pious enough not to do that and to trust the omens. So, <sup>that</sup> in other words, he could prove his utility not by being an astronomer and therefore something which was valuable strategically. He could prove it only by something so innocuous, so neutral as town-planning.

Now, you say Peisthetaerus and Euelpides also study nature, namely the daw and the jay, in order to find the ideal city. Well, that is in itself not a study of nature. On the contrary, it is the opposite, it is following the birds as omens, something which has very little to do with that. But if you insist on that formula, I would say there is an element of truth in it which I believe I have explained; namely, to the extent to which Peisthetaerus at any rate is seeking a city according to nature.

Therefore the derivation of polis from poles and so on.

Then you bring an argument which I really don't see at all. There is one further objection. The idea that Aristophanes intended the Clouds and the Birds to form connected parts of a presentation of his political thoughts. I don't want to insist on that formulation. I only said that they were connected. Now what's your proof? That they were presented nine years apart. Between these two dates of the Clouds and the Birds, Aristophanes must have written at least a dozen other plays. Surely he may, for all we know, but what does this mean? What does this mean? Maybe these lost plays would confirm fifty times what I've said. So we can't say anything. Maybe they wouldn't. We don't know. But is this the only case in which a great man takes up a theme, leaves it dormant for a certain time, for one reason or another--because he is attracted by some other themes--and then takes it up again? Not the slightest difficulty.

Now let me see if there is ... I cannot go into ... You say, I do not believe that there is any real significance to the fact that Meton is referred to by name for the practice of mocking prominent Athenians by names that appear in all of Aristophanes' plays. Sure. But why is Meton mentioned by name and why is the syccophant not mentioned by name? Why is only the poet and only the astronomer mentioned by name? That question remains, absolutely.

A: There is a point in there I'd like to bring up, if you don't mind, and that is that if Aristophanes intended to use Meton and Cinesias to make general statements about poets as a group and astronomers as a group, it seems to be more reasonable that he would have used a nameless poet or a nameless astronomer in order that they might better represent astronomers as a class and poets as a class rather than directing it to any particular one.

S: Yes. <sup>2</sup> (But we have forgotten the parabasis, what he said.) It so happens that Aristophanes in two different scenes--in the founding scene and in the scene of the potential immigrants--uses a number of anonymous people and in each case, one <sup>individual</sup> immigrant is mentioned by name and in the first case it is Meton and in the second case it is a poet, Cinesias. We have to explain that because ... I mean, if you would say astronomers, there was Meton, but syccophants, there was none around, I mean, there was a great harvest of syccophants and of such other people. That still would have to be explained. There is one point where you have some right and where I may have been a little too brief and that concerns the passage on page 48 of your translation, that's verse 1072 following, where you make this remark. I'll read it as you say. "The lines of the Chorus which go, 'Listen to the City's notice, specially proclaimed to-day; Sirs, Diagoras the Melian whosoever of you slay, Shall receive, reward, one talent; and another we'll bestow If you slay some ancient tyrant, dead and buried long ago.' These lines supposedly imply that <sup>heavily</sup> ~~hostilities~~ and tyranny are not permitted in the ideal city. But, first, these lines do not apply to Cloud-Cuckoo-land, they apply to Athens. And, second, at least the last two lines are intended as a joke." Now that is perfectly true. This is a quotation the Chorus makes and a quotation, we can safely say, literal or not literal of what an Athenian proclamation was. But still they adopt it. They adopt it and one can show that they apply, properly modified, to the ideal city. If the ideal city of the birds as I have tried to show is a universal democracy, the prohibition against tyranny applies to it, naturally. The second point, that they must have gods and cannot tolerate <sup>atheists</sup> ~~athletes~~ like Diagoras the Melian is proven by the play as a whole. The birds are the gods. And therefore that is correct, what you say at this point. You must also take a somewhat broader view; and that refers also to a remark which you make later. The city of the birds differs radically from any city we know. It still is a city. Certain basic characteristics --for example, the difference between rulers and ruled, that there are some formal



sort of laws--are the same. And therefore there is a kind of kinship to the city. A kinship which shows itself also more subtly and more indirectly by the differences. You discover the true city of the birds only by starting from the deficiencies of the city which you empirically know. You say that if the notice is about Athenian heretics and tyrants--this one which I quoted--how then could it apply to Cloud-Cuckoo-land? Answer: because the ideal polis arises out of a modification of the actual polis and therefore, modified, these things live on in the perfect city. What you say is perfectly true, that Aristophanes ridicules here, as well as in the Wasps for example, the extreme fear of Athenians of old tyrants. That's perfectly true. But that does not exclude what I said because he excludes the extreme apprehension of the Athenians regarding tyrants although he proved to be not such an extreme reactionary, as you know a little bit later, but that was Aristophanes' error. But the main point is that this prohibition against tyranny, as distinguished from the perhaps foolish apprehension, is of the essence of the democracy. And any regime has such prohibitions against all tyrants. That's the meaning of the Constitution. alternatives

Yes, well, I cannot possibly go into all the points because we really don't have the time and let us leave it at this amiable or amicable agreement. Mr. <sup>Walt</sup> does not believe that the interpretation of Aristophanes which I suggested is correct. That is perfectly good and is even very healthy for me as well as for others who perhaps do not believe that it is so entirely wrong what I said. Such questions cannot be settled in a seminar and still less in a very cursory reading as we have now but I must only <sup>warn you</sup> of one point where I believe I'm correct. And that has nothing to do with any details. One cannot leave it, in any case, at the current categories, as people call it; in this case, for example, comedy. What a comedy is, and especially in our case, what an Aristophanean comedy is is to begin with an absolute riddle and the historical information we have about its origin and things to which you refer do not yet prove that Aristophanes' comedy is the same as what the comedy originally meant in <sup>Athenian</sup> culture. The relation with this will always be there but not more. Yes? I mean, I gave a lecture of, I believe, a half an hour if not more in your absence ...

A: An absence which I regret.

S: Yes, and so do I. We all regret it very much. But I cannot for simple reasons of time and consideration of your fellow students repeat it. I'm sure you know one or the other who can repeat it, but the main point <sup>answers</sup> this question: how much have you even free thought, quiet thought, unbiased thought, <sup>the</sup> question of what the comedy is? And that, I think, affects the interpretation of every particular passage. So I must leave it there then. And we must turn to the Apology. Unless you have a very specific point which can be dealt with briefly.

A: I'm afraid I don't and since it seems to me quite reasonable. After all, you have a class to teach and only so long in which to teach it. I didn't really expect you to go over my paper in class.

S: Yes, well, that I wanted to do because I think the subject is of general interest. I mean not necessarily that all the points you made had to be considered under all circumstances, but the thing at issue between us is not merely Mr. <sup>Walt</sup> vs. me. It is a general issue. And the general issue is whether we can go on trusting the usual, conventional, and in the best <sup>case</sup> traditional notions of comedy. The same would <sup>disquisitions</sup> apply to tragedy. In the case of tragedy, we have these long <sup>disquisitions</sup> of Aristotle in the Poetics which everyone with sense will treat with the greatest respect but it is still an absolutely open question, of course, whether the tragedy as meant by Sophocles, for example, or Euripides is the same as what Aristotle understood by it. That is an open question. It is also an open question whether Plato's notion of <sup>doctrine</sup>

It is only

tragedy is the same as Aristotle, and also much harder to answer because Plato didn't design to write a treatise on tragedy. In the case of comedy, we are worse off because we have still less about it in Aristotle and in Plato than about tragedy.

So now let us then turn to the Apology of Socrates. I remind you of one point which you know from the Clouds and which is manifest and where there can be no disagreement. In the Clouds Socrates comes to sight as an astronomer and a teacher of rhetoric. That is a matter of public knowledge in Athens. Now we are about twenty years later and Socrates appears again on the stage but this time as an accused man. I mean, that is not irrelevant. You must take an intelligent Athenian who is not what now would be called a culture-vulture, but an intelligent man with his wits about him. He has seen Aristophanes' comedy and now he sees Socrates again. This time, not in a mask but himself. What do we hear?

Now in the beginning, in the prooimion, because that is of course a speech, properly elaborated, properly built up, and begins the introduction, the prooimion. The main assertion has become clear from the paper, is the accusers have lied and Socrates will say the truth. He says even, the whole truth. That is the point. Socrates explicitly says that he will say the whole truth. And the accusers have said nothing but lies. But that is qualified, what he says about the accusers right at the beginning in the first or second sentence where he says, "They have said so to speak nothing truth," meaning it is not literally true. They have said certain things which are true. Now what does this qualification in itself mean? It is absolutely impossible to say something which does not contain an element of truth. If you say, "I have seen Mr. X killing Mr. Y," and Mr. Y is alive and Mr. X at that time was in an entirely different town, it is a simple lie, yet Mr. X is and Mr. Y is. Every truth is prior. Every lie is based on some preceding truth. That is true.

But <sup>fallen</sup> this is not quite what Socrates means because immediately after he says that he has ~~tell~~ to wondering most about one thing of the many things which they have lied. You know, not all things they said were lies. And a little bit later, in 17B 7, he says, "These men, as I assert, have said hardly anything or nothing true." He does not say that everything is a lie, but that is not terribly important. The biggest lie, he says, was that they said Socrates is a clever speaker because he will easily refute them now. A clever speaker is a speaker who gets an acquittal <sup>in</sup> the worst circumstances and Socrates knows he will be condemned. So that will be refuted. But then he interprets that a bit and says, their biggest lie was that I am a clever speaker unless they mean that I say the truth. If a clever speaker is a man who says the truth, then I am a clever speaker, because he will indeed say the whole truth. He disclaims the use of rhetorical art but he will speak as he used to speak on the market place and in other places. Socrates, on the market place, talking to others, a citizen, an ordinary citizen, has nothing to do with the art of rhetoric. And especially the art which he would need now, the art of forensic rhetoric. I mean, is the term forensic rhetoric known to you? Because sometimes certain very simple expressions are unknown. Aristotle, for example, makes the distinction of rhetoric into three kinds: forensic rhetoric dealing with right and wrong used before law courts; deliberative rhetoric dealing with the expedient and inexpedient, used in political assemblies, and <sup>epideictic</sup> epideictic rhetoric, for show, display rhetoric, dealing with the beautiful and ugly or noble and base; used for show sake or edification sake. So Socrates, he does not possess the art of forensic rhetoric. Why? And he proves that to them. I mean, prior to the proof by deed, that he will be condemned, but he proves it right at the beginning. If you will turn to 17B. Do you have it? "Now I have ascended for the first time, or come up to the law court, seventy years old, and I am in the position of a stranger with regard to the way of speaking here employed." Do you have that? He does not possess the art of forensic rhetoric because he has never been accused. That is of course not a good proof because there were many teachers of rhetoric who were never



A: Public opinion?

S: Public opinion. They are nameless. Many, many. But still, let us not leave it at what could be an abstraction. The folk mind of Athens. The public opinion. Where does it reside? Where does it reside, the public opinion, this first accusation? Where does it reside? Yes?

A: He identifies Aristophanes ...

S: Yes, Aristophanes is perhaps a mouthpiece of them and the only proper name he can mention there, but Aristophanes acted as a mouthpiece, as Socrates makes clear, <sup>where</sup> but who are the accusers on whom Aristophanes relies? Who are they? I mean, public <sup>does</sup> opinion, all right, but still let us be a bit more scientific. ~~How do they decide?~~ <sup>it</sup> ~~outside?~~ How do you find out what the public opinion, say, on Vice President Nixon is? How do you find out?

A: You ask someone; by polls.

S: Yes, I mean, you don't have millions there but what do you do? I mean, you can talk to many people. Well, may I suggest a simple answer. Public opinion, in this sense, resides in many Athenians and if it is really simply the public opinion, I think one can say the majority of the Athenians. The majority of Athenians accuse Socrates of something in the past. Where are these many, this majority, now?

A: On the bench. They are trying him.

S: The first accusers are the others, sure. That is the joke. By characterizing the first accusers, he accused the others. But if you want to be a bit more scrupulous and pedantic, you say actually it was the fathers of the present ones. But it amounts to the same thing. That is what they sucked in, one can say, by their fathers' milk. Yes? I mean, when they were little children they were told by their fathers that he's such a wicked man. So. It amounts to the same thing. The former generation of Athenians or the present generation of Athenians, the former majority or the present majority; these are the first accusers. And Socrates uses a rhetorical trick which is quite remarkable, that he shows ~~in~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~them~~ <sup>Mirror</sup> by asserting, ...   
 ("That's not you.") . But there is of course that. Now what do they charge Socrates with? There are various formulations. The first occurs in 18B 6, that there is some Socrates, a wise man, a worryer about the celestial things and someone who has sought out all things beneath the earth and who makes the weaker speech the stronger speech. This is what they say. And that in itself is an accusation. The last case is obvious, that means a teacher of rhetorical ~~jokes~~ <sup>tricks</sup>. Yes? But a worryer, or thinker you can also say, about celestial things, the things aloft. That this should be wicked, we do not immediately understand. Therefore, we would have to look up and we find in Xenophon, for example, and even here, some evidence that this was regarded as an impious thing. And the things beneath the earth—that ~~are~~ <sup>is</sup> not onions, as Strepsiades thought, but Hades—life after death—he investigated that. Now there is another formulation a little bit later, when Aristophanes ~~enters~~ <sup>appears</sup> <sup>in</sup> coming up. Now when he says, what is most irrational about it, that it is impossible to know and to name the names of these accusers unless he happens to be a comic poet, that is a mere accidental case that one of these accusers happened to be a comic poet whom makes himself a mouthpiece of public opinion. But he's not the accuser.

Now, what is the motive of these people? Why do they say that, do they calumniate Socrates? Why do they say he's a wicked man? And he indicates this in the immediate sequel where I stopped here. He refers to the envy. Why are they envious? I mean, if somebody says, this is an embezzler of public funds, wrongly, the motive is not

A: A college professor?

S: Yes, it would be that! Some of them live even in much-less-fold poverty. I mean, some get much less than ten thousand as you can see from this Statistics. You could say perhaps, he lives in one of the highest poverty brackets in the country. And that is very strange. Although he lives as such a poor man, his companions are the sons of the wealthiest. Of the wealthiest men. This, incidentally, answers a simple question which we must be realistic enough to raise: what were the sources of Socrates' livelihood? Although he didn't work, he didn't ignore that he has to live. An absolutely proper question, it seems to me. I think it is answered most beautifully in Xenophon's Oeconomicus which deals with economics—with private economics, that is—and therefore, since Socrates is a teacher of economics, we have to apply the question to him. And I think the answer is the question in a brief discussion at the beginning where they say what is money, what is property, and by virtue of a very sophisticated definition of property, they arrived at the conclusion that friends may be money. That was Socrates' money. He had these wealthy people. I mean, with good breeding externally, but still ... And they of course made Socrates the more hated because they thought it was very great fun to go to a pompous ass and with all decorations and dignities and then to show him up. Well, it redounded to Socrates' unpopularity. You remember the previous statement about the older comrade of Socrates, Chairephon, who was a friend of the multitude and that's a different generation. The consequence of this story—that Socrates was accompanied by these young and wealthy men—is that he corrupted the young because these dignitaries, naturally, didn't think that this was the right thing to do but it was a luxury.

Now being young and wealthy, they were of course insatiable. That is a common man experience.

Now in this connection, the calumny against Socrates is reformulated, in 23<sup>2</sup>, 5 to 7. Now these unmasked men say that what people say—because they can't possibly say, "He has found me out," so they must calumniate—so the worst they can say about him, what is generally said about all philosophers; namely, the things aloft and those under the earth and not believing in the gods and making the weaker speech stronger. You see, not believing in the gods is now in the center because ... We come back, we will see that this is the crucial issue later. And then he speaks of the three accusers by name—Meletos, Anytus and Lycon. Meletos spoke for the poets, was angry on behalf of the poets; Anytus was angry on behalf of the craftsmen and politicians; and Lycon on behalf of the orators. So the orators are now added, as you see, and the artisans and politicians are represented by one and the same man. Both artisans and politicians have to do with the demos. Either they belong to the demos, as the artisans proper, or they work in the demos or on the demos, the politicians. Anytus is in the middle. He seems to have been the most important of the three as is shown also by the dialogue Meno.

Now then, Socrates turns to the defense against the present accusers. And then he quotes the formal charge. Do you have that, in 24B? Now let us take the charge, the charge made against him. Do you have that?

A: "Socrates is guilty of" ...

S: No, no, read the preceding <sup>words</sup> ~~verse~~. The immediate <sup>preceding</sup> ~~verse~~ <sup>words</sup>.

A: "I shall now try to defend myself against Meletos, high-principled and patriotic as he claims to be, and after that against the rest. Let us first consider their deposition again as though it represented fresh prosecution. It runs something like this:" ...



S: You see, "something like this." Yes?

A: "Socrates is guilty of corrupting the minds of the young and of believing in deities of his own invention instead of the gods recognized by the state."

S: Literally, not believing in the gods<sup>which the city</sup> recognized, believes, but other strange, demonic things. Yes?

A: "Such is the charge. Let us examine them" ...

S: Yes, such; not this. You see, Plato makes it clear by references before and after that the charge is not quoted literally. By a fortunate accident, the literal version of the charge has been preserved in Diogenes' Lærtius. Xenophon, too, does not quote the charge literally, but Xenophon makes very minor, almost invisible, changes. Plato makes very big changes. In the true charge, the charge of impiety comes first, before the charge of corruption. And secondly, Plato omits one word; namely, in the charge it is "not believing in the gods in which the city believes, but introducing other new divinities." This introducing is dropped by Plato. Good. Whatever that may mean.

Now we come to the corruption charge which he takes up in the first place. Socrates corrupts the young. He makes the young worse. That makes sense only if there are people who make the young better. What makes the young better, asks Socrates. First, the answer of Meletos, 24D, the law. The law. Socrates does not question that. But what does he <sup>lead</sup> to that, the question about the laws? "But that's not what I ask, my best, but which human being, who in the first place knows this very thing, namely the laws?" Yes? Why is the answer "the laws" not sufficient? Socrates does not question the proposition that the laws make the young better. What does this mean, this transition? Why does he appeal from the laws to human beings? Or even a single human being? Yes?

A: That the laws are conventional it may be but people ...

S: That is very good. But that is not said here. We must begin from what he <sup>knows</sup> explicitly says. He doesn't speak of the making of the laws, but of the making of the laws. Now what he's suggesting is the laws become effective on the young only by human beings who act in accordance with the laws and therefore who know the laws. The question of the laws as an authority goes through the work, as we shall see later, but it is not the theme. It becomes the theme in the Crito, which we will read after <sup>that</sup>. Who are then the human beings which make the young better? And Meletos gives an answer in accordance with democracy as then understood: Everyone! The judges, the jurymen, the men in the assembly, and so on and so on, and the men in the council. All Athenian citizens are good educators. Let us consider that for one moment. To accuse someone of corrupting, of making certain things worse, means that I know what is good. Otherwise, the charge makes no sense. Meletos claims, as a matter of course, that he knows what is good. And he implies that it is easy to know it. Everyone, all Athenians know it. Perhaps he means even all men know it. Now how could all men know what is good.

(End of first side of reel.) #9)

... Platonic philosophy implies the rejection of this notion. There is no naturally available knowledge, of <sup>good</sup> ~~good~~. It may be acquired, but it is not by nature available. There is by nature available something like a divination of the good. That's

surely what Plato means. But this divination is not knowledge and therefore you can in no way rely on it.

You remember Socrates' previous assertion about his wisdom which implies that he does not know what is the good. He is ignorant about these greatest things. But he also doubts whether what the Athenians believe to be good is good because he knows that the Athenians do not know. He doubts whether the Athenians know what is the good and he spreads this doubt by making it clear to everyone that he doesn't know. That is corruption. To that extent, Socrates proves the charge of corruption from the Athenian point of view. The question is whether there is <sup>another</sup> point of view. But the question is also whether the <sup>entire</sup> point of view can be brought out in a popular speech except by reference to the <sup>above</sup>. Now what is Socrates' main argument against the assertion, all Athenians know what is good? A typically Socratic example which goes through all these kinds of discussions. In all <sup>fields</sup> of knowledge, there are only a few who know. Experts are rare in every field. But knowledge is expert knowledge. Hence, expert knowledge regarding good and bad—the only genuine knowledge—is also rare. Now you see that this is confirmed by another feature which we have observed which you may very well call ironical, but as we have seen before, the ironical things have to be taken as seriously as non-ironical things. Since in all <sup>fields</sup> things there are only a few who know, Socrates, with perfect consistency, sends people to the professional educators, to the Sophists. On this basis, inevitable. Whatever this knowledge may be which Gorgias and such people possess, Socrates does not possess that knowledge of the good. So let us keep this in mind. We do not know ... Socrates' wisdom, which is knowledge of his ignorance, includes as such ignorance of the good. How can he live? I repeat that. Let's ~~skip~~ <sup>keep</sup> this question ~~for the moment~~ <sup>always in mind</sup>.

Now let us turn—we cannot possibly read the whole—to 25C 5, where he says to Meletos, "Now tell us, by Zeus, Meletos, whether it is better to live among good citizens or wicked citizens." Do you have that?

A: "Here is another point. Tell me seriously, Meletos, is it better to live in a good or a bad community? Answer my question like a good fellow. There is nothing difficult about it. Is it not true that wicked people have a bad effect upon those with <sup>whom</sup> they are in closest contact and good people have a good effect?

"Quite true.

"Is there anybody who prefers to be harmed rather than benefited by his associates? Answer me, my good man. The law commands you to answer. Is there anyone who prefers to be ~~harmed~~?

"Of course not.

"Well then when you summon me before this court for corrupting the young and making their characters worse, do you mean that I do so intentionally or unintentionally?

"I mean intentionally.

"Why, Meletos, are you at your age so much wiser than I at mine? You have <sup>overed</sup> discussed that bad people always have a bad effect and good people a good effect upon their nearest neighbors. Am I so hopelessly ignorant as to not even realize that by spoiling the character of one of my companions, I shall run the risk of getting some harm from him? Because nothing else would make me commit this great offense intentionally. No, I do not believe it, Meletos, and I do not suppose that anyone



else does. Either I have not a bad influence, or it is unintentional, so in either case your accusation is false. And if I unintentionally have a bad influence, the correct procedure in cases of such involuntary misdeamors is not to summon the culprit before this court but to take them aside privately for instruction and reproof because, obviously, if my eyes are opened I shall stop doing what I do not intend to do."

S: Now let us stop here. What Socrates says here is this: the charge is groundless. Why? Because no one corrupts willingly for no one wishes to be harmed. Everyone wishes to be benefited, but the good benefit and the bad harm. No one wishes to make others bad. No one wishes to corrupt others. So if Socrates corrupts others, he does it unintentionally. Socrates goes beyond that: if anyone corrupts anyone, he does it unintentionally. What is the consequence? Yes?

A: The law then would be meaningless.

S: Absolutely. Punishment would <sup>is</sup> be unjustified because—we can easily enlarge that and prove it from other dialogues—the thesis of Socrates was all sinning is involuntary. And involuntary sinning is not punishable. This thesis by itself leads to the denial of the legitimacy of punishment. Punishment is an irrational act of revenge—not more—which is of course a terrific assertion. If you are accused of undermining the polis, you say such an immensely valuable institution as the gallows and penitentiaries are irrational institutions, you destroy the city as far as it goes. He's very extreme. You see, Socrates is in one way very reticent and very polite and doesn't say things which are hard on the ear. What he in fact says is very harsh if you have ears for that. That is the consequence. The consequence is—you are perfectly right—no one can punish anyone rationally. But there is another thing. Not only the consequence is remarkable; the premise. What is the premise? No one wishes to be harmed. Everyone wishes to be benefited. That presupposes what?

A: It presupposes that the people can tell what will harm and what will benefit them.

S: Yes. Very good. <sup>more simple</sup> Now state it more generally because the implication of benefit and harm is specific. Everyone knows what good and bad is. Yes. Everyone knows what good is. But this was denied. Now if we do not know what good and bad is, we cannot teach others, we cannot improve others. Not only is punishment irrational, instruction too is irrational. That is the implication. That's fantastic. But we must really see where we can find some ground. We must see first ... look in that abyss. The conclusion which Socrates draws: since no one can punish and no one can instruct in matters of good and bad, and therefore there can also not be corruption in particular, the corruption charge is groundless. Groundless. You see, Socrates doesn't argue the matter out here on common sense grounds here. That's a fantastic thing in such a speech where only common sense would be in order; namely, everyone knows today what corruption means in a practical way. I mean, if you take Xenophon—who is much more pedestrian in these things than Plato—for example, one thing corrupting the young boys could mean a certain sexual misconduct. Xenophon even goes a bit out of his way to show that Socrates was a perfectly decent man in that respect. But it could also mean, for example, other things; to make them bad democrats. That was also discussed by Xenophon, you know, by his relation to Alcibiades and Critias, Socrates had a politically corrupting influence. Socrates doesn't speak of that here at all. He says the corruption charge is groundless but the grounds of this premise are demonstrated absolutely fantastic. They imply denial of the polis and of knowledge in any

significant sense. So.

Now we come to the impiety charge. Let us read the beginning of that. Yes! "Now then, men of Athens, this is then manifest what I said, that Meletos has not taken care to be concerned in these matters either much or little (i.e. not at all)." The constant pun on the name Meletos that reads like the Greek word for caring: the carer hasn't cared for educating. That goes with all the ... "Nevertheless tell us how do you say that I corrupt the young ones." You see, so now we come back to common sense, to the specific charge of corruption. Yes! Go on.

A: "True the terms of your indictment may be clear that you accuse me of teaching them to believe in new deities instead of the gods recognized by the state. Is not that the teaching of mine would you say has this demoralizing effect?"

S: O, that is really bad. Is this the Penguin? I retract my praise. "Is it not by teaching this that I corrupt?" The word corrupt is perfectly clear. In other words, what he does now—that is very important—he reduces the corruption charge to the impiety charge. The real thing is not the corruption charge; the real thing is the charge of impiety. And that is a point which must be stressed because Burnett, especially, did everything he could to minimize the impiety charge. The question does no longer concern knowledge. That is important. This Greek word which is ~~no longer translated~~ nomitizin. Socrates does not nomitizin the gods. Now nomitizin, that comes from the word nomos, but it has in itself roughly these two relevant meanings: not to worship the gods and not to believe in the gods. That is indistinguishable when you have such a nomitizin. It becomes distinguishable if it is said that Socrates does not nomitizin that the gods are. Then you must translate it, "does not believe," you know, because you cannot say "he does not worship that the gods are." It has this essential ambiguity. But now, the emphasis, as I say, is not knowledge. It is worship and/or belief. Now what do you call this? I don't know this word, to irritate a fellow so that he makes a statement by making of which he is licked. How do you ... ?

A: Provoke.

S: Provoke! Now Socrates says, "Well, do you mean to say that I do not believe in the gods of the city, but in some other gods of mine?" And Meletos says, "No. No gods at all. You are a straight atheist." Now after this point let us go on. "You strange (or marvelous) Meletos! Why do you say that? I do not believe that the sun and the moon are gods as the other human beings believe?" Yes! Go on.

A: "He certainly"...

S: "By Zeus," he says, "gentlemen of the jury, because he says that the sun is a stone and the moon is earth (or earthy)." Yes? Now what is that? That we must consider. Socrates has a kind of retreat, but he does not retreat. He says, granted for a moment that I don't believe in Zeus and Hera. I would at least believe in the sun and moon as gods, in what we call the cosmic gods. Some of you may remember our discussion about the Banquet where they played such a role. The cosmic gods, the gods which natural reason perceives to be gods. Self-moving and ~~and~~ splendid beings, visible gods, manifest, which everyone can see. The gods which all human beings believe in. How does Socrates answer to that? Meletos says, "No. He says <sup>they</sup> there are no gods, they are just inanimate things, stones and earth." And how does Socrates answer?

A: Shall I read?



S: Yes.

A: "Do you imagine you are prosecuting an Anaxagoras, my dear Meletos? Have you so poor an opinion of these gentlemen and do you assume them to be so illiterate as not to know that the writings of Anaxagoras are full of theories like these. And do you seriously suggest that it is from me that the young get these ideas when they can buy them on occasion at the market place for a shilling at most and so have a laugh on Socrates" ... (Laughter from the class.) That's the English translation.

S: Well, all right. We can translate ... Go on.

A: "... who claims them for his own, to say nothing of their being so silly. Tell me, honestly, Meletos, is that your opinion of me? Do I believe in no god?

"No, none at all. Not in the slightest degree."

S: Yes. Both swear, by the way. Socrates swears in his question addressed to Meletos and Meletos ... And "by Zeus," each of them. Now, not even the cosmic gods Socrates believes, which all men believed in. Socrates does not prove—that much has become clear—that he believes in the gods which the city believes in, because that had been ruled out. Granted or not granted. The question is now only the cosmic gods. And what does he say regarding the cosmic gods? Well, he uses at least an argument. And the argument is, "I am not an Anaxagoras. An Anaxagoras is a fellow who is an atheist, but not I." Not I. That's all. So, in other words, that Socrates believes in the cosmic gods is a bit more plausible, to speak cautiously, than that he believes in the Olympian gods. I cannot repeat an argument which I developed at some length when we discussed the Banquet last time. Anaxagoras was an atheist. By stating his views in writing, as we've seen, Anaxagoras was corrupting the young or, at least, trying to corrupt the young. Now we know what corruption is, don't we? What does corruption mean now?

A: Impiety.

S: Impiety. Yes. But impiety, not believing, and that comes from nomos. The standard is the nomos. No one knows whether the gods are and, in particular, whether the sun and moon are not just stones and other inanimate things. The nomos; perhaps a kind of universal nomos. It says that. We must first conclude the discussion of this argument before we turn to a general discussion, if we still have time.

Now how does the argument go on from here? In other words, Socrates argues then as follows: you have never heard me say, all right, the sun and moon are inanimate things. By what right can you accuse me of that? You have no leg to stand on. And now Socrates turns the table and says, I can prove to you now that I do believe in the gods of the city from your own charge of impiety. Socrates believes in other new demonic things. That was admitted by the accuser and that is a simple piece of forensic rhetoric. He who believes in horsey things believes that there are horses. He who believes in elephantine things believes that there are elephants. And, therefore, he who believes in demonic things believes that there are demons. There cannot be demonic things if there are no demons. What are demons? Demons are either gods or children of gods. In either way, a man who believes in demons believes in gods. But which are the gods who are generated, especially by the intercourse of human beings and gods, and are more particularly called demons in contradistinction to gods? Which are these gods? The sun and moon? No. The

Olympian gods. That's it. And Socrates uses the rather blasphemous example of mules. He who admits mules are asses--as they are called here--admits that there are horses and asses. Therefore someone who believes in beings created by the mixture of gods and men believes that there are gods. In other words, that argument doesn't prove anything. It only proves that Socrates was a much better rhetorician than the man who formulated the charge. The charge of impiety is not refuted in any way. The only part of the argument which has an element of proof is that regarding the cosmic gods because these are something which we human beings--meaning all human beings with the exception of some freaks like Anaxagoras--believe in. So we cannot obviate that.

Go beyond

So this is the defense. I mean, the other things are a defense of Socrates' way of life--you know, a justification--but they are not the defense against the charge. That's the refutation of the charge. But that is the least important thing about the Apology, though it is by no means negligible. Socrates' whole presentation, which is underlined all through the explicit interpretation of the refutation charge, is that his wisdom consists in ignorance, in knowledge of his ignorance. By the way, you see how important this issue of the cosmic gods is. I mean, after all the gravest charge is to be an atheist. It is a less grave charge not to believe in the gods of the city, obviously. So the graver charge of atheism would mean to deny that the sun and moon are gods. How could a man arrive at this conclusion, that the sun is merely a stone? How could he arrive at that conclusion? What would he have to do? Astronomy. What Socrates was accused of doing, you know; walking on the air and looking around and down on the sun. That was what he was said to have done in the Clouds. So the astronomy issue is, of course, important.

Socrates knows then nothing of the greatest things, neither of the gods nor of the good. How then can he live? That's the question. How can he live? Because it is easy to say, to show, that every knowledge which he does possess, for example that he's an Athenian citizen and married to Xanthippe and what have you, that this does not permit him to live because how should he conduct himself as an Athenian citizen and as a husband of Xanthippe and all other things? The guiding questions, or the crucial questions, he cannot answer. How can he live, as far as we see up to now? What is his wisdom? You know that by now. In what does his wisdom consist, according to his own declaration? Miss Hill?

A: In knowing of his ignorance; in knowing what he doesn't know.

S: Yes. In knowledge of his ignorance regarding the greatest things. But, all right, what does it lead to, the knowledge of his ignorance? What follows if he knows that he's ignorant?

A: An attempt to remedy the situation, to acquire ...

S: Yes. But let us assume that this is impossible for some reason or other. That appears to be the way in which the issue is stated here. Well?

A: Great caution?

S: Yes. Not to assent. Not to assent to what he does not know. Not to nomizein. Yes? Not to believe. Not to believe because he doesn't know. But examine, again and again, see whether one cannot perhaps know and yet (properly bring that back to some.) But there is an alternative. The first is not nomizein. And the other is? The only alternative.... Nomizein! Believing in and accepting the nomos. Living

(probably be brought back to the same result.)(?)



by the nomos. That is of course partly ... Also, you know, the oracle, and so on. That is not the last word, but we are speaking now only of what has appeared up to now. You want to say something?

A: Well, I'm not sure. But to know and to believe, they aren't the same thing.

S: No. All right. What is the difference as it has come to light here? That's a very long question because this word ... I mean, belief has here this rather innocent use. For example, <sup>someone</sup> he says, X is in the hospital. I don't believe he is. I have seen him around this morning. You know? That is not a solemn meaning. But believing surely means here to assent to something of which one does not know that it is true. Knowledge is used here rather not in any technical sense, although the technical sense is not excluded. To repeat, Socrates does of course not say, "I know that I know nothing" literally understood, because he knows that he's accused among other things. But he says that he is ignorant regarding the most important things. And these most important things are obviously the gods and the good, whatever the relation between the gods and the good may be. Did I answer your question? Yes?

A: To know what he does not know would imply that he knows what it would be like to know something and I don't understand how these seemingly two statements reconcile with one another.

S: Yes, but is it not ... You are perfectly right. One would have to go beyond <sup>I have to know</sup> that but, let us first take what you said. In order to say that I know that I do not know what knowledge is. Yes. That is true. But is this not also possible, to have a common sensible knowledge of knowledge, as distinguished from a ~~poorly~~ <sup>fully</sup> developed knowledge of knowledge? I mean, for example, this: ~~there is a disagreement about~~ <sup>one</sup> says something to the common-sensical man and the other says, "I know it. I have <sup>seen</sup> it." Yes? Good. I mean, we don't go into a very subtle question how such knowledge is possible, <sup>through sense perception, or so on</sup>. We all understand whether it makes sense. All right. And we also know that there is a kind of legitimate <sup>inference</sup> ~~reference~~ <sup>inferring</sup> ~~reason~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~without having developed the doctrine of the syllogism, we can see that someone contradicts himself.~~ So we can also see that someone makes assertions and that they are formally untenable like Melitos here who says Socrates doesn't believe in gods but believes in demons, yes? That doesn't require a developed ~~epistemology~~ <sup>epistemology</sup>. But I would go even further to answer your question and say, if I say I do not know the most important things, I know what the most important things are. That is very plain. But the most important things appear to be the gods and the good. Now can one not prove that these are the most important things? I mean, on the basis of our everyday knowledge which no sensible man would ever question, can we not prove that? I mean, that is of the utmost importance for human life as a whole whether there are or there are not gods.

A: But are the gods so important? Or the fact of their being gods or the <sup>effect</sup> ~~fact~~ that their being gods has on <sup>men</sup> ~~them~~?

S: What do you take ... All right. Let us then specify it and say Socrates doesn't know what is most important for man. Let us forget about the gods for the time being and speak of the good. If you do not know what the good is, you cannot act rationally. I mean, you don't know what to choose, whether one should rather commit suicide or do what this principal did, shooting the young kid. If we are really ignorant regarding the good ... (inadvisable)

A: This kind of mores wouldn't seem to be confined to mortal man, <sup>one</sup> ~~would it?~~ <sup>only</sup>

S: Well, Meletos says, all Athenians, yes? And Socrates looks around and asks some Greek, a normal citizen, "How do you know this?" Well, ultimately he did tell something, "This is how our fathers lived." And then Socrates can fight and say, "Well, your fathers also said certain things about the distance from Athens to Sparta for example—this kind of thing—that you know now isn't true." So in tradition one can say that. All right. And then we go on. How does he know? And it proves to be something like traditions of the fathers and that is not sufficient. I mean, although this ...

Q: But the gods, in other words, can prove something that is otherwise unprovable.

S: That would be one way. That would be one way to say the answer to the question ("What is good?" can be proven by the gods and therefore there must be gods. Yes, but still, that would have to be established. How do we know that there are gods? Now if the gods are questionable, that means the good would become questionable on that ground, too. We don't know.

How can Socrates live? And up to this point, we cannot say more than there is this alternative: either in obeying the nomos, the nomos who claims to know and who is surely more respected than any chance human being. Surely it is questionable, but at least it makes some popular sense. And then the alternative is not to act. And that is what Socrates is going to say immediately after that: I did not act. I mean, he says, first, act politically but then he enlarges it. He did not act. But obviously one cannot be literally accused for something else. And he went to the war and then to the jury and so on. So that cannot be quite literally true. But we must face that: we see at this point that Socrates knew that difficulty which is now calling us in the social sciences, only it is much broader and it is not stated in terms of value judgments as it is here, but that is implied. What was the way in which he found out? Somehow it seems, up to this point, that it was precisely the reflection of his ignorance, his not knowing, of the good which led him out of the wilderness. Whether that can become fully clear from the Apology, we must see, but surely that must become clearer than it is now from the rest of the work. Did I answer you? I mean, at least to the extent that I pointed to the way which we have to take now. So

So the question is stated in this work with a very great radicalism. Punishment. It is suggested that punishment, if it is to be rational, would of course presuppose knowledge of good. And instruction, also, as distinguished from punishment. You remember the distinction in Aristophanes re making people winged by words and whippings. That is this same distinction. Both are impossible as rational methods. Yes, but it goes beyond that. Look at the punitive systems. It is generally assumed that among the modes of punishment which men inflict on one another, capital punishment is the worst. I do not wish to go now into the niceties of gradation among capital punishment—you know, drawing and quartering and hanging—but let us leave it at the general statement that capital punishment is generally regarded as much worse than a fine, a money fine, or imprisonment and so on. What does this presuppose? Knowledge! That life is of a much higher value than freedom to circulate and money. We presuppose that life is valuable. On reflection, we would perhaps say it is not necessarily the highest value, but it is surely a very high value. And all of it, too. The tremendous medical establishments are a proof of how highly we value our life. Toward the end of this book it is suggested that death being death, being asleep with dreams is perhaps better than almost everything which we esteem. But not everything. Because if you say, for example, that not life is the highest thing, but virtue. All right. But virtue means, of course, virtue of a living human being. Or if you take Socrates' special assertion, the philosophic life, the life of examination, is



the best. That becomes questionable by this question: is not death, as dreamless sleep which is distinguishable of course from simple non-being, one night ... One long night is better than the day. If that becomes a question, everything is a question, everything becomes questionable. And yet the paradoxical fact is, Socrates, in spite of this, has dedicated especially his whole life to what he regarded as the one thing he knew and somehow, in place of knowledge, this human wisdom. And we must read what he did, how he succeeded. Mr. Gilman?

A: Did Socrates rest content with a common sense understanding of what knowledge is any more than he had common sense understanding of what a good and evil human being was, in the last analysis? A tentative answer to this question is that there was a common sense understanding of knowledge of ignorance which he is not ... There is also a common sense understanding of good and bad.

S: Let me put it this way. I would draw this conclusion from what you say: would one not have to go beyond that what I said? Socrates has knowledge of ... You see, that is not mere common sense knowledge. For example, let us take the simple case of Socrates' refutation of Meletos, yes? Let us take the statement of Meletos and as it stands, that this is self-contradictory and therefore absurd as knowledge and no other knowledge which you acquire from studying, say from logic and so on, could improve that knowledge as regarding the self-contradictory character of Meletos' statement. And therefore it is more than common sense knowledge. The alternative would be this: to say that Socrates does not know he does not know but that he only opines that he does not know—that was a line taken by from a certain skeptical school who reads Plato—and Socrates contradicted himself by claiming to know his ignorance. Socrates did not contradict himself. And, at any rate, that is exactly the difference between Socrates and skepticism because, as you observe, that whenever the mere ... The fact that some knowledge is possible is admitted by Socrates. That alone can be the cure for his problem. And of course the question would be, even to establish that, what are those people who say we do not have any knowledge—the real skeptics. Is this not a tenable position? And I think that is implied in the work of Plato, not developed in this one, but implied throughout, that skepticism proper is impossible. And one only has to look at the simple fact that all skepticism uses arguments to show that we do not know. And these arguments all imply knowledge, very simply. One old doctrine of skepticism is the unreliability of the senses. They give specimens of that. They never speak of the errors of our ears regarding sounds and of our eyes regarding colors. I'm sorry! Of our eyes regarding sounds and of our ears regarding colors. They know that the hearing has its object sounds and that the sight has its object colors and so on. All skepticism thrives on presupposed knowledge. Whether this is knowledge in the highest sense, that is another matter. Without it no possible argument, and here has no human position of any kind, this thinking.

What Socrates implies, naturally, and we must see later on whether we can bring this out, is that this knowledge—which no one can reject—does not necessarily give us an indication as to what is good and bad. And that is, of course, what he said. Ultimately, the Socratic argument will have to be a recourse to the nature of man. But we must see to what extent this is clear. The references of it are there from the very beginning, when he uses these homely similes; if you had acquired colts or calves, and now you have acquired sons. Sons are not calves; men are not brutes. That gives us a key. What is good we mean primarily what is good for man and what man is and what is characteristic of man is basically the answer for what is good. Ultimately the basis for

Yes, I think we must turn to that next time. We will have a report by Mr. Strickland,

yes, Mr. Steinfager. I always miss you because your names begin both with St. And Mr. Johnson, you will ... And a week later, Mr. Berger will report on the Crito. O, you did it. Well, otherwise, Mr. White--one of you will read it and the other will hand it in. That will give you a week from Monday.



dweller. And you keep your young people massed together like a herd of colts at grass. None of you takes his own colt, dragging him away from his fellows in spite of his fretting and fuming, and puts a special groom in charge of him, and trains him by rubbing him down and stroking him and using all the means proper to child-nursing, so that he may turn out not only a good soldier but also a good man able to manage city and cities." You see, the Spartan education is mass education--of course, not what we understand today by mass education but of herds, of herds. The true education is that of an individual with a private tutor who cares for him alone. Callias' position is inbetween. He seeks a tutor for his two sons. Therefore, that is a symbol of the fact that the virtue which his sons are going to achieve are those belonging to the virtue of a human being and of a citizen. The virtue of a human being simply would be that of the individual; that of a citizen, of a group. Two is inbetween.

Now let us begin at ZLB 9, at the moment where Socrates begins his examination of his fellow-citizens. Yes? Whoever has it, read it. "I went to one of those who are supposed to be wise so that I could refute the oracle there in front of him, showing to the oracle that this one is wiser than I, but you, the oracle, said I was wise." Do you have that?

A: "I went first to a man who had a high reputation for wisdom. I felt that here, if anywhere, I should succeed in disproving the oracle and pointing out to my divine authority, 'You said that I was the wisest of men, but here is a man who is wiser than I am.' Well, I gave a thorough examination to this person--I need not mention his name, but it was one of our politicians that I was studying when I had this experience--and in conversation with him I formed the impression that although in many people's opinion, and especially in his own, he appeared to be wise, in fact he was not; that when I began to try to show him that he only thought he was wise and was not really so, my efforts were to be resented, both by him and by many of the other people present. However, I reflected as I walked away, I am certainly wiser than this man. It is only too likely that neither of us has any knowledge of book-stuff but he thinks that he knows something which he does not know, whereas I am quite conscious of my ignorance. At any rate, it seems that I am wiser than he is to this small extent, that I do not think that I know what I do not know."

"After this I went on to interview a man with an even greater reputation for wisdom. And I formed the same impression again. And here too I incurred the resentment of the man himself and a number of others."

S: Yes. Let us stop here. Many of them, many others. So the first examination is then upon the political man. There is one expression which is crucial: neither of us, he says, seems to know anything noble and good. Anything noble and good. In other words, no one is completely ignorant. For example, clearly each knows that the other is a human being and that they are in the city of Athens and so on. The word knowledge is here used in the widest sense that they know nothing worthwhile. Nothing noble and good. And one can also say this implies also they do not know what the noble and the good is. And that is the greatest implication as will appear later. Let us read the immediate sequel where we left off. We cannot possibly read the whole.

A: "From that time on I interviewed one person after another. I realized with distress and alarm that I was making myself unpopular but I felt compelled to put my" ...

A: Was it an attempt to avoid using the name of a god?

S: Answer yourself.

A: Yes.

S: No! Because <sup>he</sup> ~~it~~ says all the time "by Zeus" and "by Hera." I think he swears in this very writing somewhere, "By Zeus." But he says "by Zeus" all the time. No. That can't be true. There is in the Gorgias, 482B, there is a little explanation: "By the dog god of the Egyptians"; that gives us some indication. Who were the Egyptians, I mean apart from the fact that they dwelled in the Nile Valley and built pyramids? The Egyptians were presented in Herodotus' great work as men of excessive piety. They worshipped anything and one could first say that is a part of the fact that Socrates has a kind of extreme piety that he worshipped that. There is a funny passage in the dialogue Lysis, 211E, which I will read: "One <sup>was</sup> to get possession of horses, another dogs, another money, and another honor. Of these things I care little. But for the possession of friends I have quite a passionate longing and <sup>who</sup> ~~rather~~ rather obtain a good friend than the best quail or cock in the world, yes, by Zeus, rather than any horse or dog (meaning these which are infinitely more valuable than a quail or cock). By Zeus, rather than a horse or dog. I believe even, by the dog, that rather than all ~~their~~ <sup>Persian</sup> gold, the Persian kings' gold, I would choose to gain or be a comrade." You see, you have the two together--by Zeus, by the dog. And in the connection he mentions dogs as a rather desirable possession. A dog is mentioned together with a horse. Xenophon, as I said, never mentions this oath of Socrates. But he does something equivalent. He tells the story of a man who has a herd threatened by wolves and he seeks a dog to protect the herd. And then there is a conversation, if I remember well, between the dog and the wolf and then a conversation between the dog and someone else and then the dog swears by Zeus. That was the difference between Plato and Xenophon, this little difference.

But what really does it mean if we do not take this ironical excessive piety too seriously? ~~this~~ I believe it is a joke and, in a way, a rather annoying joke but I cannot prove that. I mean there are certain suggestions in the prooimion which brought Euthyphro me to believe that but I don't know whether it would stand up under analysis of all the passages. It is a kind of joke at vulgar piety; the belief in Zeus, Hera and so on. Socrates, I believe, said this: "You talk all the time about these gods as if you knew them. The poets tell stories as if they had been present. They are presented as beings who take a special interest in men, are very much concerned with men. Now examine that. You say that the gods are a species of living beings who care for men. You don't know that. Very profound studies would be needed to prove such beings care for men. But there is one species of <sup>living</sup> human being which is empirically known to everyone as caring for men. One species only. And what is that? It's really in itself an extraordinary fact. The dogs." The dogs are the only species who take to men in that way. That's strange. I think that is part of the story; part, I don't know whether that's the whole.

Now Socrates turns to the poets but, you see, to <sup>what</sup> ~~all~~ kinds of poets? To the poets of tragedies, and of dithyrambs and the others. Well. In a way he means of course all poets but it is very remarkable that he does not mention here the comic poet. Now what about the wisdom of the poets, which was much more admirable than that of the politicians? What did we see here? Now let us read that. "I take up their poems which seem to be most carefully made by them." Yes?

A: "I used to pick up what I thought were some of their most perfect works and



question them closely about the meaning of what they had written in the hope of incidentally enlarging my own knowledge. Well, gentlemen, I hesitate to tell you the truth, but it must be told. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that any of the by-standers could have explained those poems better than their actual authors. So I soon made up my mind about the poets too. I decided that it was not wisdom that enabled them to write their poetry, but a kind of instinct or inspiration."

S: Yes. "By some nature," more literally translated. "By some nature and god possessed." Yes?

A: "Such as you <sup>kind</sup> see in seers and prophets who deliver all their sublime messages without knowing in the least what they mean. It seemed clear to me that the poets were in much the same case. And I also observed that the very fact that they were poets made them think that they had a perfect understanding of all <sup>these</sup> subjects of which they were totally ignorant. So I left that line of inquiry too with the same sense of advantage that I had felt in the case of the politicians."

S: Yes. The poets understand their own doings less than the hearers. The poets work not by wisdom but by some nature and inspiration. Like whom? Like some other human beings.

A: Priests?

S: Yes, priests not exactly, but like the soothsayers and like the iocra. <sup>Chactephon</sup> You remember Socrates hadn't heard this from Apollo. He had heard it from iocra. Socrates, by believing in the oracle, Socrates believes in the utterances of an unwise being because what is true of the poets is true of the prophetess in Delphi, too. Yet he examines these utterances of an unwise being, which is his wisdom. He is wiser than the prophetess, than the oracle. The result of all these things is that Socrates is hated and envied, but also--that's always the other side of it--a certain feeling of superiority on Socrates' side. He's free from that delusion himself. You see, the poets <sup>with a</sup> ~~lose~~ <sup>inspiration is</sup> ~~lose~~ <sup>central</sup> ~~the center~~ <sup>central</sup> part, the center part, and it is quite the widest ~~center~~ <sup>central</sup> part because it throws light on the problem of the oracle and the oracle is the starting point of the whole thing. <sup>By this</sup> This

Now the third stage, the artisans--the manual workers one could almost say. What happened there. Now they possessed knowledge. The shoemaker knows why he does what he does, whereas the poet, according to this description, does not know what he does. But they believe that they are wise in the greatest things and there they are absolutely wrong. They have a limited wisdom, but they claim to be <sup>simply</sup> wiser <sup>and</sup> than they are. Now this passage, this third sentence that goes, "But, O Athenians, they seemed to me to have the same defect as the poets." Do you have that?

A: "But, gentlemen, each professional expert seemed to share the same failings which I had noticed in the poets. I mean" ...

S: No, no. That is not correct. There is something else. "The poets and the good craftsmen." He omitted that. The good craftsmen. He spoke here, let us say, of the mandarin artisans, if I may try to bring out the meaning of the Greek word for craftsmen, which I have said before (demeagogoi?), that is also used for craftsman but it has a wider meaning. So it can also be used in the sense of magistrate. Literally it means something like people who work in the multitude, in the demos, but this <sup>time it is</sup> ~~time it is~~ not only the shoemakers, <sup>they are also</sup> ~~there were~~ the magistrates. And you only have to look up this word in the English dictionary <sup>and</sup> ~~will~~ see that this is a term ... The meaning of magistrate occurs in Thucydides and other classical writings, to say nothing of inscriptions. The politicians too are a kind of craftsmen. The politicians too do have a techné, an art, the good ones. But what Socrates says here is also implied. Just as Socrates lacks the wisdom of the astronomers and he lacks the wisdom of the educators, he also lacks the wisdom of the statesmen.

That's important. And needless to say that he lacks the wisdom of the craftsmen in the simple sense because he's not a shoemaker and so on. All these men, even the good statesmen, have some wisdom but not the wisdom regarded in the highest sense. Many Athenians are wiser than Socrates. They all have a sphere in which they are competent, in which they can give reasons why they do what they do. But these Athenians are wiser than Socrates in a partial sense, in little things. He is wiser than all Athenians in the greatest things because he knows that he has no knowledge of them. But don't overlook the claim which Socrates makes while being prosecuted for a capital crime. "I am wiser," he says, "than all of you." Imagine. Such insolence! Xenophon puts it that Socrates' defense speech was famous because of the big mouth, one could almost translate, which he had. Megalalithia, which is a derogatory term for talking big. He was talking big.

So he does not flatter his accusers or judges. This is the end of the examination. I mentioned last time that Socrates did not examine the astronomers and the Sophists. At least not according to this report. The people for one of whom he could be mistaken. Why did he not examine them? The oracle, of course. The Delphic god, by implication, denies the wisdom of the astronomers and the Sophists by saying no one is wiser than Socrates. But the verdict of the Delphian god cannot be accepted without examination, as we have seen, and in this most important respect, the oracle was not examined. If we knew only the Apology—and the simple listener, the intelligent listener to Socrates' defense knew only the Apology—no writings of Socrates and they never talked to Socrates--this really must be debatable, this point.

bewildering

I repeat then the question: What is the content of Socrates' wisdom? Let us read the answer which he gives in the immediate sequel, 23A 5, "But in this respect the god seems in truth to be wise and in this oracle to make this assertion, that human wisdom is of little or no worth." Do you have that?

pretty certainly

A: Yes. "But the truth of the matter, gentlemen, is this: that real wisdom is the property of gods and this oracle is his way of telling us that human wisdom has little or no value. It seems to me that he is not referring literally to Socrates but has merely taken my name as an example as if he would say to us, the wisest of you men is he who has realized like Socrates that in respect to wisdom he is really worthless."

S: Yes. So Socrates possesses human wisdom, i.e., wisdom of little or no value. This human wisdom is distinguished from wisdom proper, which would be super-human, as with the gods have it or the astronomers and Sophists may have it for all we know. Yet to become aware of this ignorance regarding the greatest things and to make others aware of it is service to the gods, as is said in the immediate sequel. A service. Now we could read this up to this point as follows: Human wisdom is identical with humility, but on the other hand, lest we misunderstand this sentence in a biblical sense, humility is nothing to be proud of, if I may express myself comically or contradictorily, if you want. In other words, this humility is simply a sobriety, to be aware of your ignorance. But then Socrates uses a somewhat different expression. Let us read the immediate sequel where we left off.

A: "That is why I still go about seeking and searching in obedience to the divine command. If I think that anyone is wise but is since no stranger" ...

Whether Citizen Or

S: You see, there is here a careful reference to these strangers which would include Gorgias and (Prodicus and Hippias but nothing is said about Protagoras.) Yes?



A: "And when I think that any person is not wise, I try to help the cause of the god by proving that he is not."

S: Yes, more literally, "I assist the god," "I come to the help of the god." That is important. This service to the god is an assistance to the god. Now as an assistance to the god it is of course something to be proud of. Not everyone can assist Apollo. Why does the god need assistance? Why does he need it? I mean, what we have seen before. We have here a practical example here before of why Apollo needs assistance. He needs no assistance for inspiring the Pythia. That he takes care of. But once the Pythia has spoken, what happens next? The oracles were famous for their ambiguity, for their obscurity, for their lack of clarity. The god cannot produce that, or will not produce that, and the men need clarity and this is done by a human examination. In this sense, the god needs assistance. Yes?

A: Is not Socrates' using the oracle ... Could it not be interpreted as simply Socrates' irony towards the audience here? On the one hand, he's being tried for impiety and on the other hand he claims that everything he does is the expression of his duty to the god.

S: You are, I think, ninety-nine per cent correct. Let me state this as clearly as I can. In a strict sense, everything is ironical in a Platonic dialogue. Ironical ~~wonder-if it~~ doesn't mean sneering, or this kind of thing. What does irony mean originally? We have to go back to the <sup>original meaning</sup> ~~origination~~. Originally, simply a device; it means dissimulation. And it is applied—I wonder if it is applied in the Clouds? Or is it in another comic fragment? I don't know—to Socrates. But then it acquires, through Socrates, a good meaning. Dissimulation has a good meaning if there is a noble dissimulation. Now in this sense the word is used by Aristotle when he speaks of the magnanimous man in the Ethics. A magnanimous man is ironical toward the many. What does this mean? The magnanimous man, as Aristotle defined it, is a man who possesses all virtues, and is aware of them. So the magnanimous man is a man of noble pride about his achievements, you can say. But when speaking to the many, to people without achievements, he dissembles his superiority. That is his humanity. So noble dissimulation means to dissimulate one's superiority. It does not consist in saying to a man who is blind, "What wonderful eyes you have," or to a man with any other defect ... But it is dissimulation of superiority on the part of a superior man. Now that applies especially to that kind of superiority which the ancient thinkers regarded as the highest; namely, wisdom. Irony, in the Socratic sense, is dissembling one's wisdom in the sense of one's superiority. But what does it mean, to dissemble one's wisdom? To present oneself as less intelligent than one is. And that is of course what Socrates, in a way, does; I mean, the famous story, "I don't know," and Socrates asks questions, never answers them, these famous stories. That is irony in one way, but one must see the background of the humanity in it. And whenever Socrates speaks to anyone in the dialogues, he speaks with a view to what the other fellow can understand or what will be useful to that man. That is the irony. Now if this is fundamental irony, everything is ironic. Can you repeat your statement now, Mr. Faulkner?

A: I think I stated, or implied, that he uses the oracle, more or less, in a way, simply as a joke on the Athenian people.

S: Sure, sure. I mean, that is clear. I find it that way too. But that doesn't dispose of the problem because you have only to generalize that. You have here an unwise saying; I mean, a saying going back to a human being who did not know what she was saying. And this proves to be wiser than she could have thought. But is this not so? I mean, let's generalize. Let's forget about the oracle. Is this

not our human situation regarding knowledge altogether if you generalize that? We are opposed to certain things. Opinions are embodied in our institutions, in our <sup>beliefs</sup> ~~points~~, in the very terms of our languages. And the language doesn't know why. And the opinions don't know why. But then they prove to make sense on examination. All our <sup>and here it is</sup> ~~intensive~~ knowledge are preceded by opinions which <sup>we have not made</sup> ~~we estimate~~ and which are not fully wise, because they don't know why, but which embody wisdom. To come to present day <sup>we replace for one moment</sup> the oracle by tradition. Socrates doesn't accept traditions in this sense, but he doesn't reject them either. They contain some wisdom and perhaps much wisdom--that depends on what kind of tradition. So I think we have to take this more seriously. That Socrates did not believe the <sup>Pythia</sup> ~~Pythia~~ and Apollo, <sup>I would take that</sup> ~~for granted~~ and so, it is not a merely joking. In Plato's seriousness, there is always playfulness. But also vice versa--in all his playfulness, there is seriousness. I mean, this is an apology, a very solemn thing, is in a way a grotesque comedy. You can isolate the comedy, very easily; that Socrates here doesn't refute the charge, that in a way he tells them, what you know about me from Aristophanes, if you read it with some care, that is all true except Strepsiades. I never did such a foolish thing. Only it is no longer true now. That I did when I was much younger. This is in a way suggested. And many other things. The whole conversation with Meletos, that is simple comedy. You know, the accusation is self-contradictory. He doesn't even have to prove that he believes in the gods because the accusation admits that he believes in the gods. And so, on. But on the other hand, the playful is also not merely that. Therefore, it is never sufficient to say it's ironical. Never. Yes?

A: I have a question. It says "god," and in my book it's singular. Now in the translation should it be gods or does he refer to it as god?

S: That's a very good point and a very important point. There are people who would, and I believe most of them would, translate in their translation when god <sup>occurs</sup> ~~appears~~ in the singular, God with a capital G and when it <sup>occurs</sup> ~~appears~~ in the plural, of course, gods with a small g. That is misleading, because this distinction as we know it through the Biblical <sup>distinction</sup> ~~distinction~~ between the one true God and the many false gods is of course not a Greek distinction in this way. I mean even those who were in a way monotheists like Plato admitted also other gods. I mean, they were not simply monotheists. I mean they didn't accept Zeus and Hera, but they had <sup>for example</sup> ~~the gods~~ the Greek word, when it occurs, hathēos, the god, that may mean--and means in many cases--that particular god we are speaking about, Apollo. I mean, in the perfect translation--which of course doesn't exist--it would have to be translated "the god" with a small g. And of course it may also be without the article. Then I would translate it ~~as "god"~~ <sup>as "god"</sup>. Also written with a capital G, not suggest more than the text really says. The god could also be of course, the highest god, the ~~ruler~~ ruler of the universe. That could very well be. That depends on the context. But the god may very well mean the god in question. You know, on some occasions it may be Apollo, in other cases may be Dionysus or whatever it may be. Yes? Good.

Q: How does he know that he should assist the god and point out to others that they're not wise? Isn't it enough just to find out that they aren't wise without pointing it out to them when in pointing it out to them he's arousing their enmity?

S: He takes up that question later. That belongs to that broad question toward which I'm working my way. What does Socrates know? How can he live if, <sup>as he claims</sup> ~~as he claims~~ glance, he does not know anything? The fact that he knows that he's an Athenian citizen does not even prove that he should obey the laws of Athens because there is still the question, should one obey the laws. But I'll answer your question as you stated it. How does he know? He knows, believes that the god must say the



truth, yes? It is not right for <sup>he wants to find out.</sup> you to lie, he says. But what the god says <sup>literally</sup> here, as he understands it, is manifestly not true. I mean, as far as he knows, that he should be the wisest. And the ~~answer: Why not?~~ <sup>answer: Why not?</sup> You can ~~take~~ <sup>take</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>it's</sup> mere curiosity ~~philosophy~~ <sup>with him</sup>. But when by the examination the god proves to be right, the prestige of the god increases and he has a feeling that this means this obscure and ~~apparently~~ <sup>apparently</sup> absurd statement, that Socrates is wiser than the others, is true and therefore it includes an incentive, an injunction, to Socrates always to go through that process by which the god's hidden wisdom becomes manifest. And that is what he did.

Q: But <sup>need</sup> ~~didn't~~ he point out to others that they are unwise?

S: Generally, you see, that is so. He is not concerned with others. He is concerned with the god and him but he cannot find out the truth of the god's statement—Socrates is wiser than the others—except by looking at the others and finding out by conversations with them that they are less wise.

Q: But what I mean is, can't he examine them, talk to them, and thereby prove to himself without then going outright and telling them whether they are wise or not?

S: No, he doesn't have to tell them. It is sufficient ... They say something, "I know it is absolutely true," and Socrates says, "How do you know, what are your reasons?" And then Socrates says, "Let's look at these reasons. Reason number one is wrong; reason number three is wrong." So. If he would be perfectly silent <sup>humili-  
1.4+21</sup> at that point, then Socrates would ~~not~~ become "unpopular" with that man. I mean, that cannot be avoided. As a very misanthropic man once said, Hobbes: To disagree with a man means tacitly to accuse him of ignorance. And you would be surprised how perceptive and sensitive many people who otherwise are not perceptive at all are on this matter. That is vulgarly known as vanity, but that is unfortunately a part of the human scene.

Q: But if we leave aside for a second the possibility that the people who convict Socrates have been hurt by him and want to get back at him, isn't it quite possible that Socrates has misread the knowledge level of the audience in the sense that he either overrates them or underrates them? In fact, his irony is discovered; it's not irony, it's actually sarcasm. I mean, last semester we were talking about this in the other dialogue. When the other person realizes that it's irony on your part, it becomes sarcasm and insolence.

S: Insolence. Insolence. Sure. Yes, but then, what would follow? That Socrates would not dispose of the enmity, of the hatred of him. He would only confirm it and perhaps to increase it. Yes? That seems to have happened. And that would raise the question, is Socrates not responsible for his own condemnation? That is a moot question because, on the other hand, is it not so that Socrates tells them in a language which they can understand, "I cannot live differently than I live." What is this? I believe it is true. He could not live differently than he lived and since his way of life created the hatred he had to bear the consequences. We come to that later.

Now Socrates' service, or assistance, to the god has the consequence that Socrates has no political or domestic activity—he has no time—and hence he lives in ten-thousand-fold poverty. He uses this suggestion of very great wealth—ten thousand—in order to bring out ... How would I put that in <sup>English?</sup> I don't know a good English parallel to that. In ten-thousand-fold poverty.

A: A college professor?

S: Yes, it would be that! Some of them live even in much-less-fold poverty. I mean, some get much less than ten thousand as you can see from these Statistics. You could say perhaps, he lives in one of the highest poverty brackets in the country. And that is very strange. Although he lives as such a poor man, his companions are the sons of the wealthiest. Of the wealthiest men. This, incidentally, answers a simple question which we must be realistic enough to raise: what were the sources of Socrates' livelihood? Although he didn't work, he didn't ignore that he has to live. An absolutely proper question, it seems to me. I think it is answered most beautifully in Xenophon's Oeconomicus which deals with economics--with private economics, that is--and therefore, since Socrates is a teacher of economics, we have to apply the question to him. And I think the answer is the question in a brief discussion at the beginning where they say what is money, what is property, and by virtue of a very sophisticated definition of property, they arrived at the conclusion that friends may be money. That was Socrates' money. He had these wealthy people. I mean, with good breeding externally, but still ... And they of course made Socrates the more hated because they thought it was very great fun to go to a pompous ass and with all decorations and dignities and then to show him up. Well, it redounded to Socrates' unpopularity. You remember the previous statement about the older comrade of Socrates, Chairephon, who was a friend of the multitude and that's a different generation. The consequence of this story--that Socrates was accompanied by these young and wealthy men--is that he corrupted the young because these dignitaries, naturally, didn't think that this was the right thing to do but it was a luxury.

Now being young men and wealthy they were of course insolent. That is a common experience

Corruption

Now in this connection, the calumny against Socrates is reformulated, in 23E, 5 to 7. Now these unmasked men say that what people say--because they can't possibly say, "He has found me out," so they must calumniate--so the worst they can say about him, what is generally said about all philosophers; namely, the things aloft and those under the earth and not believing in the gods and making the weaker speech stronger. You see, not believing in the gods is now in the center because ... We come back, we will see that this is the crucial issue later. And then he speaks of the three accusers by name--Meletos, Anytus and Lycon. Meletos spoke for the poets, was angry on behalf of the poets; Anytus was angry on behalf of the craftsmen and politicians; and Lycon on behalf of the orators. So the orators are now added, as you see, and the artisans and politicians are represented by one and the same man. Both artisans and politicians have to do with the demos. Either they belong to the demos, as the artisans proper, or they work in the demos or on the demos, the politicians. Anytus is in the middle. He seems to have been the most important of the three as is shown also by the dialogue Meno.

Now then, Socrates turns to the defense against the present accusers. And then he quotes the formal charge. Do you have that, in 24B? Now let us take the charge, the charge made against him. Do you have that?

A: "Socrates is guilty of" ...

S: No, no, read the preceding <sup>words</sup> ~~verse~~. The immediate <sup>preceding</sup> ~~verse~~ <sup>words</sup>.

A: "I shall now try to defend myself against Meletos, high-principled and patriotic as he claims to be, and after that against the rest. Let us first consider their deposition again as though it represented fresh prosecution. It runs something like this:" ...



S: You see, "something like this." Yes?

A: "Socrates is guilty of corrupting the minds of the young and of believing in deities of his own invention instead of the gods recognized by the state."

S: Literally, not believing in the gods<sup>which the city</sup> recognized, believes, but other strange, demonic things. Yes?

A: "Such is the charge. Let us examine them" ...

S: Yes, such; not this. You see, Plato makes it clear by references before and after that the charge is not quoted literally. By a fortunate accident, the literal version of the charge has been preserved in Diogenes' Lives. Xenophon, too, does not quote the charge literally, but Xenophon makes very minor, almost invisible, changes. Plato makes very big changes. In the true charge, the charge of impiety comes first, before the charge of corruption. And secondly, Plato omits one word; namely, in the charge it is "not believing in the gods in which the city believes, but introducing other new divinities." This introducing is dropped by Plato. Good. Whatever that may mean.

Now we come to the corruption charge which he takes up in the first place. Socrates corrupts the young. He makes the young worse. That makes sense only if there are people who make the young better. What makes the young better, asks Socrates. First, the answer of Meletos, 24D, the law. The law. Socrates does not question that. But what does he <sup>add</sup> to that, the question about the laws? "But that's not what I ask, my best, but which human being, who in the first place knows this very thing, namely the laws?" Yes? Why is the answer "the laws" not sufficient? Socrates does not question the proposition that the laws make the young better. What does this mean, this transition? Why does he appeal from the laws to human beings? Or even a single human being? Yes?

A: That the laws are conventional it may be but people ...

S: That is very good. But that is not said here. We must begin from what he <sup>knowing</sup> explicitly says. He doesn't speak of the making of the laws, but of the making of the laws. Now what he's suggesting is the laws become effective on the young only by human beings who act in accordance with the laws and therefore who knows the laws. The question of the laws as an authority goes through the work, as we shall see later, but it is not the theme. It becomes the theme in the Crito, which we will read after <sup>that</sup>. Who are then the human beings which make the young better? And Meletos gives an answer in accordance with democracy as then understood: Everyone! The judges, the jurymen, the men in the assembly, and so on and so on, and the men in the council. All Athenian citizens are good educators. Let us consider that for one moment. To accuse someone of corrupting, of making certain things worse, means that I know what is good. Otherwise, the charge makes no sense. Meletos claims, as a matter of course, that he knows what is good. And he implies that it is easy to know it. Everyone, all Athenians know it. Perhaps he means even all men know it. Now how could all men know what is good.

(End of first side of reel)

... Platonic philosophy implies the rejection of this notion. There is no naturally available knowledge, of <sup>course</sup>. It may be acquired, but it is not by nature available. There is by nature available something like a divination of the good. That's

surely what Plato means. But this divination is not knowledge and therefore you can in no way rely on it.

You remember Socrates' previous assertion about his wisdom which implies that he does not know what is the good. He is ignorant about these greatest things. But he also doubts whether what the Athenians believe to be good is good because he knows that the Athenians do not know. He doubts whether the Athenians know what is the good and he spreads this doubt by making it clear to everyone that he doesn't know. That is corruption. To that extent, Socrates proves the charge of corruption from the Athenian point of view. The question is whether there is <sup>another</sup> ~~another~~ point of view. But the question is also whether the <sup>other</sup> ~~other~~ point of view can be brought out in a popular speech except by reference to the <sup>above</sup> ~~above~~. Now what is Socrates' main argument against the assertion, all Athenians know what is good? A typically Socratic example which goes through all these kinds of discussions. In all <sup>fields</sup> ~~beings~~ of knowledge, there are only a few who know. Experts are rare in every field. But knowledge is expert knowledge. Hence, expert knowledge regarding good and bad-- the only genuine knowledge--is also rare. Now you see that this is confirmed by another feature which we have observed which you may very well call ironical, but as we have seen before, the ironical things have to be taken as seriously as non-ironical things. Since in all <sup>fields</sup> ~~things~~ there are only a few who know, Socrates, with perfect consistency, sends people to the professional educators, to the Sophists. On this basis, inevitable. Whatever this knowledge may be which Gorgias and such people possess, Socrates does not possess that knowledge of the good. So let us keep this in mind. We do not know ... Socrates' wisdom, which is knowledge of his ignorance, includes as such ignorance of the good. How can he live? I repeat that. Let's <sup>keep</sup> ~~skip~~ this question <sup>always in mind</sup> ~~for the moment~~.

Now let us turn--we cannot possibly read the whole--to 25C 5, where he says to Meletos, "Now tell us, by Zeus, Meletos, whether it is better to live among good citizens or wicked citizens." Do you have that?

A: "Here is another point. Tell me seriously, Meletos, is it better to live in a good or a bad community? Answer my question like a good fellow. There is nothing difficult about it. Is it not true that wicked people have a bad effect upon those with <sup>whom</sup> ~~which~~ they are in closest contact and good people have a good effect?

"Quite true.

"Is there anybody who prefers to be harmed rather than benefited by his associates? Answer me, my good man. The law commands you to answer. Is there anyone who prefers to be <sup>harmed</sup> ~~harm~~?

"Of course not.

"Well then when you summon me before this court for corrupting the young and making their characters worse, do you mean that I do so intentionally or unintentionally?

"I mean intentionally.

"Why, Meletos, are you at your age so much wiser than I at mine? You have discussed <sup>over</sup> ~~discussed~~ that bad people always have a bad effect and good people a good effect upon their nearest neighbors. Am I so hopelessly ignorant as to not even realize that by spoiling the character of one of my companions, I shall run the risk of getting some harm from him? Because nothing else would make me commit this great offense intentionally. No, I do not believe it, Meletos, and I do not suppose that anyone



else does. Either I have not a bad influence, or it is unintentional, so in either case your accusation is false. And if I unintentionally have a bad influence, the correct procedure in cases of such involuntary misdemeanors is not to summon the culprit before this court but to take them aside privately for instruction and reproof because, obviously, if my eyes are opened I shall stop doing what I do not intend to do."

S: Now let us stop here. What Socrates says here is this: the charge is groundless. Why? Because no one corrupts willingly for no one wishes to be harmed. Everyone wishes to be benefited, but the good benefit and the bad harm. No one wishes to make others bad. No one wishes to corrupt others. So if Socrates corrupts others, he does it unintentionally. Socrates goes beyond that: if anyone corrupts anyone, he does it unintentionally. What is the consequence? Yes?

A: The law then would be meaningless.

S: Absolutely. Punishment ~~would be~~ unjustified because—we can easily enlarge that and prove it from other dialogues—the thesis of Socrates was all sinning is involuntary. And involuntary sinning is not punishable. This thesis by itself leads to the denial of the legitimacy of punishment. Punishment is an irrational act of revenge—not more—which is of course a terrific assertion. If you are accused of undermining the polis, you say such an immensely valuable institution as the gallows and penitentiaries are irrational institutions, you destroy the city as far as it goes. He's very extreme. You see, Socrates is in one way very reticent and very polite and doesn't say things which are hard on the ear. What he in fact says is very harsh if you have ears for that. That is the consequence. The consequence is—you are perfectly right—no one can punish anyone rationally. But there is another thing. Not only the consequence is remarkable; the premise. What is the premise? No one wishes to be harmed. Everyone wishes to be benefited. That presupposes what?

A: It presupposes that the people can tell what will harm and what will benefit them.

S: Yes. Very good. <sup>more simple.</sup> Now state it more generally because the implication of benefit and harm is ~~specific~~. Everyone knows what good and bad is. Yes. Everyone knows what good is. But this was denied. Now if we do not know what good and bad is, we cannot teach others, we cannot improve others. Not only is punishment irrational, instruction too is irrational. That is ~~the~~ *the implication*. That's fantastic. But we must really see where we can find some ground. We must see first ... look in that abyss. The conclusion which Socrates draws: since no one can punish and no one can instruct in matters of good and bad, and therefore there can also not be corruption in particular, the corruption charge is groundless. Groundless. You see, Socrates doesn't argue the matter out here on common sense grounds here. That's a fantastic thing in such a speech where only common sense would be in order; namely, everyone knows today what corruption means in a practical way. I mean, if you take Xenophon—who is much more pedestrian in these things than Plato—for example, one thing corrupting the young boys could mean a certain sexual misconduct. Xenophon even goes a bit out of his way to ~~show~~ *show* that Socrates was a perfectly decent man in that respect. But it could also mean, for example, other things; to make them bad democrats. That was also discussed by Xenophon, you know, by his relation to Alcibiades and Critias, Socrates had a politically corrupting influence. Socrates doesn't speak of that here at all. He says the corruption charge is groundless but the grounds of this ~~premise~~ *premise* are *demonstration* absolutely fantastic. They imply denial of the polis and of knowledge in any

significant sense. So.

Now we come to the impiety charge. Let us read the beginning of that. Yes? "Now then, men of Athens, this is then manifest what I said, that Meletos has not taken care to be concerned in these matters either much or little (i.e. not at all)." The constant pun on the name Meletos that reads like the Greek word for caring: the carer hasn't cared for educating. That goes with all the ... "Nevertheless tell us how do you say that I corrupt the young ones." You see, so now we come back to common sense, to the specific charge of corruption. Yes? Go on.

A: "True the terms of your indictment may be clear that you accuse me of teaching them to believe in new deities instead of the gods recognized by the state. Is not that the teaching of mine would you say has this demoralizing effect?"

S: O, that is really bad. Is this the Penguin? I retract my praise. "Is it not by teaching this that I corrupt?" The word corrupt is perfectly clear. In other words, what he does now--that is very important--he reduces the corruption charge to the impiety charge. The real thing is not the corruption charge; the real thing is the charge of impiety. And that is a point which must be stressed because Burnett, especially, did everything he could to minimize the impiety charge. The question does no longer concern knowledge. That is important. This Greek word which is ~~no longer translated~~ nomizein. Socrates does not nomizein the gods. Now nomizein, that comes from the word nomos, but it has in itself roughly these two relevant meanings: not to worship the gods and not to believe in the gods. That is indistinguishable when you have such a nomizein. It becomes distinguishable if it is said that Socrates does not nomizein that the gods are. Then you must translate it, "does not believe," you know, because you cannot say "he does not worship that the gods are." It has this essential ambiguity. But now, the emphasis, as I say, is not knowledge. It is worship and/or belief. Now what do you call this? I don't know this word, to irritate a fellow so that he makes a statement by making of which he is licked. How do you ... ?

A: Provokes.

S: Provokes! Now Socrates says, "Well, do you mean to say that I do not believe in the gods of the city, but in some other gods of mine?" And Meletos says, "No. No gods at all. You are a straight atheist." Now after this point let us go on. "You strange (or marvelous) Meletos! Why do you say that? I do not believe that the sun and the moon are gods as the other human beings believe?" Yes? Go on.

A: "He certainly"...

S: "By Zeus," he says, "gentlemen of the jury, because he says that the sun is a stone and the moon is earth (or earthy)." Yes? Now what is that? That we must consider. Socrates has a kind of retreat, but he does not retreat. He says, granted for a moment that I don't believe in Zeus and Hera. I would at least believe in the sun and moon as gods, in what we call the cosmic gods. Some of you may remember our discussion about the Banquet where they played such a role. The cosmic gods, the gods which natural reason perceives to be gods. Self-moving and ~~and~~ splendid beings, visible gods, manifest, which everyone can see. The gods which all human beings believe in. How does Socrates answer to that? Meletos says, "No. He says ~~there~~ <sup>they</sup> are not gods, they are just inanimate things, stones and earth." And how does Socrates answer?

A: Shall I read?



S: Yes.

A: "Do you imagine you are prosecuting an Anaxagoras, my dear Meletos? Have you so poor an opinion of these gentlemen and do you assume them to be so illiterate as not to know that the writings of Anaxagoras are full of theories like these. And do you seriously suggest that is from me that the young get these ideas when they can buy them on occasion at the market place for a shilling at most and so have a laugh on Socrates" ... (Laughter from the class.) That's the English translation.

S: Well, all right. We can translate ... Go on.

A: "... who claims them for his own, to say nothing of their being so silly. Tell me, honestly, Meletos, is that your opinion of me? Do I believe in no god?

"No, none at all. Not in the slightest degree."

S: Yes. Both swear, by the way. Socrates swears in his question addressed to Meletos and Meletos ... And "by Zeus," each of them. Now, not even the cosmic gods Socrates believes, which all men believed in. Socrates does not prove--that much has become clear--that he believes in the gods which the city believes in, because that had been ruled out. Granted or not granted. The question is now only the cosmic gods. And what does he say regarding the cosmic gods? Well, he uses at least an argument. And the argument is, "I am not ~~an~~ Anaxagoras. An Anaxagoras is a fellow who is an athi~~st~~, but not I." Not I. That's all. So, in other words, that Socrates believes in the cosmic gods is a bit more plausible, to speak cautiously, than that he believes in the Olympian gods. I cannot repeat an argument which I developed at some length when we discussed the Banquet last time. Anaxagoras was an athi~~st~~. By stating his views in writing, as we've seen, Anaxagoras was corrupting the young or, at least, trying to corrupt the young. Now we know what corruption is, don't we? What does corruption mean now?

A: Impiety.

S: Impiety. Yes. But impiety, not believing, and that comes from nomos. The standard is the nomos. No one knows whether the gods are and, in particular, whether the sun and moon are not just stones and other inanimate things. The nomos; perhaps a kind of universal nomos. It says that. We must first conclude the discussion of this argument before we turn to a general discussion, if we still have time.

Now how does the argument go on from here? In other words, Socrates argues then as follows: you have never heard me say, all right, the sun and moon are inanimate things. By what right can you accuse me of that? You have no leg to stand on. And now Socrates turns the table and says, I can prove to you now that I do believe in the gods of the city from your own charge of ~~impiety~~. Socrates believes in other new demonic things. That was admitted by the accuser and that is a simple piece of forensic rhetoric. He who believes in horsey things believes that there are horses. He who believes in elephantine things believes that there are elephants. And, therefore, he who believes in demonic things believes that there are demons. There cannot be demonic things if there are no demons. What are demons? Demons are either gods or children of gods. In either way, a man who believes in demons believes in gods. But which are the gods who are generated, especially by the intercourse of human beings and gods, and are more particularly called demons in contradistinction to gods? Which are these gods? The sun and moon? No. The

Olympian gods. That's it. And Socrates uses the rather blasphemous example of mules. He who admits mules are asses--as they are called here--admits that there are horses and asses. Therefore someone who believes in beings created by the mixture of gods and men believes that there are gods. In other words, that argument doesn't prove anything. It only proves that Socrates was a much better rhetorician than the man was who formulated the charge. The charge of impiety is not refuted in any way. The only part of the argument which has an element of proof is that regarding the cosmic gods because these are something which we human beings--meaning all human beings with the exception of some freaks like Anaxagoras--believe in. So we cannot <sup>go beyond</sup> obviate that.

So this is the defense. I mean, the other things are a defense of Socrates' way of life--you know, a justification--but they are not the defense against the charge. That's the refutation of the charge. But that is the least important thing about the Apology, though it is by no means negligible. Socrates' whole presentation, which is underlined all through the explicit interpretation of the charge, is that his wisdom consists in ignorance, in knowledge of his ignorance. <sup>refutation</sup> By the way, you see how important this issue of the cosmic gods is. I mean, after all the gravest charge is to be an atheist. It is a less grave charge not to believe in the gods of the city, obviously. So the graver charge of atheism would mean to deny that the sun and moon are gods. How could a man arrive at this conclusion, that the sun is merely a stone? How could he arrive at that conclusion? What would he have to do? Astronomy. What Socrates was accused of doing, you know; walking on the air and looking around and down on the sun. That was what he was said to have done in the Clouds. So the astronomy issue is, of course, important.

Socrates knows then nothing of the greatest things, neither of the gods nor of the good. How then can he live? That's the question. How can he live? Because it is easy to say, to show, that every knowledge which he does possess, for example that he's an Athenian citizen and married to Xanthippe and what have you, that this does not permit him to live because how should he conduct himself as an Athenian citizen and as a husband of Xanthippe and all other things? The guiding questions, or the crucial questions, he cannot answer. How can he live, as far as we see up to now? What is his wisdom? You know that by now. In what does his wisdom consist, according to his own declaration? Miss Hill?

A: In knowing of his ignorance; in knowing what he doesn't know.

S: Yes. In knowledge of his ignorance regarding the greatest things. But, all right, what does it lead to, the knowledge of his ignorance? What follows if he knows that he's ignorant?

A: An attempt to remedy the situation, to acquire ...

S: Yes. But let us assume that this is impossible for some reason or other. That appears to be the way in which the issue is stated here. Well?

A: Great caution?

S: Yes. Not to assent. Not to assent to what he does not know. Not to nomizein. Yes? Not to believe. Not to believe because he doesn't know. But examine, again and again, see whether one cannot perhaps know and yet (properly bring that back to some.) But there is an alternative. The first is not nomizein. And the other is? The only alternative.... Nomizein! Believing in and accepting the nomos. Living!

(probably be brought back to the same result.)(?)



by the nomos. That is of course partly ... Also, you know, the oracle, and so on. That is not the last word, but we are speaking now only of what has appeared up to now. You want to say something?

A: Well, I'm not sure. But to know and to believe, they aren't the same thing.

S: No. All right. What is the difference as it has come to light here? That's a very long question because this word ... I mean, belief has here this rather innocent use. For example, when <sup>Socrates</sup> he says, X is in the hospital, I don't believe he is. I have seen him around this morning. You know? That is not a solemn meaning. But believing surely means here to assent to something of which one does not know that it is true. Knowledge is used here rather not in any technical sense, although the technical sense is not excluded. To repeat, Socrates does of course not say, "I know that I know nothing" literally understood, because he knows that he's accused among other things. But he says that he is ignorant regarding the most important things. And these most important things are obviously the gods and the good, whatever the relation between the gods and the good may be. Did I answer your question? Yes?

A: To know what he does not know would imply that he knows what it would be like to know something and I don't understand how these seemingly two statements reconcile with one another.

S: Yes, but is it not ... You are perfectly right. One would have to go beyond <sup>have to know</sup> that but let us first take what you said. In order to say that I know that I do not know what knowledge is. Yes. That is true. But is this not also possible, to have a common sensible knowledge of knowledge, as distinguished from a <sup>peerly</sup> fully developed knowledge of knowledge? I mean, for example, this: <sup>there is a disagreement about some common-sensical matter</sup> ~~there is a disagreement about some common-sensical matter~~ and the other says, "I know it. I have seen it." Yes? Good. I mean, we don't go into a very subtle question how such knowledge is possible <sup>through sense perception, or so on</sup>. We all understand whether it makes sense. All right. And we also know that there is a kind of legitimate <sup>reference</sup> ~~reference~~, reason, and without having <sup>developed</sup> the doctrine of the syllogism, we can see that someone contradicts himself. So we can also see that someone makes assertions and that they are formally untenable like Meltes here who says Socrates doesn't believe in gods but believes in demons, yes? That doesn't require a developed epistemology. But I would go even further to answer your question and say, if I say I do not know the most important things, I know what the most important things are. That is very plain. But the most important things appear to be the gods and the good. Now can one not prove that these are the most important things? I mean, on the basis of our everyday knowledge which no sensible man would ever question, can we not prove that? I mean, that is of the utmost importance for human life as a whole whether there are or there are not gods.

A: But are the gods so important? Or the fact of their being gods or the <sup>effect</sup> ~~fact~~ that their being gods has on <sup>men</sup> ~~them~~?

S: What do you take ... All right. Let us then specify it and say Socrates doesn't know what is most important for man. Let us forget about the gods for the time being and speak of the good. If you do not know what the good is, you cannot act rationally. I mean, you don't know what to choose, whether one should rather commit suicide or do what this principal did, shooting the young kid, . If we are really ignorant regarding the good, ... (unstable)

A: This kind of mores wouldn't seem to be confined to mortal man, <sup>one</sup> ~~as would it?~~ <sup>only</sup> .

S: Well, Meletos says, all Athenians, yes? And Socrates looks around and asks some Greek, a normal citizen, "How do you know this?" Well, ultimately he did tell something, "This is how our fathers lived." And then Socrates can fight and say, "Well, your fathers also said certain things about the distance from Athens to Sparta for example—this kind of thing—that you know now isn't true." So in tradition one can say that. All right. And then we go on. How does he know? And it proves to be something like traditions of the fathers and that is not sufficient. I mean, although this ...

Q: But the gods, in other words, can prove something that is otherwise unprovable.

S: That would be one way. That would be one way to say the answer to the question, "What is good?" can be proven by the gods and therefore there must be gods. Yes, but still, that would have to be established. How do we know that there are gods? Now if the gods are questionable, that means the good could become questionable on that ground, too. We don't know.

How can Socrates live? And up to this point, we cannot say more than there is this alternative: either in obeying the nomos, the nomos who claims to know and who is surely more respected than any chance human being. Surely it is questionable, but at least it makes some popular sense. And then the alternative is not to act. And that is what Socrates is going to say immediately after that: I did not act. I mean, he says first, act politically but then he enlarges it. He did not act. But obviously one cannot be literally accused for something else. And he went to the war and then to the jury and so on. So that cannot be quite literally true. But we must face that: we see at this point that Socrates knew that difficulty which is now calling us in the social sciences, only it is much broader and it is not stated in terms of value judgments as it is here, but that is implied. What was the way in which he found out? Somehow it seems, up to this point, that it was precisely the reflection of his ignorance, his not knowing, of the good which led him out of the wilderness. Whether that can become fully clear from the Apology, we must see, but surely that must become clearer than it is now from the rest of the work. Did I answer you? I mean, at least to the extent that I pointed to the way which we have to take now. So

So the question is stated in this work with a very great radicalism. Punishment. It is suggested that punishment, if it is to be rational, would of course presuppose knowledge of good. And instruction, also, as distinguished from punishment. You remember the distinction in Aristophanes re making people winged by words and whippings. That is this same distinction. Both are impossible as rational methods. Yes, but it goes beyond that. Look at the punitive systems. It is generally assumed that among the modes of punishment which men inflict on one another, capital punishment is the worst. I do not wish to go now into the niceties of gradation among capital punishment—you know, drawing and quartering and hanging—but let us leave it at the general statement that capital punishment is generally regarded as much worse than a fine, a money fine, or imprisonment and so on. What does this presuppose? Knowledge! That life is of a much higher value than freedom to circulate and money. We presuppose that life is valuable. On reflection, we would perhaps say it is not necessarily the highest value, but it is surely a very high value. And all of it, too. The tremendous medical establishments are a proof of how highly we value our life. Toward the end of this book it is suggested that death being death, being asleep with dreams is perhaps better than almost everything which we esteem. But not everything. Because if you say, for example, that not life is the highest thing, but virtue. All right. But virtue means, of course, virtue of a living human being. Or if you take Socrates' special assertion, the philosophic life, the life of examination, is



the best. That becomes questionable by this question: is not death, as dreamless sleep which is <sup>10</sup>distinguishable of course from simple non-dream, one might . . . One long night is better than the day. If that becomes a question, everything is a question, everything becomes questionable. And yet the paradoxical fact is, Socrates, in spite, <sup>11</sup>has dedicated especially his <sup>12</sup>whole life to what he regarded as the one thing he <sup>13</sup>knows and somehow, in place of knowledge, this human wisdom. And we must read what he did, how he succeeded. Mr. Gilman?

A: Did Socrates rest content with a common sense understanding of what knowledge is any more than he had common sense understanding of what a good and evil human being was, <sup>14</sup>in the last analysis <sup>15</sup>the tentative answer to this question is that there was a common sense understanding of knowledge of ignorance which he is not . . . There is also a common sense understanding of good and bad.

S: Let me put it this way. I would draw this conclusion from what you say: would one not have to go beyond that what I said? Socrates has knowledge of . . . You see, that is not mere common sense knowledge. For example, let us take the simple case of Socrates' refutation of Meletos, yes? Let us take the statement of Meletos and <sup>16</sup>as it stands, that this is self-contradictory and therefore absurd as knowledge and no other knowledge which you acquire from studying, say from logic and so on, could improve that knowledge as regarding the self-contradictory character of Meletos' statement. And therefore it is more than common sense knowledge. The alternative would be this: to say that Socrates does not know he does not know but that he only opines that he does not know—that was a line taken by <sup>17</sup>from a certain skepticism school <sup>18</sup>and Socrates contradicted himself by claiming to know his ignorance. Socrates did not contradict himself. And, at any rate, that is exactly the difference between Socrates and skepticism because, as you observe, that whenever the mere . . . The fact that some knowledge is possible is admitted by Socrates. That alone can be the cure for his problem. And of course the question would be, even to establish that, what are those people who say we do not have any knowledge—the real skeptics. Is this not a tenable position? And I think that is implied in the work of Plato, not developed in this one, but implied throughout, that skepticism proper is impossible. And one only has to look at the simple fact that all skepticism uses arguments to show that we do not know. And these arguments all imply knowledge, very simply. One old doctrine of skepticism is the unreliability of the senses. They give specimens of that. They never speak of the errors of our ears regarding sounds and of our eyes regarding colors. I'm sorry! Of our eyes regarding sounds and of our ears regarding colors. They know that the hearing has its object sounds and that the sight has its object colors and so on. All skepticism thrives on presupposed knowledge. Whether this is knowledge in the highest sense, that is another matter. Without it no possible argument. <sup>19</sup>And <sup>20</sup>has no human position of any kind, this thinking.

What Socrates implies, naturally, and we must see later on whether we can bring this out, is that this knowledge—which no one can reject—does not necessarily give us an indication as to what is good and bad. And that is, of course, what he said. Ultimately, the Socratic argument will have to be a recourse to the nature of man. But we must see <sup>21</sup>to what extent this is clear. The references of it are there from the very beginning, when he uses these homely similes; if you had acquired colts or calves, and now you have acquired sons. Sons are not calves; men are not brutes. That gives us a key. What is good we mean primarily what is good for man and what man is and what is characteristic of man is <sup>22</sup>basically the answer for what is good. <sup>23</sup>Ultimately the basis for

Yes, I think we must turn to that next time. We will have a report by Mr. Strickland,

yes, Mr. Steinfager. I always miss you because your names begin both with St. And Mr. Johnson, you will ... And a week later, Mr. Berger will report on the Crito. O, you did it. Well, otherwise, Mr. White--one of you will read it and the other will hand it in. That will give you a week from Monday.



... that it solves all questions, naturally, do not expect.

Now, let me see. You said that this section, prior to the condemnation, is the real apology and I think that is true, that is really the central part of the apology. You rightly noted the provocative character of Socrates; you spoke of insolence. That is also remarkable. I further noted that you made <sup>clear</sup> an important implication, that it is not only Socrates and the Athenian citizens, but the law itself is ignorant. The law, the nomos, itself is ignorant. In other words, that is the crucial point. The other point you made is that there is the difference between the Delphic oracle and Socrates' private voice--as it is described here, the daimonia, but you did not go into the question of their relation. <sup>called</sup>

A: I also did not go into that because I didn't fully understand the relationship although it seems to be that the daimonia is somehow also related to what Socrates initially begins with, the remark when he says the opinions of the people. They somehow

S: Yes, that is, of course, a question--I mean, whether the daimonia has anything to do with Socrates' activities as described in the Apology.

A: Well, I didn't mean to suggest that it necessarily had anything to do with the activity, but that it is somehow of the same nature as opinions, as the daimonia, because after all ...

S: Yes, but before we turn to that, I think one point is crucial. Socrates does not trace his activity, his talking to the fellow citizens, he does not trace that to his daimonia. He traced only his withdrawal from political life proper. That's important.

Then you made the very important and interesting point that the Delphic oracle is not knowledge, it's just handed down. And Socrates finds out, indeed, by his examination that it is knowledge but whether that is what the oracle had said, that's a moot question. And that the daimonia <sup>itself</sup> is not knowledge, you rightly stress. Also what you said towards the end, that the apology of Socrates is a bridge between Socrates and the demos, that is I think perfectly correct because the Apology is the only utterance of Plato's Socrates addressed to the citizen body; the other utterances are addressed to individuals, one or more.

One thing I didn't understand because you read rather fast; that is how the Delphic oracle was turned by Socrates into a command. You spoke of that more than once and I find that was a crucial part of your argument. That I did not understand.

A: As I understand it, by the act of questioning itself, that is raising the question what is wisdom, Socrates in reflecting on this saw that the life of wisdom is the proper life of man. In reflecting on man's nature he ...

S: Yes, but how does it work out? The oracle says no one is wiser than Socrates. And that's a mere assertion, an incredible assertion in a way for Socrates. And then, because it is incredible and Socrates is a pious man--he says the god can't lie--he tries to find out whether the god did not lie in this particular case and so he examined it. Well, you could say by reshoring his momentarily shaken faith in the veracity of the Delphic god he fulfilled a religious duty. That one could say. Yes?

A: I don't think ~~it would sanction this~~. *that's satisfactory, though.*

S: Why not?

A: Because Socrates really moves to a new level from an examination of the Delphic oracle. The Delphic oracle itself is not wise but Socrates discovers that he ...

S: Yes, but the <sup>Pythia</sup>~~iercia~~, the priestess, is not wise but Apollo might be wise and there is a certain pipeline between Apollo and <sup>the</sup>~~iercia~~. *Pythia.*

A: I would suggest that really Socrates' new wisdom would have nothing to do with the god at all.

S: Yes, all right, I also don't believe that Socrates believed in the Delphic oracle in any way, but still that is in itself a mere guess. I mean, that needs a long argument but we cannot neglect <sup>that however</sup> ~~forever~~, you know, because that is said. But if he didn't believed in the wisdom of the oracle in the first place, then you would have to restate the situation in an entirely different terms. I have nothing against that, but you did not do that. Then you can say he turned the oracle into something else. You have to give a presentation of Socrates' activity in a ~~censeless sort of way~~ in which the term oracle didn't occur. All right, do that. *Sentence S. to say*

A: I don't think I can do that because I don't think that's ... I'm not sure at all of whether Socrates initially believed in the Delphic oracle in any way at all and this is not ...

S: I have nothing ... I think it's a very sensible point ...

A: But supposing that he did believe in the Delphic oracle initially and then to examine the Delphic oracle and discover what is meant, in this examination he moves to a different level and finds that the Delphic oracle really is not ...

S: Well, then, all right. Let's forget about the Delphic oracle. What is then the motivation of Socrates' accusers.

A: It isn't according to the nature of man to do this activity, questioning the act of god.

S: Yes, but have you any basis in the text for saying ...

A: This, the passage that I quoted, I believe is the clearest when he says that he must look to himself first and to the state before the interest ~~in himself~~.

S: All right, but what is the reason given for being concerned first with oneself and then with the things which one has, possessions and so on?

A: So one can somehow understand the nature of man.

S: In a way you are on the right track of course, but that is not the argument I propose. What is the reason explicitly given why one should be concerned more with oneself and with one's *(self being good)* than with one's things?

A: Because of the state, I suppose, in the way that ...

S: Exactly. In the case <sup>of the state</sup> it's the same thing as in the case of the individual. Why



should he be more concerned with the soul of the city than with the things of the city? The same as in the case of the individual. What's the reason given? Does anyone ... Really, that's very important. Why is it more important to take care of the soul than of the possessions, the <sup>explicit</sup> reason given? You see, I'm sure that there is a problem in the Delphic oracle but then, if you suggest an alternative, the alternative must have a support in the text and not an intelligent guess. I mean, you understand *my criticism*, I don't mean it in any harsh way. Now let us now see what is the reason why it is more important to be concerned with the soul than with possessions. <sup>and why?</sup> What's the explicit reason given? Mr. Johnson?

A: He says that from virtue comes possessions and not from possessions comes virtue.

S: Good. What does this mean?

A: On one point, I think it means that any man doesn't get any possessions presupposes city-planning and unless you have some virtue of the city, you can't have any kind of city. <sup>city life</sup>

No, no, let us forget about the city. Let's appeal to the individual on a sensible ...

A: Then, on the second point, on the individual, it is a proper harmony that ...

S: You are all so sophisticated. Socrates, in the Apology, is the opposite of sophisticated; he's very simple. What does he say? He talks with someone who is very much concerned with his estate, with his business, what have you, but doesn't care for his soul. And Socrates tells him, but you have to think of your soul first. Something extremely simple.

A: The soul is a possession that continues with him.

S: Yes, <sup>but why not</sup> ~~but why not~~ to state it in practical terms.

A: The soul is important.

S: Yes, but something much more simple, something terribly pedestrian. There are perhaps some people who say, "I wish I had a million dollars."

Yes.

A: The state of your soul determines what you will do with your possessions, whether or not you will do good with your possessions.

S: Yes, but very practical, on the lowest level.

A: A perfect example of that, when you work all the time you're the same ... carry-over to Aristotle and the question of the person who is involved in business activity all the time where he can get all these possessions and they're of no use to him because he puts all his effort into obtaining possessions.

S: Now this simple do not understand. Very simple. Socrates tells him in two years at the latest you will not have a single cent left because you will have dissipated it. You must first acquire the habit of frugality, of thrift, which is the quality of the soul. Or, the other way around, also on acquiring the money, work hard, be industrious—a quality of the soul. Now qualities of the soul, virtues, acquire possessions and the possessions do not make you acquire virtues.

What is the effect? What is

the reason given for preferring virtue to possessions?

A: Possessions?

S: Possessions. So virtue is purely instrumental. And this purely instrumental virtue is not the virtue which Socrates obviously had in mind (in the definition of the other virtues?). And that is the problem. Now what was your question which led to these things? Yes, the argument of Socrates in favor of virtue is wholly independent of the Delphic oracle. That doesn't exist, because it is that argument which has a certain plausibility but which breaks down on reflection. It is a utilitarian virtue, which makes much sense, you know; all these things about honesty is the best quality. And it is a good rule, it's quite true but it is also very inefficient because the question, is it the <sup>motivation</sup> modulation policy or is the <sup>motivation</sup> modulation honest?

So, in other words, this is an extremely popular speech, the apology, but also an extremely difficult speech. The reason is very simple. What Socrates is really doing, he cannot explain, not because it is subversive or shocking or something similar, but the people wouldn't understand. He must state what he is doing in terms intelligible to them. Now that's impossible. So it can come out only in a caricature, in a caricature which is very funny, naturally, and at the same time also very sad because since they don't understand him, they are practically compelled to condemn him. Yes? Do you understand that? Good.

Now let us then turn to a coherent discussion and I would like to introduce it with a general statement summing up the points we made last time. Now Socrates' wisdom, as we have seen, is human wisdom in contradistinction to the super-human wisdom of the astronomers and so on; and what the astronomers do is indicated by Anaxagoras who denied that the sun and the moon--objects of astronomy--are not gods. Socrates has nothing to do with astronomy. Socrates knows only that he does not know the greatest things: the stars, gods, the things beneath the earth--which means of course also the nether world, the Hades--and the good. He knows that there are arts and <sup>among</sup> ~~the~~ most things, a political art, but he does not possess any of the arts. Yet the arts are not sufficient because they are all based on the assumption that their end, the purpose which they pursue, is good. The shoemaker; the art of shoemaking is based on the premise that perfection of the feet is good. That is linked up with the broader question of protection of the body, protection of life, preservation of life. That's the theme going through the book. What do we know as to whether life is good? You will never forget the link-up of Socrates' embarrassment with present-day social science. I mean, I must plead for forgiveness for this comparison for a two-fold reason, but the merely negative part of this assertion is of course also implied in Socrates. We do not know, we do not know. Just as they say we do not know social science comes to anything, as to whether the atomic destruction of the human race is preferable to its preservation. Only most people happen to prefer the preservation and on this kind of market research, we build a social science which acts on the premise that its preservation is preferable; not in itself. So the arts cannot justify their premise. Therefore they are ignorant as such regarding the greatest things. But not only Socrates, but everyone is ignorant regarding the greatest things. How then can he live. The first answer would be knowledge of ignorance means not to assent to anything we do not know; i.e. not believing. Now I'll use the Greek term to make this quite clear, not nomizein, which is derivative from nomos, law. Not acting on the nomos. The other is that you can't act at all if you merely suspend judgment. You have to obey the nomos. You can live only by believing, in this sense, in the simple sense, by acting on the law, by nomizein. But that is not the way in which Socrates justifies his way of life. (He traces his way of life, as we have seen, to the oracle and from this point of view his way of life appears a service to the god



and even assistance to the god ... obviously. He assists the god by proving to all men that in his case, at any rate, the oracle was true, and adds to the prestige of Apollo and that is an assistance to the god. And this activity consists in examining himself and others. And examining means, of course, inducing people to suspend judgment. So what happens is that Socrates induces himself and others not to believe, not to assent, on the basis of an assent to the oracle. The difficulty, I believe, is in this point.

*Steinfager*

But we must hear a distinction and to which Mr. Sante alluded: Socrates' knowledge of his ignorance is one thing and that may have needed in the first stages talking to others, but after a few steps he had seen that. Why does he go on all the time to try to convince others of their ignorance? Why is Socrates' knowledge of his ignorance good, so that he spreads that good by convincing others of their ignorance? Why is it better than the alternative, namely believing to know what one does not know and going on believing to know what one does not know? Now why is that better? And let us forget about the Delphic oracle because there is really a question there, but why is it in itself better? Why is it better? What does a man do who believes to know while he does not know? Take any case. I mean, take a simple case from your own experience where you have seen that someone was cocksure about something else and then he was refuted. What happens? What's the reaction of himself and the by-standers?

A: He makes a mistake.

S: A mistake, yes, but what ... pardon?

A: He doesn't achieve his goal.

S: Yes, yes, but I wish only that you would state it more precisely because we frequently don't reach our goal and that's not fatal to us. So why is this other so fatal? Again, the lowest level is the most proper because there we understand it directly.

A: He's disillusioned and despairs.

S: Yes, but why should he despair? What is the precise reason for the despair? I mean, for example, someone says something about Vice President Nixon and then he's refuted about that; he wouldn't despair necessarily. Yes?

A: He appears ridiculous?

S: Yes, yes, that's a good point, because it comes closer to the issue. But one can of course also say a sensible man does not care particularly whether he's ridiculed or not, therefore that's not the highest criterion. But why is it important? I mean, why is it more than mere fear of the ridiculing. It is a very special kind of ridiculing. You see, if someone is just, say, plain stupid, that is perhaps deplorable for him or so, or pitiable anyway, but it is not ridiculous in itself, yes? I mean, only a very callous individual would say it's ridiculous in itself. But here that's a special kind of ridicule. If someone makes an assertion he lays a claim to knowledge. By being found out that he does not know, he is condemned by his own standard. In other words, this case is an important case of boasting. If the stupid man is merely stupid and does his work, it's not ridiculous. But if he boasts, then he becomes ridiculous because he admits ... You see, the simple stupid man doesn't recognize the standard of intelligence, you can say. He says I am what I am. But the man who lays claim to knowledge erects a standard without having been called to do so and by that standard he condemns himself. He really contradicts himself in a matter

*He really contradicts himself in a matter*

by which he claims to live. That is boasting. And boasting in this case—and possibly in all cases—means self-condemnation, yes? Clear. Self-condemnation. And therefore boasters are particularly ridiculous people. And this self-condemnation is a self-contradiction. That comes a bit closer to the issue. There is something ... because he says, "I know, I live up to my standards," and he's shown not to live up to his standards. All right, but why is this examining others good? ~~One only can say~~ <sup>new we can say</sup> he tries to make them non-boasters or, more rightly, to not contradicting themselves. The first answer we can say is a simple love of his fellow human beings. I mean, a man who is not vicious wishes to help others, perhaps not more than himself but ~~if~~ he can do it without going out of his way he will naturally do it—if he's not vicious. But the explicit reason—the Delphic oracle—the Delphic oracle did not tell Socrates to examine others. So we are still not clear.

I will try to explain it now in a very impressionistic way and there is nothing wrong, I believe, with impressionistic remarks provided one admits it and provided one knows that it is really a disgraceful state that one cannot do more than that. Now when I read the Apology, I'm impressed with what I call, impressionistically, the low ceiling; you know, a very low point. And I will try to articulate that a bit. Human wisdom as defined there is knowledge of ignorance. But that means, as defined here, knowledge of nothing regarding the greatest things. A blank. To have that blank in front of you. Ignorant people have that blank but they don't know it. But to know that you have that blank. Blindness; conscious blindness. The situation described here, in the Apology, is not that of the blind led by the blind—which is a very sad picture, as you know—but the blind who do not know that they are blind except one among them who knows that. Now this blind man who knows that he is blind tries to show the others that they are blind too. What is the consequence? I mean, what did they do as long as they did not know that they were blind? I mean it again on the most pedestrian level. Think of that simple, practical position. They don't know that they are blind. What do they do?

A: Live happily in ignorance.

S: Do they live happily? I mean, what happens? They are blind and they don't know it. What do they do? Yes?

A: Act in a way ...

S: You are so abstract.

A: They stumble around and they don't know that they are stumbling.

S: Exactly. O, they feel it. They bump into one another all the time, and into ditches and other things. Now, when the blind man tells them, "You are blind," what's the consequence if they didn't know that? Well, again, the simplest case, I mean the simplest formula, they will sit still, they will become paralyzed. They will sit still. Now does this suggest anything to you? Men, reduced to a state where they sit still. Did you ever hear of men described in a situation of sitting still?

A: The cave.

S: Can you amplify that remark?

A: In the cave, stationary.

S: <sup>In Plato's Symbol of the Cave</sup> A similar case in the Republic, yes: men sitting in the cave fettered. They cannot



move. Socrates tries to bring about such a state in which they are not externally fettered, but fettered by their negative wisdom. Fine. So, it's a good state. But as it is also indicated, <sup>these</sup> men are supposed to leave the cave as, of course, it can't be the end. No suggestion of any leaving the cave in the Apology. In the Apology, only they should not run around; they should sit still. What happens then? I mean, a point which is also not unimportant is the cave itself, but let us not ... What happens? They sit still. No falling into ditches anymore, not bumping into one another anymore. But what happens? Mr. Cohn?

1: The activity of his sitting tends to bore him.

2: Sure, but that is exactly what the cave means, you know; they just talk, they don't fight wars anymore.

1: Somebody has to bring in the food.

2: Food. Exactly. This is really a practical remark. They will starve. Sure, absolutely. That is the suggestion of the Apology, because what is your objection to this policy of starving? Naturally, you would be exempt.

1: I don't want to die; I want to live.

2: You don't want to die. Why do you not want to die?

On the assumption that life is better than death, or that ...

1: Do you know that?

2: No.

2: That is the argument of the Apology. The refusing to sit still and starve is based on the alleged knowledge that you know death is an evil. It is very funny, but we must now try to find out what it is. So death is better than life perhaps. Socrates chooses death, as we have seen, by his very *incredible*. But he does not know that death is better than life. He knows nothing of the greatest things. He also doesn't know the opposite. And furthermore, which is much rarer, Socrates had not always chosen death. He chooses it now. Why? The first answer, again, is the Delphic oracle. His activity, which presupposes that he is live, is a service to the god and this justifies his relative clinging to life. It is a duty to live if it is a duty to assist the god. But again, the Delphic oracle did not tell him to examine others.

We are now beginning to read, or discuss, examine the play. Socrates is endangering his life. This much has become clear by the end of the Meletos discussion which we discussed last time. And here a question arises, right at the beginning of today's assignment—28B 2, 3 to 5: is this not disgraceful? Now that's a very strange thing. Why should it be disgraceful to endanger one's life? I mean, to say it is foolish is one thing, but to say it is disgraceful is another thing. That's a straight strange objection. It would imply that it is noble to save one's life. Now no one, since the world exists, has ever said that if someone saves his life—by taking the right kind of pills, for example—he commits a noble action. It is useful, but not a noble action. But the emphasis shifts on this question of nobility. Socrates now speaks more emphatically than ever before as a man, hombre, to other hombres—I can't bring out that in English; the Greeks have a word, enea, many human beings, and so on in English that cannot be brought out and in Spanish ...

speaks as a he-man, you could say, to other he-men who are concerned with nobility and not with mere usefulness. He has to teach them the very elements of manliness which is that life is not the highest good; disgrace is worse than death. In other words, he presents himself as being confronted with people who do not know this element of manliness, who think it is disgraceful not to save one's life, and then he must tell them the first element which everyone knows, from Homer at least, that life is not the highest good. Disgrace is worse than death.

Now then in the sequel--that's 28B to C--he gives the Homeric example. The demigods in Homer--you remember the demigods who played such a great role in the discussion with Maletos, demons and other intermediate beings--as models--they despise death and they regard it as just that one should avenge one's friends; the example is Achilles and Patroclus. That's Socrates' model. Again, mere opinion: the demigods <sup>would be or</sup> are higher than human beings and what they do is surely good, surely noble. The <sup>course</sup> question also: does Socrates follow Achilles also by avenging his friends or has this no meaning? How could Socrates avenge his friends by what he's doing now? Who are his friends? ~~It is better~~ if you will look up the words in the Iliad he quotes here. In the context you will see that Socrates changes the model. Achilles doesn't say a word about justice of his action. That's Socrates' change. Now what is that? How far could Socrates avenge his friends by what he's doing? An entirely tentative suggestion: Socrates' trial and condemnation led to the consequence that no other philosopher was condemned to death in Athens anymore. He somehow brought about an act of repentance on the part of the city of Athens and thereby a certain reconciliation. Not a complete, because Aristotle too had to escape but that may have been due, in the case of Aristotle, to political problems, you know, because of Macedonia and Phillip and Alexander--that may have been a different story. But a relative reconciliation between Athens and philosophy was brought about by Socrates' death because the Athenians repented afterwards. In other words, Socrates avenges in a way his friends, the other philosophers who had been persecuted in Athens.

So Socrates compares himself here to Achilles, the seventy-year-old Socrates to the youthful Achilles. That's his model. Do you remember the further fate of Achilles in Homer? You know he was killed by Paris, but then other things happened in the Odyssey. Do you remember? You seem to remember.

Odyssey

A: When he says to Odysseus, "I'd rather be a slave on earth than king of hell."

S: King of hell, yes, in Hades. So, in other words, Achilles after his death--we know this unfortunately not from Achilles himself but through the mouth of Odysseus, but still--Odysseus met him in Hades and there Achilles revoked the whole principle of his heroic life. He said it is better to be a slave in the light of the sun than to be a king among the dead. That we must not forget. But here, on the surface, we see only Socrates taking Achilles as his model. Disgrace is worse than death. But what is disgraceful? Let's turn to 28D 6 following. Let me see, I find it for you, page 434, the end of the second paragraph on 434, where he makes the general statement. Yes? "Thus it is, you men of Athens, in truth" ... Yes?

A: "This is true, gentlemen, wherever a man places himself, believing it to be the best place, or wherever he has been placed by his captain, there he must stay, as I think, and run any risk there is, calculating neither death nor anything, before disgrace.

"Then, gentlemen, I should have been acting strangely, if at Potidaea and Amphipolis and Delion I stayed where I was posted by the captains whom you had chosen to command me, like anyone else, and risked death; but where God posted me, as I thought and



believed, with the duty to be a philosopher and to test myself and others, there I should fear either death or anything else, and desert my post."

S: Let us stop here. So here, that's the answer. To run away from the enemy, that is disgraceful, the most elementary form of what everyone knows; that's disgraceful. Not to stay where one is put by one's captains, as he says, but more literally and simply, by one's rulers. There that's clear. Of course, a minor difficulty arises—as is pointed out in the Laches—that in some cases it is brave to run away; namely, to lure the enemy into an ambush, for example. Strictly speaking, to risk their head, and so on. Certain difficulties. But let us leave it at the simple notion to stay where one has been put. It is noble, in other words, to follow the opinion regarding the best rather than fear for one's life regardless of whether that opinion of the best is the law—that would mean the rulers—or one's own opinion. That is the conflict. I mean, one's own opinion which cannot be traced to the god. Just as when people speak, "I follow my conscience and not the law," they mean of course not merely something in themselves but ultimately something divinely sanctioned. That's the question. There is a possible conflict there. So, in other words, we grant that human nobility begins with not clinging to life. If you follow any opinion and regard it as more sacred than your life you are, in principle, noble. There is, however, even on this level, a possible conflict between two kinds of opinions—the opinion of the community, the nomos, or your own opinion. Now what does Socrates say what deserves preference in case of such a conflict between the opinion of the society as expressed in the law and the opinion of the individual? Yes?

A: The law.

S: Is this so? Which opinion of the better does he follow by his life?

A: The law.

S: The law did not tell him to philosophize. The law didn't tell him to philosophize.

A: Then there's no conflict if the law doesn't tell him to philosophize.

S: Yes, but the law apparently quasi forbids it; I mean, forbids it by *implication*. By the way, in this respect I believe that is the ordinary interpretation of the Apology, that here a man stands up for the principle that one must stand up for one's own convictions regardless of what the community thinks. At any rate, Socrates prefers, follows his ruler in the sense of the god, not in the sense of any Athenian magistrate. Well, we are so familiar with this view and it is extremely interesting that it occurs in a rudimentary form in Socrates. Today one would say one must be loyal to one's conviction. That's what Socrates says. And that alone gives a man nobility. But a crucial implication, just as in the modern view, the conviction to which one must remain loyal cannot be that life is the highest good. Look at the coward. He would say, "I follow my conviction." And that is exactly the point. That cannot be a conviction. That's understood. We moderns have a beautiful word for expressing that which, for deep reasons, could not be expressed by the poor Greeks; we speak of idealists. The idealists are exactly the people who imply that life cannot be the highest good and that means, of course, also possessions and honors and this kind of thing. That is what Socrates seems to suggest and that is one reason why this book is so popular and everyone knows it. An ideal is more sacred than any position of the citizen body. The whole notion of a political crime and of a respect for the political criminal as distinguished from the common criminal is of course based on this kind of thing. He didn't shoot this man because he wanted to rob him or because he was jealous of him or something. It was a political murder.

You know that. That's a very important element of modern <sup>liberal</sup> political thought. An idealist, according to this view, is a man who follows a conviction different from <sup>any</sup> that life and external goods are the highest good. That is not idealism. You see where we have sunk today by virtue of the substitution of value for ideal. As long as people spoke of ideals—which is also the loose term but it has a certain responsibility—it was excluded that someone could say, "My value is to have four square meals a day." That you couldn't possibly say is an idealist but you can call it a value, easily. That is important. But the trouble is value is a wholly impossible thing but ideals is also not good enough and therefore Socrates didn't speak of ideals. Why is ideals not good enough? And simply to say—to repeat this point—human nobility consists in being loyal to one's convictions regardless. But conviction, in this sense, can never mean that life and the external goods are the highest good. Yes?

A: I didn't quite follow that because according to the premise under which he's working all of his convictions or opinions are merely that and he can't further distinguish that one is correct and the other is not.

S: That is what I mean. You see, it is very important for us to understand Plato, or Socrates. But it is more important for us to understand, for example, such a thing as "ideal", what it means. You understand? And we must not completely miss <sup>dis-</sup> about that. Now why is the concept of ideal as I sketched it and as it is under- <sup>regard</sup> lined in popular usage and, of course, also the learned literature to some extent, why is this a very inadequate notion. Or, for that matter, the notion of conviction or of conscience as ordinarily used, why is this inadequate? I mean, it does make a distinction between a brutish life, a life unworthy of a human being, and a non-brutish life, but why is it so wholly insufficient?

A: Well, this again gets to the problem of justifying an ideal. Unless one can show why the ideal is worth doing things for ...

S: It's too vague. In other words, what is the criterion, the precise criterion, for distinguishing between an ideal and a mere preference? That's the question. And the difficulty here induced people to abandon the problem and say let us forget about the ideals, let us speak of preference as preference, i.e. values. That is what happened, which is of course the less desirable thing to do. Because if you say an ideal is characterized by the willingness of a man to die for it, that's obviously insufficient because people died for all kinds of things. They die even in order to get property, as we know, or for reasons ~~which are not justified~~ by losing their property which is also meaning dying for property. It's really insufficient. So Socrates cannot possibly leave it at that. In the passage which we read, in 28E 4 to 5, the end of the paragraph, when he says the god commanded me or put me there, that I must as I believed ~~as I believed~~ assumed that I ought to live <sup>10-</sup> ~~wise or otherwise~~ and so on. As I believed and assumed; that is the basis for <sup>3ing</sup> Socrates' dedicated life. It seems that Socrates' life is based on an opinion. Or does he merely mean that he ascribes his way of life to Apollo is a mere opinion. But the choice of that way of life of <sup>it's</sup> course is not. What does he mean by that? What is the basis of Socrates' dedication to an ideal? What is the basis of Socrates' ideal, if we use that term? His conviction that no one knows the greatest things is not opinion, according to the presentation here, but knowledge. That's a different story. But the connection, the conviction that he ought to examine others, that is not based on knowledge. That is based on the belief that the god has commissioned him to do so. But Socrates' knowledge that he knows nothing is not the issue because he would never have been condemned for that, never been accused for that. Now let us go on where we left off, in 29A, "For it would be awful (or terrible)..." Do you have



it? Whoever has it, read it. "For it would be awful and one could then truly or justly bring me into the law courts that I do not believe that gods exist by being disobedient to the oracle, and fearing death, and believing to be wise while not being wise." Do you have that? Go on.

A: "For to fear death, gentlemen, is only to think you are wise when you are not; for whether death is really the greatest blessing a man can have, but they fear it is the greatest curse, as if they knew well. Surely this is the objectionable kind of ignorance, to think one knows what one does not know? But in this, gentlemen, here also perhaps I am different from the general run of mankind, and if I should claim to be wiser than someone in something it would be in this, that as I do not know well enough about what happens in the house of Hades, so I do not think I know;"

S: Yes, do not believe I know. Let us stop here. Incidentally, you see here he says to fear death is to claim to know what <sup>one does</sup> we do not know. We don't know what happens after death. Death may be a very great good but we must add, if we read carefully, but it <sup>may also</sup> be a great evil. We don't know. What then does Socrates know? You see the paralysis following necessarily from this kind of thing. One little point which is meant for those who like subtlety: Socrates mentions these three grounds of accusations; a) that he doesn't believe in the gods, b) that he fears death, and 3) that he regards himself as being wise while being not. The only thing taken up in this sequel is the central one. I mean, that is a little example; what is in the center is the most important in the context. The context is the status of death. Yes, now the next sentence where you left off.

A: "But to do wrong, and to disobey those who are better than myself, whether god or man, that I know to be bad and disgraceful."

S: Now stop. Socrates has knowledge, here we know. Whether death is bad or good he doesn't know, but that one must do one's duty, to say it in a word, that he knows. How does he know? That would be a terribly important thing, naturally, because then he has a guide for everything. To translate more literally, it is evil and disgraceful to act unjustly, to disobey one's betters. Socrates know then the most important thing; like Kant, if anyone has read Kant, we do not know anything about the thing in itself, about true reality, but we know the moral law, and that's all we need. A complete darkness, but one light, the light of the moral law within us. That's sufficient, if true. But Socrates is not Kant, Plato is not Kant. And though many people have tried to equate them, that doesn't work.

Socrates knows then the most important things it would seem. One question which we must raise, but it could also be the other way around: that these things which we regard as the most important are not the most important things. Now what could this mean? Now what does it mean to do wrong? What is the most simple meaning of that?

A: To disobey.

S: Whom?

A: One's betters.

S: No, no, that is distinguished here. That's distinguished here. What does it mean?

A: Disobey the law.

S: The law, surely. That's always the first. Justice means primarily comply with the law. So, to transgress the law. And the other thing is to transgress the verdict of one's betters. That may very well be different from the law. But they may conflict. Which is to be preferred in case of conflict--the decision of the law or the verdict of one's betters? The answer is surely not given here. So we can say this, provisionally, and that is perhaps sufficient for the present occasion: this knowledge which Socrates has is less knowledge than a problem. It leads immediately to a great problem and that is not completely groundless because a problem means to understand a problem, but it is not the simple guide for life because you are confronted with an alternative and have no key as to the solution. But Socrates seems to indicate a solution in the sequel. Perhaps we read that, where we left off.

A: "Therefore, in comparison with bad things which I know to be bad, rather will I never fear or flee from what may be blessings for all I know. So even if you let me go now and refuse to listen to Anytos--you remember what he said; he said that either I ought not to have been brought into court at all, or if I was, that death was the only possible penalty; and why? He told you that if I escaped, your sons 'would at once practise what Socrates teaches, and they would all be utterly corrupted.' Then if you were to say to me in answer to this: 'We will not this time listen to Anytos, my dear Socrates; we let you go free, but on this condition, that you will no longer spend your time in this search or in philosophy, and if you are caught doing this again, you shall die'--if I should let me go free on these terms which I have mentioned, I should answer you, 'Many thanks indeed for your kindness, gentlemen, but I will obey the god rather than you,' and as long as I have breath in me, and remain able to do it, I will never cease being a philosopher, and exhorting you, and showing what is in me to any one of you I may meet, by speaking to him in my usual way:"...

S: And so on. And then there comes a long speech of Socrates. Now what does this mean? Socrates refuses to accept an acquittal under a condition. That's obvious. But this could be formulated much more strictly. They could say, all right, we acquit you, but at the next assembly we are bringing in a bill forbidding to philosophize and defining philosophizing by what Socrates does. It would be a law. And what does Socrates then say regarding that law? He will not obey it. He will not obey it. So, in other words, Socrates gives an answer to the alternative. He says in case of conflict between the law and the commandment of the god, he obeys the commandment of the god. Yes, but then, of course, that is a difficult thing because that is not a commandment of the god as I believe and the Bible could say quoting chapter and verse. You know? That is a very dubious interpretation of a very dubious oracle. So Socrates simply sets his own conviction against a possible law. Yes?

Q: Don't we get another aspect of the question in terms of his actions <sup>in</sup> and that <sup>he is</sup> trying to persuade the citizens he trying to change the law?

S: Now this whole argument is based on the premise, naturally, that Socrates did not transgress the law, yes?

A: Yes, all right.

S: Sure. Now I believe that Socrates did, in fact, transgress the law because the law forbidding impiety--that was of course not very clearly formulated--but that was sufficiently large, according to the spirit of the legislators, to cover Socrates' strange things. That's clear. (Sentence garbled due to tape being spliced.) But now a proclamation for his future life says, the law is not absolutely sacred for me. So he follows his own conviction. I mean, Socrates would never say that everyone has



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a right to prefer his convictions to the law. He limits it to certain people like himself and that is insolence and provocation of which Mr. Sante has spoken and we must see later whether that is a mere impudence on the part of Socrates or whether it has a true basis.

But to come back now, Socrates claims to have knowledge and this knowledge ... he knows nothing of whether death is an evil or good, but he knows one must follow the better. And that implies he knows somehow the good, because otherwise he could not recognize the better as better. We have the mere assertion; we have no specimen of it, no proof of it. We must wait awhile.

Now Socrates speaks in the sequel—we cannot read that—of his activity, namely what he has been doing all the time in Athens. Now the gist of that is this: what he did was to admonish people to virtue or, in other words, he admonished people to take care of their souls rather than of anything else. Now what is the basis of that? The command of the god, yes. But perhaps Socrates' conviction that the best is virtue, a virtuous life. You note here there is a transition. Previously he had spoken of knowledge of ignorance which he was spreading. Now he says he's spreading concern with virtue. How does Socrates know that virtue is good? Because that is his knowledge. And the answer we find in the passage to which we have referred before, in 30B. It is somewhat later on. Mr. Johnson, I trust you can find it, yes?

A: About the voice?

S: No, no, not nearly. That is on page ...

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A: ... <sup>take</sup> "not to care for your bodies or your monies first, and to care more exceedingly for the soul, to make it as good as possible; and I tell you that virtue comes not from money, but from virtue comes both money and all other good things for mankind, both in private and in public."

S: OK. So that is Socrates' knowledge; that he knows. He doesn't elaborate that, but we can all see that. For example, you cannot become rich and remain rich if you are not thrifty and industrious. Yes? Good. And furthermore, you cannot be honored in your city if you do not have certain (garb/c) of the soul by virtue of which you are elected a congressman and perhaps even a higher rank, such as president. Yes? Good. So virtue is demonstrably the condition of all good. A man who is notoriously nothing but a beachcomber will not get money, honors, or any other external goods. If he should get it, it would be by mere accident. That could happen. I mean, he could have fifty different aunts who leave him their money at different times and whenever he's bankrupt ... But that's mere accident, you can't count on that, it's not a rational procedure. So that, it can be proven. But it has one great difficulty, as we found in it before: virtue is instrumental for the external goods, including life itself. Yes, but if that is virtue it implies a decision of the question of which we were told we cannot decide it, namely ... ?

A: The value of life.

S: Absolutely. Virtue cannot consist in sacrificing life. So, in other words, this notion of virtue implies that we know that life is good, better than death. So we are still where we were. In other words, even the commandment of the god, to the extent to which it is an encouragement to virtue, to a virtuous life, implies

that life is good, because you cannot possibly live virtuously without living.

Now, he goes on ... since he does nothing but admonish his fellow-citizens to virtue, the Athenians will only hurt themselves—not him—by killing him, for life is not a great good and virtue is a great good. In this connection, he also mentions exile as one thing which the Athenians might do when he says exile is not a great evil. That will play a great role in the discussion of the Crito. What about exile?

Now here we have to turn again to the text, in 30B 7, in the next paragraph where we left off. "However, he might put me to death, or banish me, or make me outcast." Do you have that?

A: "However, he might put me to death, or banish me, or make me outcast; perhaps he thinks, perhaps others think, these are great evils, but I do not; I think, rather, that what he is now doing is evil, when he tries unjustly to put a man to death. Now therefore, gentlemen, so far from pleading for my own sake, as one might expect, I plead for your sakes, that you may not offend about God's gift by condemning me."

S: Yes, now let us stop here. "By the God's gift." We have this question: how does Socrates know either that virtue is a greater good than life or that virtue is only instrumental to life and therefore inferior to life? How does he know? It is a gift of god that he knows that virtue is a greater good than life or, that is not clear, that he has the capacity to admonish people to virtue. And then he develops this famous passage—unfortunately we cannot read that—that Socrates is sent as a gadfly, by the god, to the Athenians as a gadfly. The Greek word for gadfly, μυῖα, means literally closing or contracting the eyes, and therefore that's where mysticism comes from, μυῖ, and οψ is sight. And therefore that was applied to short-sighted people, as you know, when they wanted to look ... Short-sighted is the primary meaning of the word. Socrates is short-sighted; he's not blind. And we will see later on what that is. So he's sent as a gadfly to the city of Athens. He spends a whole day wherever he is in awakening the Athenians as a gadfly. The Athenians would like to spend their whole lives asleep. That is again the theme of the Republic; life or death. The virtuous life is an awake life and that's a good life. That's one proposition. Nothing of virtue is instrumental; that's in itself good. And this is obviously preferable to death, understood as non-being and nothing else. Socrates is sent by the god. His activity is entirely selfless—no instrumental virtue. As he says ... yes, I think we should read that, "That I happened to be such a character as to be given by the God to the city you might be able to recognize by the following point." Do you have that? Whoever has that, read it. That is 31B on page 437, line 5.

S: "Then this, namely what follows. By God you can easily see from this;" ...

S: "From this," namely what follows. Yes?

A: "For it does not seem human that I have neglected all my own interests, that I have been content with the neglect of my domestic affairs, all these years; while always I was attending to your interests, approaching each of you privately like a father or elder brother and persuading you to care for virtue. And indeed, if I had gained any advantage from this, and taken fees for my advice, there would have been some reason in it;" ...

S: Yes, it would have been reasonable, one could say. It would have been reasonable. Yes?



A: "But as it is, you see yourselves that my accusers, although accusing me so shamelessly of everything else, had not the effrontery or ability to produce a single witness to testify that I ever exacted or asked for a fee; and I produce, I think, the sufficient witness that I speak the truth, my poverty."

S: Yes. Now listen carefully. Socrates says, I always did your business. Does this strike, or ring, a bell? Yes?

A: In the Republic he says that minding your own business is the thing.

S: Yes. By always doing the business of others, how could he find time for minding his own business, in the strict sense? His activity is entirely selfless. He is irrational, as he puts it. If I had gotten some money for that ... you see, he comes down now to the instrumental value of virtue ... then it would have made sense, but I didn't do that. The irrationality of his act proves the divine inspiration. A merely human person wouldn't do that. He takes care of the Athenians like a father takes care of his children. He replaces the fathers. And there is implied another ~~thing~~<sup>fact</sup> which we know already: by replacing the fathers, by doing much better what the fathers ought to do, than the fathers did, he brings a certain dishonor on the fathers and so on. We will remember what we saw ... To repeat, what Socrates presents here is his pure virtue which has nothing to do with virtue as an instrument. I repeat; how does he know that this pure, selfless virtue is good? That it is not irrational? We get a kind of answer in the immediate sequel and that is <sup>a passage</sup> ~~perhaps~~ of the utmost importance. It is in a way the center of the apology. Yes? Read it.

A: "Perhaps it may seem odd that although I go about and give all this advice privately, quite a busybody," ...

S: Yes, busybody. You know, in the Republic he <sup>to</sup> minds <sup>one's</sup> ~~his~~ own business, the opposite of being a busybody. Yes?

A: ... "yet I dare not appear before your public assembly and advise the state. The reason for this is one which you have often heard me giving in many places, that something divine and spiritual comes to me," ...

S: Yes, divine and demonic comes to me. Yes?

A: ... "which Meletos put into the indictment" ...

S: No, no, they omit something even in the text here. "Something divine and demonic comes to me, a voice,". Yes?

A: ... "which Meletos put into the indictment in caricature. This has been about me since my boyhood, a voice, which when it comes always turns me away from doing something I am intending to do, but never urges me on. This is what opposes my taking up public business. And quite right, too, I think; for you may be sure, gentlemen, that if I had meddled with public business in the past, I should have perished long ago and done no good either to you or to myself. Do not be annoyed at my telling the truth; the fact is that no man in the world will come off safe who honestly opposes either you or any other multitude, and tries to hinder the many unjust and illegal doings in a state. It is necessary that one who really and truly fights for the right, if he is to survive even for a short time, shall act as a private man, not as a public man."

S: Yes. Now that is very crucial because we find now a new reference--a wholly

unexpected reference—to a super-human source of knowledge different from the Delphic oracle. It is brought in rather accidentally. Socrates has explained why he was acting by talking to individuals, to every Athenian individually. That was due to the Delphic oracle. But then the question arises here, "But if you are such a busybody, Socrates, you walk around the whole day in Athens, in the streets, the market place, the gymnasia, and button-hole everyone and say, 'Did you care for your virtue today,' (honestly, that's the way in which it's presented) then why did he not go into politics, what was obviously the duty of an intelligent man?" Why did he not dare—that's the term used—to be politically active? Answer: something divine and demonic happens to him, a voice; a voice, that's important because it is only a voice and therefore the question can you draw any inference from the voice that they are demons. You remember? You know, the argument against Meletos? The demonic voice doesn't prove that there are demons except in a purely verbal way when you say a demonic voice must be demons. Then of course you cannot prove that Socrates believed in the gods in the way in which Socrates proved it to Meletos. A voice. That voice opposes to action; it never incites to action. The incitement to action came from the Delphic oracle, not from the demonic voice, and it always opposes political action. It seems to be an irrational thing. But, as Socrates makes clear in JB 6, it's verdict is intelligible. "It seemed to me," Socrates says, "to oppose political actions in a perfectly beautiful way, and a perfectly intelligible way." Now why is it so intelligible? Why is the verdict of that voice so intelligible? Why?

A: Self-preservation.

S: That's it. Political activity would have meant to Socrates death, for political activity is fatal to decent men. I disregard now this crucial implication, that political activity is fatal to decent men. I'm now concerned only with that point which Mr. Johnson has observed that the daimonia as presented here, in the Apology, whatever Plato may say in other dialogues, is concerned with self-preservation, with Socrates' self-preservation. It is cautionary. The demonic thing, as presented here, is cautionary. That is the simple meaning of that keeping back, for this reason: life is a condition of any other good. The demonic thing leads to private life with a view to self-preservation, whereas the Delphic oracle leads to that quasi public life—you know, button-holing everyone—complete disregard of self-preservation. Completely selfless virtue, as we have seen before. The daimonia is directly concerned with Socrates' self-preservation. And what does this mean in terms of the key question of the Apology? What is that key question, to make it quite clear? Why is Socrates so absolutely ignorant? I mean, what's the concentrated form of this question?

above

A: Virtue to ~~love~~ self-preservation?

S: Yes, more simply, is death an evil or a good? The demonic thing assures him that life is good because it points him toward self-preservation. And therefore, also—although that is not made clear here at all—that to be awake is better than to be asleep because sleep is akin to death. And therefore to awaken others is better than to keep them asleep. Surely now. But what is that demonic thing? What is that thing? Well, the demonic thing is mentioned in other Platonic dialogues, naturally, and the clearest presentation is given in a dialogue called Theaetetus Theages which is almost universally considered spiritual. I say almost because I'm the only one, I think, who is sure that it is genuine. And here we find one very beautiful thing. It is a very crude presentation of the daimonia but the reason is that it is the only dialogue of Socrates <sup>with</sup> as a rustic and people don't consider the fact that when Socrates talks to someone from up state—you know this is really up state,



Athens, as we can see--he cannot talk the same way as he would talk to a sophisticated down-stater. That is suggested. By the way, this point was taken up very nicely in a master's thesis for the Committee on Soc. Theor. by ... if you want to read that. It is a very enjoyable thesis, by the way. Now what he does in the Theaetetus is this: a fellow from up state says his son wants to study with Socrates because ... he isn't always quite clear but he wants to become famous and Socrates finds out he also wants to become a tyrant and he thinks the right thing is to go to school with Socrates. Socrates doesn't want to help him. And then he says, "You see, there is something strange with me. I have only one kind of knowledge and that is eroticism." And that means, in other words, well, he didn't impute to himself, but he implies it, if I'm attracted, I'll take him on; if I am not attracted, I will not take him on. Yes? But he didn't belabor that point because it would be offensive. And so the fellow says, I have to know the exact eroticism. And then they laugh

And then they say, all right; I mean, that's perfectly legitimate. And then he speaks of the demonic thing. You see, if he clicks then I accept him; if he doesn't click then I don't. And then in order to describe the demonic thing, he tells them absolutely awful horror stories and that is the reason why the majority think it is not by Plato, you know, because of the gruesomeness, but it makes perfect sense in the context, because he can't convince them by this elegant argument based on eroticism that he uses fire and brimstone, in the Biblical sense.

Now, the point is, Socrates substitutes here ... He refuses eros and uses daimonia as a substitute for eros. I suggest that eros and daimonia are the same thing. I mean, the question of the voice of conscience, that is really no question. Now let me explain that; you must not think of Sigmund Freud. Eros has here a broad meaning. It means all natural inclinations, but particularly those which are indicated by virtue, but still it means all natural inclinations, it means also the basic ones

A: Some dissipation, too.

S: Yes. There is perfect agreement, I mean perfect consistency. Socrates has a daimonia; that means that the natural inclinations are unusually powerful so that they are more powerful than mere opinion. And that shows on all levels. It must also show that Socrates was a man of common sense, in the true sense of the crude word. You know, he had a certain sense of self-preservation is implied in that. Socrates is appraised he'd suffer. Yes?

A: Doesn't Socrates say that unless he's likely to go to death the voice doesn't appear and this would indicate that self-preservation is not the ...

S: Is not the highest consideration. But it is, of course, also something innate. But in answer to the question which you very legitimately have suggested, you have to consider circumstance. What is the most massive circumstance of this affair, this condemnation? I mean, the external circumstance. I mean, after all, you know what circumstances mean. I mean, for example, at what time did this take place?

A: When he's 70.

S: Yes. So, in other words, a sensible man of 70 will have a different position to the value of his life to him than a man of 30, yes? We come to that immediately in the Crito. You see, in the Crito that is discussed at some length. Should Socrates escape or not. There is only one place, a simple answer: obey the laws. But that is not so simple, as we shall see. And therefore a prudential consideration enters and there, in a prudential consideration, the simple verdict of the law is not

sufficient. You consider the circumstance. And one important circumstance surely is one's age.

A: You mean if he were a younger man, he might have made a different ...

S: Yes, we don't know. It might have been that. If old age was a relevant consideration it is a fair question, at any rate, which course he would have taken when he was forty. That is the question. But that we can only decide when we come to the Crito. Good.

Now let me first finish this one, if you don't mind. Now the natural revulsion against death and against stupor and torpor ... look back now to the Delphic oracle. The Delphic oracle, by inducing Socrates to expose himself to hatred, unpopularity, death, says just the opposite. And here I can only remind you--because that would lead us too far--of the Wasps, you remember, of the action of the Wasps, of the hero of the Wasps, of course also based on the Delphic oracle. This action also was misanthropic, not guided by love of man. The daimonia is guided by love of human beings, philanthropy. Eros is the philanthropic god, as you may remember from the Banquet. Now Mr. Gilman?

A: There seems to be a parallel between the daimonia and the kind of action which he decides not to take politically, because the daimonia tells him what not to do and the kind of action he speaks of consists of hindering unjust and illegal acts. In other words, it would seem impossible for him to be the daimonia of Athens. There is a place for such a voice in an individual, but not in a political community. Or have I ruined it?

S: No, no, I will come to that, but keep it in mind. I didn't think of it, but it links up very well with the point which comes up. Only one implication: The just political life, which Socrates would have regarded as the only one feasible for him, is essentially, he makes clear, a life in opposition to the multitude because of the essential injustice of the multitude. That is stated very strongly. A just man, he cannot remain just by going into politics. Clearly that implies that Socrates knows what justice is and we do not know yet whether in all respects. In the sequel, he gives proof of his justice and the injustice of the multitude under the democracy. But what did justice consist of in this case. I do not mean now the somewhat more subtle point raised by Mr. Gilman. What is his justice, very simply.

A: Following the law.

S: Legality. Socrates insists on legality. Yes. <sup>Wanted to</sup> Let me say they condemned the generals all by one verdict whereas, according to the law, everyone had to be judged by himself. Socrates obeyed by the law. And that is of course clear. One meaning, the primary meaning of legality, of justice, is to obey the law and not follow your passions, naturally. That's the reason why people establish laws, to have a protection against irrational judgments. But in this particular case, and I think that is very important ... that I think we should read ... no, no, that comes later. I'm sorry. This particular law, that appears on the context, is obviously also a wise law. It <sup>did</sup> not merely happen to be the Athenian law. It's a sensible law. And this tells us one little thing, although it is not developed here. Anyway, that justice, while being primarily legality, is not identical with legality because otherwise we could not speak of unjust laws and to speak of unjust laws is obviously necessary. That is only indicated here.

As for this question of Socrates' knowledge of justice, I would like to say only one



word because we can't develop this now, that I believe is identical here—this context—with his admission that there is a political art although he's not competent in it. And I will speak of that problem next time.

In the sequel he speaks of how he behaved legally under an oligarchy. In both cases, as Mr. Gilman said, Socrates' injustice really consists, strictly speaking, in preventing injustice, in not doing anything unjust. But is he positively just? That is the question which you meant, yes? For example, that is a question which we take up next time. And then we have to take up this question ... I can only state the problem. The whole description of Socrates' life, as given in the Apology—the Apology, as I said on a former occasion, is a kind of entrance gate to that cosmos of the Platonic dialogues. Here Socrates is presented as presenting himself to the Athenian people, the Athenian demoi. Very well. <sup>(we should expect that)</sup> This will be confirmed, this button-holing business, you know, by the many dialogues which Plato wrote. According to the Apology, Socrates is a man who gets up at four in the morning, goes out, and begins approaching *inaudible*. Did you care for your soul? What is virtue? Socrates has always initiated the questions. A different expression: that all dialogues are *voluntary*—it's the same thing—Socrates seeks something. But if we look at the dialogues, we find that only part of them are *voluntary*. Another part is imposed on Socrates. They approach him. If any button-holing is done, it is done by others. And furthermore, we see that the dialogues show us Socrates engaged not in conversation with a chance fellow-citizen. There are only two exceptions to that rule and the exceptions prove this. He comes home from a campaign, exhausted and it was a tough grind. What does he do? Where does he go the next morning? To the gymnasium where there are young men, youth; *Callitatus*; *Charmides*; that he likes, he talks to them. And then he goes perhaps also to places where Gorgias is, you know. He talks to Gorgias. This kind of thing he did. I mean, there is no question about this kind of thing. So there isn't a single Platonic dialogue which complies with that description of Socratic life. Plato refutes this description of Socrates by his own popular dialogue. There are two dialogues in which Socrates really has put his initiative and approaches a nameless fellow, a chance acquaintance. These dialogues are the Minos and Hipparchus, two small dialogues which are, again, almost universally regarded as spurious. The Minos begins *inaudible* and the *recipe* of the dialogue is really rather subversive; I mean he puts a big question mark behind the sacredness of the Athenian law. The Hipparchus begins also, what is love of gain? And it leads up to a certain justification or vindication of the Athenian tyrant Hipparchus.

As I say, the exception when he takes the initiative addressing a chance fellow human being proves the rule. He didn't do that. And that, of course, is the most interesting question regarding the Apology; what does this presentation of Socrates, this wholly unrealistic presentation, mean? After all, this was not the defense speech actually delivered by Socrates in the year 399. That was written years—perhaps ten years, twenty years, we don't know—after the death of Socrates and in a way which had of course a relation to the accusation, naturally, but which had also the function, as I said, to give the only popular speech which Socrates ever made. You remember, there was a sketch of a popular speech given here in 29 where ... "You best of men, being Athenian," and so on and so on, in 29D following.

There are such speeches. Xenophon whose deliberate principle is to leave everything at the most pedestrian level—the low ceiling, as I call it—gives at least one such speech in the third chapter of the Memorabilia in which Socrates is presented as a kind of stump-orator. He goes on the stump and makes a speech in favor of continence which is very *possible* but someone less gifted than Socrates could have made it. It contains this very charming passage when he says, "To whom would you entrust, if you died early, your sons for education and your daughters for washing," which

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includes the idea that girls don't need an education and sheds some light on the manners of olden times. That is a kind of caricature, a benevolent caricature, of Socrates. But the thesis behind it is this: it is impossible for a philosopher to present what he is doing in a popular speech, this speech addressed to the demos of Athens. They wouldn't understand. And what is immediately audible is indeed something which is in a way comic, yes? I mean, it has a great elevation and so on. <sup>reflects</sup> This elevation is, however, when you understand it more deeply, a mere recollection of the true elevation of Socrates. That is the elevation as it can be understood by the ordinary man. Then you understand the true elevation only in caricature. And there is a deep element of the comical in this presentation as I think we will see next time.

Now next time we will have to discuss the end of the Apology and Monday we will have the paper on the Crito. Mr. Bergen, are you ... No, you gave it to me. Well then, do you want to read it in class?

A: It's rather long. It's long.

S: I see. Well, then I will ask Mr. ... to read it in class next Monday. And Mr. ... you will have it ready, but you will not turn it in ...



... the Delphic oracle leads him to realize the knowledge of ignorance, the depreciation of human wisdom—it's of no worth—and implies we don't know whether death is not a great good after all. The demonic thing, on the other hand, pushes him to concern with self-preservation and therefore conveys the message that life is good. Now I interpreted that that the daimonia in Socrates stands for the natural inclinations and that implies the natural inclinations are, as such, good. Now this problem we have to discuss because it is crucial absolutely for the whole later history of social thought and social science up to the present day. The notion that natural inclinations are good is underlying the concepts of natural right and natural law. Natural right means, in the original meaning of the term, that which is intrinsically right as distinguished from everything which is right only by human <sup>over-requirements</sup> agents. But the intrinsically right is <sup>that which</sup> acknowledged by nature right. Nature is the standard. The same applies also to the ~~theoretical~~ concept of natural law. Now you all know that this view, that nature supplies us with a standard, is today rejected. But this rejection of nature as a standard is not a recent thing, but is implied in modern political thought from the very beginning. One can state that the position of modern philosophy from the very beginning was this: the ancient philosophers made the dogmatic premise that nature is good. Why should it be good? In other words, they, the modern thinkers, I will give you some names later, that they had discovered a problem ~~in which~~ the ancient thinkers had not seen a problem at all. To indicate the present-day view, the most beautiful statement of that which I have read or heard occurs ~~in Herman Melville~~; I have quoted that frequently. In one of his stories—I think it's on the Mississippi—a confidence man—you will know which story it is I'm referring to, because I have read it only in a book on Melville—this confidence man, this trickster, says something about the goodness of nature to which he owes everything and the fellow to whom he addresses that remark says, my eyes, for example, that they work, I owe not to nature but to an oculist in Philadelphia because he had to improve nature so that I could see at all. So nature, in other words, is nothing. Nature is in need of constant change and improvement of human art, of <sup>each day</sup> acknowledging of the contrast of nature. Conquest of nature means—never forget!—that nature is an enemy. You don't conquer your friends.

In the recent book by Arnold Brecht, Political Theory, this is the guiding theme, you can say. The usual distinction between facts and values is there presented as follows: the radical distinction between facts and values is indispensable because there is no possibility of making an inference, a legitimate inference, from the is to the ought. You have heard this ~~ten~~ times; that this is so doesn't prove that it is good that it is so. And Brecht, who is an oldish man, belongs to an older ~~strain~~ <sup>strain</sup> of this kind of theory—a ~~strain~~ <sup>strain</sup> which was more solid, I must say, than what we have now—says the conclusion of the is to the ought would be legitimate only if the is were knowable as the work of the good God then the is would be intrinsically good. But this, namely that ~~this~~ is the work of the good God, is not knowable, and therefore the inference is not legitimate. Yes?

A: May I ask you what was this book again?

S: Arnold Brecht, Political Theory, Princeton, 1958 or 59. I mean, it is not an original book in any way, but it is a respectable book because it gives you a coherent history of this fact-value distinction and presents in a sober way—sober, I think one can say—the accepted opinion, what he calls social ... How does he call it, Mr. Schrock? Social science relativism?

A: Yes, that's it.

S: Or scientific relativism?

A: Scientific relativism, I guess.

S: May I take the liberty of telling you that he criticizes my criticism of this view and says I don't understand the whole problem, but I don't regard this in any way as detracting from the book because the value of the book consists in being a presentation, a sober presentation, of accepted opinion and this was lacking. Most people who presented it were really savages, I'm sorry to say, who, without any inkling of the deeper issues simply said values are just preferences, you know. Someone likes steaks, another likes pineapples, and that's all there is to it. Brecht is much better than them.

But to come back to ... I mean, to <sup>trace it</sup> ~~stresses~~ the origin, Hobbs, <sup>his doctrine of the</sup> ~~he started the~~ state of nature—a term which didn't occur in political theory before. Hobbs really made it the key term. The state of nature is bad. The real thing is to get out of the state of nature. If one would apply the term, the state of nature, to earlier thought, it would mean the state of nature is a good state, the state of perfection; that was the ordinary meaning. The term doesn't occur in political theory before. It stems from theology, from <sup>Christian</sup> ~~this~~ theology, and is not at home in political thought. Only in Hobbs.

So the state of nature is bad. That means, of course, nature provides a standard. But only a negative standard. Nature tells us from what we should get away and <sup>there with</sup> ~~there with~~ gives us direction, but it is not itself the standard. But the profoundest presentation of this basic premise is, occurs in Descartes' Meditations where Descartes speaks of a bad genius—you can say a bad god—as a <sup>pre-ground</sup> ~~pre-ground~~ for doubt. We do not know whether we are not the work of an evil genius and all our natural faculties are not his work. This may be all delusions, you know, that we see things and various kinds of things, may all be delusions. We may be exposed to the artifices of a clever deceiver who has no other intention ~~other~~ than to deceive us. And then Descartes then tries to show that even if he is bad, we still could protect ourselves against him, because if he wants to deceive us he must give us some intelligence. You can't deceive a stone. And this intelligence, which he had to give us in order to deceive us, is our protection. But it is only this intelligence, this reason, not nature, on which we can rely. And so, not nature, but reason gives us guidance. Nature and reason here used as opposites. And this culminates in Kant's doctrine according to which the <sup>moral</sup> ~~moral~~ law is the law of freedom in <sup>contradiction</sup> ~~contradiction~~ to the law of nature. The traditional view was that the <sup>moral</sup> ~~moral~~ law is the law of nature. For Kant that is incompatible.

So this problem, which is so crucial for modern thought, occurs to us in the Apology, among other writings. The Apology shows that Socrates, or Plato, was aware of this problem, that he faced it, and the expression of that is: Death may be better than life. How Socrates thought that, we must try to understand.

Now to return to the immediately visible part of the argument, Socrates says that he is ignorant of the greatest things. But, also, he knows that it is evil and disgraceful to act unjustly and to disobey one's betters. Now, I interpret this to mean it is evil and disgraceful to transgress the law and to transgress the intrinsically right; wrong-doing—law, disobeying one's betters, to transgress the intrinsically right. Now this intrinsically right proves to be superior to the law, at least in the case of Socrates. Socrates, as we have seen, refuses to obey <sup>any</sup> ~~possible~~ law which would ~~may~~ forbid him to philosophize. Therefore, all right. The crucial point is Socrates knows the intrinsically right. How does he know it? He gives the



example of his conduct at the trial of the generals, ten generals, after the battle of Arginusai. Socrates acted justly at that trial. In what did his just action consist? He obeyed the law. The multitude wanted to condemn them altogether, whereas the law provided that each one should be judged by himself. Yes, but there is more to it. That law was not merely the actual law of Athens. A moment's reflection tells everyone that it was a wise law, I mean that it is an impossible procedure to condemn people in a block and not to look at each case at the guilt or the justice of it. So Socrates has another criteria--that is clear--for justice than the mere law. Now let us turn to 37A, that is in the translation on page 442, at the beginning of the second paragraph. Do you have that? Go on.

A: "Perhaps you think that in saying this, very much as I spoke of appeals for pity, I am just showing off; no such thing, gentlemen; I will tell you what I mean. I am convinced that I never willingly wronged anyone, but I cannot convince you, for we have conversed together only a short time. If we had a law, as other people have, that a trial for life or death is to be spread over many days and not confined to one, I think you would have been convinced; but as it is I cannot disperse great prejudices in a moment."

S: Now let us stop here. What does Socrates do here in this passage?

A: He criticizes the Athenian law.

S: He criticizes the law, yes. On such an occasion. That's extraordinary. And on what ground?

A: That it is unjust ... yes, but it has to say more than that.

S: Yes. Namely?

A: That it doesn't give him enough time to defend himself.

S: Yes. It's a bad law. So Socrates then has a criteria for distinguishing between bad and good laws. And that means the identification of justice with obedience to the law, with legality, is untenable, manifestly untenable. I don't know what an addict of the value-fact distinction would say, but I must confess it's an excellent argument, a rational argument that such a law is a better law as proposed by Socrates than the existing law because the law wants to punish the guilty. Not the innocent. Any penal law, whatever the legislator might understand by it--you know, there can be all kinds of funny notions as to what constitutes innocence or guilt--but the penal law tries to find out and to discriminate between the guilty and innocent, and then it must take the necessary precautions in order not to punish the innocent. Take even the Nazi system. They didn't want to destroy good Nazis. Obviously not. And therefore the legal procedure would have to be, if they had had any sense, at least to discriminate clearly between good Nazis--who might have looked as bad Nazis for one moment--and other people. So that's really intrinsically sound, although very insufficient, as my example showed.

Socrates claims then that he possesses knowledge of justice. But he denies that he possesses knowledge of the greatest things. How can this seeming contradiction be resolved?

A: Knowledge of justice is different from knowledge of the greatest things.

S: Knowledge of justice does not belong to knowledge of the greatest things. Yes.

It is stated differently. Knowledge of justice is part of knowledge of the human things and the human things are, by definition, distinguished from the divine things. And the divine things are the greatest things. Sure, but to come back to the point, Socrates claims to possess knowledge of justice and we have to understand that. On an earlier occasion, we learned that Socrates admitted that there is a political art which he denied, however, to possess. And says of that political art, of the political men rather, that they know nothing noble and good, i.e. nothing of the greatest things. But the political<sup>is</sup> is an art, for example, like the art of show-making. Whatever you may say, it is possible for you to distinguish between a good and bad shoemaker. I mean, just put on the shoe made by a good and by a bad shoemaker and you will see the difference. And a little bit more complicated, but in the long run it is able to distinguish between a good and bad statesman. But the consumption takes such a longer time<sup>For example, Chamberlain might have appeared in a different light in 1937—every gentleman, I mean—than in 1939.</sup> It needed these two years to bring out certain things which showed his lack of judgment in certain foreign matters. In Plato, it is the same thing.

What is that political art, then, and that we must clarify because our subjects<sup>is</sup> are the origins of political science. Now what is that art? Comparable to the art of the shoemaker, though more ambitious, in every sense. The art of managing the affairs of the city by deed and by speech. This art is a pre-philosophic art, as the art of the shoemaker, that exists, or can exist, among savages as well as among the most civilized people. Still, the awareness that it is an art is somehow connected with philosophy. It is, as it were, unconsciously used as an art everywhere where men live in societies but that men are aware it is an art is connected with philosophy. External <sup>proof</sup> that, I mean, that King David in the Bible possessed the political art can hardly be doubted, but there is no way to prove Hebrew that was political art, no Biblical <sup>word</sup> way. The Greeks had that word, acquiring it indeed in the period when their way of speaking had already become influenced by philosophy.

Now let us look into that political art, keeping in mind its relation to the knowledge of justice. This political art in Greek ... the Greeks had two different words—one is technē and the other epistēmē; now the traditional translation is for that art, and for that science—but in the classical period they are used rather indiscriminately. I mean, the strict, formal distinction occurs in Aristotle, but even Aristotle does not always use them in the strict <sup>terminological</sup> sense. So we can also say the political science; it doesn't make any difference, political science or political art. This political science in the primary sense, the art or science possessed by the good politician or statesman. Does anyone of you know where we find the first presentation of that science in its pre-philosophic meaning? That's a very important question. I believe I have not discussed that subject for some years in my classes, otherwise you would know—some of you would know. Well, the statement occurs in Aristotle's Rhetoric, book I, chapter 4. I will read it to you. Aristotle's Rhetoric deals with the art of speech, naturally. One kind of speech is deliberative speech; the speech in political assemblies concerned with what is expedient or inexpedient for the polis. "We must first ascertain about what kind of things the deliberative orator advises, since he cannot do so about everything but only about things which may possibly happen on earth Everything which of necessity often is said to be, either is or will be or which cannot possibly be or come to pass is outside the scope of deliberation. Indeed, even in the case of things that are possible, advice is not universally appropriate for they include certain advantages, natural and accidental, about which it is not worthwhile to offer advice; but it is clear that advice is limited to those subjects about which we take counsel. And such are all those which can naturally be referred to ourselves and the first



cause of who's origination is in our own power, for our examination is limited to finding out whether such things are possible or impossible for us to perform, not whether they are possible for angels; or, for that matter, for foreigners. We are discussing what we in this community can do. However, there is no legal precedent to endeavor to enumerate with crudeness, exactness, or to classify those subjects which men are wont to discuss, or to define them, <sup>if possible</sup>, with strict accuracy, since this is not the function of rhetorical art, but of one that is more intelligent and exact; and furthermore, <sup>moreover</sup> that its legitimate subjects of inquiry have already been assigned to it. For what we have said before is true, that rhetoric is composed of logic—let me say—and of that political science which is concerned with characters." Aristotle doesn't mean by that political science which is not <sup>that there</sup> concerned with characters, but he only wants to exclude any notion that there could be a political science which does not deal ultimately with characters, with good and bad men.

So, in other words, a strict discussion would belong rather to political science but here he has to give at least a sketch because of the overlapping of rhetoric and the political art. Now we must say that the most important subjects about which all men deliberate and deliberative orators harangue are five in number, to wit; ways and means, war and peace, the defense of the country, imports and exports, legislation. These are the five things. You see, he makes a distinction between the defense of the country—which means ordinary guarding, fortressing, and such things—and the question should we now make war or keep peace, which is a different question, surely. And then he develops these themes. Let me only read what he says about legislation. "With a view to the safety of the city, it is necessary that ~~an~~ the orator should be able to judge of all these questions" ... namely food, imports and exports, ways and means, war and peace, and the guarding of the country ... "but an understanding of legislation is of special importance, for it is on ~~the~~ law that ~~the~~ safety of the city is based; therefore, he must know how many regimes there are, what is <sup>συμφέρει</sup> expedient for each, and the natural course of their downfall, whether they are peculiar to the particular form of government, or opposed to it. By being ruined by causes peculiar to itself—I mean that with the exception of the best regime—all the rest are ruined by being relaxed or strained to excess. Thus democracy, not only when relaxed, but also when strained to excess, becomes ~~the~~ weaker and will end in oligarchy. Similarly, not only does an aquiline or snub-nose reach the mean when one of these defects is relaxed" ... you know, the opposites ... "but when it becomes aquiline or snubbed to excess, it is altered to such an extent that even the likeness of the nose is lost." But if they would come to the middle, they would give you a normal nose; that is the perfect <sup>regime</sup> region. That's all right. "Moreover, with reference to acts of legislation, it is useful not only to understand what regime is expedient by judging in the light of the past" ... reading histories ... "but also to become acquainted with those in existence in other nations <sup>to comparative</sup> learn what regimes are suitable to what kind of people." For example, for the <sup>Government</sup> Persians, their kind of kingship may be much better and they would be lost in a republic. "It is clear therefore that for legislation, books of travel are useful." You see, he doesn't say scientific books on South America. He says books of travel because he thinks <sup>more intelligent</sup> books of travellers are perfectly good guides for ruling, since they have to understand laws of other nations; and for political debates, historical works. There you find models for political speeches. "All these things, however, belong to politics and not to rhetoric." So, you have here the framework really of what political science, even today, fundamentally means. The kind of knowledge which men need for acting wisely in political matters. There is no reflection on methodology, because methodology is implied—you know how to go about it. If you want to find about Nehru's India, you surely may also need some statistics because you can't count the heads and you can't count the amount of food the Indian

uses. Sure, that's easy. It may be technically difficult, but it's not a serious problem, an intellectual problem. And so. That's it.

Now that is really a classic statement which, if there were a good reader introduction to political science, that would be in it. But what has that to do with our present problem, Socrates? The answer is simple. What Aristotle does here is based on a Socratic statement. Mr. Kendrick? Do you recognize it?

A: No, I missed it.

S: I said Aristotle's statement, which I read in parts, is based on a Socratic statement.

A: first book is the Memorabilia?

S: No, no. In the Memorabilia, book 3, chapter 6, Socrates conversation with Glaucon, the fellow whom you know from Plato's Republic, the son of Ariston, Glaucon, was attempting to become an orator and striving for headship in the polis, though he was less than twenty years old. And none of his friends or relations could check him. So he would get himself dragged from blackboard and make himself a laughing-stock. Only Socrates, who was benevolent to him for the sake of Plato and for the sake of Charmides, the son of Glaucon, alone managed to check him. For once on meeting him, he stopped him and contrived to engage his attention by saying, "Glaucon, have you made up your mind to be our chief man in the polis?" "I have, Socrates." "Well, by Zeus, there is no more honorable ambition in the world for, obviously, if you gain your object, you will be able to get whatever you want and will have the means of helping your friends. You will <sup>will live</sup> up your father's house and exalt your fatherland. You will make a name for yourself, first at home, later on in Greece, and possible, like Themistocles, in foreign lands as well. Wherever you go, you will be a man of marvel." When Glaucon heard this, he felt proud and gladly stayed on. Next Socrates asked, "Well, Glaucon, as you want to win honor, is it not obvious that you must benefit your city?" "Most certainly." "By the gods, don't be reticent then, but tell us how you propose to begin your services to the polis." As Glaucon remained silent, apparently considering for the first time how to begin, Socrates said, "If you wanted to add to friend's fortune, you would set out making him richer. Would you try then to make our city richer?" "Certainly." "Would she not be richer if she had a larger revenue?" "Yes, obviously." "Now tell me from what source are the city's present revenue derived and what is their total? No doubt you have gone into this matter and know that the present amount of the revenue is deficient and the <sup>supply of</sup> supplies in it are lacking?" "Certainly not!" exclaimed Glaucon, "I haven't gone into that." "Well, if you have left that out, tell us the expenditure of the city. No doubt you intend to cut out any items that are excessive?" "The fact is that I haven't time yet for that either." "O, then we'll postpone the business of making the city richer, for how is it possible to look up the income and expenditures without knowing what they are?" "Well, Socrates, we can make our enemies contribute to the revenue of the city." "Yes, by Zeus, provided he is stronger than they, but if he be weaker, he may lose what he has got instead. True. Therefore, in order to advise her whom to fight, it is necessary to know the strength of the city and of the enemy so that if the city be stronger, one may recommend her to go to war, but if weaker, then the enemy may persuade her to beware. You are right. First then, tell us the naval and military strength of our city and that of her enemies." "By Zeus, I can't tell you that out of my head." "Well, if you have made notes, fetch them, for I should greatly like to hear this." "But, by Zeus, I haven't yet made any notes either." "Then we will postpone offering advice about war, too, for the present. You are new to power and perhaps have not yet had time to investigate



such big things. But the defense of the country now" ... you see, the defense of the country is a different question from war and peace ... "I feel sure that you have thought about that and know how many of the garrisons are well placed and how many are not and how many of the guards are efficient and how many are not and you will propose to strengthen the well-placed garrisons and to do away with those that are superfluous." "By Zeus, I shall propose to do away with them all, for the only effect of maintaining them is that our crops are stolen." Here he knows something. "But if you do away with the garrisons, don't you think that anyone will be at liberty to rob us openly? However, have you been on a tour of inspection? How do you know that they are badly maintained?" "By guesswork." "Then shall we wait to offer advice on this question, too, until we really know instead of merely guessing." "Perhaps this would be better," said Glaucon. Now for the silver mines, which was a major source of revenue for the city of Athens. "I'm sure you have not visited them and so cannot you can tell from <sup>why the amount derived from them</sup> whether any has fallen." "No, I have not been there." "But, by Zeus," says Socrates, "this district is considered unhealthy, and therefore the people leave the silver mines, and so when you have to offer advice on the problem, this excuse will serve." "You are joking at my expense," says Glaucon. "Ah, but there is one question I feel sure you have not overlooked. No doubt you have reckoned how long the corn grown in the country will maintain the population and how much is <sup>grown</sup> annually, so that you should not be caught napping should the city at any time be short and may come to the rescue and relieve the city by giving expert advice about food." "What an overwhelming task," says Glaucon, "if one has got to include such things as that in one's duties." "But you know," says Socrates, "no <sup>one</sup> ~~man~~ ever will ever managed his own household successfully unless he knows its needs and sees that they are also planned. Seeing that our city contains more than ten thousand houses and it is difficult to look after so many families at once, you must try to make a start by doing something for one, ~~probably your uncle~~ Probably Charmides. "It needs it. And if you succeed with that one, you can set to work on a larger number. But if you can't do anything for one, how are you going to succeed with many? If a man can't carry one talent, it's absurd for him to try to carry more than one, isn't it?" "Well," says Glaucon, "I could do something for uncle's household if only he would listen to me." "What!" says Socrates, "You can't persuade your uncle and yet you suppose you will be able to persuade all the Athenians, including your uncle? Pray take care, Glaucon, that your daring ambition does not lead to a fall. Don't you see how risky it is to say or do what you don't understand? Think of others whom you know to be the sort of man to say or do what they don't understand. Do you think they get praise or blame for it? And think of those who understand what they say and what they do. You will find that the men who are famous and admired always come from those who have the widest knowledge and the infamous and despised from the most ignorant. Therefore, if you want to win fame and admiration in public life, try to get a thorough knowledge of what you propose to do." And so on.

Now, you see, that is jocular and it is much richer than appears at first reading, but Socrates gives here the sketch, just as Aristotle does--only Aristotle doesn't do it jocularly--what political knowledge is; revenue, food one needs, guarding of the country. For reasons which would be interesting to explore, Socrates does not mention legislation, which Aristotle mentions. But we can dismiss that.

But to come back to the one point, these are the two earliest statements on political science. One thing is striking. Both statements are silent on justice. I mean, I have read only excerpts, but you will see if you read it. Does political science, in the original sense, have nothing to do with justice? Surely not. As Aristotle makes clear in the Rhetoric, in the passage I read, political science has to do with legislation and, therefore, with the distinction between good and bad laws. And here is, well... justice is the whole thing. Even in the case of war and peace, the question of justice

comes in as you see from any political debates in Thucydides and so on. The true statesman, the good statesman, must then have knowledge of justice. And that is presupposed. This knowledge is not far-fetched. Everyone has that. There are current opinions, in Athens as well as today, which tell us that. For example: there is no doubt that to steal, to cheat, to rob, to murder are unjust actions regardless of what the law says. Behind it, to summarize, justice consists in respecting what belongs to others. That is the point; to respect the other's property. Property means, of course not mere possessions. These fellows who collaborated with this young fellow, the policemen, had in their possession *radios and so on; these things* were obviously not their property. And so property means always lawful possessions. To respect the other's property, that's clear. That stands true even in Soviet Russia. The moot question is only whether at the limits there may not be confiscatory laws. And there is always the question, is confiscation by law not robbery in the whole. That's a very important question. But still, for the private man there is no question.

It is also clear that wrong-doing is to be punished, meaning that the guilty must be punished. And this implies proper judicial procedure. Proper judicial procedure may not be available, and that is a bad law. For example, people may think they find out the criminal, the guilty, by torture and a little reflection shows that this is not the proper way, because if I torture, not your guilt or innocence is tested, but your nerves, which is an entirely different proposition. And so torture is, therefore, an unreasonable means.

Aththe beginning of the Republic you get a crude notion also what belong to justice. One part is paying debts, naturally; implied in the very idea. You got something from another fellow with the understanding that you'd pay back. Clear. If you don't, you cheat. On this problem, there is based this great problem of the relation of creditors and debtors, and which can lead to very great political problems as you know from Shay, as well as from Solon and Greek history. Implied also is something of the notion like a decent rate of interest if you loan money. A borrows a horse from B. He's not supposed to return two horses. But if he borrows money in an amount A, maybe he's supposed to return two A's. ~~That's not absurd?~~ So that's really then a problem. Is not interest altogether unjust? Long discussions in Aristotle, but they are based on common sense, on primary notions. Borrowing cannot possibly mean paying back much more than you took in the first place. Or take another simple rule; first come, first served, the idea being if everyone is equal--either absolutely or in a certain context, as customers, for example--not all can be served at the same time. The fairest thing is, of course, to give him first who came first, because he took the trouble of getting up at four in the morning and there should be some proper relation between pain taken and reward. That is a simple law of justice. Or other things. For example, from everyone according to his obligation and to everyone according to his merits. On this is based that foreigners may have to pay heavier taxes than citizens because they have a much greater obligation. They are protected without rendering a service, for example. Also various degrees of punishment, that you can't punish petty theft as you can for murder. And here an important point comes in, important for the argument of the Apology. What is the greatest punishment, according to ...

A: Death.

S: Death. So what does the legislator imply by making capital punishment the greatest punishment?

A: This is the greatest thing to anyone.

S: Life is a very great good. <sup>if not</sup> You know, the greatest good. Life is a very great good



and has to be protected by the laws. And you see, therefore, how great Socrates' question here is, whether life is such a good. If it is not a good, why should it be protected?

Now, is this a mere assumption, that life is a good or not--an arbitrary assumption? What does Socrates tell us about that? At least, up to the point we are presently to. What does he say? Well, his daimonia tells him that the desire for keeping alive is a natural inclination and, therefore, the legislator is right in his notion that capital punishment is the greatest punishment. But we must add that the impulse to live is not the only natural inclination. If it were the only natural inclination, virtue would be merely instrumental. There would never be a question of sacrificing one's life being a virtuous action. Virtue could only be vulgar virtue, as it is called in Plato's terminology; merely instrumental. Yes, but still maybe that's a sound view; a simplistic utilitarianism is the only right view. Why can one not leave it at that? Why can one not leave it at the equation of virtue with vulgar virtue? At this point we go on. Let us turn to 32C 4, where we left off last time. Socrates had spoken of his just conduct under <sup>the</sup> democracy. Do you have that? "And this happened while the city still was democratically ruled; but after the oligarchy came in" ... Do you have that? Read it. Whoever has it, read it. Let's not waste time, gentlemen.

A: "This happened while the government was still democratic; and when the oligarchy came in, the Thirty again summoned me and four others to the Dome, and ordered us to bring Leon of Salamis from Salamis, whom they meant to put to death. Such things those people used often to do to others, wishing to make as many as possible share their guilt. Then, however, I showed again by acts, not by words, that as for death, if it is not too vulgar to use the expression, I cared not one jot, but all my anxiety was to do nothing unjust or wrong."

S: "Unjust or unholy." Yes.

A: "That government did not terrify me, strong as it was, into doing injustice; but when we came out of the Dome, the other four went to Salamis and brought Leon, but I went away home. And perhaps I should have been put to death for that, if the government had not been overthrown soon. You will find many witnesses of this."

S: Yes. Thank you. He did not refer to witnesses when he spoke of his conduct in the assembly because that was a public event and this was more private. He refused to do something unjust again. Now, I mention here only one point. Socrates indicates here, in these two sections, that he was neither a democrat nor an adherent of the oligarchy. What is the alternative?

A: *Mixed regime*

S: Yes. That you can say. But there is also a simpler meaning, the primary meaning, let me say. Aristocracy; the rule of the best. Yes? Rule of the best.

A: Why wasn't he a democrat?

S: You see what he says about the multitude, in 31A, 32 beginning, that where the multitude rules, it is impossible to act justly. That's democracy.

A: Isn't he following the laws which were made by ...

S: Yes, but that is characteristic of the multitude, when ~~he~~ <sup>it</sup> gets hysterical, ~~he~~ <sup>it</sup>

disobeys their own law. He doesn't go into this matter here, but let us bear it in mind. So aristocracy is the right thing. Rule of the best. But what is goodness? What is virtue? This shows the difficulty of the concept of virtue as merely instrumental. Aristocracy means the rule of the virtuous men who do not understand virtue as instrumental, but as <sup>choice worth</sup> virtue for its own sake. Now this, if followed up-- which is not done in the Apology--would lead to the broad notion of the art of the political science which starts with the question, what is virtue, i.e., what is gentlemanly virtue? This is Socrates' wisdom. He declines to possess the political art in the vulgar sense, in the democratic-oligarchy sense. He doesn't care for that. But if it were understood properly, perhaps ~~then~~ <sup>he has it</sup>.

Now, I mention a little curiosity. We know from a contemporary orator that the man who brought Leon from Salamis to Athens was a guy called Maletos. It is not certain whether he's identical with the accuser, but it is an interesting suggestion that he might have been the same fellow, and how delicate of Socrates not to say so.

Q: In this example, is it possible for the oligarchy to make the law in such a way that whatever they say ... Is he following a prior law ...

S: That is a very good question. That is developed by Xenophon in his <sup>incredible</sup> when Socrates says he upholds the laws of Athens over against the Thirty Tyrants.

A: So there was a prior law then.

S: Yes, but the question is one ... You see, that is, as I say, one of the delicacies of political life. Similar things existed also in Nazi Germany and other places. This notion of the sanctity of the laws <sup>advise</sup> that the laws are higher than any government, but a short reflection shows that laws depend on the government because our laws are made by a legislative assembly and a legislative assembly, that is a regime. And the law is determined by that. And that is of course underlined in the Crito where the notion of the sanctity of the laws is developed. And where the question arises, for example, can the river rise higher than the source? If the laws are the laws of the demos, made by the demos, and the demos is as despicable as it is presented there, where does the sanctity of the democratic life come in? The only consistent way of doing that would be to make a distinction between the natural law-- which intrinsically antedates any government--and the merely possible. That's one way of doing it. That is surely. Socrates does not here refer the laws in this way. He refers to the law in the democratic when he speaks of the democracy. That is, a rule of laws which is a very good and persuasive term, ~~it~~ <sup>it</sup> is also a very difficult term. You know, it <sup>conceals</sup> ~~conceals~~ also quite a problem because laws never rule. I mean, that is a metaphoric expression. Laws must be administered and applied. In the first place, they must be laid down and that is exactly where the political problem, as distinguished from the merely legal problem, comes in. Now here he says, in this immediate sequel, where we left off ...

A: "Then do you think I should have survived all these years, if I had engaged in public business, and if then I had acted as a good man should, and defended the just, and made that, as is one's duty, my chief concern?"

S: Now let us stop here. Socrates did nothing unjust. That was shown. But was he positively just? You see, he refused to comply with the unjust command of the Tyrants, the Thirty Tyrants, but he went home. That's all he did. He did not engage in an action to subvert these dirty fellows as other patriotic Athenian citizens did. Was he not concerned with self-preservation, rather than with positively doing the just things. This is a criticism you'll find as it is developed in the first book of



Cicero's Republic where Cicero, or a character of Cicero's, refers to a statement of Socrates that justice consists in not injuring others. Is this not too narrow a notion of justice? Does it not also including benefiting others? That's the problem. Now, as Mr. Gilman suggested last time, shortly before the daimonia was mentioned, the context suggests this: the daimonia as stated here is merely negative. It keeps him from acting, keeps him back from injustice. Does it incite him to justice? And that seems to be denied. But one must also say that there is no explicit connection between the negative character of the daimonia and the negative character of Socrates' action regarding justice. Negative action means avoiding injustice is not the full meaning of justice.

He developed that in the sequel to this scene. We do not have to read the whole thing. Socrates did not make anyone unjust. He takes the opposite theme of corrupting the young. He did not teach anyone anything. This is rich in implication. He did not teach Strepsiades or Pheidippides. Nor did he teach Alcibiades, the great evil under the democracy, or Critias, the great evil under the oligarchy. If someone listening to him became unjust, Socrates cannot be blamed for that because that cannot be traced to Socrates' teaching. There were other sources of corruption around. And now let us read here a point. That is in 33B, the end. So Socrates did not corrupt anyone, any young man. But why did the young men come to him and enjoyed being together with Socrates if he did not corrupt them? That's the joke. Do you have that passage? "Why do some people enjoy spending much time with me?"

A: "But why ever do some people enjoy spending a great deal of time with me? You have heard why, gentlemen; I have told you the whole truth, they enjoy hearing men cross-examined who think they are wise, and are not; indeed that is not unpleasant."

S: We will stop here. That's not unpleasant. So they are not attracted so much by Socrates' admonishing to virtue, but they are amused, yes? You remember the previous description, Socrates button-holing all and sundry. Virtue. Did you care for your virtue? And yet there is a small group of men who are spending much time with him. The others whom he button-holes don't spend much time with him. And they spend much time with him and like it. What did they like? Listening to Socrates' sermons exalting virtue; is this pleasant? Well, is this pleasant? No. They like to listen to Socrates' examining, for this was not unpleasant. That is a slight understatement.

Now let us reflect here for a moment on what light this throws on Socrates. The key thesis of the Apology: Socrates has only human wisdom, no true wisdom. And this wisdom consists in knowledge of his ignorance. He makes others aware of their blindness and of course himself aware of his blindness. Now what does this mean, to become aware of one's blindness? That is not, naturally, meant as <sup>positively</sup> blindness. Where there was formerly a content thought to be true there is now nothing. A blank. That's it. And a most important of things. What is the result of that, if the things which you regarded as the most important things and of which you were absolutely sure, it appeared you know nothing about them. The most important things. What is the result on any normal human being of that? Despair. It can't be different. Despair. Everything breaks down. But nothing of the kind is mentioned here. What happens? The activity <sup>here</sup> is not unpleasant. How come? How can this be not unpleasant? How can this be pleasant? Knowledge of ignorance means, as here indicated, he examines this fellow—this is a rhetorician, this is a shoemaker, this is a physician, and so on and so on. What of that? Well, one little thing. This ignorance is not the same in all cases. For example, if you take a pompous ass, that's one thing. But then if you take a very simple man who is not pretentious in any way, but without knowing it he raises enormous ~~crises~~ <sup>crises</sup>, what he all knows. I mean, there can also be pretentiousness in seeming simplicity, but they are two different ~~phenomena~~ <sup>phenomena</sup>. And you can go on. You

Phenomena

discover various kinds of ignorance. In discovering these various kinds of ignorance, you discover the human soul. That is psychology in the original sense of the term. But as knowledge of the human soul, it is not knowledge of nothing, obviously. If we enlarge that, knowledge of the human soul, knowledge of the soul, that means, according to Plato on the highest level, what is soul. Well, soul is that which makes a living being a living being, which enables the being to have the origination of motion in itself. Let me leave it for the moment at this not exact remark. But what beings are the most astonishing, from this point of view, of this having the principle of motion in themselves, which move not by being pushed and pulled on the common sense level....

(End of first side of reel.) #11.)

... to philosophize. Yes, Mr. Gilman? Let me first finish this, yes? The next speech, the end.

A: (At this point, there seems to be a quotation that doesn't belong to this seminar. I can't understand it very well, and can find nothing similar to it in this part of the Apology.)

S: Thinking about the soul, there emerges a revised astronomy; no longer the astronomy of Anaxagoras, who said they are inanimate things, earth and stone. But they are animate, they have the principle of motion in themselves. But all this, of course, is not even alluded to in the Apology. The Apology of Socrates is perfectly compatible with Socrates being the Socrates of the Clouds without Strepsiades, surely. Why is Strepsiades completely incompatible with the Socrates of the Apology? I mean, really in a hard-headed, practical way. What would have prevented the Strepsiades affair, according to the Apology rightly rendered? The daimonia. The demonic thing in Socrates would have told him, ~~no, no~~, that's not good company. By this cautious element in the daimonia ~~that we just read before~~. Aristophanes made the great blunder of not considering Socrates' daimonia. More than that. Let us assume for one moment Socrates has akkind of astronomy, whatever that may mean. That would be not enough. He must do something. Socrates could not have merely secluded himself then he also, of course, never have come to the trial. If he had stayed at home and walked the air there, without anyone knowing it, that would not have had any consequences.

Socrates did not seclude himself. The Apology says this very simply. But admonished people to vulgar virtue; namely to this instrumental virtue. The burden of Aristophanes' attack on Socrates was, while astronomy—the study of the things aloft—is wisdom, this is insufficient for full wisdom, because the astronomer falls into the ditch. You know, the thing looking at the sun and falling into the ditch. It lacks self-knowledge. It lacks the reflection on the meaning of astronomy in the human context. And that means especially also in the political context, the context of the political in society. This additional thing is supplied by the Aristophanean comedy where this blindness of the mere astronomer is corrected. In the light of the Apology, one could make the suggestion that Plato says

, no, not comedy is needed. Something much better. What Socrates does, or is presented as doing, button-holing everyone, like Uncle Sam on the posters only saying, "Did you take care of your soul today?" Like saying, "Did you brush your teeth today?" This is extremely comical, this button-holing.

The very comical suggestion of the Apology is this: "astronomy" (in quotes)—study of things aloft, which may also mean the ideas—must be capped by a comical activity, not by comedy. In Plato's Laws, we find this remark on that: they throw out tragedy. Tragedy is thrown out with this reasoning: we ourselves—legislators, philosophers—are the authors of the fairest tragedy. One can say with perfect justice, throw out comedy; we—Socrates—are the authors of the fairest comedy. What Socrates does to the



non-philosophers, that is genuine, that is serious. That's no question about that. But it cannot but be comical from the highest point of view. Now let us go on from here where we left off. It is not unpleasant, his activity. So, in other words, he doesn't corrupt the young; but on the other hand, he's not preaching virtue all the time, yes? But he does something which is pleasing, which is enjoyable, which is amusing. Yes?

A: "And I maintain that I have been commanded by the god to do this, through oracles and dreams and in every way in which some divine influence or other has ever commanded a man to do anything. This, gentlemen, is both true and easy to test."

S: All right. Socrates' case is different from these people who enjoy that. Socrates did not enjoy it. Socrates obeys a divine injunction. Not indeed the damning thing in him, because this is an injunction to act, to do something. But he owes it to oracles and dreams and all other forms of such instruction. Then he goes on to continue and conclude, in a way, the corruption charge. If Socrates has corrupted anyone of those whom he conversed with, let them get up and say so. That follows in the sequel. And he says no one will come up and there was never a Pheidippides whose father, Strepsiades, would say, "You have corrupted my son." He mentions several of them by name. I do not understand all this, but one thing I would like to mention. He mentions first people who might have been corrupted by him whose fathers are present. And then he mentions others possibly corrupted by him whose brothers are present. Now let us begin with the brothers; Nicostratos, yes? Nicostratos; and Paralos; and then the last one. And here is Adeimantos, the son of Ariston. Adeimantos you will know from the Republic, whose brother here, Plato. And Aiantodoros, whose brother here is Apollodoros. You see what Plato does? He brings himself in a special sort of compliment. Do you know who Apollodoros was?

A: A silly sort of follower.

S: Yes, a silly, enthusiastic follower of Socrates. So the least silly and the most silly are brought together but in the form as if they would be exactly the same thing. That is very amusing. Yes?

Q: I wonder about the soundness of that argument, since the ones he asked to stand up are already standing there accusing him.

S: But how do you know that the accusers, they or their sons, had been corrupted by Socrates?

A: Well, they thought so. I mean ...

S: Yes, but their own son? They spoke of some young men who had been corrupted.

A: Yes, Anytos'. Anytos' son.

S: Yes, but was he corrupted? I mean, did he have anything to do ... What was that? Xenophon speaks about him. What was that?

A: Well, apparently he had spent some time with Socrates and he ended up a drunkard for some reason.

Surely that he didn't ... to Socrates.

A: His father attributes that to Socrates. And it's <sup>e</sup>elaborated. Socrates admits

that the father educating the boy in the tanner's trade wasn't doing him justice. And he switches the blame to the father, but that Socrates was somehow responsible for the boy's break with the father and break with the tanning trade, and consequent alcoholism seemed to even admit it.

S: Yes, but what should we say then? In other words, you would say there might have been quite a few people around, fathers and older brothers, who could have said, "You have corrupted my son or my brother." Yes?

X: Yes. And especially, while they're standing there, the likelihood of if anyone has had such an experience, stand up. This is the point. They are standing there already.

S: I see. I mean, that is connected with this general question because Socrates makes this claim that he's walking through the city of Athens, the streets of Athens, all the time and he's button-holing people. And somehow that doesn't sound plausible. I must not be so emphatic. How can Socrates be presented to say these things to the jury? Yes? That's the great difficulty in the whole work. Yes?

A: One thing I wonder about, I can see why no father would want to come up and say that his son was corrupted.

S: Yes. That is one point. You mean, for sheer shame.

A: Yes. He might want to <sup>put</sup> up someone else's son that was corrupted, but Socrates didn't actually ask for that.

S: I see. That's a good point.

Q: Could this hold true for brothers, necessarily, as much for fathers, do you suppose?

S: Yes. I mean, as long as there's a real connection ... Do you have a brother?

A: Yes.

S: Would you like to appear in public and say that he has been corrupted? Yes, that's a good point, Mr. Jones. Yes?

A: I have a question about the daimonia. You say it is a natural capacity and refer to it as eros, but eros seems to be on the one hand a moving principle, and on the other hand something inherent, that is, in people. And in the presentation of the daimonia it seems, it's presented as a halting, precautionary principle, and it's also presented as coming from outside; a voice of some sort. I'm wondering if you can explain this somehow.

S: Yes, I mean the voice, that is meant to establish some connection with oracles, yes? From the outside.

A: Is it necessarily an oracle, or something divine?

S: Yes, but a voice would mean that something else than an individual addresses him. And that connects it with the oracle. Now, as for the other point you raised, it is this: the effect is only keeping back, cautionary, but what is the root for that? I mean, the desire for, as indicated by the word self, preservation. The self is already <sup>there</sup> dead; it has only been preserved. Whereas in the case of eros, that is toward generation, is toward something which is not yet there. That explains it. The third



which I should mention, is this: every human being has natural inclinations but very few, if any apart from Socrates, have the daimonia. And I think I spoke of that last time. It means that in the case of Socrates, the natural instincts, as it would be called in modern times, were unusually powerful. Socrates had a fusio, a nature, *physis* which in every respect fitted him for the philosophic life. I mean, not only the amazing memory and the great mind and the other things which he also had, but also the control <sup>of the intellect and the law</sup> higher of the law. Socrates could drink infinitely. The mind was unbreakable. And similarly, the instinct—who is fit and and who is not fit. And also that he had an instinct for finding out who is fit for whom, that this guy should go to Gorgias and that should go to Protagoras and this should become a mathematician. Intuitive certainty. That is all implied here. I think it is not an impossible task to develop the doctrine of Socrates' daimonia on the basis of Plato with perfect clarity and, as I said, the dialogue hēneaggists that the dispised thing is one very major source, because it explains the connection—which no other dialogue does—between daimonia and eros. It's the same thing, only different ... Eros is also a common phenomenon, but to be so radically erotic, to be so incredibly sensitive to the beautiful and ugly in the soul, that is a kind of miracle. Socrates had that. That's the claim. And Socrates, when he says he has only one art, the erotic art, that means that. An indescribable sensitivity to human differences.

A: It seems to me--I don't know the Thages so can't but it seems that it's coming from outside... *Comment knowledgeably.*

S: But you must not forget the general point which I suggested. In the Apology, the ceiling is very low and everything is presented as close to the common understanding as possible. And whatever transcends that common understanding remains in the clouds. Yes? perhaps not ... *inadmissible*

Socrates goes on. He speaks of his refusal to beg for mercy, a scene to which we return in a moment. He's so far from begging for mercy that he incites his judges to anger against him in the way in which he refuses to beg for mercy. That was mentioned in the paper last time. Now let us look at 34D. Do you have that? That must be on 430, about the upper third. "Then if any one of you feels like that" ... Do you have that?

A: "Then if any of you feels like that—I do not in the least expect it, but if he does—I may fairly say to him, My good sir, I too have relatives of my own somewhere, for to quote Homer, no stick or stone is the origin of me, but humanity; so I have relatives and sons too, gentlemen—three of them, one a young man already, two still children" ...

S: Yes. By the way, I do not want to go into the question of Socrates' sons, because that is the test case for Socrates' concern with educating the common virtues. Socrates' sons were not in any way outstanding, you see, and the famous argument which Socrates uses, if Pericles had had the political art, his sons would be excellent too, you know, and his sons were notorious nobodies. The same applies identically to Socrates himself. That would lead us too far. But this quote from Homer; who said it to whom? That says, "What is your origin? You are not descended from an oak or from a rock."

A: According to the note at the bottom, this is where Odysseus came back and was disguised as a shepherd and spoke to his wife.

S: Penelope, his wife, says it to Odysseus. So, in other words, Socrates appears here in the role of Odysseus. That is the point. I wanted to make this clear only because Socrates is Achilles, you remember? Earlier; ~~and he began the~~ trial began.

But here for a second, without any reference to the name of Odysseus, he reveals himself as an Odysseus.

Then, a little bit later, speaking of the disgraceful character of begging for mercy and so on, he says, "If those of you who are reputed to be outstanding in wisdom or manliness or in any other virtue acted in such a way, it would be a disgrace." You see, wisdom and courage are here mentioned. They are also mentioned in other passages. As far as I can see, moderation is never mentioned in the Apology and that ~~when acquired~~ <sup>which requires</sup> some understanding of it. And I think also not in the Crito, but I have not a complete ~~synopsis~~ <sup>synopsis</sup> so I can't say that. Now let us read a bit later, in the next paragraph here in the edition of the original, page 441, top.

A: "Apart from reputation, gentlemen, it does not seem to me right to entreat the judge, or to be acquitted by entreating; one should instruct and persuade him. For why does the judge sit? Not to make a gracious gift of justice by favour, but to decide what is just; and he has sworn not to show favour as may please him, but to judge according to law. Then we must not get you into the habit of breaking that oath, nor must you let yourselves fall into that habit; one is as bad as the other in the sight of heaven. Then do not demand, gentlemen, that I should do before you such things as I hold neither honourable nor just nor permissible, most especially, by Zeus, for one who is prosecuted for impiety by Meletos here."

S: Yes. Stop here. You see, the charge was impiety. Perfectly clear. But the other point I would like to mention, there are three grounds to which he refers: the honorable, as he translates--the noble or beautiful, the just, and the pious or holy. Where does the noble or honorable come in? Well, that is at the beginning of what you read here; apart from the reputation, it is unworthy to beg. Where does the pious or holy come in? That's made very clear. The oath. They have sworn. So the center consideration is justice and this we must keep in mind for the understanding of this sequel. Justice is the central theme of this sequel. I will mention only this point in advance, so that you will ... In the sequel, Socrates--namely after his condemnation, when Socrates is asked to make a proposal regarding his punishment--he states first what he regards as just, a just retribution to him, and then he deviates from that in deference to the opinion of the jury that he must not be rewarded, but punished. Socrates deviates from the just openly. That comes after.

<sup>See intrager</sup>  
One word about the question of Socrates' design on moderation. Last time, in the paper, Mr. ~~Sandler~~ <sup>Sandler</sup> emphasized the provocative character of Socrates' speech. The insolence of that speech. Insolence, humble, ~~humble~~ <sup>humble</sup> is the opposite of moderation. That's the connection.  
humble

So, that's the end of the apology proper. Then he is condemned. They say he is guilty and the question is only what punishment. Yes?

A: He again reiterates his belief in god in the sense in which "none of my accusers does."

S: Absolutely. Yes, but the question is belief is not knowledge. You know? And in addition, what "the god" means is absolutely undetermined. That may very well mean Apollo and Delphi. That is undecided. I mean, the translators, as I say, put god into ... capitalize it or put it in small letters as they see fit. But there is no such distinction in the original.

A: Well, since it's ambiguous--and it's ambiguous earlier, too, in references to god when he says he assists the god--isn't it possible that he's referring not to Apollo



which might have been taken by the average person listening, but to the god that he really does believe in?

S: Yes, sure. Absolutely. But the question is then this. I mean, that was understood in post-classical times, by Christian writers and so on, that Socrates could not speak of one god in the pagan world and therefore there is a certain confusion. I mean, there are many places where he suddenly goes over from the plural "the gods" to the one "god". Yes, but the question is, apart from beliefs, how does he know? There is one developed argument—I mean, there were indications in the Sophists—but one developed argument in Plato's writings how he knows that there is a god above.

In the 10th Book of the Laws. And that is taken from the phenomenon of motion. And this is just as in Aristotle. The argument in the translation is this: <sup>the gods</sup> is that god a part of movement, a part of motion. Only the argument in the details <sup>are</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>demon-</sup> <sup>stration</sup> <sup>of</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>existence</sup> <sup>of</sup> <sup>god</sup> <sup>is</sup> are very clear. But that means ... leads first to the cosmic gods; the stars, and beyond them to a <sup>central</sup> <sup>being</sup> beyond them. To one god. Plato was not a monotheist, by the way. He may have been a hemitheist, as we could say; in other words, one outstanding god, but he was not a monotheist. Yes, but those are the cosmic gods and the Apology is perfectly compatible with this. You remember the discussion about Anaxagoras and the question about the Olympic gods who were worshipped by the city is left open, because Meletos says, "True, that you are a complete atheist," and then Socrates says, "You mean that I do not even recognize the gods, which are recognized by all men, the sun, the moon, the stars?" And then he says, "No, you have said that they are stone and earth." And Socrates says, "Who said that? Anaxagoras said that; I never said that. But this is not excluded in the Apology. I mean, the cosmic gods. And at the top of the cosmic gods, the ruler of the earth."

them

A: Could it have been then the ruler of the cosmic gods who commanded him, as he says in a number of places, to do what he did?

S: Yes, but what he said, the command of which he speaks is traced to the Delphic Apollo, not to ...

A: Well, since he refers ambiguously to the god, could he have in mind ...

S: All right then. But how would that highest cosmic god command him? How would it command him? By the soul. The soul is so constructed that it can store knowledge. That you can say. But one point I must emphasize. Throughout the Apology, Socrates says that he is ignorant of the greatest things, that he does not know the greatest things. That is compatible with believing. But he has no perfect knowledge. That remains.

Now, as I said, here at the end of the Apology proper, Socrates question, guilty or innocent, is answered. The question is guilty. And there is some little thing which is quite interesting at the beginning. If you would read that.

A: "You have voted for my condemnation, gentlemen of Athens; and if I am not resentful at this which has been done, many things contribute to that, and particularly that I expected this to be done which has been done. Indeed, I am much rather surprised at the actual number of votes on either side. I did not expect the voting to be so close, I thought there would be a large majority; but now, as it seems, if only thirty votes had been changed, I should have been acquitted. Even now to my mind I have been acquitted of Meletos, and not only have I been acquitted, but this indeed is clear to everyone, that if Anytos and Lycon had not joined in accusing me, he would have been liable for the fine of a thousand drachmas as he did not get the fifth part of the votes."

S: Yes. Now, that's a little arithmetical problem, and as far as I can see, the commentators start in their interpretation from a report in Diogenes' Laertius according to which 281 condemned Socrates and 220 acquitted him. But that is not obligatory, Diogenes' analysis. We have to figure that out ourselves, and that we must do. Now, I tried to figure it out in the formula way. The question is, how many votes altogether? That's not said. Let us call it  $X$ , and then figure it out. How many condemned and how many acquitted? In other words, we must try to get an equation, one you ~~all~~ know, and then figure it out. Who is particularly trained in mathematics here? First we make the difference, yes?  $\frac{1}{2}X + 30$  and  $\frac{1}{2}X - 30$ . Yes. That's one way, one part of the equation. So,  $\frac{1}{2}X + 30$  or  $\frac{1}{2}X - 30$ . Now that doesn't give us the equation. We get the equation if we take into consideration the other considerations. What does this say? Meletos got only one-fifth. About. It's not really exact. Now there are three accusers. So I think one must make the equation, yes? Now figure it out and see what you get. Well?

A: Well, I get 300 as a maximum.

S: It cannot be exact, because he says something, he qualifies it a bit. He says something which qualifies it, the numbers are not quite exact, but you arrive from the equation at 300. And as far as I have been able to look up, that's perfectly compatible, that the jury could have consisted of 300 people. I cannot solve this problem why Plato gives us this little arithmetical problem here. I cannot solve that, but it is clearly not 500. It is sensible to try and figure it out. I note this only, for the moment, as a mere curiosity. But I have never seen that Plato makes curiosities merely for the sake of ... It at least shows that he could count and could present an arithmetical problem, although he didn't use the unknown  $X$  as we do now. They probably would have done it in some proportion. I do not know that. Yes, let us leave it at this curiosity.

We will not be able to finish our discussion of the Apology, but let us read only the sequel a bit.

A: "Well, the man asks for the penalty of death. Good; and what penalty shall I propose against this, gentlemen? The proper penalty, it is clear surely? But what is that? What is proper for me to suffer or to pay, for not having the sense to be idle in my life, and for neglecting what most people care about, moneymaking and housekeeping and military appointments and oratory, and besides, all the posts and parties which arise in this city—for believing myself to be really too honest to go after these things and survive?"

S: Yes. The term "too honest" is perhaps too weak. The term can mean equitable; it means also "too noble". The reason why Socrates led an entirely non-political life was not self-preservation, according to this statement, but contempt for the political life. That is a very strong statement and it is perhaps not an accident that he says this after the condemnation.

Q: This wouldn't be limited to a democracy, would it? I mean, like in the other speech he speaks about the multitude.

S: No, I think that he ... I mean, except an aristocracy proper, which there is a question whether that ever exists. We can perhaps link this up with the daimonia, with self-preservation remark in the earlier speech. The function of the daimonia is not so much self-preservation—that is only the lowest level—as eros. And eros, according to the Platonic understanding, is vertical. It goes up to the highest. And therefore it implies a contempt for the law. Now go on.



A: "I did not go where I thought I should be of no use either to you or to myself, but I went where I hoped I might benefit each man separately with the greatest possible benefit, as I declare; I tried to persuade each one of you to take care for himself first, and how he could become most good and most wise, before he took care for any of his interests, and to take care for the state herself first before he took care of any of her interests: that in other things also, this was the proper order of his care. Then what do I deserve, since I am such as that? Something good, gentlemen, if I am to make the estimate what it ought to be in truth; and further, something good which would be suitable for me."

S: Something good, and we must add, and therefore, not death. Yes? Go on.

A: "Then what is suitable for a poor benefactor, who craves to have leisure for your encouragement?"

S: For your encouragement to <sup>virtue</sup> ~~worship~~. Yes?

A: "Nothing, gentlemen, is so suitable, as that such a man should be boarded free in the town hall, which he deserves much more than any one of you who has gained the prize at Olympia with a pair of horses or a four-in-hand: for this one makes you seem to be happy, but I make you be happy, and he is not in want for food, but I am."

S: Now, let's stop. You see, Socrates <sup>overstates his</sup> ~~is in~~ need for food considering <sup>ably</sup> ~~that~~ he lives in ten-thousand-fold poverty. But look at this fantastic claim: Socrates is the one who makes the Athenians blessed--happy is a bit weak translation of the Greek word. He is responsible for the greatest benefits. No wonder that he looks down on the political life. I mean, the general is inbetween the prize-winner and Socrates. You know, <sup>What would be a just retribution for Socrates?</sup> Yes? And he says this: to be entertained in the thimarchion, in the town hall. Yes? Go on.

A: "Then if I must estimate the just penalty according to my deserts, this is my estimate: free board in the town hall."

S: Yes. That would be a just retribution. Now?

A: "Perhaps you think that in saying this, very much as I spoke of appeals for pity, I am just showing off; no such thing, gentlemen; I will tell you what I mean. I am convinced that I never willingly wronged anyone," ...

S: Now, let's stop here for one moment. Socrates has first said what is a just retribution. And then he says, in almost as many words, that he will deviate ~~from~~ from the just in deference to the multitude. In a very strict sense, he commits an unjust act. He deviates from the strictly just. Yes?

A: "But I cannot convince" ...

S: Yes, "I am convinced that" ...

A: "I am convinced that I never willingly wronged anyone, but I cannot convince you, for we have conversed together only a short time. If we had a law, as other people have, that a trial for life or death is to be spread over many days" ...

S: Excuse me. This "we have conversed only a short time;" we did not have a

conversation, a dialogue, except for a short time. The Apology is a dialogue, a dialogue with the demos. The only dialogue with the demos. But it is as dialogic, in the deeper sense of the word, as any other Platonic dialogue, a dialogue being a conversation where the speaker adapts his speech to the capacity of the addressed. Yes? And then ... Yes?

A: "If we had a law, as other people have, that a trial for life or death is to be spread over many days and not confined to one, I think you would have been convinced."

S: I note this only. I think we leave it at that today. Socrates suggests that the Athenian law is bad. He criticizes the Athenian law. In a crude way, that was an act of injustice. He ought to comply with the law, not to criticize it. At least certainly not

Yes, I think we have to stop here, because it is clear that the true retribution is the next after that and Socrates must therefore postpone a punishment. And therefore, the question arises, what is an evil? What is an evil? This question of knowledge of the greatest things comes up again. We will see here, in the sequel, we learn that prison is a true evil. Whether death is an evil has remained uncertain. But prison is a true evil. And why is it a true evil, according to that statement? Because freedom is a good. And that is connected with Socrates' earlier remark, you know, this proud remark: It would be beneath me to do that. Freedom, in the simple sense, where it means that you are not prevented from circulation, is akin to freedom in the inner and higher sense, not to be dependant in your thoughts on the opinion of other people. And, therefore, freedom and this kind of pride that goes with that, that comes out in this passage.

Next time we will discuss the rest of the Apology, and if we have still time, as I am reasonably sure, we will read the paper and the three other gentlemen will hand in their papers.



... begin our discussion of the Crito. There are three papers due. This one; good. And then there is Mr. Shroek, who's not in <sup>yet here</sup> today; and then there is Rabbi Weiss, who's supposed to read the paper but, at any rate, not for some time.

Now let us first conclude the discussion of the Apology. We were at the end of the second speech after the condemnation. But before the precise punishment was established, that was the procedure. Now where was that? That would be on page 442, or thereabouts. Yes, the second paragraph on page 442. The context, to repeat: Socrates is condemned. The punishment proposed by the accusers is death, but this is still to be decided. Socrates is allowed, according to Athenian law, to make a counter proposal. The counter proposal first was what Socrates deserves according to justice. That would be a signal honor, not punishment. But then, of course, Socrates knows that this is not feasible and so he deviates from the just and he makes a proposal what is something which would be generally regarded as a punishment. And at that place we stopped last time. Now if someone would just begin on page 442, the paragraph. Do you have it?

A: "Perhaps you think me stubborn and arrogant in what I am saying now, as in what I've said about the entreaties and tears. It is not so, Athenians; it is rather that I am convinced that I never wronged any man voluntarily, though I cannot persuade you of that since we have talked together only a little time. If there were a law in Athens, as there is elsewhere, not to finish a trial of life and death in a single day, I think that I could have persuaded you; but now it is not easy in so short a time to clear myself of great prejudices. But when I am persuaded that I have never wronged any man, I shall certainly not wrong myself, or admit that I deserve <sup>any</sup> evil or propose any evil for myself as penalty. Why should I? Thus I should suffer the penalty which Meletos proposes when I say that I do not know whether it is a good or an evil. <sup>Should I</sup> choose instead of it something which I know to be an evil, and propose that as a punishment? Shall I propose imprisonment? Yet why should I pass the rest of my days in prison, the slave of successive officials? Or shall I propose a fine, with imprisonment until it is paid? I have told you why I will not do that. I should have to remain in prison, for I have no money to pay a fine with."

S: So, prison ... a fine would be the same as prison, yes?

A: "Shall I then propose exile? Perhaps you would agree to that. Life would indeed be very dear to me" ...

S: Now let us stop here for the time being and then go on. To repeat, the reward which Socrates proposes isn't acceptable, is unacceptable. He must propose a punishment, an evil. He cannot propose death for the simple reason that he does not know whether death is an evil, you see. So he must propose something that he knows would be an evil. Socrates knows that prison, fine and banishment would be evils. First of all, a fine is reduced to prison because he can't pay. So why is prison an evil? Answer: because it means deprivation of freedom. Freedom, wealth and being at home are good things. And it is made clear, in the case of prison, why that is an evil, because to be subject, a slave to someone else, is an evil. From here we understand also why death is not simply good, because life without freedom, and of destitution, and in exile, may be <sup>or</sup> more miserable than death. That is another consideration.

But there is another point which we must understand. Socrates says first, I have never voluntarily hurt, injured, or done injustice to a man and later on, a little bit later, he says, I have never injured or done injustice to anyone. <sup>The latter</sup> So that is a much larger claim. He has not even involuntarily, or unwittingly, hurt or done injustice to (the latter)

another man. Yes, but what about Socrates' famous claim, that no one does voluntarily do evil? You remember, that all sins are due to ignorance, and therefore involuntary. That creates a certain difficulty. What solution would you suggest? Well, there is one very simple solution, that Socrates very often shifts from one level to another. And there is, of course, a common sense level on which one can and must speak of deliberate murder, let me say. Yes? And malice aforethought and involuntary homicide. So that is possible, to say that Socrates speaks sometimes simply common sensibly, but also sometimes on a deeper level where ... The two levels are that of the political life, which stands and falls by punishment, and a deeper reflection which makes questionable the political life, because if all errors, all sins, all crimes are involuntary, there cannot be punishment. There can only be instruction. You see, that throws light on our present discussion, because present-day liberalism is an attempt to bring out on the political level what, according to Socrates' point of view, cannot be brought out on the political level. You know? Do you see it in this case? Is this intelligible what I said?

Q: Do you mean liberalism or social science?

S: Well, let us forget about ... I mean, liberalism is a much broader thing than social science. It's not simply identical. No, but you know the people who really, in fact, deny responsibility and try to trace any criminal action or criminal inclination to something beyond the control of the individual. That is also underlying all attempts to reduce punishment and to make it less and less punitive and more and more rehabilitative treatment, if I may say so. That is something which that has in common with Socrates. Yes? But also in Socrates, there is this crucial difference between ... Aristophanes implies that if you make an application of a profound truth to political matters, you have to modify that profound truth. It cannot be politically true--I use now Burke's well-known expression--in proportion as these things if they are physically true, they are politically untrue. I think that is really a crucial point, because the whole notion that there can be a wholly rational society, all of whose members are enlightened men, is the background of liberalism. I mean, there are a few liberals who would assert it this way, but that is somehow the background. And for Socrates that's impossible. A polis, a society is necessarily not enlightened. Only a very small part of it can be enlightened. The polis as a whole is not enlightened, and therefore, the metaphysical truth--you can call it that way--are not susceptible of being directly, immediately, politically relevant, politically true. You know that the Apology is the favorite document of certain generous liberals. Yes? And that is not entirely unfounded, but we must also see the difference. Mr. Kendrick?

A: Why does he shift?

S: Pardon?

A: Why does he make the shift? Why does he cover himself like that? In this argument if he never voluntarily harmed anyone, if he never harmed anyone, he can't be punished. Why is he so ...

S: Yes, that is a different question, because that is not a question regarding all men, but Socrates in particular. I mean, that's an entirely different issue than the one we discussed up to now. Is this clear to you? Because one doesn't have to say that no one voluntarily does evil in order to say this individual never voluntarily did evil. That's clear. That's a special case. So what was your question then?

A: Why does he need both arguments?



S: He makes use here only of one argument; namely, regarding himself. In this connection, where the question is of his punishment, he says, "Am I guilty?" He has to answer this question. And he says, "No, I'm not guilty."

(A few lines seem to have been erased. The tape is spliced at this point, and after the joining, I'm unable to get any sound for a few inches.)

(Girl's voice): ... were sure of before and are not sure of now. But look how he places them under tutelage, which could be translated as a deprivation of liberty, could it not? In this sense ...

S: You are very liberal. In other words, to become more sensible ...

A: Well, that's not my stand. It's a question.

S: I know, but it sounds so. I think, I believe very few people implied before you that to become more sensible is a deprivation of liberty.

A: This is the way they seem to react. I mean, they're angry about something and could it not be this?

S: Yes, you may be right. But that would need some argument. What is their first reaction? I mean, if we take seriously what he said, that's an accusation of impiety. And Socrates therefore is accused not of having interfered with the freedom of anyone, but with having violated the most sacred. How do you go on from here? Where does the interference with freedom come in? Freedom is understood by these people in a very simple way, that anyone who would deprive them of their voting rights, and their other civic rights, he would be accused of being a tyrant, a potential tyrant. That was not suggested in the Apology. Or do you mean to say that to the extent to which Socrates implies that the only one who really deserves to have civic rights is a wise man. To that extent, he makes an attack on their liberty. Did you mean that? In other words, that would be a defensible position. Also, if you think of the other Platonic dialogues. To the extent to which Socrates says, only the experts can judge.

A: Well, there's a problem, because along these same lines he says that he also is under a tutelage, at least to the gods.

S: Yes, but still this is a very high freedom. What do you imply then? What do you understand by freedom?

A: Well, all I can say is its sort of a negative description [inaudible]...

S: No, I think what you say is very important, although I believe the formulas which you have come to are not clear enough. I mean, does not every freedom presuppose a previous bondage, to state it quite clearly? Can freedom be the first premise. That's a very good question. You see, I mean, in other words, for example, if you take a very common older view that there are certain natural rights of men, basic among humans, how they are derived—I mean, I take now not such an extreme view, but a more common view—they are derived from a previous natural law. You have these freedoms as a gift. As a gift. Not something that you can claim ~~that~~. I know that modern libertarianism has a tendency to conceive of freedom as the beginning, as the absolute beginning of any moral argument. But that creates great difficulties, because sooner or later you have to make a distinction between freedom and license, for example. You can try to make a distinction as follows: (as Montesquieu?) I tried to say, freedom implies the obligation to recognize that same freedom in every other man. And freedom means an order in which the freedom of all is

recognized. License means a claim to freedom not limited by the recognition of the freedom of all. That one can try to do. But is it not . . . that if man is a free being has he made that freedom? Has he made that? And even if you say, as some people say, we conquered freedom, originally we were brutes, some sort of higher monkeys and we made ourselves free, by our own efforts. But even granting that for argument's sake, was this capacity, which the monkeys do not possess, not something with which man started, which he did not acquire. Must we not always presuppose some "gift"—I mean, you know, you can take this as a modern expression—as the basis for anything man can then do, acquire, etc. I would like to know what was the specific point in the Apology of Socrates which induced you to raise the question.

A: (Can't understand any of the answer.)

S: I see now. What Socrates means is not so very deep. That's something very simple. What he says is this: whether death is an evil or good is really a difficult question. Some people are better off when dead. And Socrates includes himself, of course, in that. But then, a sensible human being is worse off if bossed around by a vicious fool, because that fellow in jail is not likely to be an enlightened sage, you know. That he's worse off than if he can circulate and decide what is he going to do then, seems to me common sensically true. I think that if we . . . not to be evil should experimentally try it in a jail and I think they will come up to that and would see that.

But if you want to go into a deeper stratum, then you can, of course, link this—what Socrates means by freedom in the simple sense, the common sensical sense—is linked up indeed with what he claims. The highest thing for man, according to this, is to philosophize. But that is the highest form of freedom. But this rule has its inner law; to seek the truth. I mean, that's not just to say anything which comes to your head. That's not philosophy. That's an impudent assertion, and not philosophy. Surely. To that extent it's true. And that freedom, of course, is denied by the polis. We have seen in the passage where Socrates says, "You might acquit me, with the proviso that I give up my philosophizing." Now, in the clearest case, there will be now a formal law in Athens: philosophizing is strictly forbidden. And Socrates says, "I will not comply," because he would not give it up. Philosophizing, as Socrates understands it, is something which cannot be regulated by the polis. That is not quite the same thing as modern liberalism means. Because Socrates would say there is no question that tragedy and comedy can and ought to be regulated. This he says very clearly. As in the case of Jack Paar, that this is something that is susceptible of being regulated by the polis, I think is clear.

. But philosophy cannot be. I mean, in other words, think of science, the position regarding Lysenko. I mean, it is wholly incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial that a government as such should be able to speak competently on biology. But it can very well speak competently about what is conducive to public morality in such performances as those of Mr. Paar. So you can say that common freedom, which Socrates claims to be good, is related in his mind to the highest form of freedom. Now that's philosophizing. Because that freedom which means not only the freedom to circulate, but it means also the inner-most freedom. You see, the freedom to circulate doesn't mean much if you are a slave of human beings, of your fellow citizens. Then you are in one sense free; in another sense, you are a slave. But the true freedom is, of course, freedom of the mind. To that extent, that is linked up. But the explicit problem here is only this common sensical thing that to be in jail is surely, generally speaking, an evil. There are extreme cases where this must be good. There are cases where people try to go to jail . . . For example, that was a safe place in Nazi Germany for some people because, since they were common criminals, they were not suspected of conspiracy against the regime. They were safe. And there were also other places in Germany, I remember, in pre-Hitlerian times when



a shepherd, say, committed a minor misdemeanor in order to spend the winter well fed and well housed in a jail, you see. But still, that doesn't alter the fact that, generally speaking, jail is undesirable.

do away  
with

Now let us continue where we left off, because we really should try to finish this discussion. Yes? Read it, please.

A: "Shall I propose exile? Perhaps you would agree to that. Life would indeed be <sup>cher full</sup> very dear to me if I were unreasonable enough to expect that strangers would tolerate my discussions and arguments when you who are my fellow-citizens cannot endure them, and have found them to be so irksome and odious that you are seeking now to be relieved of them. No, indeed, Athenians; that is not likely. A fine life I should lead for an old man if I were to withdraw from Athens and spend the rest of my days wandering from city to city and continually being expelled, for I know very well that the young men will listen to me wherever I go, as they do here. If I drive them away, they will persuade their elders to expel me; and if I do not drive them away, their fathers and other relatives will expel me for their sakes."

S: That is of course a description to the Athenians of what they have been doing to him. Yes? So, that is a sketch of the argument of the Crito, as you can see, why exile is not a possibility. Now, yes, we have to read the immediate sequel.

A: "Perhaps someone will say, Why cannot you withdraw from Athens, Socrates, and hold your peace?"

S: "Withdraw from Athens"? That is not in here. "Withdraw from Athens"? No, no. I mean, after you got out--meaning from jail. In other words, could you not, after having been acquitted, could you not keep still. Yes?

A: "It is the most difficult thing in the world to make you understand why I cannot do that."

S: "Some of you". Yes.

A: "If I say that I cannot hold my peace because that would be to disobey the god, you will think that I am not in earnest and will not believe me."

S: No, "you would not believe me, thinking that I'm speaking ironically." Speaking ironically. Some of you will not believe that Socrates cannot remain silent and depressed. They regard his assertion, that he obeys the gods as ironical. Therefore, Socrates has to give another reason which no one can regard as ironical. You remember, this suspicion, that this might be ironical, has occurred to some contemporaries, some of us when we read it. Just like the Theages, which I mentioned to you, when Socrates gives first his reason for not accepting a certain young man as a student, saying, "The only thing I know is eroticism." And they say this is crazy. And then he says, no, the daimonia, that prevents me; that terrific thing, you know. *That they believe*. Now here the order is reversed. What does he say, the reason which no one can regard as ironical? *inverted*

A: "And if I tell you that no greater good can happen to a man than to discuss human excellence every day, and the other matters about which you've heard me arguing and examining myself and others, and that an unexamined life is not worth living, then you'll believe me still less."

S: Yes, so, in other words, Socrates is compelled to refer to the Delphic god, because

the true reason is wholly unbelievable. That's the heart of the point he makes, yes? The true reason is, the philosophic life is the greatest good. And in what does it consist, the philosophic life, as it is described here? Here, the description. To make speeches on virtue, about virtue. Not admonition to virtue, but raising questions; what is virtue? That is the point. That is the reason why Socrates cannot change, because he is certain that the philosophic life is the best life; the greatest good. How does he know that the philosophic life is the best life? How does he know that? You remember, we come always back to this question. How does he know? What does Socrates know? I would give this answer: he knows it fundamentally in the same way in which he knows that freedom in this crude sense, not being jailed, is in principle preferable to being jailed. By starting from this obvious phenomenon and reflecting then on the meaning of freedom, whether this freedom is mere absence of external impediments to motion really exhausts what we mean by freedom. And then we come to certain observations, for example, that men who are auto-directed and can circulate are unfree people because they are directed by someone else. And then we see that there is a kind of freedom which is much higher. I think we leave it at this point and go then ...

Now there is the deliberation of the jury and Socrates is condemned to death. Socrates makes then a speech first which is addressed to the condemners; and then a speech addressed to the acquitters. I summarize what he says to the condemners. He makes three points: first, it would have been wiser for you to wait a bit for I'm close to death--he's seventy; secondly, I have not been <sup>caught</sup> by the condemners on account of lack of speaking ability, of speeches, but because he lacked daring, impudence--namely, I didn't dare to say or do things which would disgrace me. In other words, I was afraid of badness rather than of death. And the third point he makes is a prophecy: I shall be avenged by people younger than myself. Now the crucial point is, I think, what is Socrates' lack of daring? What does that mean? We can use a better term to make the problem clear. What is Socrates' sense of shame? What is his shame? If we look at the Apology as a whole, what is Socrates' shame? How does it show? I mean, surely, also that he doesn't do these disgraceful things, crying and appealing to the compassion of the judges, but the book is, in a much more profound sense, a document of Socrates' sense of shame. You remember, I said more than once that the characteristic of the book is the low ceiling. The true meaning of philosophy does not appear. It appears only to the extent to which it could be intelligible to the average Athenian citizen. That is a kind of sense of shame. He conceals the true character of philosophy. We must see whether this is not of some pertinence for the rest of the discussion.

Then he addresses the acquitters and here he makes it clear that he will tell them myths. He didn't say anything of this kind when speaking to the condemners. Why does he tell them myths? Because they believe in myths. But you must always remember that this is addressed the acquitters. Do the condemners not believe in myths? In the speech which he addresses to the condemners, he doesn't say a word about the gods nor of Hades. Whereas the speech to the acquitters has at least four references to the gods and, of course, of Hades. So Socrates creates the impression which is borne out by an explicit remark; the condemners are the unbelievers, the acquitters are the believers. But in what sense? Surely in this sense, that the condemners do not believe in Socrates' beliefs, whereas the acquitters believe in Socrates' beliefs. They are the friends of Socrates, whereas the condemners are his enemies. Now, we begin to read in 40C, on page 445, the paragraph.

: "And if we reflect in another way, we shall see that we may well hope that death is a good."



S: That is only a little way before, if you will read the preceeding sentence. He mentions the fact that the daimonia did not resist Socrates, did not oppose a) his going to the trial and b) to his making the speech in which he made it. From this, it would seem to follow that here ... Now read this last sentence before the sentence you began, please. "A great testimony of that has occurred to me." Yes?

A: "This thing that has come upon me must be a good and those that think that death is an evil" ...

S: No, no, before.

A: Before that? "But now in this matter, it has never once opposed me, either in my words or my actions."

S: Yes. "If I was not about to do something good," this seems to imply that here the daimonia is presented as inciting to good actions. You remember that before it was only presented as preventing bad actions. Never inciting. Yes. Now let us go on where you started.

A: "And if we reflect in another way, we shall see that we may well hope that death is a good, for the state of death is one of two things; either the dead man ceases to be and loses all consciousness, or, as we are told, it is a change and a migration of the soul to another place."

S: Yes. Now let us understand this. Death is no evil; that's a thesis to be proved, for either it's perfect absence of sensing--yes? He says consciousness--of any awareness, or else it is transmigration of the soul. In both cases, he is going to say, death is a good. So Socrates is no longer ignorant as to whether death is good, as he has claimed throughout. Now he claims to possess knowledge of the fact that death is good. Now let us see how the argument runs.

A: "And that death is the absence of all consciousness and like the sleep of one whose slumbers are unbroken by any dreams, it will be a wonderful game; for if a man had to select that night in which he slept so soundly that he did not even dream and had to compare it with all the other days and nights of his life and then had to say how many days and nights in his life he had spent better than this night, I think that a private person, nay, even the great king of Persia himself, would find them easy to count compared with the others. If that is the nature of death, I for one count it a game, for then it appears that all time is nothing more than a single night."

S: Yes. Stop here. That's a proof that death is a good on the one alternative. Complete unconsciousness, complete unawareness, is a good. What do you say to that?

A: Hasn't he denied this philosophically?

S: I should say so. I mean, if philosophizing is the greatest good, then this is the very opposite, because that is even lower than the awareness of the most stupid fellow. Sure. That's one point. And think also of the gadfly. The gadfly, that is a good activity. The gadfly is awakening Athenians, arousing them from their sleep.

A: But could this not be brought on by the suffering that life is, and beyond life, would no sufferings leave no awareness? There is no need for philosophy.

S: Surely not. But the question is whether there is not, for this reason, because there is no need and no possibility of philosophy, whether it is not entirely inferior

to life? Otherwise ...

A: Well, he doesn't say that it's the greatest good. It's just that it's ...

S: No, he says, compare this night with all days and nights, with all other days and nights, meaning also those days and nights when you philosophize, and this is still better. Now, let us see first how he argues out the other alternative, in the sequel.

A: "But if death is a journey to another place and what we are told is true, that all who have died are there, what good would <sup>it</sup> be greater than this, my judges? Would a journey not be worth the taking, at the end of which in the other world we should be delivered from the pretended judges here, and should find the true judges who are said to sit in judgment below, such as Minos and Rhadamanthys and Aiacos and Triptolemos, and the other demigods who were just in their own lives? Or what would you not give to converse with Orpheus, Musaios, Hesiod and Homer? I'm willing to die many times, if this be true. And for my own part, I should find it wonderful to meet there Palamedes, and Ajax, the son of Telamon, and the other men of old who died through an unjust judgment and to compare my experiences with theirs. That, I think, would be no small pleasure. And above all, I could spend my time in examining men there, as I examine men here, and finding out which of them is wise and which of them thinks he is wise when he is not wise. What would we not give, my judges, to be able to examine the leader of the great expedition against Troy, or Odysseus or Sisyphos, and countless other men and women whom we could name? It would be an inexpressible happiness to converse with them, to live with them, and to examine them. Assuredly, there they do not put men to death for doing that, for besides the other ways in which they are happier than we are, they are immortal; at least, if what we are told is true."

S: Yes. So, in other words, that would be better because, why? Because you don't have to fear death anymore. That indicates that death is an evil. Now let me develop that. In the later case, we go into Hades in the company of the just demigods, in the first <sup>place</sup> case. Although Socrates only alludes to this--he's very delicate--that since all dead men are there, also the unjust ones. So there is, in other words, also a compartment for the unjust, you know, Hell. But he doesn't speak of that because <sup>death</sup> he is absolutely sure he will not go to Hell. He has led a just life. But for those, that would be worse than life; for those going to the other compartment. The accusers will be punished there, see, they go there.

And, of course, the poets. The poets are naturally a different class than the just demigods. Whether he also means they are different <sup>than the</sup> just men, that is left entirely open. And the third class are the unjustly condemned. Whether any of these <sup>mentioned</sup> individuals here is wise or not is a question. Socrates wants to find out by talking to them. And with a view to this question, he mentions in particular Agamemnon, Odysseus and Sisyphos. Agamemnon he does not mention by name, but he's obviously meant.

The perfect happiness, eudaimonia, bliss, in life after death consists in examining. Yes? He says so. By doing exactly there what Socrates has been doing here. This life which he leads as a living being, is then capable of perfect happiness. Only he doesn't have so many terribly bright fellows around as he would <sup>find</sup> have there. That is some difference. But otherwise, they're the same. And, of course, there is this additional boon, that death is no longer to be feared which implies, to repeat, that death in itself is an evil.

There is another point. Why does he not say, "That's it! That's the proof that death is not to be feared." Why does he not leave it at that? Why does he say that? You see, he has a two-pronged argument to prove that death is not an evil. This is a much



stronger proof, isn't it. You are in the best company and you can do the finest things you did in this life still better because you have no longer to fear any interruption by death. Why does he not leave it at that? If the stories are true, if the stories are true, he always says. So, therefore, he cannot really know which way death is good. Is it good because it's complete senselessness, or because it's the opposite of complete senselessness; namely, complete awakensness. But since this is undecided, the question of whether awakensness or senselessness is undecided and since awakensness is philosophy, the question of whether philosophy is the greatest good or it is not is also left open.

Now the argument here reminds of a later argument in Plato's dialogue, The Statesman, where the story of the golden age is presented, in glowing pictures, and <sup>where the</sup> ~~the~~ philosopher there--it's not Socrates--says, we don't know whether this is a ~~decidable~~ <sup>desirable</sup> condition, ~~whether~~ <sup>where the</sup> men have everything in abundance, because we don't know what men did with that abundance. If they used it for philosophizing, then it was really wonderful. But if they merely sat around and told jokes or played bridge, then it was nothing to be admired. So that is, of course, what goes through. Socrates knows somehow that philosophy is the best thing. From this it follows that life is a good and death is an evil. What does this mean? Who acted on this premise, that life is good and death is an evil. Most clearly, the condemners. They could not be persuaded that death is a good. Socrates doesn't even try to persuade them. There is then in this point an agreement between Socrates and the condemners, as distinguished from the acquitters. Socrates was ashamed to admit that death was an evil. That death is not the greatest thing he was sure, <sup>of</sup> but that death was an evil, he was ashamed to admit. He presents himself as ignorant as to whether death is a good or an evil. He presents his self, or his wisdom, as mere knowledge of ignorance. And therefore he concedes the true character of philosophy.

Now let us read the conclusion.

A: "And you, too, judges, must face death hopefully, and believe this one truth--that no evil can happen to a good man either in life or after death. His affairs are not neglected by the gods. What has happened to me today has not happened by chance. I am persuaded that it is better for me to die now and to be relieved from trouble."

S: Now, you see, what Socrates ... That's an important point. That's a different thesis. Death may be a good, but that doesn't mean it is a good for all men, for every man, however ~~circumstantial~~. Death is an evil; but now, for Socrates, it is good because he is an old man. Death is not simply good, but good for Socrates. These two different theses--death simply good and death good for Socrates--constantly play to one another and create one of the great difficulties of this speech. Now, go on.

A: "That was the reason why the guide never turned me back. And so I am not at all angry with my accusers or with those who have condemned me to die; yet it was not with this in mind that they accused me and condemned me, but meaning to do me an injury. So far I may blame them."

S: In other words, if they wanted to help Socrates to get over that hump, then it would have been good; I mean the hump of the fear of death. But they did it in order to harm him. Yes?

A: "Yet I have one request to make of them."

S: Read clearly. Re-read that sentence.

A: "Yet I have one request to make of them."

S: Of whom?

A: The accusers.

S: Or condemners. Yes. Keep this in mind. Yes?

A: "When my sons grow up, punish them, my friends."

S: Not friends. Men. Gentlemen. Yes?

A: "And harass them in the same way I have harassed you if they seem to you to care for riches or any other thing more than excellence; and if they think that they are something when they are <sup>really</sup> nothing, reproach them as I have reproached you, for not caring for what they should and for thinking that they are something when really they are nothing. If you <sup>will</sup> do this, I myself and my sons will have received justice from you."

"But now the time has come and we must go away; I to die and you to live. Which is better is known to the god alone."

S: Yes. But it ends in Greek, "is <sup>(m)</sup> manifest to everyone except to the god." The god is the last word; the only Platonic dialogue which ends with the word "god." And there is only one Platonic dialogue which begins with the word "god." Do you happen to know what that is?

A: The Laws.

S: Laws. There is a connection. But what does he say in this final remark? You see, the final speech is <sup>a</sup>tripartite: first to the condemners, the second to the acquitters --and this acquitter section has the proof that death is good--and then again to the condemners. What does he say to the condemners in the end?

A: That if they treat his sons in a certain way, they will have done justice to both him and his sons.

S: Yes, but first. Step-by-step; what does he say first?

A: Well, first he tells his condemners to always to treat his sons the way that he has treated them.

S: Yes. Good. Can you re-state it in a bit more forceful way without affecting the substance?

A: This first part of the statement? To make his sons care about virtue.

S: Right. Who has been doing that before?

A: Socrates.

S: And the condemners? Well, all right. Let us take that up later. So, he's asked his condemners to take up his mission. But what part of the mission? Or what aspect of that mission. <sup>Examining</sup> Admonishing to virtue. But what was the admonishing to

Less the <sup>than</sup> the



virtue as presented by Socrates <sup>explicitly</sup> ~~physically~~ when he made this, "Did you care for your soul today"--you remember that passage--what was the crucial point there? Mr. Johnson, you were the one who saw it at that time.

A: Well, in the sense that they didn't ...

S: What was the argument by which he ...

A: That virtue is simply utilitarian ...

S: Instrumental. Instrumental virtue. If you want to be wealthy and honored, then you have to practice virtue; vulgar virtue, in the Platonic language. In other words, he says his condemners should encourage the practicing of vulgar virtue. But that, as I say, is not such an outrageous demand, because in a way they had been doing that all the time. But he asked not his acquitters, but his condemners to take up his mission. Now if they do this, he says--for example, if they instruct Socrates' sons in that vulgar virtue--they will have done justice to them and to Socrates. How will they have done justice to Socrates' sons?

A: The sons were not capable of the higher <sup>sort of virtues?</sup> things?

S: Yes, but often it is the affair of the city to take care of orphans. By instructing them in the vulgar virtues, they take the place of the father of whom they have been deprived by an unfortunate accident. But in what sense, too, would they have done justice to Socrates?

A: They would show they had learned something....

S: That they knew. I mean, that is really common. All citizens, with few exceptions--depends a bit on the circumstances; in statistics of Chicago, the percentage is low--but generally speaking the majority of citizens encourage their children to be decent. That's nothing far-fetched.

A: The terms of his are ... to scorn riches and so forth ...

S: Let me see. O, he is careful. He says, if they seem to you to care for money and something else before they take care of virtue. They should not discourage taking care of money; only virtue first. As any normal father would say, if the son cares for money without considering the penalties attached to embezzlement and other things, that he doesn't <sup>earn</sup> ~~earn~~. The same position as stated in this passage. How would they have done justice to Socrates, these fellows? It's difficult to say. But let us leave it open then.

I would like now to discuss very briefly the Apology as a whole before we come to the Crito. Socrates is accused of impiety. That is the crime. But he believes in the gods, especially in Apollo. And if he believes in Apollo, he also believes in Artemis and Zeus and Hera; that's clear. Through obeying the god's command, he comes to see that all men are ignorant regarding the greatest things; that human wisdom is just knowledge of ignorance. But what does this mean? If men are ignorant regarding the greatest things, what do they not know--for instance?

A: Whether death is good or bad.

S: Yes, sure. We come to that. But something else which Socrates never says, but which is clearly implied.

A: Could it be astronomy?

S: Connected with that, but more simply. If men are ignorant regarding the greatest things ...

A: Gods.

S: Sure. They don't know whether the gods are or are not. Now, there was a man who wrote a book beginning with that proposition. "Whether the gods are or are not, I do not know; the aloofness of the subject and the brevity of human life prevents me from knowing it." Do you know who that was?

A: ~~Protagoras~~ Anaxagoras?

S: No. Protagoras, whose book was burned for this reason in Athens. You'll find a discussion of that in Theaetetus. So, in other words, what I'm getting at is that is very paradoxical, that this terrible assertion of Protagoras is not contradicted by Socrates. He doesn't say it. What he says is only—indeed, as Mr. Kendrick mentioned—Socrates does not know whether or not death is an evil. That is, so to speak, the reflection of this more basic question of the gods. The pro and cons regarding the gods are not discussed, but the pro and cons regarding death are discussed. Now, what is the situation? Who says that death is an evil and who says that death is not an evil? I mean, ultimately. You know, Socrates himself says throughout the dialogue he doesn't know. Only in the speech addressed to the acquitters does he say, in effect, he knows. In the dialogue as a whole, he doesn't say it. I would say this: the Delphic Apollo suggests that death is no evil. One must serve the god despite of arousing hatred; i.e., despite of bringing about one's own death violently. The Delphic god demands of Socrates that he should examine his fellow-citizens and regardless of whether that leads to death or not. Socrates' daimonia suggests that death is an evil, as I have shown when we discussed that. He says, in so many words, one ought to be cautious. It keeps him back from the dangerous life of politics. There is a connection between the daimonia and self-preservation and self-preservation by itself leads to vulgar virtue. The argument of Hobbs, <sup>as you might have</sup> a geometric argument regarding self-preservation. No, no, really, because Hobbs's beautiful argument, if death is the greatest evil then you must prefer peace at all costs, because in war the danger of a violent death is reached there. The life of a soldier—how did this Colonel Blimp say?—the life of a soldier is hard and not without real dangers. And so, then you must choose peace, but if you want to have peace, you have to behave peaceably. And the habits of peaceable men are the virtues. That's a very good argument. And which didn't need the genius of Hobbs to discover, only Hobbs made of it the whole morality; that was his genius.

Now, the Delphic Apollo's thesis is proven by the alternative in this speech to the acquitters. Either death is one night without dream, or else death means to examine people in Hades. This, however, is based on what people say; there is no certainty. Socrates knows that death is not an evil. The alternative, that death is ...

(End of first side of reel.)

(man's voice): ... I took that to apply here ...

S: Yes. Sure. All right, only Socrates, or Plato, would put it somewhat differently. But all right.



a few

A: But I don't understand this critique. Is it unique to individuals or is it a natural capacity for all men?

S: Yes. That depends. I mean, if you mean philosophizing, yes?

A: That would be part of it, yes.

S: Yes, the highest, most important part. Now, you have read, I know, a dialogue in which Plato discusses this problem at much greater length and on a much higher level; I mean the Republic. How does the discussion on philosophy in the Republic begin? I mean after it has been introduced as a subject, in the fifth book. The first subject, when he speaks about philosophy?

A: The education of philosophers.

S: No, no, before, before he speaks of the education.

A: The cave?

S: No, no, that's later. In the fifth book.

A: The difference between philosophers and non-philosophers.

S: That is too vague. The nature. The nature. The subject of the end of the fifth book, which is the beginning of the discussion of philosophy, is the nature of philosophers. And only after he has discussed the nature of philosophers does he discuss the education of philosophers. Just as he did regarding the guardians in the second book. What is the nature of the guardian, you know--like dogs. A mixture of kindness to acquaintances and harshness to enemies, that's the nature of a guardian. And then the question arises, how he's to be educated. So, the nature of philosophers. What is the crude reality of the discussion regarding the human race as a whole, of the discussion of the nature of philosophy? They are very rare. Yes? Very rare.

also

On the other hand, it is very clear, I think, from common sense, that morose people are also very rare. Most people are able to walk around and to prevent their being run over by cars and other dangers of this nature and somehow come safely through life if they are not killed by diseases and so on, of course. So, in other words, a kind of medium range which is supra-moronic, but also sub-philosophic, is a fate of the large majority of man. And there are, of course, considerable differences there, you know. Someone can have an extremely good practical wisdom--~~soundness~~ <sup>soundness</sup> and breadth and so on--and still not be a philosophic mind. That is a Platonic scheme.

Therefore, if philosophy is the highest form of freedom, that highest freedom would be preserved for a few. But another kind of freedom, capacity to take care of their own affairs, capacity to take care of the polis, in a ~~just~~ <sup>very</sup> extremely demanding sense, would not be too infrequent.

A: Well, any man could conclude on the basis of reflection of what freedom means for him that life <sup>is</sup> ~~is~~ good. I mean, it doesn't have to be Socrates' reflection on freedom to conclude that the philosophic life is best, but the political man or the business man or whoever else reflect on ...

S: Yes, sure, not Socrates. Sure. In this, in the Apology, the basic question is whether life as such is good or an evil. That's the basic question. And it is, of course, in Socrates' case, linked up with the assertion that the philosophic life is

the best life. Life, as such, being good, the philosophic life is the best life. And what was your question? How does he prove that?

A: No, my question was, is freedom a gift, but I see it is a gift only in an extended sense, that is when applied to Socrates.

S: No, no. Excuse me, let's go back to the text. It says life is good. That is a gift and, therefore, the love of life is a gift which every man has.

A: So in what way is it a gift if all men have it?

S: Then let me use a somewhat more cautious expression--a natural inclination, the love of life, self preservation. That, I think, cannot be denied that this is so and we see, therefore, whenever a man commits suicide, the question arises, why did he commit suicide? You never raise the question, why did Mr. Cornered commit suicide, because you're around. You take it for granted that not committing suicide is not the question. Committing suicide involves a question. The normal and natural thing is not committing suicide. And the ordinary explanation is, he had particular misery--I don't mean you now--he had particular misery which induced him to do this unnatural thing, to take his own life. He may also have been demented or something. Now the fundamental question would be this: all arguments of this kind which are underlying the traditional natural law doctrine presuppose that nature is good. I mentioned this before. It means that the natural inclinations, as natural inclinations are good. And ~~what~~ quite a few people have said, at least in the beginning of modern times, that's a dogmatic <sup>premise</sup> practice. I believe I mentioned this problem last time or so. That raises a question, surely. And the question is, how does Plato and Socrates meet that? That one can speak of meeting it, I believe, is proved by the fact that the alternative--namely, that life and therefore also the inclination to life is evil--is brought up here. So he knew the issue. Whether he met it adequately or not would require a fuller study a) of Plato than we can afford now, b) of the arguments of the other side. You know? Say, the implicit argument of men like Descartes and Hobbes and others. One would have to go into that. Simply stated, in the case of Plato, I think, is that it leads to a simple self-contradiction to deny the goodness of nature.

A: You also put a great store in this natural inclination of Socrates as ...

S: Yes. Socrates was a special case. Now let me elaborate this. The natural inclinations are, of course, not alone effective in man. They are always affected by opinions, which cannot be so in the case of the brutes--brutes are incapable to opine. But in the case of man we are always influenced by opinions. And there are certain opinions which are opinions against nature; that's the implication--destructive of nature. Socrates is characterized by Plato as a man in whom the natural inclinations on all levels--not only on certain levels--on all levels, and especially on the higher levels, were unbelievably healthy, powerful, so that the false opinions could not affect him. One way of stating it is that Socrates, even if he had no knowledge, always had the right opinion. That's only the reflection of his basis, which was so well-ordered. <sup>developed</sup> <sub>physics</sub>

A: But not only well-<sup>developed</sup> and healthy, but correct.

S: Yes, yes, sure. That is the meaning of that. So that the opinions to which he adhered, even prior to reflection, only divining, not knowing, were true opinions.

A: Yes, but I'm puzzled about the falling back on natural inclinations as the source



for 1) Socrates' knowledge or wisdom and 2) the general source for the peoples' desires.

A: Yes, but, all right, let us try alternatives. Let us say, all right, but the predominant view today, of course, is what you said; and not only the positivists, but very great thinkers--for example, Kant. Kant said it is impossible to base moral teaching on a reflection on human nature. And he used all kinds of arguments. One of them, for example, this: that if, say the doctrine of justice, is based on the consideration of human nature, the concept of justice thus emerging is inapplicable to God. So you cannot speak, in any strict sense, of justice, and that has grave consequences for human life. So we must understand justice, or all morality, in such a way that it's meaning is in no way dependent on the nature of man, but must be related to the nature of any rational or intellectual being--man or higher than man; a complete divorce of ethics from the understanding of man's nature. That was probably the most radical point. Yes, but what was the consequence? The consequence was Kant's formal ethics. The problem of the matter, the content, was ... Kant believed his form, as he understood it, would generate the matter, but I think one can show that this doesn't work. And therefore the content has to be gotten from somewhere, and merely formal ethics, which tells you ... That is exactly in practice, although Kant didn't mean it, the position which I sketched on another occasion: the people who say the men to be respected are those who adhere to an idea whatever the idea may be. I mean, people who would say one's consideration with one's comfort and belly and self-preservation and so on, that is of course not morality; that we share with the brutes. Man's dignity depends on his being dedicated to an idea. Which idea? Any idea. That is not what Kant intended, but that is strictly formal ethics. You have a description only of the how--dedication, or whatever you call it--but not of the what. And the how does not generate a what. But that, I think, leads also to absurdities, although it is practically, as a rule of thumb, within certain limits possible, but only within certain limits. Think of those who people who say, as has often been said, think of the really best type of Communists; you cannot deny that they have an integrity--that's the word which is used--meaning a dedication which the ordinary man does not possess. His integrity is something. Yes? It is the only thing which counts. That is much too abstract. You have to go into content of the ideas, you know?

A: <sup>Where do you</sup> ~~We're to~~ make a distinction between the goodness of the natural inclinations, ~~per se~~, and the need for the natural inclinations to be molded and directed; not the natural inclinations themselves.

S: As natural inclinations, they point toward something, they are directed toward something, and that gives you the end, in the most general sense. Now show me the concrete difficulty.

A: Socrates' whole endeavor is to change the course of man in political life. They went into political life because their natural inclinations, combined with their opinions, said this was the best life for them. So, since you don't change natural inclinations ...

S: I don't know whether I understood you. I mean, all men have a natural inclination to live--yes?--except if <sup>perverted</sup> they are ~~perverted~~ by certain false opinions. For example, the Indian widow, a young woman of 22, who has herself burned, Socrates, I think, would say--and not only Socrates--that is based on a wrong opinion that she commits suicide for that reason. Yes? Good.

So all men, when not <sup>perverted</sup> ~~hindered~~ by wrong opinion, have a desire to live. And out of this, there grows the art of medicine, the art of shoemaking, and so on. And above

all, the political art, because man is not only mortal, but also killable, and therefore, he needs the polis for protection both against the criminals within society as well as against the enemies without. So the political art is developed on this level for the sake of self-preservation.

A: Maybe I can state it more <sup>SUCCINCTLY</sup> distinctly. If Socrates' inclinations lead him to have opinions which differ radically from the opinions of most men, these opinions cannot themselves be defended on the basis of his natural inclinations. That is, at many places in the course of the dialogue you seem to say, "How does Socrates know this? He knows this because his eros" ...

S: Yes, sure. That is not sufficient knowledge. You can say that is an inference from the fact that it is a natural inclination. He is directed--not only he, but everyone--is directed by his natural inclinations, but knowledge consists in realizing ~~that~~ it's a natural inclination.

A: Yes, but how can this particular natural inclination of Socrates be defended against all ...

S: Yes, but which is the objection? The fact that the desire for self-preservation is itself a natural inclination? What is the objection?

A: There is no objection to that.

S: All right. I thought you meant this, the desire for self-preservation--to take the most interesting case here--leads to the polis and therefore it requires that men are citizens, ~~live in the city~~ <sup>do their duty</sup> as citizens, and some even more than that--lead an active political life. Socrates does not do that. As a practical proposition, how would you say that? I mean, if everyone would do what Socrates did, no polis could exist. Is that right? Self-preservation would become impossible, irrational.

A: Although that may be a true practical consequence, can this position of Socrates be defended apart from any reference to his peculiar inclination for philosophy?

S: Sure it must be defended. I mean, otherwise that would be a mere idiosyncrasy which is not in any respect ...

A: Yes, but at all crucial points, it seems, you just referred to his ...

S: No, no. I mean, let us take this seriously ~~thing~~. How would Socrates, in a developed argument which he doesn't give here, defend himself against the proposition he neglects his duty? He admits that the polis is necessary and that means that people must be not only law-abiding, but these ... sufficiently gifted must take an active share in political life. A perfectly good argument. How does Socrates defend it? That is the real accusation of Socrates. What does he say? If someone says, you, by your action, contributed to the destruction of the polis, what would he say?

A: That is part of his not knowing, so therefore ...

S: Yes, all right, but let us forget now this point because we must be able to discern this really serious argument behind that and then we can also try to link it up with the argument as it's explicitly given. Did Socrates' non-participation in political life destroy the city of Athens, as a matter of fact? No. It was before



and then on. So, <sup>let</sup> ~~it led us to~~ draw an inference: there are plenty of people who are eager to be politically active, number 1. ~~There is no real effect.~~ Now the question is, of course, those eager fellows may not be the best ones, and therefore the argument of the Republic--you know, why good men should go into politics. Not because they like it, but lest the bad men will take over. But then the question becomes really a practical question, as it is in itself: How could Socrates do more good, by not going into politics or by going into politics? And then ~~this~~ serious judgement was, he did more good by not going into politics. Not only because it preserved his life, because that argument is, of course, fallacious. One can make an equally good argument on the grounds of self-preservation ~~by~~ going into politics, for having powerful connections which will get you out of any fix into which you might come. You remember, the argument of Calicles to which is alluded by Socrates. So that is the sensible problem, and a necessary question, we can say, because that is the <sup>in fact</sup> effect of the argument of Aristophanes against Socrates, that people like you destroy what is the basis of your own activity--namely, the polis. And Socrates--I think the argument goes through the Platonic work--denies that; that's not true. The private life--if you can call that a private life--as led by Socrates or Plato is so far from being destructive ~~to~~ the polis is contributing, if indirectly, to the polis. The polis needs philosophy--such is the position of Socrates--but it doesn't need the rule of philosophy. I mean, officially, of course, that's the argument of the Republic, that the polis needs the rule of philosophy, but that's practically impossible, as is made very clear in the Republic. A good society, if we use modern terms, requires that there be men dedicated to the life of the mind but, as such, they are not the rulers. They are not the rulers, because there is a certain disproportion between what they are doing and what a political life requires. The tenth book of the Ethics of Aristotle is a beautiful description of that problem. I mean, Plato is very far from having a simplistic view of the harmony of the natural inclinations. There are tensions between them. Yes? Tensions. For example, take the very simple thing, without going into philosophy, the social life of man <sup>requires</sup> ~~led by~~ the polis requires therefore <sup>the pulling force</sup> ~~that the man has~~ to die for the country, for the city, in clear contradiction to self-preservation. That cannot be helped. There is no <sup>simple</sup> harmony. One can state it in very general terms. Self-preservation is a <sup>basic, alone, the lowest</sup> ~~basic, alone, the lowest~~ social life, and the qualities demanded by that, have a higher rank than mere self-preservation. Empirically, easily provable: we do not admire a man for the mere fact that he preserves himself. I mean, the classic case of the mere self-preservation, ~~of~~ <sup>is</sup> ~~course the valetudinarian~~. We can say he's a shrewd fellow, but that's not admiration. But a public-spirited man, a thoughtful man who exposes himself to dangers not only in war but to other more difficult dangers, for the sake of the good society is an admirable man. That is higher. On the other hand, according to the Platonic scheme, the life of the mind is still higher. And there are also tensions between the social life and the life of the mind which correspond, in a different way, to the tensions between society and self-preservation of which I spoke before. Mr. Faulkner?

A: Where is the contribution of philosophy to the polis made clear in the Apology? I thought that, as far as I remember from previous discussions, it was merely established that Socrates did not harm the polis but, except for the argument concerning the gadfly which is discredited, there is no statement that he's contributed to it.

S: Yes, that is very good, too, <sup>what you say</sup> ~~that statement~~. But <sup>what would be the... answer to your question</sup> ~~what is distinctly accomplished~~ was, the purpose of the Apology is not to prove that the polis needs philosophy, but a decent defense of the philosopher who is no longer concerned with living, a defense so phrased that it would not make philosophy utterly unpopular in Athens since.

? (They're much more lenient.) And to say nothing of the fact that if Socrates had to talk to the political cream of Athens, he would talk differently than in such a speech addressed to three hundred men more or less arbitrarily at random chosen. Mr. Gilman?

A: There's something that puzzles me. The early part of the dialogue seemed to maintain the paradox that no man harmed another willingly. Here at the very end he seems to say the opposite, that they do not harm him, but they intend to harm him. And I wondered if there is anything there.

S: Yes, that is a long question and I'm sure I have not solved it *this difficulty*, but still I can only suggest one step for clarification: strictly speaking, Socrates doesn't say that no one voluntarily commits an injustice or no one voluntarily harms another. I come back to that later.

Strictly speaking, Socrates says no one voluntarily chooses to be bad. Yes? No one chooses evil as evil—meaning for himself. That is true. But I know you mean this passage where he says ... the link between the two theses ... what was that passage which I mean? There is a contradiction which ...

A: Well, I'm thinking of the ... when he refutes Meletos strictly with this very paradoxical argument, you know—how can I be harming anyone else. And at the very end he says ...

S: Yes, but was the more specific thesis? I don't remember at the moment. Against Meletos? What did he say more precisely than you stated it now? You stated it more precisely before.

A: No one wishes to live with bad neighbors ...

S: O, yes! Yes, that's it. Yes, that is true. Why is this an overstatement. I mean, everyone wants the good for himself. That's true. Only the question is, which good? And some people, believe it or not, think that certain very low goods are the highest goods. Take a miser. He doesn't want to harm himself by not eating and by living bad in every respect. He thinks he is acquiring for himself the highest good, the highest good being cash in a box. Yes? Good. Now how would Socrates argue against him? I mean, that's the highest good for you. Therefore, you are very anxious that there are no robbers, no housebreakers, and so on. And, therefore, he will go around and tell everyone how wicked it is to enter houses, yes? He would also have to say, or at least act on the maxim, that contribution to charity is wicked, because it would

Now, in other words, what is the mistake of Socrates in the argument. Well, it is much too general. I mean, it doesn't go into the fact that the goods which people desire and the preservation with which they are concerned, there is an enormous variety there and the famous fact that there are quite a few people who corrupt their fellow men—for example, you get <sup>repeated</sup> support of it every day, I mean, Mr. Morrison's activity with the policemen is a good example, if you don't believe me. Now, he corrupted his fellow men. Why? He made life more miserable for himself? That was not the motive. He thought he made life more comfortable, because if the policemen cover up for his robberies or whatever he did he will not be punished. Yes? Now what was wrong in the calculations?

A: Somebody slipped up.

S: No, that's important on the lowest level. The danger of slip-up is so considerable that a prudent man wouldn't do what they did. Yes, sure. Honest/as policy is surely good, as far as it goes.

Now I think I will only say a few words regarding the Crito which we will discuss next time. First, read the paper. Now the Apology and Crito are, very superficially, very different in spirit. I remember having read in Paul Shorey—you know, he was



a professor of classics at this university about forty years ago--he says somewhere in his book What Plato Says, not "What He Thought--and I think it was really not quite adequate regarding what he said--but it is a useful summary of the dialogues, by the way, and it has one quality, one helpful quality. He gives you parallels. You know, when you read a passage, say, in the Crito, in his report he gives you parallels in other dialogues and that can be helpful. Now in it he makes this remark: he loves the Crito and detests the Apology, because the Crito is a conservative book, law-abiding, and the Apology is the book of a rebel, a revolutionary--you know, when Socrates says, regardless of what you do, I will philosophize, even if the law forbids it. He challenges the whole polis and its laws. And here he accepts the laws en bloc and says you must not disobey them under any circumstances. As an original provisional statement of the difficulty, it is interesting, and shows also how this fashionable distinction between the liberals and conservatives today don't work out when you go to interesting cases, yes? You know? I mean, you must have read some of this discussion on what conservatives and liberals are and what each of them gets in to. That would not be, by the way, a bad subject for a Doctor's thesis, to take up these two positions as presented and see that it is a way of blind men fighting against each other. I mean, I don't say that the distinction is meaningless politically--very far from that--but it is only relevant in a very crude political sense. You know, those who wish to abolish progressive income tax, and those who wish to increase it. That is a clear, practical distinction, and there are others of the same kind, and also loyalty oaths and this kind of thing, which are the practical issues. But if you trace it beyond the politics of this very moment, to principles, it is really impossible to find any principles.

Now, in the Apology, Socrates, we may say, appeals from the law of Athens to something like a higher law, although the term never occurs. But there is an equivalent of that, because you can say what it says about the oracle of Apollo, that it has a function of a higher law. In the Crito he says implicitly--he rejects implicitly--any such appeal. You have to abide by the law. That seems to be a clear contradiction, but is it really, is it necessarily, a contradiction. Can these two positions not be reconciled, at least in the way in which Socrates understands it? An appeal to a higher law in the one dialogue and the refusal to make such an appeal in the other. Then we would have to establish the precise meaning of the appeal on the one hand and of the refusal to appeal on the other. Yes?

A: Well, I think that he assumes in the Crito that the laws would have to be good laws, then make the distinction between ...

S: O, no. Then it would be easy. That is the best excuse for any revolutionary action. No, no. That he does not do.

A: He says that Sparta and Crete, for example, have good laws and singles out these cities and the implication is that some ...

S: That is a very good point, but that is already on a much deeper level than I now take it. You are already indicating the difficulties of the argument of the Crito. I'm speaking now of the obvious surface, accessible without any reflection. What does the appeal to a higher law mean in the Apology? Let us get this straight. I mean, what is that higher law, a very specific law? A law imposed on an individual called Socrates and perhaps on people akin to him--the claim of Socrates and people akin to him--to philosophize. Nothing else. There is no appeal to a higher law against loyalty oaths or something like this. Philosophy, and philosophy alone. And what the trouble is--and the inevitable trouble in the argument--is that is not very clear what philosophy means. Yes? I mean, walking around and examining; that seems to be

the meaning. What does he do in the Crito? I mean, the most obvious thing. He ~~refuses to run away from jail~~; I mean, to commit a flagrantly illegal action. I think one could suggest this formula: man has no right to transgress the law even if it hurts unjustly his body. And the greatest hurt which can be done to the body would be, of course, capital punishment. But there is a right to transgress the law which hurts the soul. Now, what was done to Socrates, the capital punishment, did not hurt his soul; therefore, no right to transgress. But a law which would forbid him to philosophize would hurt the soul and, therefore, he could not obey it. That would be an easy way to reconcile the two distinctions. The problem has a certain similarity with the problem of passive and active disobedience as it was ~~to philosophy~~ <sup>developed</sup> in the ~~fifteenth~~ <sup>sixteenth</sup> and seventeenth centuries. Do you know what that was?

A: One has to obey an action, but not necessarily <sup>the</sup> conscience?

S: No, no. Passive disobedience would mean you never rebel, under no circumstances, even if the government is ~~hereditative and got no where~~. <sup>No.</sup> But active obedience would mean to positively do what the government commands. Take a simple case, as it was the situation there--~~protestant~~ <sup>could be</sup> or catholic ~~candidate~~ <sup>could be</sup>. A protestant government commanding catholics to deny certain principles of catholicism by deed or speech, that would be active obedience. And the catholics in this case said no. Passive obedience ~~meaning not to rebel~~ <sup>merely meant</sup>. Was it clear what I said? The crucial point was under no circumstances has a citizen or subject the right to rebel. But he does have the right to disobey commandments of his government which are incompatible with his conscience. That was the most moderate position. The alternative, of course, was that under certain conditions you may rebel. Socrates' position has something to do with that, but I believe the formula which I suggested comes closer to what he says. But if I say man has a right to transgress the laws which hurt the soul, he means that in a very precise sense. Only a law which forbids philosophizing can hurt the soul. A law which would, for example, forbid him openly to question the existence of Zeus, he would not think that it would hurt his soul, because that would, in his opinion, clearly belong to the competence of government to do that. Yes?

A: Why doesn't a law which kills him, presumably, be classed ... this distinction between laws against the soul and the law which kills the body, a law against the body, presumably meaning death ...

S: So, in other words ... I see. Your difficulty is this: there might be cases-- and this is exactly such a case--which hurts both the body and the soul. Yes, but Socrates denies that. On what ground does he deny that there is a contradiction of the two-pronged law here, or the two prongs of that law? Socrates says his soul is not hurt by accepting punishment, capital punishment. Why is his soul not hurt. I mean, you say in certain cases, and especially in our case, the two provisions of that law as I described it contradict each other. His body is hurt, obviously, but hurt of the body is no reason. But you say also his soul is hurt. But the whole argument of the Apology was that his soul is not hurt. Did Socrates become a meaner man by accepting the punishment? That would mean hurting the soul.

A: No.

S: But, still, you've got a point. The fact that Socrates mentions so frequently in both works the fact that he is seventy plays a role. That is a relevant circumstance. Take a young man of twenty-five instead of a man of seventy.

A:



S: That is, I think, the problem really. That is, the great problem of the Crito is, as it seems to be at first glance, that statement that under all circumstances you must not disobey a law which hurts the body. Universally valid for all men, regardless of circumstances. Or is it only valid under certain circumstances, for example, age? Socrates' useful life was practically at an end. That was his opinion. And therefore, that was a special case.

A: The question is how valid is the age argument? He makes this argument to Criton, who is presumably who almost as old as he is, and Criton brushes it off and says, but other people, their age doesn't keep them from resenting it when they find themselves in your position.

S: Yes, surely, I know that.

A: So it's this specific circumstance of the philosopher ...

S: No, not only that, but whether these other men are <sup>not</sup> rather foolish. We take that up next time. You know, by clinging to life and would wish to live a hundred and fifty years if they could, even if they were completely decrepit and a burden on anyone and everyone.

A: It's not a question of clinging, you see. Criton doesn't make it an act of clinging so it's not an act of ...

S: What I say now is only this: there is not obviously a contradiction between the two things. Yes? Between the two dialogues. That we must keep in mind. We must also keep in mind another problem. The thesis of the Apology was that Socrates knows nothing and that his wisdom consists in his knowing that he knows nothing. We must keep in mind <sup>the problem of</sup> Socrates' knowledge or his ignorance regarding the greatest things. Is the argument of the Crito based on knowledge? You know, is this thesis--under no circumstances must you transgress the law, or more specifically, in this form that you legally condemned, you make a jail break--is this a universally valid law? Socrates says so. But does he know it? Or is it merely an opinion? That's the question. We must investigate that.

As to this passage to which Mr. Berger referred, that is 43C, where he says, "But others of your age are caught in such disasters, but their old age does not in any way induce them not to worry or not to be angry at the present calamity." And Socrates says, "That is so."

A: And it leads to the point. It goes on to say ...

S: Yes, sure it does. But is it not possible ... Socrates is not perturbed at all by approaching death because he is old, he says. Yes? And the argument of Criton induces us to add, this is not a sufficient reason, because there are other old men who, when death approaches, are perturbed. Socrates, apart from being old, he has another quality which we can call, he is a sensible man. He's old and sensible. He acts his age. He acts in accordance with his age. He acts in accordance with nature. Therefore, he is not perturbed. He knows that he has to die and he knows that he will be not for very long the same Socrates that he was before. He doesn't see any benefit in being a decayed Socrates. That is a point which he doesn't develop, but which is not too difficult to guess.

Well, I think, the other points ... It's of no use to continue the discussion of the Crito. Is there any point you would like to bring up now? A few minutes we can still

have here.

A: I have a naive question.

S: The naive questions are always the best questions.

A: From the point of view of Socrates, the passions were really not and had to be commanded by reason, but you seem to develop the theme that the natural inclinations are good ...

S: O, that's easy. That is not naive, but if I may use another word, it's ignorant.

A: That's what I would have said.

S: <sup>It</sup> are passions that in modern times they began to be identified as <sup>Natural</sup> inclinations. But that is, in itself, that you strive for life's <sup>not a</sup> passion, <sup>it's natural</sup> life's inclinations. A passion it becomes only when it becomes a kind of obsession. A natural inclination is perfectly compatible with any mere ...



... of the laws. The question of what Socrates should do is still open. The question is, is it just to escape from prison? Is it just for Socrates' circumstances, as he is, to escape from prison? Obviously two different questions. This question turns around the more fundamental question as to the knowledge of justice. Does Socrates possess such knowledge? Socrates says he follows only the logos, and yet he acted in the past and is going to act now. So he must possess knowledge of justice, you would say. But this knowledge is not presented as knowledge in the Crito. That knowledge is taken over and presupposed from earlier acts of reasoning, from earlier agreements between Socrates and Crito. But agreement is not the same thing as truth. Two people may agree on something without being satisfied that it is the truth. These earlier agreements, however, are here said to be open for reconsideration. They are, however, not re-examined; they are only re-asserted, especially the crucial premise, to live well is equivalent with living justly.

identical

Now, hitherto, the case for Socrates' position, for staying in prison--i.e., dying--was this: for an old man, life is not worth living. In this argument, the point of view is, the good life without any regard to the just life. Simply from the point of good living, you don't live as long as you are very old. Against this, Crito has said, "It is your duty to escape. By dying, you, Socrates, are taking the easy way out," the easy way out because death might be that dreamless sleep--you remember?--which is such a very pleasant condition, much more pleasant than to raise the children of Socrates, you see, who were not so attractive--~~obvious~~<sup>obvious</sup> ~~implication~~<sup>implication</sup> as some other people were. It was Crito who said one must do the just thing, and the just thing is not to take the easy way out--in this case, to die. So this point has to be stressed more than I have done last time. It is Crito who brings up the question of justice. But the question, of course, is this: Is Crito's understanding of justice correct?

What is justice? Is there knowledge of justice? Are there experts in justice, just as there are experts in bodily health? Now if there is an expert in any field, one must follow his opinion as distinguished from the opinions of the many. And the laws are opinions of the many. If there is no expert, one may or may not follow the opinion of the many--i.e., the laws. But a prudent man, a practically man, would consider, in that case, the power of the many; their power to kill. He would not consider it if there is knowledge of justice, if there are experts in justice. By obeying the opinion of the many--i.e., the laws--Socrates will be killed. But there is another opinion of the many which plays a great role here, which is public opinion to which Crito has referred. By obeying the opinion of the many in the sense of public opinion, Socrates will not be killed, because public opinion approves of escaping from prison under these conditions. So Crito is surely right if there is no knowledge of the just. In other words, if there is nothing by nature just, if justice is entirely conventional, entirely opinion, then why should you respect that opinion? Merely because it is the opinion of the many does not make it more respectable.

Therefore, to contradict Crito, Socrates must prove that there is something by nature just which is not mere opinion. And this is the function of the appearance of the Laws. This personification of the Laws is a substitute for the proof of natural justice. It is of course not a proof, but within it we see the nature of justice.

Now, two suggestions were made at the end of what we read last time regarding justice: first--but it is rather a clarification of what injustice means--to act unjustly means to hurt human beings--that was the first suggestion; the second suggestion was, to act unjustly means to break promises, or engagements. That is clear, because the modern doctrine, as started by Hobbes, is implied in that, in the latter point. Nothing is, by nature, just. I exaggerate a bit. But justice means performance of promises. The

only principle of right is that if you have agreed to something, not deceived and not under duress, then you have recognized something which then you have to consider <sup>consider</sup> consequent. Now, these two principles, these two understandings of justice--injustice means hurting people or injustice means breaking promises--can conflict with one another. That makes it interesting. In certain situations, you hurt people by keeping your promise. As the beginning of the Republic: you promise to return the gun and the owner has become a madman inbetween, you hurt him and anyone exposed to him by returning the gun. So, in other words, not hurting people is the higher principle. This much I think we should remember before we continue. And now let us continue immediately, because it is my firm contention and/or hope that we finish our reading of the Crito today. We begin now at the point where the laws come up, 50A 6. Yes.

"Now look at it," Socrates says, "in the following manner. If you are about to run away from here (or whoever one has to call that action," I mean the more delicate expression for what we are doing, "the Laws and the Community of the polis would appear to us and ask." Do you have that? Now this term "appearing" is used of dreams and visions, as I learned from Berlin. You see also here two different things: the Laws and the polis appear, and they would ask ... You see, what do they say here--tell me, O Socrates. Who is then speaking, the plural or the singular?

<sup>Burnet</sup>

A: The singular.

S: And what is the singular here, in this particular case?

A: The polis.

S: The polis. So to begin with, it is not the Laws who are speaking, but the polis. Now the polis consists, of course, of human beings--the citizen body assembled. The Laws are not human beings. The polis cannot be super-human. They Laws may be, because they are not human beings. Now let us go on from here. Yes? "Tell me, Socrates, what do you intend to do?" Do you have it? Whoever has it, read it. Let us not be formal.

A: "Tell me, Socrates, what have you in mind to do? In trying to do this, can't you see that you are trying to destroy us, the Laws, and the whole state, as far as you can do it?"

S: The whole polis. I mean, we don't have to correct <sup>each time</sup> ~~this part~~. Yes?

A: "Or do you think it possible that a city can exist and not be overturned, where sentence given has no force but is made null by private persons and destroyed?" What shall I say, Criton, to this and other such things? For one could say much, especially an orator, in pleading about the destruction of the law" ...

S: Of this law. This law. That's important. Yes?

A: ... "which lays down that sentences given must be carried out."

S: Let us stop here for one moment. All laws are destroyed if the law regarding the enforcement of punitive sentences is destroyed. What does this imply regarding law, as law? In other words, that's the key law. Yes? That's the law of laws. What does it tell us about laws in general?

A: That it depends on force for its enactment.



S: All laws depend on sanctions. Now if this principle of sanctions is denied, all laws are denied. All laws are laws by virtue of having human sanctions. Now I exaggerate for a good reason; law is essentially punitive. Without that punitive appendage, the law is not law. And if the laws are destroyed, the city is destroyed. By fleeing, Socrates would be the most unjust of men, because he would hurt the whole polis—not only this or that individual. This seems to settle the issue. But it is not yet asserted; it's still only a question. Why? Why does this not settle the issue? How does he go on? "Or shall we answer the Laws" ... Yes. Go on.

A: "Or shall I answer the Laws" ...

S: Not I, we. O, he is very unintelligent. It is very important <sup>who speaks</sup> to the speech whether Socrates speaks or Socrates and Criton jointly. And that's easy. I mean, that is not ... Yes?

A: Why does he say, "Tell me Socrates," and then he says, "you are trying to destroy us"? Why is the number changing?

S: Well, that is ... Plato was a great man. The translator is almost certainly not a great man. So if Plato does something strange, it is worth considering, but if the translator commits a simple blunder in translating, which no second term student of Greek would commit ... Yes? Good.

A: Why does it say, or does the Greek say, "you would destroy me"?

(Another voice): No, the Greek says ... That's in Greek, "destroy us".

S: Yes, well, you see, first the polis speaks and then the polis is replaced by the Laws. That's the whole thing. First you have the Athenians. The Athenians—well, there are all kinds of Athenians. It's not necessarily something impressive. Then you have the polis. Now the Athenians are here in an official capacity. That's something impressive. But still by no means infallible because they go by majority vote and so on and so on. And then you get the Laws. And the polis disappears. The Laws are somewhere in the clouds.

A: But this composition takes place in another sentence.

S: Why not? To make it still more ... Sure. That is clear. But the point is, that although the voice addresses Socrates, Socrates does not answer, but asks Criton, "What shall we answer?" You see, that brings it out most clearly that Socrates does not answer, but Criton answers on behalf of both Criton and Socrates. So Socrates is really ironical, as I always said, to ask questions and don't answer them. Here he raises questions and Criton answers them on Socrates' behalf. So, do you see that it makes sense that the sage Plato does these strange things, as distinguished from the unsage translator who is not aware of these things. Yes?

A: It is absolutely clear in the Greek that the polis, and not the Laws, is speaking?

S: At the beginning? Sure. "Tell me." Tell singular me, or Socrates. The addressee is the singular, Socrates. Of course. And the speaker is also in the singular, so it cannot be the Laws. Yes. Now, what then does he say? What do we say to the laws?

A: "The reason is that the state wronged me, and did not judge the case right?"

S: "Wronged us." Also important, because it is a joint action of Criton and Socrates and preceded by an action of the polis against both of them, because Criton too is hurt—he loses his friend. "Because the polis did wrong to us and did not decide the trial correctly." Is that what we shall say—that, by Zeus! The whole issue. In other words, the city has no right to do wrong and if it does wrong, it ceases to be respectable. You must have heard that argument in more highflouting terms very frequently. The city acted unjustly against us and it did not decide the laws law suit correctly; these are two different things. Why did the city act unjustly against us? Not by deciding the laws; that is the second point. What is the primary injustice of the city, independent of the decision of the lawsuit, the trial? The accusation itself was unjust, meaning it was based on the irrational demand that one must believe in the gods of the city. The law itself was unjust. And secondly, the trial was incorrect, because the accusers did not prove that which they were supposed to. You remember the argument against Meletos. Socrates proved that he believed in the gods of the city. So, in other words, that is the question: Must you obey not only the laws, but unjust laws? And that is what the Laws themselves have the nerve to raise, this question. Now, let us see. What then will the Laws say? Yes?

A: "Was that the agreement between us, Socrates?"

S: Between us and you. Yes?

A: "Or was it to abide by whatever judgements the state may make?"

S: Yes. Let us stop here. The first issue is altogether dropped—yes?—the issue of the just of the laws. One cannot question the laws. One can question only the application of the laws in a given case; were the laws properly applied? But this cannot be questioned by you, Socrates, because you agreed not to question these legal decisions, as distinguished from the laws themselves. This is a surprising assertion of the Laws. Where did Socrates ever say that? Now, how does he go on? Now if we were surprised when they say this, they would perhaps say ... Now let me see. The Laws reply only to Socrates here, you see, although both Socrates and Criton are presented as addressing the Laws. Why? Well, perhaps they know that it's sufficient for them to persuade Socrates. If Socrates is satisfied that he can't go out of jail, Criton has to take that decision. Socrates deliberates with himself, you know? This discussion is a kind of deliberation of Socrates with himself, not with Criton. Whether that is sufficient or not remains to be seen. Now let us go on here.

A: "Socrates, do not be surprised at what we say, but answer, since you are accustomed to the use of questions and answers. If you please, what do you complain of in us and the state that you try to destroy us? First of all, did we not bring you into life" ...

S: Did we not generate you. It's an unnecessary prudishness. Yes?

A: "And through us your father took your mother, and begat you? Tell us then, are the marriage laws those of us you find fault with? Do you think there is something wrong with them?" "I have no fault to find," I should say."

S: Now let us stop here. You see, the Laws imitate Socrates. Since Socrates is so well known for his questioning and answering, the Laws adopt Socrates' procedure. But the crucial point here, we, the Laws, generated you. What does this mean? What would you say if someone would say, "Who generated you," and you would say, "the Laws." Yes? I mean, look at it from the practical point of view. Yes?



A: Generate the conditions that ...

S: Yes, but he doesn't qualify it, he simply says, we generate you.

A: Which in turn may influence ...

S: Yes, sure, that is defensible, but they say they generate him. That's important. You see, the Laws magnify themselves. They claim to do something which they couldn't possibly have done. Who did the generating? Yes. Man. Man who, as Aristotle in his wisdom said, "Sun and man generates man," the sun meaning the whole natural conditions. Without it they couldn't be. Here, the Laws say, the Laws generate men. They push aside nature. They push it aside, and that is of the greatest importance since the question, is nature natural justice? Yes? Now let's go on. And Socrates, as you see, doesn't blame these marriage laws. He thinks they are perfectly all right. Now ... ?

A: "I have no fault to find," I should say. "Well, the laws about feeding the child and the education in which you were brought up."

S: "In which you ~~too~~ were brought up." That's important.

A: "Did not those which had that duty do well in directing your father to educate you in mind and body?"

S: Yes? In mind and body? In music and gymnastics. Because that's a long question, whether musical education is not an education of the body--dancing--or whether gymnastic education is really education of the soul. It's a long story. So, you see what criminal understanding ... What's the name of that fellow? The translator, is it this one?

A: Rouse.

S: Well, he should get a severe reprimand, high crime and <sup>meanor</sup> misdemeanor. If death were a punishment ... but that we don't know. So let us not say it. Now, go on.

A: "Yes," I should say.

S: Now let us stop for a moment. So, the education which you too got, yes--namely, which everyone got, every Athenian. The Laws are silent about what we may call higher education, which not everyone gets. This higher education which Socrates got he did not owe to the city. This the Laws are decent enough to admit, by implication. Yes? After you were generated and fed--nursed--and educated, yes?

A: "Yes," I should say. "Very well. When you had been born and brought up and educated, could you say in the first place that you were not our offspring and our slave, you and your ancestors also?"

S: Let us stop here. I put the emphasis now on a <sup>crucial</sup> good point. Socrates became by his generation and education, the slave of the city. Why a slave? How does a man become a slave?

A: He is bought.

S: Yes, but that presupposes an earlier act. I mean, you are not familiar with the technicalities. You may know it partly from American history. Where did you buy the

slave? Probably at a slave market. And where did they come there?

A: From a country conquered.

S: Yes, so, in other words, the ground of slavery is coercion.

A: Or by birth.

S: That could also be, but that's still <sup>derivative</sup> coercion. Ultimately, you come back to coercion. You had no choice in the matter. No one has a choice in being born, you know. Socrates wasn't asked. There was no agreement between him and the polis. You will see later on there are two opposite arguments: part of the argument is based on agreement between Socrates and the city; another part of the argument is based on the opposite of agreement, namely coercion. So here, a slave. Yes? Now, go on.

A: "And if this is so, do you think you have equal rights with us, and whatever we try to do to you, do you think you also have a right to do to us? Why, against your father you had no equal rights, or against a master, if you had one, so that you might do back whatever was done to you; if you were scolded you could not scold back, if beaten you could not beat back, and there were many other such things."

S: Now let us stop here. The relation of the city to the citizen is despotic—in the strict sense, despotic means the relation of a master to a slave—or paternal. It does not make any difference, as is shown by the fact that the examples are used equally. There is no agreement between masters and slaves, between parents and children. Children and slaves have no right to resistance, regardless of what parents and masters try to do to them. They have no right to use force against superiors. But does Socrates plan to use force? No, but he plans to use deception—I mean, in case he would escape. But may not a child/slave, <sup>or deception</sup> against his mad father/master in the interest of his father/master, or the father/master's equal fellow-citizens? For hitting back is permitted in the case of equals, as the Laws <sup>passively</sup> admit. Hitting back is only forbidden when the two partners are unequal. And, you know, that's a great question, whether that may not be done. Here it is discussed in connection with the past, but it is also clear today.

But another conclusion: Socrates is a slave of the city. He belongs entirely to the city. He could have, of course, no private life—slaves have no private life. He could do nothing but the affairs of the polis as the polis understands them. You see, Socrates himself says, "I'm the only true politician in Athens," in the Gorgias. But that is not ... A slave can't define his duties as he sees them, he has to do the duties a master imposes on him. The same applies to children. Now, Socrates obviously did not do the political things as the polis of Athens understood them.

The conclusion, at any rate is that the laws are to be obeyed, even if they are unjust. But remember the discussion in the Apology on a possible law that forbids philosophy and Socrates says he will not obey such a law. Would Socrates resist such a law by force? Would he do that? I mean, would he make a picket and in case the police come to run him away, he will throw stones at them? What would he do?

A: Deceive them

S: Yes, but I would raise one question. Do you remember what Socrates said in the Apology, this famous simile which he uses regarding his relation to the polis? He compares himself to a rather small beast, an unpleasant beast. Do you remember? What is it?



A: A gadfly.

S: What does the gadfly do to the horse?

A: He bites it.

S: Force. So there is a kind of force used by Socrates, yes? But still you can say that's only a simile. But, if Socrates will never use force, why will he never use force against the polis?

A: He's out numbered.

S: In other words, he would use force against his mad father if his mad father would rush out and try to kill his neighbor, he would of course use force against the father. But he wouldn't do that against the polis if it is rushing out to do some mad action because the polis is too strong for Socrates. Now, if we could stop here, which is of course impossible, we could say the one expert on justice--Socrates--advises against the use of force when confronted with such opinions of the many as are backed by overpowering force or coercion.

Now let us see how it goes on. Up to now he has used only the case of the father and master. Now we come to the polis again, where we left off.

Q: How do we know that the reason is the force of the polis, that he wouldn't use deception? He did what you just said.

S: No, I didn't discuss deception. Deception is not discussed.

A: Oh. Well, why wouldn't he use ...

S: Deception is not discussed, so if you draw from these remarks we just read the conclusion he might use deception as Mr. Schrock suggested, that is not excluded.

A: But what about force? What would ...

S: The principle stated here is you must not use force against your father or master. Now that is true in case the father or master <sup>seriously</sup> hurts you. But what if they hurt other people? Then, of course, he would use force even as the child or as the slave, and he would be praised by everyone for doing that.

A: The reason that he doesn't use force against his parents isn't because they're stronger--or against the master. Isn't there a natural relationship ...

S: Yes, sure, but that is not so simple. This is not universally true. There are cases in which you may use force against your father and against your master; namely, if he is mad, to take the simplest case. And the madness may, of course, be also a highly emotional state which is not technically insanity and yet has the effects of insanity. Now let us go on.

A: "But against your country, it seems" ...

S: Yes, now the word used here and throughout is fatherland. It is not so familiar a word in English as on the European Continent, but we have to translate it literally because it has a certain ... That's important. Fatherland.

A: "But against your fatherland, it seems, and the Laws, you shall be allowed to do it! So that, if we try to destroy you because we think it right, then you shall try to destroy us the Laws and your country, as far as you can, and you will say you do right in this, you whose care is set upon virtue in very truth?"

S: Yes, let us stop here. The Laws, they admit, attempt to destroy Socrates. They admit that. In the belief that they act justly. In other words, it is not merely a matter of misinterpretation of the laws by frail human beings. The Laws refer here, also, to Socrates' special case. Precisely Socrates has to be a slave of the Laws. Precisely so, because he talks all the time of virtue. And the irony is very great, because precisely Socrates cannot be a slave of the Laws. Those who are completely the product of the city, if I may say so--of course not in their body, but who are completely molded by the polis--they, of course, are the slaves of the polis. But Socrates is not molded by the city; he has something beyond that. You see, just turned around. The Laws disregard, in this very statement, the difference between vulgar virtue--which is a product of the polis--and true virtue. Yes? Now? How does he go on?

A: "Are you so wise that you failed to see that something else is more precious than father and mother and all your ancestors besides--your country, something more reverend, more holy, of greater value, as the gods judge, and any men that have sense? You must honour and obey and conciliate your country when angry, more than a father; you must either persuade her, or do whatever she commands; you must bear in quiet anything she bids you bear, be it stripes or prison; or if she leads you to war, to be wounded or to die, this you must do, and it is right; you must not give way or retreat or leave your post, but in war and in court and everywhere you must do whatever city and fatherland commands, or else convince her where the right lies."

S: Literally, "how the right is by nature," or persuade her what is by nature just. Now, you see, when you began to read first, the mother comes in who was completely disregarded in the first ... There's a beautiful discussion of this problem in Locke, Civil Government, when his adversary, Filmer, had always said, "Honor thy father. That's the highest command." And then Locke simply says, "But look what the Bible says, honor thy father and mother." You see, and that destroys immediately the argument in favor of absolute monarchy which Filmer was ... But that is, of course, not what Socrates had in mind. The mother, you remember, the mother in the Clouds where the difficulties came not with beating the father, but with beating the mother? Now, the dual domestic authority ... if you have a dual authority, you have necessarily the possibility of conflict. And that applies also to the interesting case of father and fatherland. Yes? The father may be a traitor, for example. He may be a traitor and whom do you respect in that case? Now here it is, of course, decided simply in favor of the polis. The polis takes precedent over the parent, on the basis of the presumed omnipotence of the Laws, because it was not your father who generated you or your grandfather, indirectly, but the fatherland which generated you. The most venerable--after the gods, I take it--is the fatherland. But earlier, when he had almost mentioned the soul--but he didn't mention it, he walked around it--that was in 48A 3, he said, X, which is not the body, more venerable than the body by far, that leads to the interesting question what is more venerable, more worthy of honor, the fatherland or the soul?--a problem which which you are familiar from the Christian tradition. You know? And the statement from the anti-Christian point of view by Cosimo de Medici--how did he say it?--he was more concerned with the salvation of the fatherland than with the salvation of the soul. Now, that's the problem. That's the problem here indicated. Is the soul more venerable than the fatherland or not?



There is a fuller discussion of this subject at the beginning of the fifth book of the Laws. You may try to persuade the Laws how the just is by nature, which means in plain English, that the Laws as laws don't know it. They don't know that. No claim is made at any point that the Law is divine, of super-human wisdom. It's not made. That's very important. Although they appear like gods, no such claim is made. Someone wanted to say something. Was it Mr. Cohn? OK. Go on, otherwise, where you left off.

Rebbi Weiss

A: "Violence is not allowed against mother or father, much less against your country." What shall we answer to this, Criton? Shall we say the Laws are speaking the truth, or not?

"I think they are."

S: You see, in the first place he drops now the master/slave thing which is very good to do because that is a very odious thing--if you are simply the slave of the polis. What is the implication? What is the difference between master/slave and parents/children?

A: The parents rule for the benefit of the children.

S: Exactly. The master/slave, that this is a rule for the benefit of the slave is a questionable assertion. But that the parents rule for the benefit of the children is a plausible assertion. So, in other words, if the Laws have any leg to stand on, it must be not their power, but it must be their beneficial character. And that we must see, what comes out of that. Criton, you see, not Socrates, says one must not use violence against the fatherland. And, of course, that is also not the practical question. They are not going to use violence as we have seen before. It would be a matter only of a minor deception. Yes. Go on here.

A: "The Laws might say, perhaps, 'See then, Socrates, whether we are speaking the truth when we say that you do wrong to us now in this attempt. We who brought you into being, who brought you up, educated you, gave you and all the other citizens a share of all the beautiful things we could'" ...

S: Yes. We could. Yes? Of which we are capable. You see only, the Laws make clear the limitations of their gifts; they gave a lot of things, but they didn't give everything. The beneficence of the polis or of the Laws is limited. What did they not give? What could they not give. They gave many wonderful things--they gave him wonderful military training and gave him training in propriety and decent conduct and so forth. What did they not give him?

A: Wisdom.

S: You remember the passage near the beginning, the many cannot give us wisdom, sensibility. Therefore, the silence on philosophy in the Crito, *severely observed*, is crucial. If philosophy were considered, the whole thing would have to be reconsidered. Socrates would still arrive at this conclusion, to stay in prison and to die, but not on these grounds. What these grounds are, we must see. Yes!

A: "Yet we proclaim, by granting permission to any of the Athenians who wishes that when he has passed the muster and sees the public business and us the Laws, anyone who does not like us has leave to take what is his and go where he will. None of us Laws will stand in the way or dissuade him; if one of you does not like us and the city and wishes to go to a colony, or if he prefers to emigrate somewhere else,

he may go wherever he wishes and take whatever is his."

S: You see, now the Laws formally repudiate their despotic character. No compulsion is asserted. Slaves do not have this permission, to go away if they don't like their masters, Athenians have this right. You see here now, this is not only a distinction between the city or the Laws and the master, but also a distinction between the Laws and the father. You cannot repudiate your father. Your relation to your father is entirely involuntary in its character. But the ground of obedience to the laws is entirely voluntary and that leads to great consequences. The relation of children to fathers is not voluntary, therefore the partners are unequal. But if the relation between city and citizen should prove to be entirely voluntary, the partners would be equal. It would be a contract, as is later suggested. The movement of thought here is a movement from one ground of obedience to an entirely different ground of obedience, the one based on involuntariness--compulsion, the other based on perfect voluntariness. If voluntariness is a basis of reasonable obedience, if you are obliged only by virtue of a free agreement which you made in full possession of your mind, not under duress and not deceived, if that is the essence of reasonable obedience then, of course, what becomes of obedience to parents? That has to be reconsidered in each case. In other words, if this is true--if voluntariness is the basis of reasonable obedience--one may resist to rulers whose rule is based on force alone.

If one would read more carefully, this passage we just read, he would see there are two formulations of that; first, a very broad permission--everyday the herald appears in the marketplace and says every Athenian who doesn't like it here may leave--and later on the much more cautious formulation. But the first formulation, which is very funny, has nevertheless a very important theoretical backing. I don't know whether you know Rousseau's social contract; according to the strict teaching of Rousseau--which in practice he did not maintain, fortunately--every meeting of the citizen body has to begin with the question, "Do you wish to preserve the constitution which you have studied before, or do you wish to introduce a new one?" Perfect reconsideration of the whole legal order. That is absolute voluntariness. But the two cases are different; here it is the citizen body--the individual citizen has no choice. No. For Rousseau, he has a choice. The right to immigration is essential if the social contract is to be just. Otherwise it would be compulsion. You see, the fundamental principle of the so-called contractual doctrine is here stated--that is of course well known in the literature. But the opposite principle is also stated. You know? The analogy with the father/child relation.

Yes, but is it so absolutely voluntary with Socrates? Is it, or is it a question? Why not?

A: Well, first, economic considerations might make it very hard for him. <sup>to leave</sup>

S: That's one point, even though he has all kinds of friends and so on. Yes. Good. Did you want to say something?

A:

S: Yes, but Socrates is not an intellectual and so he has a certain inner freedom from that.

A: If he went elsewhere, he wouldn't be a citizen.

S: Yes, but he made clear in the Apology that exile is not a great evil. It is an evil, but not a great evil. But what are the alternatives? What would he do? I mean,



what is the alternative. He doesn't like the laws of Athens. What does he do?

A: He has to go to another city, whose laws may be worse.

S: Yes. Or living in that city is not voluntary. That's the point. So there is no simple hundred percent free contractual relation. It is necessary for him to live in the city. Yes. Now go on. "But who of you" ...

A: "But if any one of you remains, when he sees in what manner we decide lawsuits and manage other public business" ...

S: You see, now the Laws reveal themselves to be Athenians. Laws do not administer the city. That is done by human beings. Never forget, the Laws are--how shall I say it?--glorified Athenians. That's all. But that doesn't come to sight. Yes?

A: "We say that he has now agreed in fact to do whatever we command; and we say that the disobedient man does wrong in three ways when he disobeys us: firstly, because we are his parents, secondly because we are his nurturers, and thirdly, because he agreed to obey us and neither obeys us nor convinces us if we do anything not right; although we give him his chance, and we do not savagely command him to do what we bid, or to convince us--and he does neither."

but we leave him a choice  
C: either to do it  
S: You see, "we do not savagely command," we are not masters of slaves. Complete repudiation of the first ground. If the ruler would command savagely, without giving the ruled a say in the matter, there is no ground to obedience. The ground to of obedience, we can say, is a combination of compulsion and agreement. And not only because the Laws have this punitive clause, but because man has to live in a city. And at the same time, agreement. That is beautifully presented. That is the secret of justice, as Plato sees it. That is indicated very beautifully at the beginning of the Republic in that scene where, "Socrates," said Polemarchos, "I do believe you are starting back to town and leaving us." "You have guessed right," I answered. "Well," he said, "you see what a large party we are." "I do." "Unless you are more than a match for us, then you must stay here." Yes? Compulsion. Many fists against two fists. "Isn't there an alternative?" said I. "We might convince you that you must let us go." Persuasion in opposition to compulsion. "How will you convince us if we refuse to listen?" How will you convince the Laws if they refuse to listen. "We cannot," said Glaucon. Glaucon gives in to force, superior force. "Well, we shall refuse. Make up your minds to that." Socrates says, no, I don't want to force. Here, Adeimantos interposed, who is a much more sophisticated man than Polemarchos--Polemarchos means a war lord. "Don't you even know that in the evening there's going to be a torch race on horseback in honor of the goddess?" "On horseback!" I exclaimed. "That's something new. Are the riders going to race with torches and hand them on to another?" "Just so," said Polemarchos, "so please stay and don't disappoint us." "It looks as if we had better stay," said Glaucon. "Well," said I, "if it seems, we must do it." If it seems meaning if it is the decision of the citizen body, we do it. You see, compulsion and persuasion that combined brings about political justice. Where were we? Go on. Yes.

A: "These charges will lie upon you also, Socrates, if you do what you design; and on you more than anyone else in the whole country."

S: You, not the least of the Athenians but rather among those who are the highest Athenians.

A: "Suppose I say then, 'Why so, pray?'--perhaps they might retort that I have made

this agreement with them more completely than anyone else in the city."

A: You see the obligation by the Laws, which is based on agreement, is a matter of degree. There is no provision for that in the modern contractual doctrines, that someone is more obliged than someone else. Socrates is perhaps under more obligation to obey the Laws than most others, or even than all others. Now why is Socrates under such special obligation to obey the Laws? Why has he made a stronger contract than the others? You see, the contract is not such a simple legal instrument that you can say a stronger or weaker contract. Yes? The answer is given in the sequel.

A: "'Socrates,' they would say, 'we have great proofs that you are pleased with us and the city. You would never have been so remarkably more constant in living here than the other Athenians, if you had not been remarkably more pleased with us. You never went out of the city to a holy festival, or anywhere else at all, except sometimes on campaign; you never made any other journey abroad like other people; you had no desire to see other cities or to know other laws, but we and our city were enough for you: so completely you chose us and agreed to live as a citizen under us, and indeed got your family in the city, which obviously pleased you.'"

S: Yes, now, you see, proof is a problem. He says you had no desire to know of other laws. In the sequel that's clearly contradicted. Socrates had knowledge of other laws and he wouldn't have acquired it except for having a desire to know them. Or else--it could also be--Socrates was not interested in any laws and therefore--and therefore the whole reasoning collapses--is he has no interest in any laws then, of course, also not in the Athenian laws. Yes? Now go on.

A: "'Further, in the court itself, it was open to you to propose the penalty of banishment, if you wished, and to do with the consent of the city what you now attempt to do without it. Then you gave yourself airs, and pretended that you did not object to die, but you chose death before banishment, as you said.'"

S: Yes, let us stop. Now let me recapitulate the argument. Socrates was not obliged by compulsion. This much is clear. Socrates was obliged by benefits, because gratitude is a natural reaction of a decent human being to benefits. That is true. But he was not obliged by the city, by the greatest benefits. Therefore, the greatest obligation is not to the polis. The soul is more venerable than the fatherland and the soul gets its proper food not from the city. Certainly Socrates was not obliged by agreement with the Athenian laws. He stayed in Athens since there was no trouble on account of his philosophizing and as long as there was no trouble. He had no reason. When the trouble started, he was too old to leave. The practical question is that he should flee from prison now, to go into exile now. Yes. That is the question. But then the Laws make an absolutely sensible point. Socrates could have gone into exile with the consent of the Laws. He merely should have said, when the accusers say the punishment should be death, he should say, "Give me exile." They would have accepted it. So the true ground of his decision now is because he preferred death to exile. Mr. Gilman, you wanted to say something?

A: Yes. I don't know what this means, but it puzzles me. In addressing Socrates, they--on two occasions--put nursing him in the center and then at the very end they say, "Listen to us, Socrates, who nursed you." I don't know why, but I wondered if ...

S: Yes, we read that a short while ago, in 51E 6--we generated you, we nursed you, and you made the agreement. Yes?

A: And also earlier: "We generated you. Do you object to our laws about nursing" ...

S: Yes, surely, those are really the *temporal sequence* temperate sequences. But secondly, it is centered because nursing--*trofos*--is, of course, also ... (End of first side of reel.)



... education would still be the highest. And that is the same in Greek. What the polis gives you; that, I think, is the meaning--this average, mediocre kind of formation, not the highest formation. Mr. Faulkner?

A: Could you discuss the <sup>nature of</sup> Socrates' injustice; that is, rather, the <sup>nature of the</sup> injustice that is done by the laws to him? On the surface it seems to be perfectly just that he was convicted. I mean, after all, he didn't believe in ...

S: Yes, that, I'm afraid, is so.

A: But previously you distinguished between two sorts of facets of justice; the law, justice of the city law, and something a little deeper, and that is hurt. Is the injustice done to Socrates bound up in some way with the fact that thereby the city is harmed? Or that Socrates was doing good to the city, even though he was disobeying the law?

S: We must make some distinctions in order to answer your question and I don't know yet which distinctions so let me think aloud. Now the first step is, of course, is it possible that the law is unjust? I think there is no question that Socrates thought so and tried to live without that and, you see, no one can live without from time to time saying ... even the most extreme legal positivists can't say it. For example, if there should be a law according to which all those whose second names begin with an A have to pay ten times the taxes than those whose names begin with another letter, now everyone in his senses, everyone, will say that's an unjust law. Why? Because the ground for the discrimination has nothing to do with what is relevant regarding unequal taxation. So there are unjust things, sure.

A: But is this law unjust. Socrates may think so, but it seems to me a reasonable kind of law that a city should require belief and so on.

S: Yes. All right. Then what is Socrates' crime. Given. Let us assume that there must be gods and these gods must be defined in terms intelligible to the meanest capacities and then Socrates can't believe in this. All right. Socrates can't believe in that. He does not believe in them. He is a criminal. But qualified. He is an involuntary criminal. And I think it is a general principle of justice that someone who commits a crime involuntarily has to be treated a bit better than those who commit a crime with malice aforethought. That is possible. You must not forget this. Some of you, and perhaps all of you, have read the Republic. The Republic is the only theoretically complete answer to this problem. The only solution for Socrates is a polis in which the philosophers rule. And therefore, of course philosophy is permitted without any strings attached.

A: Looking at it from the point of view of this polis, in spite of the fact that Socrates committed a crime involuntarily, it still may be a crime. And he may be treated differently, but the treating differently does not go to the extent of not treating his activities as a crime in spite of the fact that the punishment might be ...

S: Yes, sure. That is one of the troubles, one of the inconveniences, of human life, that the highest type of man can appear in the company of criminals.

A: But isn't the problem really deeper, that Socrates' activities, in fact, did harm the polis, actually did harm the polis; that is, it might help to engender unbelief in the gods?

S: Yes, but that would only be true if he spreads that unbelief, and that he denies. He says there is not a word of truth that he ever had intercourse with such fellows as Strepsiades.

A: But it's possible that his unbelief might spread, even if not by his intention; that is, the news of Socrates as a very intelligent man.

S: Yes, but all right. You can then say let us then make it a strict rule that not only the public utterances of philosophic statements *is prohibited* but anything of this kind. In other words, what will you do? The suspicion that this guy philosophizes suffices for killing him. That is a very bad legal principle, suspicion as legal ground for condemnation. Really very bad, because that will spread too to other things. The suspicion of murder will then be regarded as sufficient grounds for condemning an innocent man. So what can you do? But you can also argue as follows: the complete prohibition of philosophy, the complete and unqualified prohibition of philosophy, could do harm to the polis. As a simple example, from the military sphere which I gave on a former occasion, the soldiers getting panicky because of an eclipse of the sun and then a bright general who has talked to Anaxagoras tells them, O, that's easy. It doesn't mean divine *punishment* it means simply a certain relation of sun and moon and that's all there is to it. Don't worry. And the soldiers fight, win the battle; good for the polis.

Now, if I use--how should I say it?--seemingly flippant language, I do not even apologize for that, but it is sometimes good not to talk in highfaluting words, you know. The problem is of the utmost gravity, of course. All classical thought was haunted by this problem, that there was no elegant solution to the problem of the relation between the polis and philosophy. There is no elegant solution. They need one another and yet, also, they repel one another. It is a complicated marriage, but there must be a marriage. I mean, in other words, that you can't live without polises, everyone would admit that. But one can also show that you can't live without philosophy. The polis needs philosophy, because otherwise it would become a savage tribe and with certain great inconveniences which that entails. And so the polis needs philosophy. That's proven all the time by Plato and by Aristotle. But that doesn't mean that the relation is unqualifiedly harmonious. That is not possible to live with. The modern liberal doctrine ... I mean, for the time being, I merely restate the classical thought, I don't say that it's true, but for all better understanding of the whole political thought it is important to realize that modern liberalism is a great and impressive attempt--not what now is called liberalism, I don't mean that, but this great movement of the last centuries--to bring about a perfect harmony between philosophy and society by conceiving of philosophy, or science, as unqualifiedly beneficial to society. In the words of Bacon, the function of science is to relieve man's estate. Now if that is the function of philosophy and science, there is perfect harmony. I mean, you know it from John Dewey and others, it's clear that there is no problem and even to suspect a problem is a sign of a deplorable obscurantism. But, there is a problem we, after the death of John Dewey, have come to realize. When did he die?

A: In about '52.

S: '52.

But the atomic bomb is a famous example; the atomic bomb and all its accompaniments have shown that there is a real problem. If science tries to become simply beneficial, in the sense in which every ordinary citizen understands beneficial, then science becomes a social power. And again, I refer to a famous liberal principle--power corrupts! And don't think that science cannot be corrupted by power. It comes into the service. Science doesn't



dictate

decey. I mean, you know that <sup>some of the</sup> ~~the social~~ scientists were against the bombing of Hiroshima, whatever the merits or demerits <sup>of the</sup> might have been. But they did not say ... the government said, of course. And so the modern solution is elegant only on paper by saying science is <sup>free</sup> because there is no possibility of a conflict. That is not so if you look at the facts. And, as I say, up to a certain point, the modern solution has a great plausibility--the abolition of all the plagues, and polio, and the other ones, and infant mortality enormously reduced, and all this kind of thing and yet, the other side, the microcosm which is still with us, in spite of the Nazis. And so that is not so simple. I mean, one has to understand the classical notion if only because the modern solution is not so elegantly perfect that we do not need some further knowledge on this subject. Mr. Johnson, you want to say something?

A: I was just wondering about this statement where the laws were complimenting him <sup>for</sup> ~~the laws of the city~~ showing that he really demonstrated this by never going out <sup>leaving</sup> of the city on a holy festival. I was wondering if that really .... <sup>the city</sup>

S: Poreia, a procession. You can say that. Poreia means a procession, a holy procession originally, but <sup>it takes on a</sup> ~~that is sometimes~~ the meaning, any <sup>speciality</sup> ~~speciality~~, anything at which you look And what does this ... ?

A: Well, if the holy aspect of the thing was really ...

S: Yes, perhaps. I mean, I wasn't quite clear what you meant by that. Perhaps you are right. But I would have to know more than I do about the practice of wise Athenians, whether it was regarded as a sign of piety that a man <sup>in audible</sup> If that is true, then you are right.

Q: I wonder if you can clear up something for me, the difference between the polis and the laws, as they appear here, because they both appear, supposedly, in an interchanging role and he says, "Both in war and in law courts and everywhere else, you must do whatever your city and your country demands, or else persuade it in accordance with universal justice." That's about 51B ...

S: Yes, <sup>and</sup> 51B ~~N~~, yes.

A: It doesn't say that you have to persuade the laws and later on it says also, you know, that "you will leave this place when you do as the victim of a wrong done not by us--the laws--but by your fellow men."

S: Yes, yes. But the laws also say, we make the decisions. In other words, we are not merely the laws in 51E--yes?--and we administer the polis in other respects too. So the point is this: as long as he speaks of Athenians or of the polis, and even of the fatherland, he means the human beings. But when he speaks of the laws, he hypostatizes something which is only by virtue of human beings. But this hypostatization is not complete senseless, because in a way the laws are, after they have been established, above the human being. I mean, therefore, did you ever hear of the pure theory of law by Kelsen? Well, that plays a certain role in legal discussions. And that is an attempt to take this absoluteness of the laws absolutely literally. And then infinite troubles arise, because then the question arises, what is a law? Well, it must, of course, be not merely on the statute book, it must be also in fact in force; i.e., by human beings. In other words, the mere validity, regardless of facticity--the human beings are facts, not zeroes; the laws are ~~thoughts~~, not facts, but these ~~thoughts~~ are questions. But the positive laws are not mere ~~thoughts~~, they are also facts. Otherwise, they wouldn't be valid laws, laws which are <sup>enforced</sup> ~~enforced~~. So the absolutation of the laws serves the function to ascribe the laws a sanctity, a

supremacy, which they cannot have, which they could have only in one case—if they were simply perfect. Now, two laws are examined: the laws regarding marriage—if you call that an examination, they are at least alluded to—the laws regarding marriage and the laws regarding the education of infants, you could almost say, of children. But these are other laws which have to be <sup>examined</sup> ~~examined~~. For example, the implicit law ~~against~~ philosophize, against philosophizing. This is, of course, not mentioned here. The only law which counts, as far as Socrates is concerned. The argument is meant to convince Criton and it succeeds.

We must now go on, gentlemen and ladies. Where were we? In 51C 6 to 7 I believe.

A: Further, in the court itself it was open to you" ...

S: No, I'm sorry. Where were we? In 52 ...

A: I'm sorry. "And now are you not ashamed of that talk, when you do not respect us Laws, trying as you are to destroy us, but you do what the commonest slave" ...

S: No, only a little bit before. We didn't finish that, I believe. Yes? No, no. Where you were—I'm sorry. "And you were not ashamed to those speeches." Yes?

A: ... "when you do not respect us Laws, trying as you are to destroy us, but you do what the commonest slave would do, you try to take to your heels, contrary to the agreements and contracts by which you consented to live as a citizen with us."

S: You see, the funny thing is the slaves never contracted, of course. The slaves never contracted not running away. And the running away of the slaves is a most dastardly act, from the point of view of the masters. But if you think of a decent slave, I mean a tough and honorable fellow taken prisoner in a war, he would not regard this as such a ~~great~~ thing, as a dastardly thing. Yes. Now?

A: "First then, answer us even this, whether we tell the truth when we say you agreed to live in conformity with us, in fact although not <sup>grave</sup> in word, or whether that is not true."

S: Yes. You see, in deed but not by speech. Socrates never said that the laws of Athens are simply perfect. By deed, by his action, as his action is interpreted by the laws. But his action—I mean, Socrates staying in Athens all the time—can be interpreted also differently.

Q: Does the grammar permit the interpretation, "to be governed in deed but not in speech"?

S: Must be.

A: I mean, "agreed in deed but not in speech," as distinguished from ...

S: Absolutely. Even "but not in speech" is there. That you would live according to us in deed ... I mean, you agreed to live according to us by deed but not by speech. But is in the original.

A: Yes, but I mean is "the agreement," is it to the agreement that the distinction between deed and speech refers, or to the governing, or to the being governed?

S: Both are possible, but it is more simple to understand in the way in which I did



it and I believe everyone <sup>would</sup> <sup>an ambiguity</sup> say that, because he exists. Now, go on. "What shall we say to that, Criton?"

A: "Must we not agree?"

"We must indeed, Socrates."

S: You see, Socrates doesn't answer, Criton answers. Yes?

A: "They would say then: 'And so you are breaking your bargains and agreements with us, which you made under no compulsion, and not deceived; you were not compelled to decide in a short time, but you had seventy years in which you could have gone away, if you did not like us, or if the agreements did not seem to you just.'"

S: You see, the laws don't claim to be just, only the agreements were just. The laws are, in a way, very honest, you see. Yes?

A: "But you did not prefer Lacedaimon or Crete, which you always declare to be under good laws, nor any other city, Hellenic or barbarian; but you were less out of town than the lame or the blind or the others who are maimed; so much more remarkably than the other Athenians you liked the city and us, the Laws, that is clear--for what city could please without laws?"

S: You note the absurdity of the argument here, that lawlessness is worst, doesn't of course prove that any given laws are good, are pleasing. That anyone would prefer life in a policed country--almost anyone--to life in a desert doesn't mean that he's pleased by these particular rules. Yes. Go on.

A: "And now then, will you not abide by your agreements? Yes, if you obey us, Socrates, and do not make yourself ridiculous by leaving the city."

S: Yes. So this is the argument, the proof, that justice demands that Socrates stay in prison. It's finished. Finished. And yet there is an <sup>appendage</sup> ~~appendage~~. Let us read the beginning, why there is need for any further argument. <sup>Append. X</sup>

A: "For consider again: Suppose you do thus break and violate any bit of them, what good will you do to yourself or your friends?"

S: Yes. Let us stop here. Now what does this argument which begins now here mean in the light of the preceding? The issue is settled, because the only issue was whether it was just or not. But perhaps not. The fact that you commit an unjust action perhaps does not decide the issue, because the grounds of justice are not so clear as they seem to be if you read only superficially. More generally stated, there are profitable crimes. What would be the profit of your crime? In other words, we get now a discussion of the subject independent of justice entirely on the basis of expediency. That begins here. Yes?

A: "It is plain enough that your friends themselves also will risk being banished and deprived of their citizen's rights, or losing all their property."

S: You see, the argument of friends. Socrates takes up the argument of Criton: "You all will be ruined," yes? "You all will be ruined if I escape now." That's it. That's all he says about the friends, then there comes a long argument--relatively long--about the good for Socrates. What would be the profit for him? And then in the last section the children--three of them, the children. And the center one is <sup>arguments, last</sup>

the profit for Socrates; how a criminal would argue, you know--his own profit would be the most important. Yes?

A: "And you yourself, if you go to one of the cities nearest, Thebes or Megara--for both are under good laws--you will come as an enemy, Socrates, to their constitution."

S: "To their regime." Yes?

Q: Why, except in his role as a philosopher, would he come as an enemy, if the agreement is here?

S: Nothing is said about Socrates as a philosopher in the whole thing.

A: Yes, but why then would he come as an enemy?

S: That is not considered. I mean, the fact that there were in Thebes a Pythagorean colony, a colony of Pythagorean philosophers, who would have enjoyed having Socrates with them, two came to Athens--Simias and Cebes--and stayed with him when he died. They would have been delighted to have him in Thebes. It's not considered.

S: Why then do they say he would be coming as an enemy to those governments? Wouldn't he, under the previous argument, be making an agreement with those governments since he comes to them?

S: But let us first finish that now. I mean, the laws have some argument. Now let us see.

A: "And whoever have care for their own cities will think you a destroyer of laws, and look askance at you, and you will confirm the judges in their opinion, so that they will believe they decided aright in their judgment; for whoever is a destroyer of laws would surely be thought to be a corrupter of young men and foolish people."

S: Yes. Now, you see, this is a long story. He says you will come as an enemy of their constitution, he translates. Yes, the Greek word politia has a variety of meanings. It means also, of their citizenship, if you could coin that word--because the word citizenship has a narrow meaning now. Of their living as citizens, of their civic life would be one translation. But politia means also the regime; a regime which is a democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy and what have you, whatever it may be. Now that is, of course, a subject which is completely eluded by our fine absolutized laws, that the laws are related to a regime; the democratic laws developed from the oligarchic laws and so on. These laws which are here speaking are, of course, democratic laws and no word is said about that. Now, Thebes and Megara were not democratic and the whole phenomenon of political exiles who were accepted with delight by the corresponding cities--say a democratic exile was accepted by a democratic city, naturally, and vice versa. And so whether he broke a law or not there didn't make any difference. I mean, an ordinary crime, but if he was in prison because of his democratic convictions in an oligarchic city and he got out of that, by hook and by crook, that was of course considered as we would consider now someone who would get out of a Soviet jail. Would we say, "You broke out of a Soviet jail, you will destroy all American laws"? That's an allusion to this thing. So exiles were not such an uncommon thing, I mean even exiles who illegally eluded the regimes of their city. It is a gross simplification of the problem here, a disregard of all relevant considerations regarding the law. That was the point the lady made last time, about the political crimes, yes? I mean, the Greeks didn't have this concept of the



political criminal which we have, but it of course affects the situation because those on the side of those criminals didn't regard them as criminals, and so on. There was no absolute concept of a political criminal, I mean, regardless of whether you are Communist, Fascist, or Democratic, but if you were a Democratic, you did not regard a man who was technically a criminal in an Oligarchic city as a criminal, but as a lover of freedom, and the others say a lover of docency, the Oligarchy or Aristocracy.

And you see also another point which comes out here: they will suspect you, they will think badly about you. Respect for the opinion of the many is indicated. You will confirm the judges in their opinion, he says. This also may allude to the opinion that you were disloyal to the Athenian democracy, a point never mentioned otherwise.

Yes, but now if you think of ordinary criminals, Socrates is of course perfectly right. I mean, a fugitive from justice because he has stolen or robbed is not a respectable man anywhere. That's perfectly true. But the question is whether that is what you meant. But the point is, as a philosopher, that didn't exist. But if Socrates had a reputation of not being one hundred per cent sound regarding democracy came to a non-democratic city, there were plenty of people ... You know, Socrates was regarded as a laconizer, a man who admired Sparta and Crete. Here the Laws themselves say that. Now, if he would go to an Oligarchic city, what in Athens would make him suspect would make him commendable in that other city.

Q: Given his statement before, that he preferred death to exile, and coming in the light of that statement as an exile, don't you think that would utterly disgrace him?

S: Socrates gives now the reasons--or rather, makes the Laws give the reasons--why he didn't want to go into exile. Whether these are the true reasons remains to be seen, because we are not yet through. But first of all, I mean quite superficially, but massively, he's a fugitive from justice and that is surely not a recommendation for anyone. But if, however, it is specified he is a fugitive from the Cheka, or whatever they may call it now, that's no longer a fugitive from justice--or the Gestapo. Yes? You see, the political element affects that immediately. And, of course, if he said he is a fugitive from justice because he didn't believe in the gods of the city, as a philosopher, that would also not be a recommendation as became clear in our discussion with Mr. Faulkner. But if he would appear, without any untruth, that there was some passionate democratic <sup>reaction</sup> reason ... You know, the ordinary interpretation of Socrates' trial now is that this had nothing to do with the impiety, but was an act of revenge on the part of the radical democratic party against all these things which had happened. There was the story of Alcibiades, there was the story of Critias, and they had all been related to Socrates--that is the official view now. I think that is wrong because it massively contradicts what Xenophon and Plato say all the time, but it has an element of truth, as Xenophon indicates.

Q: I'm still wondering. Does the agreement and contract theory earlier over here hold only in the case of a democracy?

S: No.

A: No, I didn't think so. In that case ...

S: No. That's exactly the point. It is a universal theory of legal obligation which sins by virtue of its universality. You know, you have these famous doctrines of the grounds of political obligation in the nineteenth century--Green and other theories. Yes, but these state, the duty or obligation to the state. But what Plato would say,

; #15

"To which state?" Because it obviously makes a difference whether a reasonable state or an unreasonable state. And there are various kinds of unreasonable states. There is a degree of unreasonableness where there cannot be any obligation but mere ceding to force. But if it is reasonably unreasonable, then it is only a matter of these several concerns. Perhaps one should protect it because the evil of a change might be worse. But if it is simply a reasonable state, of course obligation.

A: But if Socrates were to escape, he would be given liberty to choose, given the conditions here. He'd have funds from friends and could probably prevail upon them to send him anywhere. If he goes to a city, is not his going a tacit assumption that he plans to obey the laws there? He is choosing that city out of many, that constitution. What then makes him unacceptable to those folks?

S: Because of the reasons stated, because he comes as a fugitive from justice and, therefore, as a man who has broken ...

A: A fugitive from another city's justice.

S: Yes. And this other city also probably has a different kind of political order, a different regime. Surely. Yes, but that is only what I say, the argument of the Laws—with a capital L—suffers from generality. The problem of obedience to the laws cannot be so simply decided. On the other hand, and that is why Plato wrote the dialogue as he did, as a crude rule of thumb, it is sound teaching. People should really be law-abiding, by all means. There are cases where it is not possible to be law-abiding, but don't teach people that what is true in extreme cases, because that has a bad effect. That makes them extremists themselves and that's not good for any society. But there are extreme cases. I mean, extreme cases ... I think any one of you can find examples—I hope fictitious examples—where he would not obey the law. Mr. Anastaplo—I don't know if some of you will know him—has not been admitted to the bar here because he stated this principle. He stated it, I think, very soberly, but it is, of course, an undeniable principle. But it is also a principle which—how should I say it?—which one shouldn't teach in the first grade of elementary school, because it is also a disconcerting point. Yes? Now, go on.

A: "Then will you avoid well-governed cities and the most decent men? If you do, will your life be worth living? Or will you approach these, and will you be shameless enough to talk—how Socrates? The same sort of talk as here, how virtue and justice is most precious for mankind, and law and order?"

S: Notice the distinction between virtue and justice here. That's important. But let us go on first.

A: "Don't you think that the whole business of Socrates will be a notorious, nasty story? You must think so. And suppose you decamp from these places, and go to the friends of Criton in Thessaly. The greatest disorder and laxity is found there, and perhaps they would like to hear from you how comically you played truant from that prison with some disguise on, how you changed your looks with a rough cloak or such things as runaways wrap around them. Won't someone say, "You, an old man, with probably only a short time left for life; did you dare to break the greatest laws and do you still shamefully desire to live?"

S: Let us stop here for one moment. You see again the reference to opinion. "What a bad figure will you cut." Yes? Will you cut. And the other point which he makes here. Criton had said the condemnation and everything else was a comedy. You remember that? That this was disgracefully mismanaged, the whole thing from the start,



a ridiculous affair. Now Socrates say, "If you talk of ridiculousness, what is more ridiculous than if I would go out of here disguised as a woman and then there would exist the absolute ridiculousness if someone would recognize me however." But you see, that's opinion of the many here, the ridiculous. And you see also, the importance of Socrates' old age is mentioned here again. Yes? "Perhaps," he says ...

A: "Perhaps no one will, if you do not make yourself disagreeable to anyone."

S: Yes. "If you do not" ... Yes. All right. "If you do not pain someone," "If you do not irritate someone." And that's impossible. It's impossible to live without giving pain to other people. That's important. Very important for the argument here, because it is unjust to do evil to a man, but how do people judge of evil, generally speaking? By the pain done to them. And that is, crudely speaking, also the view of the laws. Now if this is so, that of course creates a great problem. What is the value of laws which take a crude, merely subjective, criterion instead of the true criterion, because what is truly good and evil would have to be defined by experts. Again, the old story. The laws have not been made by experts. Yes?

A: "If you do, Socrates, you will hear plenty of ugly names to your disgrace."

S: You see, a reputation.

A: "So you will live, at every creature's beck and every creature's slave; and what will be your business?—eating and drinking in Thessaly, as if you had travelled abroad to dine in Thessaly!"

S: Yes. To dine; the Greek word can mean all kinds of meals, but it means also the dinner or supper, the evening meal. Yes? You have an enjoyable evening of your life in Thessaly because they are very hospitable—a gangster type of hospitality. Yes?

A: "Where will your talks be, our talks about justice and all the other virtues?"

S: You see, here justice is subsumed under virtue; for many, it was distinguished from virtue. Yes?

A: "Suppose you want to live for the children's sake, to bring them up and educate them. Will you take them to Thessaly, and bring them up and educate them there, and make them foreigners, that they may enjoy that too?"

S: In other words, the implication, exile is such a terrible thing that that is the worst thing you could do to your children, contrary to what was said in the Apology. Yes?

A: "Perhaps not, but if they are brought up here while you live, will they be better brought up and educated better while you are separated from them?"

Question

S: Yes, that depends on the very grave problem what kind of a father Socrates was. About two hundred years ago, a German theologian, I believe, wrote a book—a treatise—Socrates was neither a dutiful husband nor a laudable father and family man, and I suggest that you—unfortunately it's written in Latin. They bring altogether all things—probably also much gossip—about Socrates ... Socrates, you know, was never at home. That appears perfectly from the dialogues. He went home to sleep, yes? The end of the Banquet makes that clear. He went home to sleep, but he left the education of his children ... Occasionally he had one conversation with one of his sons, about the nagging of his mother. That is the only report we have in Plato or

who complained

Xenophon. So maybe they were better off without him. We don't know. Yes?

A: "Yes, for your friends will care for them. Will they care for them then if you migrate to Thessaly, but not if you migrate to Hades? Oh yes, we must believe that they will, if there is any good in those who say they are your friends."

S: Yes. So, in other words, there is no ground whatever--no ground of expediency--why you should leave prison. He leaves his children here to friends. The Greek word is not the ordinary word for friends, but that other word--*φίλοι* (philo) which means the serviceable or the useful ones, not those for whom you have affection. In the Apology, near the end, you will recall, he left his children, in a way, to his condemners--at the end of the Apology--and there is, of course, perfect agreement, because these kind of friends, as Critons and the condemners, have one thing in common. They will bring up Socrates' children--I mean, at least the decent ones among them--in vulgar virtue; I mean, in common decency. But this vulgar virtue is a virtue which understands virtue instrumentally. You remember, in the argument in the Apology, you have to be virtuous if you want to have money, because otherwise you will not get it and you will not keep it. You remember? That Socrates' children will learn both from the condemners and from Criton. But this vulgar virtue is a thing which Socrates doesn't take care and cannot take care, so maybe it's really better for the children if Socrates is not around. Yes?

A: "Then listen to us, Socrates, who reared you; do not value children or life or anything else above the right, so that when you come to the world below you may have all these things to plead before the magistrates there. For if you do what you intend, things clearly do not seem any better for you in this world, and you will find no more justice and piety here, nor will any of your people; and when you come to the next world, it will be no better. As things are" ...

S: You see, there is no reference to justice and piety in the next world, because your doing just and pious acts is limited to this world. In the next world, you will be assigned your place according to what the just and pious acts you did in this. Yes?

A: "As things are, if you depart, you will depart wronged not by us, the Laws, but by human beings."

S: You see, the Laws, they are immune. That was a misadministration of laws. Misadministration of the laws, not an act of the Laws, contrary to what the very Laws themselves said before, that they administer ... The Laws are a product of the Athenian citizen body--i.e., the majority--and this same majority which established the Laws condemned Socrates. Just as in the Apology, the distinction between the first accusers--you remember?--and the jury was such a *fiction*. Socrates showed the jury an image of himself by describing the first accusers. Here he turns that around. He turns it around. He makes the Athenians forget themselves. Yes?

A: "But if you escape in this ugly way, after requiting wrong with wrong and damage with damage, and after breaking your own bargains and agreements with us, and doing evil to those you least ought to wrong, yourself and your friends and your country and us, then we shall be angry with you living, and in the next world our brothers the Laws in the house of Hades will not receive you as a friend, for they will know that you tried to destroy us as far as you could. But do not let Criton persuade you to do what he said; let us rather persuade you."

"This, I assure you, my dear comrade Criton, is what I seem to hear, as the mystic revellers think they hear the pipes; so in my ears the sound of these words keeps



humming and makes me deaf to other things. As far as I can see, you may be sure that whatever you say contrary to this, you will say in vain. However, if you think you can do any good, speak.

"But, my dear Socrates, I have nothing to say.

"Then let it be, Criton, and let us do in this way, since in this way God is leading us."

S: Yes, the God. I mean, the question of how to understand this expression, we have discussed before. That's it. Yes. What then do we learn about justice from this discussion? I think this distinction which is made between justice and virtue, near the end of 53C, is of the utmost importance. What is virtue when it is distinguished from justice? I mean, of course Socrates sometimes presents justice as a subdivision of virtue. For example, in the Republic. But then justice means something very different from what it means now. There justice means minding one's own business; more precisely, to do one's own work well. But this is not possible except in the best regime, because in an imperfect regime you may not do your own work. You may have gotten the wrong kind of work, not the one which is truly fitting for you. So that's another story. That's not the justice of which he speaks here.

Now, what's the virtue of which he speaks here, in contradistinction to justice? We have seen it. What is the greatest good?

A: Philosophy.

S: Yes, or wisdom. Wisdom. So virtue is wisdom just as knowledge is the greatest good.

But what is justice then? Justice would then not be wisdom or knowledge proper. Do we have any alternatives suggested here? That is not the highest meaning of justice, but a really important one. What is the most simple notion of justice which we understand and which was ...

A: To obey the law.

S: Yes, to obey the law. What does it mean, however, in the light of the analysis given in this dialogue? To obey the laws regardless of what the laws are, regardless of whether the laws are sound or unsound, just or unjust.

A: Wisdom is united with justice.

S: No, I mean this kind of justice which is identical with obeying the laws regardless of the character and the quality of the laws. Complying with the opinion of the many. That is, even on the higher level, something necessary. I mean, not in the simplistic crude sense, that you have to obey the law regardless. From this point of view, justice is identical with humanity in the sense of being kind and friendly to people, especially to people inferior to a man. That is not identical with the human perfection proper, but it accompanies that. I mean, one could show that by going into any detail. For example, justice means--that was the broadest statement there--to inflict evil on human beings. Murder is one form of inflicting evil on a human being. But is death objectively, scientifically, an evil for every human being? Think not only of a man who is suffering from an incurable disease and living in <sup>capable</sup> terror of thinking for a moment because of pain. Not only that, but there can be someone who is not bodily sick at all. He may be an absolutely corrupt individual who

caught

cannot be legally called by some evidence or what not, and who does infinite mischief to every human being he comes in contact with. Death would be good for him. What does the law say? The law says, no, under no circumstances can you kill such a man. Because what would happen? The law must speak crudely and universally. This permission would be necessarily abused. Necessarily. It is much better to err on the side of this unqualified prohibition than on the other side of laxness. So that, I think, is what Socrates means. So, while good is crudely defined here, and no sophistication is permitted, yet the alternatives are impossible. Are impossible. In other words, it is really an opinion which is frozen into law for good reason. I think that is the status of law in Plato's opinion. And therefore, one must really distinguish between justice and wisdom. And there is a connection, obviously, because there are good reasons for this complying with opinions. This is, I think, what he means.

But to return to the general question and to conclude this seminar, as we must, in studying the Crito, we must never forget one simple thing: there are two questions which must be ~~given~~ separate, although there is only one answer given to both. Is a jailbreak unqualifiedly unjust or is it unjust in the case of Socrates as a practical deliberation, and they mean of course Socrates. And we must distinguish between the universal principle and the reason applied to Socrates' case in particular. Something of this kind happens, of course, in all Platonic dialogues, because in all Platonic dialogues ... no Platonic dialogue is a treatise. In every Platonic dialogue, individual human beings in individual cases under individual circumstances meet and where these individual elements affect the discussion of the universal. But here, I think, it is in a way particularly striking.

Now, I'll conclude this seminar with that unless there is one other point you would like to raise. A few more minutes I could spare. I shall be glad to spend with you. Mr. Johnson?

A: Just a side question, because of something that came out last quarter about Spinoza philosophy as a private thing in which philosophers in almost any regime could philosophize in the Crito compared with what has come out of the Apology against the Crito in which it is construed in some sense as a public thing; I mean, that there must be more than one person that does this.

S: I don't understand your question. Do you mean to say that Plato would have agreed, or Socrates, with the view that as far as philosophy is concerned the difference in regimes is negligible?

A: I couldn't imagine him agreeing with that.

S: No, I think he would not have agreed with that.

A: But it seems to me that the contemplation of god as the highest thing that can be, I mean that this can be a private thing and once this is reached as a decision, it seems to be a whole political doctrine itself. Not only because the two could be separated and then another question would come into play.

S: Yes, but still, is this assent--to say nothing of the end of the assent--is this assent not affected by the character of the society in which men live? And I think even Spinoza would say that ultimately--otherwise it wouldn't have been so interesting politically as it was, but surely in the case of Plato. I mean, even in the Apology you find a trace of it when he describes what happened to him after the battle of Arginusai--you know, the trial of the generals. He disagreed with a whim of the



majority and they didn't like it, but nothing happened to him. But when he disagreed with the whim of the Thirty Tyrants--you know?--then he said that if that regime had not been so short-lived he would have been killed by them. And so the democracy in Athens lasted almost as long as Socrates' life and it took them almost seventy years to hurt him, whereas this tyranny would have taken less than a year. So there would be a difference, surely. Incidentally, that is one point which I should have mentioned, but I have spoken of it so frequently in other classes that I could not mention it. When Socrates discusses exile in the expediency argument--yes? not the justice argument--where should he go? To well-ordered cities like Thebes and Megara or to Thessaly? But two other well-ordered cities were mentioned--Sparta and Crete. Now, the distinction would be this: an ill-ordered city is undesirable, I mean Thessaly. So only well-ordered cities. Thebes and Megara, if he would go there, everyone would know him. Why? Because they are nearby. And, of course, Sparta was so Xenophobic that it wasn't a good place to go there. I mean, unless you served so well in Sparta as Xenophon did that they gave him an estate it wasn't a healthy place for any foreigner. But Crete is well-ordered--according to the text--and it is far away. No one would know a stranger from Athens arriving there whether he was a fugitive from justice or not. That, I believe, is the ironical background of the laws, what Socrates would have done if he had accepted Criton's suggestion. He would have gone to Crete and there taught the Cretans the rudiments of civilization, because they were well-ordered in a crude way--they had certain habits of law-abidingness, but their laws were very bad. And then in the Laws, an Athenian stranger teaches the Cretans how to establish a really good order and this good order is the Athenian order; not the democratic Athenians, the older ones, the ancestral polity which you may remember from when we discussed Aristophanes. You know? The old order prior to Cleisthenes' classless reform where the rural squires predominated. That was the alternative. And the practical problem for Socrates was--I mean, stated in theoretical generality and precision--either to leave Athens to a place where his whole past did not count and use his faculties for the benefit of those people--this he could have done even as a man of seventy--or die now. And I think what is the true deliberation of Socrates is what is better for my fellow man. And he felt it was better for his fellow men, and more particularly for his fellow-citizens, if they did this and lived to regret it. Which they did very soon afterward. And therefore, in a way that marriage between philosophy and the polis was consummated by Socrates' death. From now on, somehow it was possible as is shown by the fact, to establish academies openly dedicated to philosophy ...

(End of the tape.)